

Brill's Companion to
Horace

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Brill's Companion to Horace

Edited by
Hans-Christian Günther



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MEMORIAE
EDUARDI FRAENKEL
ET
HUGONIS LLOYD-JONES
D.D.D.
EDITOR

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PREFACE

Ein italienischer Dichter hat die Poesie einmal als die heroische Ursprache des Menschengeschlechtes gefaßt [...] Diesen ihren höchsten Beruf hat sie in der Antike nur zweimal erfüllt: im klassischen Zeitalter der Griechen und im augusteischen Rom.¹

This companion volume on Horace has the good fortune to be preceded by two rather recent forerunners, Harrison's (2007a) Cambridge and Davis's (2010) Blackwell companion. I was thus able not only to benefit from these useful books, I also feel much more at ease with my decision to opt for the rather unusual form of this companion, a kind of paraphrastic interpretation of Horace's works, modelled on Fraenkel's (1957) monograph and Syndikus's (2001) interpretations of the *Odes*. I am most grateful to my collaborators, Edward Courtney, Elaine Fantham, and Tobias Reinhardt, for agreeing on this concept and sharing this work with me. Horace is and will always remain an extremely difficult author, who, in my opinion, calls for an interpretation along the text. However, I have addressed more general issues, too, either in the introduction on Horace's life and work or, with close reference to the Horatian texts, in the chapters on the *Epodes* and *Odes*. In these works the large number of poems and rather short compositions make a mere paraphrastic commentary in the style of Syndikus impossible.

The acknowledgement of Fraenkel's and Syndikus's works as models for our own, clearly reveals our methodology. A handbook is not a bibliography, nor an account of research; with an author as over-researched as Horace, it must be a collection of what is relevant, which, of course, must remain to a certain extent subjective. I have at any rate experienced that what Fraenkel (1957: vii) says in his introduction is even more true today;² by addressing issues discussed in recent scholarly research one often loses sight of what is really relevant for understanding Horace's text. On the choice of bibliography, I thus refer the reader to the preface of Edward Courtney's contribution on the *Satires* (p. 63; also Fantham, pp. 407 f. below). I could also, for that matter, refer to Nisbet-Hubbard's (1970) preface (v–vii) to their

¹ Schadewaldt 1960: 500.

² Cf. also Schadewaldt's wise remarks in his obituary of Harder (citing the latter) in Schadewaldt 1960: 1029.

commentary on *Odes* I,³ which has a usefully succinct description of the aims and methods of scholarly interpretation of ancient poetry. In view of the development of classical studies since Nisbet-Hubbard's book one may be tempted to refer the reader further to Krämer's (2007) excellent and comprehensive book on modern hermeneutics, which will relieve anybody who ever felt the need to argue in more detail with certain trends of modern "scholarship" of this task.⁴ Suffice it to say that modern theory is nothing but a misapplication of half-understood philosophies (or sometimes pseudophilosophies) to literary criticism, a misapplication that substitutes the texts as objects of research by theory itself; that the advance in knowledge or understanding gained by such a procedure is virtually nil, is no wonder.

That Fraenkel's (1957) book is the fundament upon which all subsequent research on Horace must be based, is an often repeated and universally acknowledged truism; yet, this book is not only one of those works of classical scholarship that will remain basic, it is remarkable that for more than fifty years now no comprehensive large-scale monograph on Horace has appeared that can stand beside Fraenkel's work, if only as a worthy supplement. However, just before I finished the revision of my text John Kevin Newman was kind enough to send me his newly published book (Newman 2011); this is, at long last, a work that radically challenges comfortable notions of Horace, the jolly good fellow who wrote beautifully crafted poems on women, drink, and several other commonplaces, when he was not sliding, from time to time, into cheap propaganda for the political system that enabled him to enjoy the life of a hedonistic Epicurean bachelor. Although I disagree with most of what Newman says, his book is a treasure trove of stimulating and challenging observations and ideas that no Horatian will want to ignore. There have also been some useful and more generally accessible modern accounts such as those of Reckford (1969) and Armstrong (1989). The significance of Fraenkel's monograph, however, extended far beyond Horatian studies *stricto sensu*; it showed what "Quellenforschung" in the tradition of Wilamowitz and, as regards Latin studies, Friedrich Leo contribute to a new understanding of Augustan poetry. The large number of postwar commentaries on Augustan poets, which now cover almost the complete corpus of texts, is more or less directly due to the stimulus of Fraenkel's

³ For a useful brief account of research, see also Harrison in Harrison 1995: 1ff.; for bibliographical resources, see Harrison 2007: 4.

⁴ Cf. also Günther 2011b.

book; the commentaries of some of Fraenkel's pupils on Horace are not by chance among the most impressive monuments of scholarship in the postwar period (cf. Fedeli 2009).

In fact, the most important gain in knowledge after Fraenkel, beside Syndikus's volumes on the *Odes*, comes from the excellent modern large-scale and small-scale commentaries, which we possess now on all works of Horace; those by Brink (1971, 1973, 1982), Nisbet and Hubbard (1970, 1978), and Nisbet and Rudd (2004) stand out as scholarship of the highest order (see also Fedeli 1994, Watson 2003, Fedeli-Ciccarelli 2008, and the smaller commentaries by Rudd 1989, Cavarzere 1992, Brown 1993, Muecke 1993, Mayer 1994, and Mankin 1995; unfortunately, Thomas 2011 appeared too late to be taken into account by us; there are good modern commentaries on almost all the works of the other Augustan poets as well). Moreover, in addition to Syndikus and the useful volumes of West (1995, 1998, 2002), Nisbet and Hubbard's and Nisbet and Rudd's brief introductions to every ode provide the best comprehensive interpretation of Horace's first collection of *Carmina*. Brink's commentary includes not only one of the most eminent literary studies of *Epistles* II and the *Ars Poetica*, but is also important for an understanding of Horace's poetic personality and poetic technique in general.

Apart from these works, only a few monographs on some major aspects of Horace's work mark considerable progress in the interpretation of his poetry, most notably, perhaps, Becker (1963). The contributions of Doblhofer (1966 and 1981) have done much to put Horace's much-discussed and misinterpreted political poetry in perspective.⁵ Commager's (1962) book on the *Odes* is useful as well; on the *Epistles* McGann (1969) is a worthy complement to Becker and on the *Satires* Rudd (1966) is basic reading. In addition, several recent miscellanies on Horace (Woodman and West 1984, Rudd 1993, Harrison 1995, Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001, Woodman and Feeney 2002), including Harrison's and Davis's companion volumes, present a fair picture of modern research and contain some excellent contributions (in particular by Griffin and Barchiesi). More general works on Augustan poetry or culture (Newman 1967, Williams 1968, Griffin 1995, Galinsky 1996, Zanker 1997, and Kienast 2009) or excellent monographs on other Augustan poets (Knauer 1964 or Griffin 1986 on Virgil; Boucher 1965, Hubbard 1975, and Syndikus 2010 on Propertius) have also contributed to a better understanding of Augustan poetry, from which Horatian scholarship can

⁵ Cf. also Günther 201b.

also profit. The most important advance, however, in the interpretation of Horace's poetry, since Fraenkel's work, is marked by the two volumes of paraphrastic commentary on the *Odes* by Peter Syndikus (2001), already mentioned.⁶

As I have said, Fraenkel's monograph opened the path for a new dimension of "Quellenforschung" and its application to the understanding of Horace and Augustan poetry, and fathered the series of modern commentaries mentioned above. If, by Adolf Hitler's well-known services to classical scholarship in Great Britain, the bulk of useful postwar commentaries on Augustan poets (and other ancient authors as well) is in English, with some in Italian and almost none in German, at least a few remnants of the great German tradition of Latin studies have survived the Second World War even "at home." Horace's most eminent interpreter in recent times, Hans Peter Syndikus, represents—as Carl Becker before him—an unbroken continuity with Richard Heinze's pupil Friedrich Klinger (1964 and 1965). Heinze's revision of Kiessling's commentary (Kiessling and Heinze 1955, 1957, and 1959) is a remarkable combination of sound scholarship and fine literary taste. The extraordinary quality of this commentary is all the more remarkable if one bears in mind that commentaries that combined "Quellenforschung" with literary interpretation were something new in Kiessling's day; the failure of Rothstein's *Propertius* shows the difficulty of commentating on Augustan poetry. After the pioneering studies of Friedrich Leo, Heinze, with his numerous contributions on Augustan culture and poetry (Heinze 1914, 1960a/b), marks, together with Eduard Norden (Norden repr. 1995, also repr. 1998), the beginning of a new appreciation of Latin poetry and the beginning of a new epoch of Latin studies. Well known as Heinze's and Norden's work is, however, it seems to me that, unfortunately, the most eminent merit of Heinze's and Norden's approach, their attempt to explain the poet's working technique by formal analysis of the text (Heinze's book on Virgil's "epische Technik" is a particularly magisterial example) has not been continued much in subsequent research.⁷ Much more than their modern counterparts the ancient poets were craftsmen who designed their works according to fixed sets of rules, and with the Augustan poets we are in the fortunate position of knowing enough about these rules to be able to analyze their works almost like a piece of music; the parallels from music I have adduced from

⁶ The ms. was finished in early 2011; thus, unfortunately, the commentary of R. Thomas (mentioned above), Cairns 2012, and Eicks 2011 appeared too late to be taken into account.

⁷ Cf. my remarks in Günther 1996.

time to time are therefore by no means arbitrary.⁸ In any case, I have based my analysis to quite an extent on Heinze's formalistic approach and tried to elaborate on it.

An all too often neglected forerunner of Fraenkel's book is Pasquali's (1920/1964) monograph, which, in spite of its defects—recognized by the author himself—remains a work of lasting value. Beside Pasquali, among the monographs older than Fraenkel's, I would single out Sellar (1891) and Campbell (1924); it goes without saying that Wilamowitz's (1913) appendices on Augustan poetry in his *Sappho und Simonides* will always remain essential reading.

Since I have ventured to intrude into the modern "Methodendiskussion" with my brief negative remark at the beginning on what we did not attempt in this volume, I feel that I should perhaps conclude with a brief positive note on what I tried to do. In my contributions to this volume the reader will from time to time get the impression that my text appeals to a kind of gut feeling. I am perfectly well aware that this must arouse suspicions; I know perfectly well that it is supposed to be the hallmark of a true scholar not to be sentimental or romantic, not to commit himself to anything, surely not to convictions or eternal values, but to be a model of sceptical, detached, rational and, above all, enlightened sobriety. If he is distinctly cautious toward anything profound, let alone German "Ernst," but rather takes things lightly and displays just a subtle touch of humor, all the better: he probably is almost like our Horace, the Horace who is "one of us." Sobriety and the refusal to commit oneself may, where the latter notion still exists in modern scholarship, even be called common sense. And where would one expect to find this virtue more than in a handbook? Still, I feel that it would not make much sense if I were to rid my life of sentiment, intuition, or convictions, and I venture to doubt that we can understand anything of a text that reflects a life as immensely rich as that of Horace, a text that had an immense influence on other people's lives over the centuries, if we approach it as a mere piece of paper. Unfashionable as it is, I remain convinced that the approach to the world that is good enough for me in real everyday life is not bad for me in approaching the objects of research either. In real life I base my rapport with the "other" on the assumption that I can somehow understand, somehow enter the inner life of my vis-à-vis by using intellect, feeling, and, what is even more than the combination of the two, intuition or

⁸ Cf. also Günther (forthcoming).

gut feeling, if you like. And people with rather different backgrounds from mine have confirmed that I did, on occasion, really understand what they meant to say to me.

Of course, this need not necessarily apply to human beings as far removed in time from me as Horace, but be this as it may, I can only operate under the assumption that what holds true for my vis-à-vis in my everyday life is somehow applicable to people, texts, and situations of other epochs and cultures as well. If it were not so, I would not know why I should waste my time with them. However, although I think that probably here and there in the course of my repeated reading of Horace's texts I came to understand something of the man and of his work, I certainly think that an artist like Horace can never be "one of us." And, in fact, I think that if scholars were more conscious of this trivial insight modern scholarship in general would be much better off.

Eduard Fraenkel taught at the University of Freiburg, where I studied and where I now teach, before he was driven out of his country by the Nazi dictatorship. Today in Freiburg Fraenkel's name is remembered only on a long list of university members who fell victim to the Nazi purge that is inscribed on one of the all too many examples of today's holocaust memorial industry. But I had the good fortune be taught as an undergraduate by Fraenkel's pupil Franz Doll, who paid for his loyalty to his teacher by having his academic career cut short and being allowed to return to the university only after the war.⁹ Above all I profited from the friendship and advice of some scholars close to him, namely Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones and Josef Delz. If the part I have played in this book does not turn the dedication, chosen by the editor, into an insult to Fraenkel's memory and a cruel betrayal of the generous trust and encouragement the latter always so kindly showed toward my work, I have achieved more than I could hope for.

For criticism and advice on what I have written I thank Arnd Kerkhecker, Salvatore Lavecchia, John Kevin Newman, Donald Rayfield, and Katharina Roettig. Arnd Kerkhecker, Donald Rayfield, and Ivo de Gennaro I also have to thank for their help in brushing up my English. But my greatest debt is to Hans Peter Syndikus, who read my whole manuscript, made an enormous number of suggestions that substantially improved on my first draft, far beyond the few places where I have acknowledged the debt I owe to his advice. Needless to say, the opinions expressed in my text are my own and

⁹ See Kullmann 1981.

he cannot be held responsible for its many shortcomings. For help with the preparation of the manuscript I thank again Katharina Roettig and Friederike Schmiga.

Freiburg, January 2012
H.-C. G.

HORACE'S LIFE AND WORK

Hans-Christian Günther

Abstract: Horace's life and career are reconstructed from the information available in the *Vita*, which goes back to the biography of Suetonius, but above all in Horace's poetry. The relevance of the poet's experiences in real life for his poetry and their transformation into poetry are likewise analyzed. Special attention is paid to Horace's political attitude and his relations with Maecenas and Augustus.

Keywords: life, poetry, politics, Maecenas, Augustus

1. SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS¹

"It is certain that Horace cannot instruct or be known except through his poetry. Remove his precepts, like *carpe diem* or *aurea mediocritas*, from their living contexts, and they wither like branches cut from trees: that is the alpha and omega of modern Horatian Criticism. Yet it is also certain that the *Satires*, *Odes*, or *Epistles* themselves disintegrate in the withering light of critical analysis if we isolate them too long from the human experience which informs them and the larger, growing organism, whose unfolding and maturation they embody when taken altogether. Horace's life is itself a work of art; it pleases us by its architectonic completeness; and it contributes to our own education and growth, to the degree, perhaps, that we realize with what pain it was achieved; for, in Horace's words, the poet resembles the ballet dancer who 'will look like one who plays, and will suffer agony':

¹ For a succinct survey of the basic facts of Horace's biography, see Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 7–21; an important supplement is Armstrong in Davis 2010: 7–33 (a synoptic account, which supersedes his earlier publication on the topic). Armstrong builds on Lyne's (1995) factually correct findings, but avoids the pitfalls of Lyne's interpretation and paints a convincing new picture of Horace's character and career that goes beyond Fraenkel's (1957: 1 ff.) still fundamental account. Levi's (1977) lively description of the poet's life and Reckford (1969) are also well worth reading. Watson (2003: 1 ff.) gives a particularly good and sensitive account of Horace's early years. For most detailed information see also *EO* I 217 ff. For the English translation of quotations from Horace I use Rudd (2004) and Rudd (1973).

Iudentis speciem dabit et torquebitur.²

Perfection of art and sanity of outlook are hard won, but they are—or so Horace helps convince us—worth the cost.”

I cite this text from the beginning of Kenneth Reckford's *Horace*,³ because I could not find better words myself to describe the task of both the interpreter of Horace's poetry and the student of the poet's biography and historical background—and, indeed, the entanglement of the two. It seems a triviality to say that we know more about Horace's life than about that of any other great poet of classical antiquity, yet this is not the case. For although we possess a quite reliable source in the *Vita*,⁴ preserved together with the poetic text in Horatian mss., as it goes back to Suetonius's life of Horace in his *vitae poetarum*, still, our information about the poet's biography from secondary sources is scarce in comparison to the rich biographical tradition of Virgil;⁵ it is of crucial importance to note that we owe our exceptionally detailed knowledge about Horace as a man to the fact that no other poet of classical antiquity speaks as much about his private, everyday life and its external circumstances in his poetry as Horace does.⁶ His poems not only indicate his geographic roots (*Serm.* 2.1.34–36; *Epist.* 1.16.49), they reveal events that are purported to be childhood memories (*C.* 3.4.5 ff.), name and describe mountains and rivers of his birthplace (*Serm.* 1.5.77 f.; *C.* 3.30.10; 4.9.2), speak of his family background (*Serm.* 1.6.45–48, 86 f.; *Epist.* 1.20.20), his boyhood and adolescence (*Serm.* 1.4.105–129; 1.6.72–89; *Epist.* 1.18.13 f., 2.1.69–71; 2.2.41–45), war experiences (*C.* 2.7.9–14; 3.4.25 f.) and minor events from his military life (*Serm.* 1.7.9–27), subsequent encounters with the powerful and wealthy (*Serm.* 1.6.45 ff.), private travel with friends (*Serm.* 1.5), further participation in military excursions (*C.* 3.4.28; *Epod.* 1 and 9), major successes of his poetic career (*C.* 4.6), and little private adventures of daily life (*C.* 2.17; *C.* 3.4.27; *C.* 1.22.9–16); the poet even speaks about his everyday

² *Epist.* 2.2.124.

³ Reckford 1969: 11.

⁴ Very poorly preserved (text in Rostagni [1956] and in Klingner's [1959] edition, important observations on the text in Fraenkel's [1957: 1 ff.] first chapter); in what follows I eventually print my own text.

⁵ See the new edition by Brugnoli and Stok (1997) and Bayer (2002); Diehl (1911) remains important for his introduction and commentary. On Virgil's biography, cf. also *EV* s.v. *Vitae Vergilianae* and Günther (1996: 63 ff.). A comparative study of the biographies of Latin poets such as Lefkowitz (1981) and, more recently, Kivilo (2010), an important supplement and corrective to Lefkowitz, would be most useful.

⁶ I have therefore chosen to quote *in extenso* the passages from Horace's poetry in which he speaks of his own life.

pastimes (*Serm.* 1.6.111–131) and reading (*Epist.* 1.2.1f.; *Serm.* 2.3.11) and gives details of his looks, bodily complexion (“short, fat⁷ with premature white hair”: *Epist.* 1.20.24; *Epist.* 1.4.15; *Epod.* 17.23; *Epist.* 1.7.26; 1.20.24), character (“irascible, but easily mollified”: *Epist.* 1.20.25), and lack of interest in stylish elegance (*Epist.* 1.1.95 f., 104).

The fact that Horace is alone among ancient poets in depicting his life in such kaleidoscopic detail tells us a lot about his very personal way of writing poetry. To be sure, being personal is a characteristic trait of Augustan poetry, explicitly underpinned by Augustan poets as an essential element of their poetical identity. This explicitly personal character of Augustan poetry, which one may call fictive or, rather, ideal autobiography,⁸ is in no way sabotaged by the fact that Augustan poets clothe what is depicted as personal experience, to a large degree, in traditional forms and motifs borrowed from a long literary tradition, to which they refer in a pointed and subtly reflected manner. On the contrary, the entanglement of deeply felt content and sophisticated reference to a literary tradition reveals the very essence of this poetry, a poetry born in a time of dramatic external and internal change, and which in all its emphatically detached aestheticism is a mirror of the reality surrounding the poet as experienced by him. The embedding of this vital experience in an imagery and form borrowed from a rich literary heritage sets the ‘sentimental’ experience of the poet in a kind of ideal landscape as the poetic space in which the poets recreates, transforms, and sublimates his inner experience with the outside world. This leaves us, of course, with a picture of the ideal life of the poet and does not allow us to capture more than rare glimpses into the details of his real life behind its transformation into poetry. Rather, we are invoked to grasp the sentimental experience enshrined in the poetic form. But by no means does reference to a literary tradition exclude personal experience and an autobiographical background: on the contrary, as the poet’s way of experiencing the world is already determined by his living in this tradition, in wrapping lived experience in poetic cloth that refers to this tradition, he harks back to the very roots of his life as an inhabitant of both a real and

⁷ The *Vita* (55–61) reports that Augustus (who also called him *purissimum penem* and *homuncionem lepidissimum*, *vita* 35f.; cf. Fraenkel 1957: 19, with n. 4) wrote to him: *pertulit ad me Onysius libellum tuum, quem ego +ut accusantem+ quantuluscumque est boni consulo. vereri autem mihi videris ne maiores libelli tui sint quam ipse es. sed tibi statura deest, corpusculum non deest. itaque licebit in sextariolo scribas, quo circuitus voluminis tui sit ὀγκωδέστερος, sicut est ventriculi tui*; see Fraenkel 1957: 20 f.

⁸ Günther 2010a: 2 ff.

a poetic world. I have referred elsewhere to D'Annunzio, in whose works we are able to observe this process on the basis of external evidence, as an example of this mutual dependence of autobiographical and literary experience in a poet's work.⁹

Yet, Horace's way of referring to his own person contrasts rather sharply with that of other Augustan poets, even though, or rather precisely because the picture painted above of Augustan poetical technique applies in general to his poetry as well:¹⁰ while the personal poetry of the Augustan elegists delivers an almost exclusively sentimental biography of the poet and gives hardly any factual details of the poet's life, except for very few autobiographical references in particular places in Propertius, Horace, as we have seen, refers frequently to external circumstances of personal experiences. Moreover, apart from the occasional hint at a particular event, Horace dwells on telling extensive stories from his life, full of vivid detail, relating to his everyday life. This is, of course, in accord with some of the genres he chooses, such as satire and verse epistle, a form of poetry he created himself building upon the poetry of Lucilius; in the *Satires* he confesses himself true to his Lucilian model in painting a picture that is a mirror of the personal everyday life of the poet and a heartfelt confession at the same time (*Serm.* 2.1.28 ff.):¹¹

... quot capitum vivunt, totidem studiorum
milia: me pedibus delectat claudere verba
Lucili ritu, nostrum melioris utroque.
ille velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim
credebat libris, neque si male cesserat usquam

⁹ Cf. Günther 2002: 34 f.; Heine was quite conscious of the fact that topicality need not stand in opposition to lived experience when he wrote his poem *Ein Jüngling liebte ein Mädchen* ("Das ist eine alte Geschichte, / doch ist sie immer neu; / und wem sie just passiert, / dem bricht das Herz entzwei."); see Günther 2010b: 211 with n. 2.

¹⁰ It is also revealing to contrast this emphasis on the specific and the vividness with which Horace speaks of details of his life, even where he vests personal experience in conventional topics and images (as in C. 3.4) with his technique of adapting his Greek models, where, as far as we can control it, he regularly reduces the vivid detail of the original to a rather abstract essence of thought. A particularly telling example is C. 1.14, in comparison with its Alcaean, and C. 1.13, with its Sapphic model (see below, pp. 360 ff. and 334 ff.).

¹¹ It is remarkable that Horace pictures Lucilius as a poet who "confesses to his books," *si male cesserat* "if something had gone wrong." This is almost the modern concept of the poet that found its classic expression in Goethe's *Tasso*: "... und mir noch über alles; sie gab im Schmerz mir Melodie und Rede, die tiefste Fülle meiner Not zu klagen. / Und wenn der Mensch in seiner Qual verstummt, gab mir ein Gott zu sagen, was ich leide." The earliest hint at this concept of poetry I know is Eur. *Tr.* 608 f.; cited below, pp. 204 f.; later one finds it foreshadowed in Ovid's exile poetry. Cf. also Heinze 1960: 298 ff.; Puelma Piwonka 1949: 61; and below, pp. 204 ff.

*decurrens alio neque si bene: quo fit ut omnis
votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
vita senis. sequor hunc, Lucanus an Apulus anceps:
nam Venusinus arat finem sub utrumque colonus,
missus ad hoc pulsus, vetus est ut fama, Sabellis,
quo ne per vacuum Romano incurreret hostis,
sive quod Apula gens seu quod Lucania bellum
incuteret violenta.*

Take a thousand men, you'll find
a thousand hobbies. Mine is enclosing words in meter,
as Lucilius did—a better man than either of us.
In the past he would confide his secrets to his books. He trusted them
like friends, and whether things went well or badly he'd always
turn to them; in consequence, the whole of the old man's life
is laid before us, as if it were painted on a votive tablet.
He's the man I follow, as a son of Lucania—or is it
Apulia? For the settler at Venusia ploughs on the border of both.
He was sent out, according to tradition, when the Samnites were expelled,
so that if the wild Apulian or Lucanian folk unleashed
a war they might be prevented from dashing through the open space
to invade Roman soil.

Lucilian poetry in this sense inspired the origins of Horace's poetic production, and it came back even more pointedly in his late poetry, with the *Epistles*.¹² Even though he would have sketched some of the *Epodes* before the publication of the first book of *Satires*,¹³ the latter is the first book of poetry Horace completed and published. Of course, in the *Odes* the genre leaves little room for dwelling on particular events in the poet's life,¹⁴ but still, by referring to particular places in Rome or from his childhood, Horace gives local color to his poetic images. But the autobiographical character of Horace's poetry does not mean, even for the *Satires* or *Epistles*, that his compositions are the immediate reflection of events in his life. What matters is rather the condensed and sublimated expression of the general essence of lived experience, the blending of events in the poet's inner conscience. The reference to specific detail serves as a marker by which Horace's poetry provokes us explicitly to see the poet not as an abstract poetical 'I',¹⁵ but as a real

¹² See below, pp. 411, 498.

¹³ See below, p. 169.

¹⁴ Syndikus 2001: I 6 ff.

¹⁵ Russell (1993) offers an unusually subtle and perceptive approach; for the methodological problem, see Günther 2010a: 2 ff. and Syndikus 2010: 21 (on Propertius), who very aptly states that "die heute so beliebten Bezeichnungen, persona', Sprecher oder, lyrisches Ich'

person, with his very particular life and circumstances. The ideal *persona*, as which the poet presents himself, points explicitly to the lived experience behind the poet's words; contemporary readers, depending on how close they were to the poet in real life, may have activated their common experience or their knowledge of the poet's biography. We too can understand something of Horace's poetry only if we recur to such a common experience, far removed as we may be from him; we are thus bound to reconstruct as much as is possible the poet's real biography, with all its uncertainties, given the deficiency of our secondary sources. In fact, reconstructing this biography via the text of Horace's work has been an essential part of the interpretation of his poetry, and if Horace's poetry is 'ideal' autobiography in this sense one may cite, quasi as a complement to Reckford, Schadewaldt's words on the interpreter's task in his book on Pindar,¹⁶ which *mutatis mutandis* can be applied to the interpretation of Horatian poetry as well:

Der Stil Pindars existiert für sich allein so wenig wie das Individuell-Persönliche, die objektive Einheit für sich so wenig wie die subjektive. Es zeigte sich endlich hier und da, wie es sich gerade ergab, daß die verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen der Persönlichkeit Pindars, das autoritäre Ich des berufenen Dichters, das ethisch-politische des Adligen, das empfindende und scheinbar spontan sich äußernde Selbst des Menschen ihre Einheit und ihren Grund im Ethischen haben. So fragen wir bei diesem Dichter nicht nach der zufälligen, rein menschlichen Person. Die Vollendung des Persönlichen in der Form, der der Mensch diente indem er sie schuf, gilt es in jedem Falle zu begreifen; ist die vollendete geistige Form doch das allein wissenschaftlich Begreifbare und ästhetisch wie ethisch Wertbare an der historischen Persönlichkeit.

In any case: does this obsession with self-depiction that we can identify as a distinctive trait of Horace's poetry correspond to a distinctive trait of the character of Horace, the man? In much of his poetry Horace appears to have been a particularly keen and perceptive observer of himself in his relations with the world around him. In fact, that a life as extraordinary as that of Horace should make a man prone to self-reflection is no wonder.

sind wohl viel zu papierene philologische Begriffe, die dem unauslotbaren Zusammenspiel zwischen persönlichen Erfahrungen und Gefühlen und dem Leben in einer literarischen Tradition nicht gerecht werden können." The concrete historical conditions, as reflected in Horace's poetry, are relevant to our understanding if interpretation takes only "the way from the poems to history" and not vice versa; cf. Fraenkel 1957: 369 (with reference to Vahlen vs. Mommsen on the *Carmen Saeculare*).

¹⁶ Schadewaldt 1966: 33.

2. CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH

2.1. *Venosa*

Like all central figures of Roman intellectual life, whose birthplaces are known to us, Horace did not come from the capital;¹⁷ he traces his origins to the Italian provinces. Yet, Horace seems to be the only one of the great Augustan poets who comes from the very south of Italy (as did Lucilius and Ennius before him). Quintus Horatius Flaccus (all three elements of his name are attested by the poet himself) was born on 8 December 69 BC¹⁸ in the *municipium* of Venosa (the ancient Venusia), a little hill town at the frontier of what was then Apulia and Lucania, as he explicitly states himself in the passage cited above (*Serm.* 2.1.34 ff.). Calling himself a Samnite (also *Epist.* 1.6.49) he stresses his Italian origins; Venosa had a considerable foreign community, and, as the son of a freedman, Horace presumably was keen to indicate that his father had not been a foreign slave.¹⁹ As the passage already cited shows, Horace used every opportunity to dwell on his provincial origins. In speaking of his upbringing,²⁰ he even allows us glimpses into his childhood in his native town.²¹ Venosa, as Horace reports in the passage cited above, was a Samnite town, taken by the Romans in 292 BC and reinforced as a garrison of some strategic importance in 200 BC. After its defection in the War of the Allies, it was resettled by Metellus; in 89 BC after Sulla's victory in the Social War, Venusia again appears to have been among those Italian towns that had part of their native citizens expelled and replaced by Sulla's veterans.²² When Horace remembers its soldatesca in recording a detail from his boyhood in *Serm.* 1.6.72–74 (*magni/*

¹⁷ Fraenkel 1957: 4.

¹⁸ For the day, cf. *vita* 71; for the month, cf. *Epist.* 1.20.27; for the year, cf. *C.* 3.21.1 (*consule Manlio*), also *Epod.* 13.6.

¹⁹ Williams in Harrison 1995: 296–313, also Courtney, below, p. 102. Newman 2011: 446 ff. revives Seec's theory that Horace's father was an Alexandrian Jew, if only as a possibility; Newman (see also pp. 25 ff.) shows that Williams's hypothesis is not as certain as the quasi universal consensus on it seems to indicate, and certainly Williams grossly overstates the element of fiction in Horace's statements about his father. Still, that Horace should overstate his humble origins seems to me a much more clever and thus plausible strategy for the "outsider," which Horace certainly was, than to portray an ex-slave of foreign descent as an example of old Roman probity or make statements like those in *Serm.* 1.6, if he was not an Italian.

²⁰ Below, pp. 8 ff.; 13 f.

²¹ Below, pp. 8 ff.

²² Fraenkel 1957: 2.

quo pueri magnis e centurionibus orti,/ laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto,/ ibant ... “where the important boys, the sons of important sergeant-majors, used to go, with satchel and slate swinging from the left arm”), he poignantly refers to the previous vicissitudes of his hometown, which foreshadowed the fate it was to suffer in 43 BC under the triumvirs, when he lost his father’s estate.

Although Horace appears never to have returned to his native place after he lost his father’s property there,²³ on his journey to Brindisi with Maecenas²⁴ he greets with affection the familiar sight of Mount Vulture (*Serm.* 1.5.77 f.),²⁵ which looms large over the landscape around his native Venusia. He describes the region’s largest river, Aufidus (today Ofanto), in *Serm.* 1.1.58 and *C.* 4.14.25–28; in *C.* 3.30.10 and 4.9.2 it represents the poet’s descent; the woodlands of Mount Garganus are described in *C.* 2.9.7 and *Epist.* 2.1.202. Horace also shows his attachment to his provincial past in many passing references either to his native town (*Serm.* 2.1.35, also *C.* 1.28.26 f.; the adjective *Matinus* [also *C.* 1.28.3], which Horace in *C.* 4.2.27 refers to himself probably to the region of Murgia, around Venosa²⁶), Apulia or the Apulians (ten times, cf. the index in Shackleton Bailey’s edition), Lucania (seven times), Daunus or Daunia (i.e., northern Apulia, five times). He speaks of the fertile farmland (*Serm.* 2.1.35) and the oak woods (*C.* 1.28.26 f.) around Venosa, about the flocks and pastures of the region (*Epod.* 1.28; *Epist.* 2.2.178 f.; cf. also *C.* 1.33.7 f. and *Serm.* 2.8.6; in *Epod.* 1.27 f. the neighborly region of Calabria, the heel of Italy and famous for its pastures,²⁷ is combined with Lucania); the inhabitants of Venusia are described as ploughmen (*Serm.* 2.1.35), the Apulians’ epithet is *impiger* “laborious” (*C.* 3.16.26). In *Serm.* 2.2 Horace recounts an episode of an old farmer, which he as attributes to childhood memories.²⁸

In *Serm.* 1.5.77 f. the poet sketches with a few strokes the mountain scenery and mentions the Apulian scirocco (cf. Sen. *NQ* 5.17.5), calling it by its local name *atabulus*:

*Incipit ex illo montis Apulia notos
ostentare mihi, quos torret Atabulus. ...*

²³ Below, pp. 26 f.

²⁴ Below, pp. 97 f.

²⁵ Quoted below, pp. 8 f.; the nostalgic (*montis ... notos* in l. 77) affection is emphasized not only by the dialectal *atabulus* (see Fraenkel 1957: 4), but also by *ostentare*, cf. Fedeli 1994: 434.

²⁶ Russi (*EO* I 397) is almost certainly right with this new identification against the traditional localizations, cf. Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 322 f. and Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: 151 f.

²⁷ Cf. also below, p. 11.

²⁸ Below, pp. 131 ff.

From that point on Apulia began to bring into view
her old familiar hills. They were scorched as usual by the Scirocco. ...

The land is elsewhere described as dry, hot, and full of vapors (*Epod.* 1.27f.; *Epod.* 3.15f.). The image of Horace's native place that emerges from his poetry is clearly that of an individual place with certain particular characteristics: a mountain landscape dominated by a widely visible peak, full of forests with their wild beasts, oak trees mourning in the storms, highland pastures with flocks, the lowlands dried by the sun, clammy vapors or wind from the sea, a mighty, sounding river often flooding the lands.

However, Horace provides the most comprehensive and significant picture of the his childhood landscape in *C.* 3.4.9–28. If one were not to guess that Horace's love for the countryside, the place nature holds in his life as a poet, and the image he projects of it in his poetry, is inspired and distinctly colored by his childhood memories, these verses attest to the significance of his native landscape for Horace's vocation as a poet (*C.* 3.4.5–28):²⁹

*auditis? an me ludit amabilis
insania? audire et videor pios
errare per lucos, amoenae
quos et aquae subeunt et aerae.*

*me fabulosae Vulture in Apulo
nutricis extra limina pergulae³⁰
ludo fatigatumque somno
fronde nova puerum palumbes*

*texere, mirum quod foret omnibus,
quicumque celsae nidum Aceruntiae
saltusque Bantinos et arvum
pingue tenent humilis Forenti,*

*ut tuto ab atris corpore viperis
dormirem et ursis, ut premerer sacra
lauroque conlataque myrto,
non sine dis animosus infans.*

*vester, Camenae, vester in arduos
tollor Sabinos, seu mihi frigidum
Praeneste seu Tibur supinum
seu liquidae placuere Baiae.*

²⁹ See below, pp. 389ff. The explicit reference to place names of his childhood in the context of an account of his inspiration as a poet resembles young Gabriele D'Annunzio's lines: *A sì, le calme del tuo ciel divine/ mi fecero poeta,/ i sussurri d'un mar senza confine/ qui tra la mia pineta.*

³⁰ Thus Baehrens, probably rightly, cf. Nisbet and Rudd (2004) ad loc.

*vestris amicum fontibus et choris
non me Philippis versa acies retro,
devota non exstinxit arbor
nec Sicala Palinurus unda.*

Do you hear, my friends? Or am I misled by a fond delusion? I seem to hear her and to be walking in a sacred grove, through which delightful streams and breezes wander.

On pathless Vulture, beyond the threshold of my nurse's cottage, when as a child I was worn out with play and sleep, the legendary wood pigeons covered me

with fresh leaves. It was a marvel to all who live in the eyrie of lofty Acherontia and Bantia's glades and the rich ploughland of low-lying Forentum

how I slept with my body unharmed by bears and black vipers, how I was hidden under piles of sacred laurel and myrtle, thanks to the gods a spirited child.

I am yours, Muses, yes, yours when borne aloft to the Sabine region, yours whether I prefer cool Preneste or sloping Tibur or Baiae with its limpid air.

Because I loved your springs and dances, I was not destroyed by the rout of our line at Philippi, nor by the accursed tree, nor by Palinurus with his Sicilian waters.

In this passage Horace replaces Hesiod's Helikon with the mountain scenery of his native place and, in what follows, by that of his country retreats in Latium, as he replaces the Muses with the Latin *Camenae*; later, in one of his proudest poems where he speaks in retrospect of the highest peak of his poetic career,³¹ he even calls them *Dauniae Camenae* (4.6.27). In C. 3.4.9–16 he places a story, adapted from common topics about miraculous events in poets' lives,³² in the landscape of his native region at the foot of Mount Vulture (elev. 4,350 ft.), 9 miles west of Venosa (elev. 1,362 ft.); Horace describes, not without vivid detail, the mountain landscape around Venosa, dominated by the former volcano with its sinister name, between mountain citadels like Aceruntia (modern Acerenza, 2,700 ft., 13 miles south of Venosa), the highland pastures of Bantia (modern Banzi, 1,900 ft., 13 miles southeast of Venosa), and the rich soil of farmland in the plain.³³ The countryside as an ideal landscape, nature offering a retreat from the brutal real-

³¹ Below, pp. 431 ff.

³² Below, p. 391.

³³ *Arvum pingue humilis Forenti* "the rich ploughland of low-lying Forentum" (location uncertain, cf. *EO* I 393 f.).

ities of life into a newly found innocence and providing the source of the poet's inspiration, is a central motif of Augustan poetry;³⁴ in these verses Horace reveals that for him the ideal landscape (in this sense) of his poetry connotes a return to the rural surroundings of his childhood. It is conspicuous that Horace appears to be the first poet who—for all his preference for literary *loci communes* over picturesque detail, which he shares with his fellow poets—gives the landscapes he describes an individual physiognomy, whether he is referring explicitly to his native region or the surroundings of his country estate.³⁵

Thus, when in *Epod.* 1.25–30³⁶ the poet declares himself content with Maecenas's gift of his Sabine farm, he disclaims interest in the ownership of large flocks with words that speak of a flock moving up to the Lucanian hills from its winter pasture in the plain of Calabria (*Epod.* 1.27 f.); this echoes the description of the hills and plains on the foot of Mount Vulture in *C.* 3.4.9–12; when he speaks of the rise of the Dog Star in l. 27, he evokes the hot, dry summers of Apulia. The poet's native place is present again in the ideal landscape of *Epod.* 2:³⁷ toward the end of the poem we hear of a farmer's home and children, cared for by a chaste wife: "*Sabina qualis aut perusta solibus/ pernicis uxor Apuli*" (like a Sabine woman or the sun-tanned³⁸ wife of an energetic Apulian) (41 f.).

In *C.* 1.17³⁹ Horace depicts the landscape surrounding his Sabinum as pastoral mountain scenery transporting Faunus from his native Arcadia to Horace's flock in the summer heat around Mount Lucretilis and the valleys and rocks of Ustica.⁴⁰ The description shows many specific individual features, and it is not far-fetched to see in these pictures the childhood memories of the young poet strolling in the woods and pastures of the hillsides around Venosa, as he pictures himself in *C.* 3.4.9–16, perhaps even of his actual experiences in driving flocks to their pastures.⁴¹

³⁴ Below, pp. 229, 282, 390, 392.

³⁵ "Horace seems to be the first European poet who persistently connects the charm of country with a specific and recognizable locality. The villages of his childhood and the place-names of the Digentia valley are given significance because he himself happened to write about them," Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xx (referring to *C.* 1.17.3 and 3.4.14 ff.)

³⁶ Below, p. 196.

³⁷ Below, p. 195.

³⁸ He describes himself as *solibus aptum* in *Epist.* 1.20.24.

³⁹ Below, p. 282.

⁴⁰ Exact location and meaning uncertain, cf. *EO* I 558 f.

⁴¹ This may be true, independently of the fanciful geography of Levi 1997: 13, who also mistranslates *Epod.* 1.27 f.

Thus, even when Horace does not locate landscapes in his native Apulia he recalls the images from his native place; in *C.* 1.9⁴² Mount Soracte looms from afar (ll. 1–4) with forests laden with snow and frozen rivers:

*Vides ut alta stet nive candidum
Soracte, nec iam sustineant onus
silvae laborantes geluque
flumina constiterint acuto?*

Do you see how Soracte stands there shining with its blanket of deep snow, how the straining woods no longer support their burden, and the streams have been halted by the sharp grip of ice?

Later oak trees, beaten by storms, are evoked in ll. 9–12:

*Permitte divis cetera, qui simul
stravere ventos aequore fervido
deproeliantis, nec cupressi
nec veteres agitantur orni.*

Leave the rest to the gods. Once they still the winds that battle so fiercely over the boiling sea, the old cypress and ash trees are no longer in commotion.

The storm-beaten oaks reappear beside wintry ice in *C.* 2.9.4–8:

*... nec Armeniis in oris,
amice Valgi, stat glacies iners
mensis per omnis aut Aquilonibus
querqueta Gargani laborant
et foliis viduantur orni.*

... my dear Valgius, the ice

does not stand motionless on Armenia's coast through every month of the year, nor do the oaks of Garganus always struggle against the northern blasts, nor are the ash trees widowed of their leaves.

The sight of Soracte recalls Mount Vulture from the Appian way between Benent and Canosa;⁴³ the Garganus, too, may have been visible from the region around Horace's place.⁴⁴ It has been rightly observed that it is quite unlikely that Horace saw Mount Soracte, 20 miles north of Rome, on a winter evening through the narrow slit of an ancient window;⁴⁵ in giving local color to his Alcaean model, Horace, despite setting the scene in the surroundings

⁴² Below, pp. 273 ff.

⁴³ For the problem of location, see *EO* I 399.

⁴⁴ *EO* I 395.

⁴⁵ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 116.

of the capital, recreates childhood experiences, perhaps of the snow-covered peaks of the Lucanian hills (he speaks of the *Lucana nix* in *Serm.* 2.3.234; in *Epod.* 1.28, referred to above, he contrasts the cool mountain pastures of Lucania to the hot Calabrian plain⁴⁶).

Fraenkel⁴⁷ has drawn attention to the attachment of many Italians to their provincial origins. Horace is among those artists whose particular taste one can truly appreciate only if one sees, through the transformation in their poetry or music, the landscape, the surroundings of the artist's native place, as, for example, when one has once seen the Marche's benign landscape of hills and slopes they always rise before one's eyes while reading Leopardi's poetry, even when, on the barren back of Mount Vesuvius he dreams of gay villages, pastures, gardens and palaces, and famous old towns. How can one understand the music of Mahler without hearing the echoes of the sounds of the small old mountain town Iglau at the frontier of Bohemia and Moravia with its k. and k. garrison, its Jewish merchants and artisans, the vivid musical folk tradition of this German-speaking enclave, and the mellow landscape of the Bohemian Moravian highlands with its meadows, forests, scattered farms, and shimmering ponds?

2.2. *Horace's Father and the Poet's Education at Rome and Athens*

We have already mentioned *Serm.* 2.2,⁴⁸ where Horace introduces the farmer, Ofellus, from whom he had received good advice as a *puer* on moral issues (*Serm.* 2.2.112–114). Ofellus⁴⁹ is depicted as a farmer whose property had been confiscated (*Serm.* 2.2.112–114 and 129 ff.). Ofellus thus mirrors Horace's own misfortune at losing his father's estate. As a moral advisor, Ofellus is a mirror of the poet's father, as Horace describes him in a passage we shall examine below.⁵⁰ But although the story of Ofellus's advice is modeled on one about Horace's father instructing his poet son, Ofellus appears to be not just a fictitious projection of the poet's father; that Horace must have met men who lost their property in the confiscations of 89 BC is obvious, and Ofellus's lot is parallel to that of the poet, not of his father. Rather, Ofellus brings us back precisely to Horace's humble origins, his acquaintance with and sympathy for the life of simple people.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Calabria was famous for its sheep; cf. Colum. 7.4.1, Plin. *nat.* 8.190.

⁴⁷ Fraenkel 1957: 3.

⁴⁸ Above, pp. 8, 13.

⁴⁹ Probably a real person, see Courtney, below, p. 134.

⁵⁰ Pp. 22, 53, 131 ff.

⁵¹ Cf. e.g., *Serm.* 2.6.

Horace's father was a freedman (*Serm.* 1.6.45 f.;⁵² *Epist.* 1.20.20), but it is very likely that he had been not a foreign slave, but a captive in the Samnite wars,⁵³ hence Horace's insistence on his Italian roots. In *Serm.* 1.6.86 he calls his father a *praeco* (auctioneer) and *coactor* (thus also the *vita* 2), a middleman who provided money for the purchaser, a profession often exercised by freedmen.⁵⁴ But although this was regarded as a low-class profession, it could be very lucrative. Horace's father was among the very successful self-made men of his time and managed his business so well that he was able to acquire a house in the capital, and thus to provide his son with an education equal to that of the son of any *eques* or senator, as Horace puts it himself. This obviously very ambitious father⁵⁵ even provided funds sufficient for his son to continue his studies in Athens (*Serm.* 1.6.65–92):

*atqui si vitiis mediocribus ac mea paucis
mendosa est natura, alioqui recta, velut si
egregio inspersos rependas corpore naevos,
si neque avaritiam neque sordes nec mala lustra
obiciet vere quisquam mihi, purus et insons
ut me collaudem, si et vivo carus amicis:
causa fuit pater his, qui macro pauper agello
noluit in Flavi ludum me mittere, magni
quo pueri magnis e centurionibus orti,
laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto,
ibant octonos referentes Idibus aeris,
sed puerum est ausus Romam portare docendum
artis quas doceat quivis eques atque senator
semet prognatos. vestem servosque sequentis,
in magno ut populo, siqui vidisset, avita
ex re praeberi sumptus mihi crederet illos.
ipse mihi custos incorruptissimus omnis
circum doctores aderat. quid multa? pudicum,
qui primus virtutis honos, servavit ab omni
non solum facto, verum opprobrio quoque turpi,
nec timuit, sibi ne vitio quis verteret, olim
si praeco parvas aut, ut fuit ipse, coactor
mercedes sequeretur; neque ego essem questus. at hoc nunc
laus illi debetur et a me gratia maior.*

⁵² Cf. e.g., *Serm.* 1.6.6, with Courtney's comment, below, p. 103; also below, pp. 16 f.

⁵³ See above, n. 19.

⁵⁴ Fraenkel 1957: 5; also Crook (1967) 219 f. For the story that Horace's father was a *salsamentarius* (seller of salt fish), also transmitted by the *vita* (3–5), see Fraenkel 1957: 6; Williams in Harrison 1995: 309. Cf. also Treggiari 1969: 101, 108.

⁵⁵ Treggiari 1969: 233 ff.

*nil me paeniteat sanum patris huius, eoque
non, ut magna dolo factum negat esse suo pars,
quod non ingenuos habeat clarosque parentes,
sic me defendam.*

Yet if my faults are not too serious or too many, and if my nature, apart from such blemishes, is in other respects sound (just as on a handsome body you might notice a few moles), if no one can fairly accuse me of greed or meanness or frequenting brothels, if (to blow my own trumpet) my life is clean and above reproach, and if my friends are fond of me, the credit is due to my father. He was a poor man with a few scraggy acres, yet wouldn't send me to Flavius's school where the important boys, the sons of important sergeant-majors, used to go, with satchel and slate swinging from the left arm, carrying their eight-penny fee on the Ides of every month. Instead, he courageously took his boy up to Rome, to be taught the accomplishments which any knight or senator would have his own progeny taught. Anyone who noticed my clothes and the servants in attendance (a feature of city life) would have assumed that the money for these items came from the family coffers. My father himself was the most trustworthy guardian imaginable, accompanying me to all my classes. In short, he preserved my innocence (which is fundamental in forming a good character), saving me not only from nasty behavior but from nasty imputations. He wasn't worried that someone might criticize him later on if I became an auctioneer or, like himself, a broker, and didn't make much money; nor would I have complained. As it is, I owe him all the more respect and gratitude. I would never dream of feeling dissatisfied with a father like that, and so while people often protest that it's no fault of theirs that they don't possess noble and famous parents, I shan't take that line.

Once he had escaped his awkward fellow pupils in the province and despite his father's personal care for his education (*Serm.* 1.6.81 ff.), Horace's school-days in Rome (probably from ca. 53–49 BC) might still have been something less than agreeable: Horace in retrospect calls his teacher Orbilius *plagossus* “a man of the rod” (*Epist.* 2.1.70 f.), and when, in *Epist.* 1.18.13 f., he speaks of a *saevus magister* “a stern master,” this may well be an echo of his experience with Orbilius (cf. Domitius Marsus fr. 4 Courtney = 177 Hollis). But although Orbilius appears to have gotten some bad press for his cruel teaching methods (cf. Furius Bibaculus fr. 3 Courtney = 83 Hollis, with Courtney's comment), he was a *grammaticus* of distinction (cf. Suet. *De gramm.* 9), to whom a statue was erected in his hometown after his death. He introduced young Horace to both archaic Latin poets, namely Livius Andronicus (*Epist.*

2.1.69–71), and Homer (*Epist.* 2.2.41 f.⁵⁶) and the ancient moralizing explanation of his poems, of which Horace shows knowledge in *Epist.* 1.2.1 ff. Apart from some rather unpleasant experiences in Orbilius's classes, one should not forget that Rome was a rather nasty and dangerous place in Horace's schooldays, as Peter Levi rightly points out.⁵⁷ Small wonder that Horace apparently never felt particularly attracted to the town even later in life; he never celebrates its monuments and sites as other Augustans do, but rather dwells on the memories of his childhood in the province.

Athens seems to have been a very agreeable change. His student years there appear to have gratified Horace greatly and he mentions them in retrospect with affection and nostalgia (*Epist.* 2.2.46 f.). It was certainly there that Horace acquired not only a profound philosophical education, but also his wide-ranging knowledge of Greek poetry. He does not mention studies of Greek poetry and literature in his account, but refers only to the Academy, since in those days Horace did not seriously contemplate becoming a poet. Yet, in *Serm.* 1.10.31–35 he says that he made attempts at composing Greek verse.⁵⁸ One may further venture to date to these years the affair of the young poet with Cinara, the only female figure in Horace's love poetry that is surely modeled on a real person, since he speaks of her with a similar—unusual, as one should add⁵⁹—touch of sentimentality and nostalgia as he speaks of his youthful past in *C.* 4.1.3 f. and *Epist.* 1.7.27 f. and 1.14.33; we hear the same tone of voice in *Epist.* 2.2.55 ff., where he speaks of the bygone pleasures of wine and love.

Horace, in *Serm.* 1.6.45 ff. and in ll. 76–88 in particular, emphasized his humble origins and his gratitude toward his father; he of course exaggerates because he is keen on stressing the humbleness of his family background. Despite his low social standing Horace's father must have been a successful businessman who had made a remarkable amount of money; Horace was quite well-off from the start. It is even possible that he had enough money to buy himself into the equestrian rank (denied to his father as a *libertinus*) before studying in Athens (the slave Davus mentions Horace's equestrian ring in *Serm.* 2.7.53).⁶⁰ But what is essential to understanding Horace's psychology is the fact that, as the poet testifies himself, he bore the stigma of the low-class social climber for a long time,⁶¹ first for having reached a high

⁵⁶ Below, pp. 27 f.

⁵⁷ Levi 1977: 37.

⁵⁸ Below, pp. 28 f.

⁵⁹ Below, pp. 334 ff., 353 ff.

⁶⁰ Lyne 1995: 3 n. 7.

⁶¹ Treggiari 1969: 232.

military position in Brutus's army and later for having been received in the upper circles of Roman society and being Maecenas's close friend (*Serm.* 1.6.45–48):

*nunc ad me redeo libertino patre natum
quem rodunt omnes libertino patre natum,
nunc quia simi tibi, Maecenas, convictor; at olim
quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno.*

I revert to myself—only a freedman's son,
run down by everyone as being only a freedman's son,
now because I'm a friend of yours, Maecenas, previously
because as a military tribune I commanded a Roman legion.

Horace's career was rather exceptional, one that carried him from his humble origins in the provinces to a rather high military position in the republican army.⁶² Later, despite his political engagement on the wrong side and consequent loss of much of the position he had ascended to, he managed to make a new start and a second career that allowed him to enter the intellectual circles around the most wealthy and powerful men of Rome. In fact, Horace appears to have been the only one of the Augustan poets associated by close bonds of friendship not only to Augustus's prime minister, but to the princeps himself.⁶³ His life must have appeared in retrospect, even to the poet himself, that of an extremely successful social climber, far outdoing even the wildest dreams of his ambitious father; when Horace had reached his position in Maecenas's circle, he could look back on a remarkable life full of dramatic ups and downs. The way in which he refers to or stresses his humble origins and protests his moral integrity and the sincerity of his friendship to his patron across an originally enormous social divide, reflects the inevitable complexes of a man who must have been viewed as a cunning, cynical, and hypocritical self-made man and regarded with both envy and suspicion. Horace's employing the old rhetorical trick of self-humiliating irony⁶⁴ by overstating his humbleness rather than trying to play it down is surely the best he could do, not only to counter his detractors, but also to assuage his own self-esteem. And surely the carefully constructed image of himself and his family background that he projects in his poetry testifies to Horace's extraordinary shrewdness and social ability.

⁶² Below, p. 27.

⁶³ Below, pp. 43 ff., 485 ff.

⁶⁴ Heinze 1889: 6; Süß 1910: 257 f.

One of the few great European intellectuals who had an even more astounding career was Nicholas of Cusa, offspring of a family of well-off merchants. Like Horace, he, too, was an extremely clever man of affairs, who because of his singular practical efficiency made an astonishing career, for a man of his background, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.⁶⁵ Like Horace, he had his detractors and felt for a lifetime the stigma of the social outsider. The cardinal's statement about his life (in the third person) in an autobiographical note of 1449 (probably written by his brother) is quite similar to Horace's words about his success with Maecenas in *Serm.* 1.6 and even more to *Epist.* 1.20.20–22, where he still in 20 BC, at the height of his career, refers to his humble origins,⁶⁶ yet it is patently obvious that Cusanus in fact coped much less well with these pressures than Horace:

Et ut sciant cuncti sanctam Romanam ecclesiam non respicere ad locum vel genus nativitatis, sed esse largissimam remuneratricem virtutum, hunc hanc historiam in dei laudem iussit scribi ipse cardinalis anno 1449 die 21 octobris ...

And that all may know that the Holy Roman Church does not regard the place and the social class of birth, but rewards virtues most generously, therefore the cardinal himself had this account written for the glory of the Lord October 21st of 1449. ...

But if Horace was clever enough to be candid about his origins and thus deprive snobbish detractors of their steam, he shows a touch of bitterness about his own need to always be on his guard against these detractors in *Epod.* 4, where he cruelly ridicules an upstart who precisely mirrors himself.⁶⁷ What is truly remarkable about Horace's life and career is his active engagement as a man of action and subsequent rise to high social prominence; even, had he not declined, high public office as Augustus's private secretary.⁶⁸ Much less remarkable was the artist's ability to manage his financial success, if we set aside romantic conceits of the poor artist (all too familiar already in antiquity), or that great artists cannot be able businessmen, unless they are cynics or hypocrites. One need not even think of Renaissance or Baroque painters who made large fortunes, like Titian, who was embraced in public by Emperor Charles V and left an immense fortune hotly contested among his heirs; or the orphan Racine, who, not unlike Horace with Augustus, entered into a close personal relationship with

⁶⁵ See Meuthen 1979: 5 ff., 21 f.; Dudow in Bellito, Izbicki, and Christianson 2004: 25 ff.

⁶⁶ Quoted below, p. 23.

⁶⁷ See below, pp. 34, 43, 186.

⁶⁸ Below, p. 43.

Louis XIV and died a wealthy man. A relatively recent example, comparable to Horace in many respects, is Ferdinand Hodler, who with a very humble working-class background and an extremely difficult childhood and youth managed to become a highly acclaimed and wealthy artist, who assumed the mantle of Swiss national painter and who reveled in his public success. Richard Strauss, whom I have compared to Horace elsewhere,⁶⁹ was an unashamedly able businessman, who openly declared that everything that mattered to him was artistic quality and listeners who pay the full price for a ticket. This is not far from Horace, who claimed that he had the money to buy himself a seat in the senate if he wished.⁷⁰

Anyhow, Horace appears to have inherited the shrewd approach to practical life, attested both by his clever stylization of the poet's self and by the real man's external success. We should not forget that Horace's father was a successful self-made man when we read how Horace expresses his warm gratitude to his father not only for the higher education he received, but also for the moral advice he bestowed on him, as he does not only in the passage cited above, but also in *Serm.* 1.4.103–143:

... *liberius si*
dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris
cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me,
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.
cum me hortaretur, parce frugaliter atque
viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset:
"nonne vides, Albi ut male vivat filius utque
Baius inops? magnum documentum, ne patriam rem
perdere quis velit." a turpi meretricis amore
cum deterreret: "Scetani dissimilis sis."
ne sequerer moechas, concessa cum venere uti
possem: "deprepsi non bella est fama Treboni"
aiebat. "sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu
sit melius, causas reddet tibi; mi satis est si
traditum ab antiquis morem servare tuamque,
dum custodis eges, vitam famamque tueri
incolumem possum; simul ac duraverit aetas
membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice." sic me
formabat puerum dictis et, sive iubebat,
ut facerem quid, "habes auctorem, quo facias hoc"
unum ex iudicibus selectis obiebat;
sive vetabat, "an hoc inhonestum et inutile factu

⁶⁹ Günther 2010a: 180 f.

⁷⁰ Below, p. 26 n. 90.

*necne sit addubites, flagret rumore malo cum
hic atque ille?" avidos vicinum funus ut aegros
exanimat mortisque metu sibi parcere cogit,
sic teneros animos aliena opprobria saepe
absterrent vitiis. ex hoc ego sanus ab illis
perniciem quaecumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis
ignoscas vitiis teneor; fortassis et istinc
largiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus,
consilium proprium: neque enim, cum lectulus aut me
porticus excepit, desum mihi. "rectius hoc est;
hoc faciens vivam melius; sic dulcis amicis
occurram. hoc quidam non belle: numquid ego illi
inprudens olim faciam simile?" haec ego mecum
compressis agito labris; ubi quid datur oti,
inludo chartis. hoc est mediocribus illis
ex vitiis unum; cui si concedere nolis,
multa poetarum veniat manus, auxilio quae
sit mihi—nam multo plures sumus—ac veluti te
Iudaei cogemus in hanc concedere turbam.*

Yet if I'm a little outspoken or perhaps
too fond of a joke, I hope you'll grant me that privilege.
My father gave me the habit; to warn me off
he used to point out various vices by citing examples.
When urging me to practice thrift and economy and to be content
with what he himself had managed to save he used to say:
"Notice what a miserable life young Albius leads and how Baius
is down and out—a salutary warning not to be so quick
to squander one's inheritance." Steering me away from a squalid attachment
to a prostitute he would say: "Don't be like Scetanus!" To stop me
chasing someone else's wife when legitimate sex was available:
"It isn't nice to get a name like that of Trebonius—he
was caught in the act." He would add: "A philosopher will give you reasons
why this is desirable and that is better avoided. For me
it's enough to preserve the ways which our forefathers handed down,
to look after your physical safety and keep your name untarnished
while you need a guardian. When time has toughened your body and mind
you'll be able to swim without a ring." That was how he talked
my young character into shape. Recommending something he'd say:
"You have a good precedent for that," and point to one of the judges
selected by the Praetor; or by way of dissuading me: "How can you doubt,"
he'd say, "whether this would be a foolish and dishonorable thing to do
when X and Y are the centre of a blazing scandal?" Invalids
who are tempted to overeat are given a fright by the funeral
of the man next door, and the terror of death compels them to go easy;
in the same way young folk are often deterred from doing wrong
when they see the notoriety of other people. As a result of that

I am free from the more dangerous defects of character and am troubled only by milder and more venial faults. Perhaps even these may be largely modified by the lapse of time or by straight talk from a friend, or by my own reflection. For when I go off to my sofa or to the colonnade, I'm not idle: "This is more honest; this will help improve my life: this will endear me to my friends; that was a dirty trick so and so did; could I ever be so careless as to act like that?" This is a kind of discussion that I hold behind closed lips. When I get any free time I amuse myself on paper. That's one of the milder faults I mentioned above. If you aren't prepared to fall in with this habit a mighty company of poets will rally round to bring me assistance (for we are by far the larger portion of mankind) and, like the Jews, we shall make you fall in with our happy band.

As in C. 3.4.5 ff. this is again a telling example of how Horace transforms his biography into poetry:⁷¹ Horace's father has—fittingly in this context⁷²—a comic model. He employs the educational method of Demea in Ter. *Ad.* 411–418,⁷³ who tries to educate his son by pointing to the concrete example of other people's lives. This trait of the Terentian model perfectly suits Horace's purpose to blame his satiric attack on the education he received and even to justify it by pointing out its educational value. However, apart from integrating this story from his adolescence into the context of *Serm.* 1.4,⁷⁴ if Horace depicts his father as applying Demea's method he depicts him above all as an example of a shrewd exponent of traditional Roman values with a pragmatic down-to-earth attitude. Horace's father explicitly poses as a prototype of the traditional old-fashioned Roman who fairly and squarely states his preference for down-to-earth pragmatism, not without contempt for theory and abstractions.⁷⁵ In accord with the passage's purpose in the context of *Serm.* 1.4 and what he says elsewhere, Horace puts his moral (as his sexual) integrity at the forefront: we see Horace's father as the cause of Horace's purity of character, exactly as in *Serm.* 1.6.65 ff., and of the boy's chastity, as in *Serm.* 1.6.82 ff. But Horace does not dwell here and in *Serm.* 1.6

⁷¹ On this passage, see also Newman 2011: 49 f.

⁷² Ll. 1 ff.; cf. also the comic father: ll. 48 ff.

⁷³ Observed by Leach 1971; Demea's educational method has precedents, see Martin 1976: 168 and also Courtney, below, pp. 94 f. If Horace models the speech after Terence, this does not mean that it has no factual content; *Serm.* 1.5 describes a real journey, even though it emulates a Lucilian model.

⁷⁴ Courtney, below, pp. 87 ff.

⁷⁵ Reckford 1969: 30, on ll. 115–120.

(cited above) on his and his father's moral integrity simply in order to sell himself as an apt moral advisor: Horace's insistence on this point shows the social climber's need to establish his integrity beyond a doubt.

However, when Horace makes his father begin his sermon with an exhortation "to practice thrift and economy" (*frugaliter vivere*), to get along by the fruits of one's own labor, this point, not immediately relevant for the context of the satire as a whole, surely reflects the influence the example of the able businessman his father was had on Horace; it was he who taught him how to handle money and make his way up in society.⁷⁶ The emphasis on a frugal life, on self-earned success is echoed in the sermon of Ofellus, mentioned above.⁷⁷

Horace's claim of combining integrity of character with external success is not a vain boast; to take the cynical stance of some modern observers toward Horace's ability to navigate difficulties in his life realistically and make his way to the top is quite inappropriate. Horace could not have been the moral advisor he has been for generations, had he not been a person who knew life deeply in all its precariousness, if he had not been someone who had to struggle with difficulties from the start, someone who was born into a time of great external upheaval, someone who nonetheless was able to have an astonishing career while preserving his moral integrity and self-respect. This is a rare achievement, but Horace surely had the character to succeed in this. The impact his work has had over the centuries testifies to this. Without a feeling for the man behind this work one misses its very essence. The almost unique quality of Horace's work is that it is the ideal (in the true sense of the word) expression of the life behind it: Horace was not an ideal character in the vulgar sense, quite the opposite, but he was a man who from his profound experience of life was able to project his own self, with all its deficiencies and weaknesses, into a poetic voice that serves as an ideal of a worldly wise man who has seen beyond the realities of everyday life because he has seen through them.

⁷⁶ "... he [sc. Vulteius Maena] and Horatius are patterns of the strongest type of Roman: simple, hard-working, tolerant, independent," Treggiari 1969: 101, with reference to Cic. *De off.* 2.70.

⁷⁷ P. 13. Moreover, with the reference to the *iudices selecti* in l. 123 the passage probably alludes to a factual detail of Horace's biography; see below, p. 26 n. 90.

3. A TURNING POINT IN HORACE'S LIFE

3.1. *The Poet before Maecenas*

If we take into account Horace's character as both a socially well versed and highly successful self-made man, the poet's claims that Maecenas accepted him into his circle because of his moral integrity assumes a new significance: after mentioning the stigma of his low birth in *Serm.* 1.6.45–48 Horace speaks in ll. 49–64 about his first encounter with the man who was to play a decisive role in his later life:

*dissimile hoc illi est, quia non, ut forsit honorem
iure mihi invidet quivis, ita te quoque amicum,
praesertim cautum dignos adsumere, prava
ambitione procul. felicem dicere non hoc
me possim, casu quod te sortitus amicum:
nulla etenim mihi te fors obtulit; optimus olim
Vergilius, post hunc Varius dixere quid essem.
ut veni coram, singultim pauca locutus
(infans namque pudor prohibebat plura profari)
non ego me claro natum patre, non ego circum
me Satureiano vectari rura caballo,
sed quod eram narro. respondes, ut tuus est mos,
pauca: abeo, et revocas nono post mense, iubesque
esse in amicorum numero. magnum hoc ego duco,
quod placui tibi, qui turpi secernis honestum,
non patre praeclaro, sed vita et pectore puro.*

The two factors are different; a person might perhaps be justified in grudging me that rank, but he oughtn't to grudge me your friendship, especially as you are so careful to choose suitable people, and to hold aloof from twisters on the make. I could never say I was fortunate in the sense that I *just happened* to win your friendship. It wasn't chance that brought you into my life. First the admirable Virgil and then Varius told you what I was. When I met you in person I just gulped out a few words, for diffidence tied my tongue and prevented me from speaking plainly. I didn't pretend that I had a distinguished father or possessed estates outside Tarentum, which I rode around on a horse. I told you what I was. As usual, you answered briefly. I left. Nine months later you asked me back and invited me to join your group of friends. For me the great thing is that I won the regard of a discriminating man like you, not by having a highly distinguished father but by decency of heart and character.

That Maecenas, when he accepted Horace into his circle, may indeed have taken a liking to Horace the man apart from his artistic qualities is a likely

assumption: Horace had not yet met with acclaimed public success, as had Virgil or, later, Propertius. Maecenas received Virgil and Propertius as poets, who were already close to another patron and whose work had won great public acclaim. And as the latter's case shows, Maecenas was keen to attract real talent, even when a poet like Propertius had in his work hitherto shown a rather apolitical, even antipolitical agenda.⁷⁸ After having settled in Rome as a *scriba quaestorius*, Horace surely frequented the intellectual circles around Messalla⁷⁹ (later the dedicatee of *C.* 3.21), probably an old friend from his student's days in Athens, with whom he fought at Philippi, and Asinius Pollio (dedicatee of *C.* 2.1⁸⁰), both of whom he mentions in *Serm.* 1.10.85 in the company of other learned or poet friends who appreciated his poetry. In these circles he would have become acquainted with Virgil (for Horace's admiration for him, cf. *Serm.* 1.10.44 f.), Varius, and later Tibullus.⁸¹ In fact, Messalla and Pollio may from the start have helped the poet in his attempts to get a foot in the capital after the catastrophe of Philippi. In any case, Horace tells us himself that he made his way into Maecenas's circle on the recommendation of his most eminent poet friends, Varius and Virgil; they, of course, would have recommended him for his poetic talent:⁸² as he states *Serm.* 1.4.73, he recited poetry only among his friends; at the same time he protests his reservation about publication or recitation to a wider public (ll. 71 ff.), a feeling echoed in *Epist.* 1.20 and 2.2.90 ff.⁸³ *Serm.* 1.10 speaks of

⁷⁸ See Günther (forthcoming).

⁷⁹ Cf. *EO* I 808 f.; Syme 1986: 200 ff.; Nisbet in Woodman and Feeney 200: 80 ff.; for his education at Athens together with Cicero's son, cf. *RE* s.v. Valerius (261) col. 137; also below, pp. 27 f.

⁸⁰ Below, p. 241.

⁸¹ See below, pp. 347, 416.

⁸² Although Horace appears not to have had any public success as a poet before he met Maecenas he must have impressed his poet friends by formidable signs of talent, and of course he had already composed a significant amount of poetry. *Serm.* 1.2 (presupposed in 1.4; but see Courtney, below, pp. 93; 95) is often thought to be an early work but this is no more than a guess. More likely is an early date for *Serm.* 1.7, recounting an event during Brutus's Asian campaign and being also the shortest poem of the book (cf. Della Corte in *EO* I 232; but surely not already in 42 BC, as D'Anna suggests in *EO* I 259). *Epod.* 7 and 16 certainly date before Horace's encounter with Maecenas; *Epod.* 16 was perhaps written ca. 38 BC, probably after and in response to Virg. *Ecl.* 4 (cf. Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 9; hesitantly also Watson 2003: 486 ff.; *Epod.* 7 may be slightly earlier, below, p. 169). Maeuius in *Epod.* 10 also refers to Virgil's *Eclogues* and must, as Fraenkel 1957: 31 (also Watson 2003: 342) has seen, be written not long after publication of the latter, below, p. 169. Thus, two of Horace's earliest poems refer to Virgil's work; *Epod.* 10 takes issue with one of Virgil's poetic enemies, but see also pp. 198 f. below. To date *Epod.* 13 to 42 BC relies on pure fancy; Watson 2003: 417 rightly refers to Kiessling and Heinze ad loc.

⁸³ Below, pp. 476 f.

literary feuds rather than public success, and Horace appears to have been not quite in tune with the literary trends of the time: he shows no liking for archaic Latin poetry, nor for the Neoterics of his time.⁸⁴ From all that we can tell, Horace does not seem to have been an acclaimed poet before his meeting with Maecenas, but rather a sort of 'Geheimtipp' among the real connoisseurs.

Apart from the poet's lack of public success, with Horace Maecenas accepted a man, who was not only a- or antipolitical like Propertius, but who had already made a distinguished career on the wrong side. Despite *Epist.* 2.2.51f.⁸⁵ one suspects that after Philippi Horace was occupied primarily with securing some material basis of living in the difficult years from 42 to 38 BC. Of course, in the passage cited above, Horace styles himself as the modest, humble person and Maecenas as the grand seigneur well versed in life, but there is a truth in that. Maecenas certainly was a very worldly wise grandee; he could not have reached the position he had, had he not been a good judge of human character. In fact, with this quality he was—in the ideal world of the poem and in reality—a mirror of the successful upstart Horace, who, of course, both in life and in his poetry knew to exploit his humble social origins by pointed modesty and understatement. It is quite likely that Maecenas recognized and admired in Horace the efficiency and strength of character of the self-made man who—in contrast to himself—had to make his way up in society by himself; thus Horace introduces Maecenas at the beginning of the poem as someone who does not snub people of humble birth (*Serm.* 1.6.1–6⁸⁶). If we think of the close personal friendship (mentioned also in the *vita* 9ff.⁸⁷) that was to develop between the two men, it is quite likely that Maecenas had a particular sympathy for the man presented to him by his poet clients, and if Horace quite often in his later poetry protests his sincere and warm gratitude toward his patron, he had every reason for that, since he owed to him more than any other Augustan poet his particularly high-ranking position in society.

When we read Horace's account of his encounter with Maecenas it is important to be well aware of what he says and what he does not say. Most of what he writes about himself in *Serm.* 1.6 is addressed to his detractors;

⁸⁴ Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 10 with reference to Nisbet 1995: 391ff., where Horace's views, voiced in *Serm.* 1.10.1ff. (including an interpretation of the spurious preface attached to this satire), are set in their historical context; see also below, pp. 118ff.

⁸⁵ Below, pp. 37, 192.

⁸⁶ Cf. Courtney, below, pp. 102ff.

⁸⁷ Cf. Fraenkel 1957: 16f.

it is not what he said when he was called to see Maecenas. Face to face with Maecenas he spoke “little” (*pauca*); he simply told him who he was: a freedman’s son, caught up on the wrong side. What could the noble-born chief representative of the new order say to such a frank and sparse statement? *pauca*; what else? What should he do? There was not much to say between an ex-slave’s son and ex-fighter against the regime and the wealthy, noble grand seigneur, party lion, and clever manager of political power. Horace was dismissed and had to wait nine months, nine months of silence, until he was admitted. Horace’s words have the ring of truth. Why tell such a story if it were not true, why mention these nine months of waiting at all if the conclusion the text draws from it were not true? Maecenas took a liking to Horace (*placui tibi ... vita et pectore puro*). Quite obviously the chemistry between these two very different men was right, they understood and respected each other without many words: In his obituary of Paul Natorp Martin Heidegger remembered his friendship with a man very different from himself: “Er konnte schweigen; er war einer von den Menschen, mit denen man auf einem Spaziergang schweigen konnte.”

3.2. From Philippi to Rome

Horace had lost his father’s property in the confiscation of property and resettlement of soldiers at Venusia in 43 BC (cf. App. *Bell. Civ.* 4.3), after he had fought on the wrong side at Philippi, but he was pardoned, as the *Vita* (7 f.: *venia impetrata*) notes, probably in the amnesty after the treaty of Brindisi in 40 BC.⁸⁸ He evidently managed to preserve a decent amount of his fortune, so that he was able to buy himself the position of scribe in the quaestorial office, as described in the *Vita* (8: *scriptum quaestorium comparavit*), though Pollio and Messalla may have lent a hand as well.⁸⁹ As such, he had economic security and decent social standing.⁹⁰ Even without Maecenas’s gifts Horace was remarkably well-off in social and

⁸⁸ Hinard 1985: 264–269.

⁸⁹ Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 9.

⁹⁰ *EO* I 240 ff. *Serm.* 2.1 and *Epist.* 1.5 Horace flaunts acquaintance with two jurisconsults, Trebatius Testa (*EO* I 1922 f.) and Manlius Torquatus (dedicatee of *Epist.* 1.5 and *C.* 4.7; cf. Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: 325). It has even been plausibly suggested (Taylor 1925: 162 f., id. 1968: 478; Nicolet 1974: 183; Talbert 1984: 24 n. 60; Armstrong 1986: 255 f.; *EO* I 239; Oliensis 1998: 30 ff.; Armstrong in Davis 2010: 18 f.) that, in view of Horace’s boast in *Serm.* 1.6.107–111 that he might easily attain the rank of *praetor* or *senator* and Davus’s reference to a *iudex Damas*, while speaking of Horace’s equestrian ring (*Serm.* 2.7.53 f.), *Serm.* 1.4.123 may allude to Horace also having been a *iudex selectus*.

financial standing; yet as *Serm.* 1.6.58f.⁹¹ indicates, he (or perhaps Virgil or Varius?) mentioned the loss of his father's property when he was introduced to Maecenas. If we want to appreciate what Maecenas's patronage meant to Horace's self-esteem we must take into account that simply being a successful businessman and a Roman magistrate, however high-ranking, was not what a man like Horace had once aspired to.

During his studies at Athens the young man had been recruited, like many others, by Brutus for his republican army in 44 BC (Plut. *Brut.* 24). Horace made a startling career, one that might have surprised his rather ambitious father, and became a military officer at the rank of *tribunus militum*⁹² and commander of a legion (*Serm.* 1.6.46–48). If he had not been an *eques* before, he must have become one at this stage.⁹³ Surely, Horace, in his early twenties, would not have made this astounding career without being both an extremely efficient man of action and an ardent believer in the ideals of the old system. His engagement on the side of the old system will have had the fervor of converts who made their way into a position that had not been given to them as a matter of course.⁹⁴ Thus, just reconstructing his life and succeeding at least materially after Philippi must have appeared to Horace no more than trying to collect the bits and pieces of his external existence, which had suffered a major catastrophe for all his beliefs and aspirations; the position that the circumstances allowed for must have appeared highly unsatisfactory to him.

In retrospect he talks about the failure of his youthful aspirations in *Epist.* 2.2.41 ff.:

*Romae nutriri mihi contigit atque doceri,
iratus Graiis quantum nocuisset Achilles.
adiecere bonae paulo plus artis Athenae,
scilicet ut vellem curvo dinoscere rectum
atque inter silvas Academi quaerere verum.
dura sed emovere loco me tempora grato
civilisque rudem belli tulit aestus in arma
Caesaris Augusti non responsura lacertis.
unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi,*

⁹¹ On these lines cf. also Armstrong in Davis 2010: 20. Further Courtney, below, p. 108.

⁹² *EO* I 237 ff.; on this office, cf. Marquardt 1881–1885: 364–368; Suolahti 1955: 35–187. In *Epist.* 2.2.41 ff. Horace implicitly admits (*rudem belli*) that one may at least have been surprised or even have found him inadequate for the job.

⁹³ Above, p. 16.

⁹⁴ As a poignant example of such one could read e.g. Eduard Norden's speech of 1929 on the dead of three wars, printed in Mensching 1993: 101 ff.; one will understand C. 3.2. much better.

*decisis humilem pinnis inopemque paterni
et laris et fundi paupertas impulit audax
ut versus facerem ...*

I had the fortune to be raised in Rome, where I learned from my teacher how much harm was done to the Greeks by the wrath of Achilles. Then a little more training was added by Athens the good, so that at least I was keen to distinguish straight from crooked and to go in search of truth among the Academy's trees. But harsh times tore me away from the pleasant spot, and the billows swept the raw recruit into a force which would prove no match for the brawny arms of Caesar Augustus. Discharged by Philippi, there I was with my wings clipped, no longer a flyer and without my family hearth and home. At once our Lady Poverty, daring as ever, impelled me to turn out verses ...

After what has been said the *paupertas* (poverty) that is mentioned in l. 51 cannot refer to actual material poverty resulting from the loss of the father's estate, as the text jokingly pretends,⁹⁵ nor would verse-making have been a better means of earning one's living in Horace's days than it is today: the poverty of which Horace speaks is the spiritual poverty of a man who was deeply shattered in his beliefs and in his aspirations to a meaningful role in a society that, as he had to acknowledge, had no chance of surviving.⁹⁶ The *paupertas* symbolizes a crisis and new orientation in Horace's life. Horace confesses in *Serm.* 1.10.31–35 that in Athens he composed some Greek poetry; the Greek Anthology includes two epigrams attributed to a certain Flaccus, which some have attributed to Horace.⁹⁷ Yet this did not mean that he intended to become a poet; on the contrary, his words mean exactly the opposite, i.e., that he did not feel that this was his destiny:

*Atque ego cum Graecos facerem, natus mare citra,
versiculos, vetuit me tali voce Quirinus,
post mediam noctem visus, cum somnia vera:
'In silvam non ligna feras insanius ac si
magnas Graecorum malis implere catervas.'*

I myself once tried to write a little piece in Greek, in spite of being born this side of the water; but far after midnight, when dreams are true, Quirinus appeared and stopped me. He said: "For you to aspire to swell the mighty ranks of the Greeks is just as silly as carrying a load of timber to the forest."

⁹⁵ Below, pp. 29 f.

⁹⁶ Cf. also Reckford 1969: 23 f.

⁹⁷ See *EO* I 214, 316.

Horace brushes his poetic activity aside, *en passant*, as the pastime of a dilettante, one not unusual among educated Romans.⁹⁸ He does not call poetry his vocation from his adolescence onward (as does Propertius in 4.1.131ff.⁹⁹). On the contrary, Horace had sought to play a significant role in public life. This hope was shattered after Philippi. When Horace says that *paupertas* drove him to turn to poetry, he indicates that in this time of external and internal crisis after Philippi he discovered his vocation as a poet. In C. 2.7 he reveals the real background of his vocation by recreating his experience of defeat, recalling the poet Archilochus's loss of his shield in Thracia, and, at the same time, styling himself as a successor of his models Archilochus and Alcaeus, who in his poetry referred to an analogous event (ll. 9–16):¹⁰⁰

*tecum Philippos et celerem fugam
sensi relictā non bene parmula,
cum fracta virtus et minaces
turpe solum tetigere mento:*

*sed me per hostis Mercurius celer
denso paventem sustulit aere,
te rursus in bellum resorbens
unda fretis tulit aestuosus.*

With you beside me I experienced Philippi and its headlong rout, leaving my little shield behind without much credit, when valor was broken and threatening warriors ignominiously bit the dust.

I, however, was swiftly caught up by Mercury in a thick cloud and carried trembling through the enemy's ranks, whereas you were sucked back into the war by the current and borne away by the seething tide.

And in fact, as Hans Peter Synikus has pointed out to me, in C. 1.32.6–12 Horace speaks of Alcaeus:

*... qui ferox bello, tamen inter arma
sive iactatam religarat udo
litore navim,*

*Liberum et Musas Veneremque et illi
semper haerentem puerum canebat
et Lycum nigris oculis nigroque
crine decorum.*

⁹⁸ See below, pp. 229, 480 f.

⁹⁹ See Günther 2010a: 59.

¹⁰⁰ "A literary poet fighting near the Thracian coast would have remembered that this was where Archilochus had lost his shield," Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 113; cf. below, pp. 192, 321, 393, 398, 400.

... who was a valiant warrior, and yet, between attacks, or if he had tied up his storm-tossed ship on the still-wet sand,

would sing of Bacchus and the Muses and Venus and the little boy who clings to her side, and the gorgeous Lycus with his jet-black eyes and jet-black hair.

Probably in the period of inner reversion after Philippi, Horace came in contact with the Epicurean circles around Philodemus through his friends Virgil and Varius and thus became attracted to Epicurean philosophy as a model for another kind of life, one that suited his new situation. In Athens, Horace had studied at the Academy,¹⁰¹ and if proof were needed, his further course of life shows that his philosophical attachments in Athens would have been all but Epicurean: Brutus was a Platonist (Plut. *Brut.* 2) or rather a Platonist informed by Antiochus of Askalon's fusion of Platonism with Stoic philosophy. Horace mentions Plato in *Serm.* 2.3.11 (cf. also *AP* 309–311) and 2.4.3.¹⁰² In his political stance Horace, the man of action and partisan of the old order, proves himself a true disciple of his father's moral education in old-fashioned Roman style, as described in *Serm.* 1.4.103 ff. and 1.6.81 ff., and his philosophical inclinations would have drawn him to a philosophical school in sympathy with this upbringing. Horace refers to Brutus's famous quotation of the lines of tragedy (*trag. adesp.* 374 N) before his suicide (Dio 47.49.2) as *fracta virtus* (broken virtue).¹⁰³ Like Brutus, Horace experienced virtue, as he conceived of it until then, broken apart like an empty word:

After a tenacious and bloody contest, the Caesarian army prevailed. Once again the Balkan lands witnessed a Roman disaster and entombed the armies of the Republic—"Romani bustum populi."¹⁰⁴ This time the decision was final and irrevocable, the last struggle of the Free State. Henceforth nothing but a contest of despots over the corpse of liberty. The men who fell at Philippi fought for a principle, a tradition and a class—narrow, imperfect and outworn, but for all that the soul and spirit of Rome.¹⁰⁵

It was precisely this ambiguity, that the very soul of Rome was embodied in the representatives of an outworn class, which could provide only a last echo of the greatness of the Roman past in its irrevocable defeat, it was this ambiguity that Horace, the young upstart of humble origins, must have felt after

¹⁰¹ Cf. also Stenuit in *EO* I 229 ff.

¹⁰² He also writes a poem where Archytas, *C.* 1.28, is a central figure; on this poem cf. also Huffman 2005: 19 ff.

¹⁰³ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 115, who deny specific reference, which is however likely in view of the fact that Horace refers to the Greek lines in *Epist.* 1.6.31.

¹⁰⁴ Lucan on Pharsalus (7.862), recalling Propertius's *civilia busta*, *Philippos* (2.27).

¹⁰⁵ Syme 1939: 205; cf. Dio 47.39.

escaping the dreadful slaughter of the remains of the aristocracy. Horace has often been accused of speaking here and elsewhere in a detached, almost jokingly off-hand manner of his war experience; yet, it would be a mistake to take Horace's ostentatious nonchalance as a sign of detachment: Horace was a man who had experienced the unprecedented slaughter of Philippi (Dio 47.39.1; Plut. *Brut.* 45.1).¹⁰⁶ In *C.* 2.7.11 f. (*minaces turpe solum tetigere mento* "threatening warriors ignominiously bit the dust") one can still feel the bitterness of a man who felt somewhat like the soldier of the First World War of whom Stefan George writes in his poem *Der Krieg*:

*der lacht nur grell wenn falsche heldenreden
von vormals tönen der als blut und klumpen
den bruder sinken sah ...*

And Appian's (*BC* 4.128) description of the battle (*φόνος δέῃν καὶ στόνος πολὺς, καὶ τὰ μὲν σώματα αὐτοῖς ὑπεξεφέρετο, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀντικαθίσταντο ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων*: "[T]he slaughter and the groan was terrible. The bodies of the fallen were carried back and others stepped into their places from their reserves") is not so far from Stefan George's description of the battle in the trenches in the same poem. It was easy to become a cynic after Philippi, as did many of the surviving members of an outworn class,¹⁰⁷ but not all—certainly not Horace.

If Horace adopted the quietism of Epicurean teaching¹⁰⁸ as a consequence of his personal misfortunes, he was never a strict adherent of this or any other philosophical school, despite the explicit declaration of his Epicureanism in *Epist.* 1.4.15 (cf. also *Serm.* 1.5.101–103). He adopted Epicureanism as a philosophy that suited the new role he thought he had to play in life, but he was equally open to other philosophical approaches as time went on, whenever they suited his personal situation.¹⁰⁹ But, as his later political poetry shows,¹¹⁰ he was never unfaithful to the political ideals of his youth. In *C.* 2.1.21–24 Horace recalls the suicide of Cato's *atrox animus*.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Syme, *op. cit.*, 205 f.

¹⁰⁷ Men like the Delliui of *C.* 2.3 (see Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 51 f.), and even Messalla, who described the latter as a cynic (*Sen. suas.* 1.7), and Pollio himself; see Syme 1986: 214 f.; 384 f.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the beautiful pages of Schwartz (1943 and 1951) on Epicurus; also Festugière 1954: 54 ff.

¹⁰⁹ See Günther 2010a: 62 ff.

¹¹⁰ Below, p. 409.

¹¹¹ "The word is derived from *ater*, and is complimentary only by way of paradox," Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 24. Cf. also Cato's appearance among the great men of Roman history in *C.* 1.12.35 f. (below, pp. 365 ff.).

*videre magnos iam videor duces
non indecoro pulvere sordidos
et cuncta terrarum subacta
praeter atrocem animum Catonis.*

Already I think I see the great generals, dirty with no inglorious dust, and the whole world vanquished except for Cato's defiant soul.

The *duces non indecoro pulvere sordidos* (generals dirty with no inglorious dust) echoes C. 2.7.11 f. and sounds very much like George's "heilig sind nur die säfte noch makelfrei verspritzt" in the poem quoted above. And one may well apply to Horace the words of George's poem *Auf einen Jungen Führer aus dem ersten Weltkrieg*:

*Du aber tu es nicht gleich unbedachtsamem schwarm
der was er gestern bejauchzt heute zum kehricht bestimmt.*

After Philippi Horace might have pondered questions similar to those Cicero put to himself in his letter to the Epicurean Atticus from 12 March 49 BC¹¹² (9.4) when he meditates: *εἰ μενετέον ἐν τῇ πατρίδι τυραννουμένης αὐτῆς* (whether one should stay in one's homeland when it is under the rule of a tyrant; 9.4.2). But while Cicero only "took his mind for a while off his troubles" (9.4.3), if Horace had pondered Cicero's question, *εἰ πολιτικὸν τὸ ἡσυχάζειν ἀναχωρήσαντά ποι τῆς πατρίδος τυραννουμένης ἢ διὰ παντὸς ἰτέον κινδύνου τῆς ἐλευτερίας πέρι* (ought a statesman to live quietly in retirement while his country is under despotism or ought he to take every risk for freedom's sake), the answer would have been obvious: in the contest of despots there were no *ἄριστοι*, no *optimates* any longer to join; whoever tried to overthrow tyranny would only risk that "the very existence of the state was going to be endangered" (*περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἢ πόλις κινδυνεύσειν*). Horace was sure that, after "having brought himself irreparable suffering," having "incurred danger on his country's behalf," he was allowed "to begin to think of himself and give up political opposition to those in power." And when withdrawal from politics was final and inevitable, Horace had to look for something that filled his life with new meaning; seeking an intellectual justification for his retreat from public life what other philosophy but Epicureanism could he adopt if he aspired to be coherent in what he thought he would be destined to do for the rest of his life? And yet, when his chance came to be able, in a surprising way, "to help his country by words" (*ἀρήγειν τῇ πατρίδι λόγῳ*), how could he resist the opportunity?

¹¹² Shackleton Bailey 1968: 366.

Horace never completely abandoned his youthful aspirations to play a meaningful political role in Roman society. It was difficult for him to renounce his political aspirations, and *Epodes* 9 and 16¹¹³ testify to both his bitterness about the “contest of despots,” and his determination never to renounce his own political voice; once he had convinced himself that Augustus’s regime provided the only realistic possibility of national resurrection he wholeheartedly welcomed the new order and became its fervent and sincere adherent.¹¹⁴ When Horace fought for the old system, he fought for a mere ideal, one that was not contaminated by interests or attitudes and was natural for those belonging to the elite of the old system. Horace could not have felt the slightest inclination to cling to an outworn political system for reasons of convenience or personal attachment. If Cicero was well aware of the shortcomings of the contemporary members of the political elite, how much more so must Horace have been?¹¹⁵ And if Horace changed sides, it was not, as with members of the Republican elite, out of convenience and cynicism; he was never “one of them”; he was a member of the Roman people on whose acclaim Augustus claimed to base his power. When Horace, toward the end of his life and career, in the fourth book of the *Odes*,¹¹⁶ takes back the pompous stance of the *vates* of *Epod.* 16 and the *Roman Odes* and portrays himself as one of the simple Roman citizens, this attitude perfectly fits his mentality, rooted in his humble social background. M. Lowrie¹¹⁷ is entirely right when she detects in *C.* 4.15 that Horace is an advocate of a strong interpretation of Augustus’s claim to rule by the *consensus universorum* (consensus of all the people);¹¹⁸ there could be nobody to whom the essence of this concept must have appealed more than it did to Horace.

Of course, Horace profited substantially in terms of material wealth from Maecenas’s patronage.¹¹⁹ Yet, what really mattered to him was the fact that his reception into Maecenas’s circle paved the way for him to find a meaningful role in the new system adequate for his aspirations. *Serm.* 2.6.25–58 shows that to be a member of Maecenas’s circle was regarded as a position

¹¹³ Above, pp. 171 ff., and below, pp. 191 ff.

¹¹⁴ See below, pp. 360 ff., on *C.* 1.14 in particular.

¹¹⁵ “Horace, who may have seen too much of Roman *nobiles* at Philippi (cf. *trichilas* already at Pharsalus, Caesar, *Bell. Civ.* III.96.1), had enough of Republican romanticism,” Newman 2011: 129.

¹¹⁶ See Günther 2010a: 142 ff.

¹¹⁷ Lowrie in Davis 2010: 229.

¹¹⁸ Below, pp. 371 ff.

¹¹⁹ Below, pp. 34 ff.

that might lead to considerable influence in public life. Yet, Horace obviously did not aspire to a petty role in everyday politics; it was as a poet that he intended to find his place in contemporary society and he must have felt deep gratitude to the man who provided him with this opportunity. Thus, he hails Maecenas as his patron, addressing him with *o et praesidium et dulce decus meum* (my protection, my fame, and my joy) in the proem of the first collection of *Odes* (C. 1.1.2) and similarly in the address in *Epist.* 1.1.1.¹²⁰

4. THE ESTABLISHED POET

Horace had been introduced to Maecenas in about 38 BC and within nine months was admitted to his circle (*Serm.* 1.6.61f.). In the middle of 37 BC he accompanied Maecenas (together with Virgil) on a diplomatic mission as far as Brindisi (*Serm.* 1.5), whence Maecenas continued in order to negotiate the treaty of Tarentum with Antony. In the following year (36 BC), the poet probably served in Maecenas's company (App. BC 5.99) in the Sicilian War and almost died in a shipwreck at Cape Palinurus (C. 3.4.28).¹²¹

Horace's first book of poetry, the first book of the *Satires*, was published ca. 35 BC;¹²² later, Maecenas bestowed on him his beloved Sabine farm,¹²³ of which the poet speaks in the second book of *Satires*, published ca. 30 BC (surely after Actium because of *Serm.* 2.1.11, cited below). More or less at the same time Horace published the book of *Iambi* (as Horace himself calls the *Epodes*¹²⁴), in which he first adopted the meters of archaic Greek poetry. Both genres, satire and iambus, are not what one would expect a court poet would compose as his first works after being admitted to the inner circle. Such poetry rather fits the situation and the attitudes of the social outsider Horace was. In fact, not only *Serm.* 1.6, but also a piece such as *Epod.* 4, reflects the peculiar personal problems with which a poet with Horace's background was faced in the circles in which he was now moving. The development of Horace's poetic production in Maecenas's circle testifies to the patron's respect for the poet's real and poetic personality. There is nothing faintly panegyric or outright political in the first book of *Satires*: Horace's homage to his patron is just an expression of gratitude to the private person; it is his

¹²⁰ See Günther 2010a: 14 with n. 47, and below, pp. 38, 543 f.

¹²¹ Wistrand 1972: 304 f.

¹²² See also Courtney, below, pp. 124 ff.

¹²³ Below, pp. 36 f.

¹²⁴ Below, p. 169.

private character Horace depicts in such favorable terms in *Serm.* 1.6; he is conspicuously silent about the political significance of the journey depicted in *Serm.* 1.5.

The second book pays homage to the *Caesar invictus* in *Serm.* 2.1.11 in the context of a *recusatio*,¹²⁵ the rhetorical standard of Augustan poets for panegyric praise *en passant*,¹²⁶ but as regards Maecenas again Horace speaks only of personal friendship and gratitude to his patron for favors bestowed. The respect for the poet's autonomy, a respect Maecenas also showed Propertius, who before his last book never wrote much political poetry, is characteristic of the cultural politics of Maecenas and Augustus and made possible the development of a great poetic culture that was closely associated with a specific political system.¹²⁷ In the *Epodes*, published more or less at the same time as the second book of *Satires*, Horace includes two explicitly political poems, which mirror his dismay at the chaos and violence he experienced in his youth,¹²⁸ but in his depiction of Sextus Pompeius in *Epod.* 4.17–20¹²⁹ and Cleopatra in *Epod.* 9 he expresses explicit political partisanship.¹³⁰ At long last, he now also pays tribute to Maecenas's political position¹³¹ and protests his loyalty to the princeps.¹³² In fact, *Epod.* 1 and 9 attest that Horace had served at Maecenas's side at Actium¹³³ as he had probably in the Sicilian Wars.

The ultimate success with which Horace asserted himself as a leading poet with a distinctive poetic personality of his own came seven years later with the publication of the first collection of *Carmina* in 23 BC;¹³⁴ in *Epist.* 1.13 he tells us that he sent the three *volumina* to the princeps. As I shall suggest below¹³⁵ Horace may soon have felt that the Archilochean poetry of the *Epodes* did not really suit his aspirations and the generic restrictions to invective did not suit a world that, after Actium, became ever more peaceful and orderly. Thus, when Horace finally felt that he had

¹²⁵ Courtney, below, pp. 126 ff.; also pp. 232, 258.

¹²⁶ Below, pp. 256 ff.

¹²⁷ Below, pp. 260 f.

¹²⁸ See above, pp. 26 ff.

¹²⁹ Below, p. 186; also Watson 2003: 3.

¹³⁰ Below, pp. 191 ff.

¹³¹ Cf. also *Epod.* 3 and 14, where he shows Maecenas's amenable private side, below, pp. 186, 200 ff.

¹³² Watson (2003: 3) aptly speaks of a "microscopic representation of the *coniuratio totius Italiae*, the oath of fidelity sworn by Italy and the western provinces in 32 BC."

¹³³ See Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 11 f.; Watson 2003: 3 n. 28.

¹³⁴ Below, pp. 211 ff.

¹³⁵ Pp. 171, 191 ff.

mastered the forms of archaic Greek poetry in a way that met his artistic standards, he abandoned Archilochean poetry in favor of Lesbian lyrics; his first attempts at the new metrical form may date to as early as ca. 35 BC.¹³⁶ In any case, with the first collection of *Carmina* Horace introduces a new genre of lyrics in Rome, one that was to occupy him until the end of his career and that resulted in a large corpus of work with which Horace's achievement as a poet was predominantly associated by his contemporaries, and, despite the popularity his hexameter poems, in general also by future generations.¹³⁷ Although Horace still plays with the conventional trick of the Augustan *recusatio* by professing (C. 1.6) to be a poet of "Wein, Weib und Gesang,"¹³⁸ conformist political poetry now ranges conspicuously in the book. The *recusatio* is postponed as a kind of quasi-aside in a small poem, while the first poem of the major corpus of text (C. 1.2) after the proem is a sophisticated panegyric dedicated to the ruler.¹³⁹ Horace returns to Augustus in C. 1.12 with a second, even more panegyric poem in pointed reference to a Pindaric model.¹⁴⁰ At the beginning of book III Horace places the peak of his poetic achievement hitherto: a cycle of six poems in which Horace pointedly reassumes and reinterprets the role of *vates* he had vindicated for himself in *Epod.* 16.¹⁴¹ He now solemnly proclaims the old Roman values as they were conceived by Augustus's official political program.¹⁴² At the end of the collection Horace proudly proclaims himself satisfied that the proud aspirations to eternal fame as a poet with which he opened the collection in C. 1.1¹⁴³ have come true.

At the time of publication of C. I–III Horace appears to have owned a second country house in addition to his Sabine farm and his house in Rome (*Serm.* 1.6.114).¹⁴⁴ When the *Vita* (65) says, *vixit plurimum in secessu ruris sui Sabini aut Tiburtini domusque ostenditur circa Tiburni luculum* (He lived for the most part either in his Sabine or his Tiburtine country estate, and a house of his is shown near the grove of Tiburnus) this most likely implies that two different properties in the countryside are meant: one is

¹³⁶ Below, p. 212.

¹³⁷ See Tarrant in Harrison 2007a: 279 ff.; Jensen, *ibid.* 293 ff.

¹³⁸ In C. 1.6; see below, pp. 256 ff.

¹³⁹ Below, pp. 232 ff.

¹⁴⁰ Below, pp. 360 ff.

¹⁴¹ Below, pp. 191 ff. and 373 ff.

¹⁴² Below, pp. 373 ff.

¹⁴³ Below, pp. 224 ff.

¹⁴⁴ See Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 16; Shackleton Bailey 1982: 57; Lyne 1995: 7 f.

his Sabine farm, located probably near Licenza,¹⁴⁵ the other is a second house or estate (or both) at Tivoli, to which he alludes in *C.* 2.6¹⁴⁶ and which he later mentions explicitly in *C.* 4.2.30 ff. and *C.* 4.3.10.¹⁴⁷ By that time he may also have had some property at Tarentum, as Lyne plausibly concludes from *Epist.* 1.7.45, where Horace mentions Tibur and Tarentum as a place of retreat in one breath.¹⁴⁸ These were probably gifts from Augustus¹⁴⁹ himself, who is named explicitly as Horace's second benefactor after Maecenas in the *Vita* (9 f. and 37: *unaque et altera liberalitate locupletavit* [he bestowed on him the one and the other gift]). Horace also spent the summer months in the cool mountains at Praeneste and the winter in the fashionable sea resort in Baiae (*C.* 3.4.22–24; also *Epist.* 1.2.1 f.). Through his poetry Horace had become even wealthier. His ambiguous remark in *Epist.* 2.2.51 f., discussed above,¹⁵⁰ that “poverty” induced him to become a poet, thus acquires a new meaning: in retrospect Horace can rightly attribute his extraordinary success, particularly his elevated social and material position, to his poetic vocation.¹⁵¹ Yet, what does it mean when he says in the same breath that now that he has enough he prefers to sleep rather than write more poetry (ll. 52–54)? This statement, too, is ambiguous and full of self-irony; yet, there is a biographical background to it, as Horace's statement that poverty turned him into a poet interprets a concrete fact of Horace's biography.

5. THOUGHTS OF RETIREMENT

Only three years after the publication of *Carmina* I–III (there were five years between the publication of *Satires* I and II and the *Epodes*, and seven between these books and *C.* I–III) Horace makes another, much more explicit statement than that in *Epist.* 2.2, that he has become tired of composing poetry (*Epist.* 1.1.1–11).¹⁵²

¹⁴⁵ On Horace's Sabine farm, see, in particular, the beautiful monograph of Schmidt 1997; further Lyne 1995: 6 f. and Armstrong in Davis 2010: 31 n. 10.

¹⁴⁶ Below, p. 333.

¹⁴⁷ Fantham, below, pp. 448, 451.

¹⁴⁸ Lyne 1995: 10 f.

¹⁴⁹ We do not know when Horace became personally acquainted with Augustus; but it was surely before he sent him the three books of *Carmina* in 23 BC; see Becker 1963: 230 n. 17.

¹⁵⁰ P. 28.

¹⁵¹ Cf. also Brink 1982: 295, and below, pp. 45 ff.

¹⁵² See Günther 2010a: 10 ff., 38 ff., 42 ff.; also Heinze 1960: 300 ff.; Becker 1963: 38 ff.; Fantham, below, pp. 410 ff.

*Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena,
spectatum satis et donatum iam rude quaeris,
Maecenas, iterum antiquo me includere ludo?
Non eadem est aetas, non mens. Veianius armis
Herculis ad postem fixis latet abditus agro,
ne populum extrema rediens exoret harena.
Est mihi purgatum crebro qui personet aurem:
'solve senescentem mature sanus equum, ne
peccet ad extremum ridendus et ilia ducat.'
Nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono:
quid verum atque decens curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum.
Condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.*

Named by my earliest Muse and duly named by my last—Maecenas, I have
been tested enough and have now received
my foil. Are you trying to put me back in the old school?
My age and keenness are not what they were. Having hung his weapons
on Hercules's door, Veianius is lying low in the country
for fear he might have to plead again and again for discharge
from the edge of the sand. A voice whispers in my well-rinsed ear:
"Have some sense and release the aging horse in time,
or he'll end by stumbling and straining his flanks to the jeers of the crowd."
So now I am laying aside my verses and other amusements.
My sole concern is the question "What is right and proper?"
I'm carefully storing things for use in the days ahead.

This is the program poem of the first book of the *Epistles*, published in the year 20 BC. That Horace, after the publication of the three books of *Carmina*, should turn to a new type of poetry in tune with his advanced age and his position as an established poet is not surprising. C. 3.30 sums up Horace's previous achievement and marks an end that suggests that no continuation should be expected.¹⁵³ However, that Horace in *Epist.* 1.1 rejects Maecenas's request to compose more poetry of the type of C. I–III has often been seen as the result of Horace's disappointment with the reception of the *Odes*, which he voices in the last but one composition of the book, *Epist.* 1.19.19–34.¹⁵⁴

*O imitatores, servum pecus, ut mihi saepe
bilem, saepe iocum vestri movere tumultus!
Libera per vacuum posui vestigia princeps,
non aliena meo pressi pede. Qui sibi fidet,
dux reget examen. Parios ego primus iambos*

¹⁵³ Cf. also Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: 9 ff.

¹⁵⁴ For a detailed examination of the difficult and much discussed passage, see below, pp. 179 ff.

*ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
 Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.
 Ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes
 quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem,
 temperat Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho,
 temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar,
 nec socerum quaerit quem versibus oblinat atris,
 nec sponsae laqueum famoso carmine nectit.
 Hunc quoque, non alio dictum prius ore, Latinus
 vulgavi fidicen. Iuvat immemorata ferentem
 ingenuis oculisque legi manibusque teneri.*

Imitators! Bah! A slavish herd. How often their antics
 have made me wild with rage! How often they've made me laugh!
 Beholden to no one I blazed a trail over virgin country;
 nobody had trodden that ground. The one who trusts himself
 will rule and lead the swarm. I was the first to show
 the iambs of Paros to Latium, keeping Archilochus's rhythms
 and fire, but not his themes or the words which hunted Lycambes.
 In case, however, you think I deserve a smaller garland
 because I declined to change his meters and verse technique,
 manly Sappho moderated the Muse of Archilochus,
 and so did Alcaeus,¹⁵⁵ but different in themes and arrangement,
 he doesn't look for a father-in-law to smear with invective,
 or make a noose for his bride out of scarifying verses.
 I, the lyrist of Latium, have made him familiar—a poet
 never sung before. I am glad to be held and read
 by the better sort, and to offer things that no one has uttered.

Yet, if these words betray disappointment, it is certainly not because of lack of success.¹⁵⁶ On the contrary, this statement clearly indicates that the first collection of the *Odes* was a huge success. It brought the poet the highest public prominence and attention. In fact, the astonishing rise of the social upstart is due to the success of his highly original work as a poet, which attracted much envy, bad will, and detraction from fellow poets and intellectual circles of the day. Horace's rightful claim of originality seems to have been undermined by these critics and detractors. Thus, Horace's anger is directed against intentionally fostered misapprehension of his work and negative public opinion, different from the attitude of the *ingenui*, the "noble and pure of heart," whom Horace desires as readers.¹⁵⁷ As far as

¹⁵⁵ Here the translation is my own, since Rudd gives a version in accord with the *communis opinio*, which I reject; see below, pp. 179 ff.

¹⁵⁶ Günther 2010a: 12 ff.

¹⁵⁷ Günther 2010a: 10 with n. 34.

external factors determined Horace's refusal to continue with lyric poetry, one suspects that, once he reached the limelight, he tired of its negative aspects, and that in view of his more than comfortable financial and social standing he felt no need to further expose himself to the public, but chose rather to retire. This appears to be the meaning of what he says in the *Florus-Epistle*. Yet what he says in *Epist.* 1.1 goes further.

If we take Horace at his word, he says he is too old now for lyric poetry and this means for poetry *stricto sensu*, in general. In *Epist.* 2.2.55–57 Horace says explicitly that old age is making him increasingly unable to write poetry:

*Singula de nobis anni praedantur euntes.
Eripuere iocos, Venerem, convivia, ludum,
tendunt extorquere poemata. Quid faciam vis?*

As the years go by they rob us of one thing after another.
Already they've taken fun, sex, parties, and sport;
now they're pulling away my poems. What shall I do then?

The poet also expresses the fact that age weighs heavily on him at the beginning of the much-discussed *Epist.* 1.7 (1–12):

*Quinque dies tibi pollicitus me rure futurum,
Sextilem totum mendax desideror. Atqui
si me uiuere vis recteque videre valentem,
quam mihi das aegro, dabis aegrotare timenti,
Maecenas, veniam; dum ficus prima calorque
designatorem decorat lictoribus atris,
dum pueris omnis pater et matercula pallet,
officiosaque sedulitas et opella forensis
adducit febres et testamenta resignat.
Quodsi bruma nives Albanis illinet agris
ad mare descendet vates tuus, et sibi parcat,
contractusque leget. Tè, dulcis amice, reviset
cum Zephyris, si concedes, et hirundine prima.*

A week—that is how long I promised to stay in the country.
And I'm gone the whole of August. Most reprehensible. Yet
I know you want me to remain healthy and fit, Maecenas.
You show patience when I'm ill; so please do the same when I'm trying
to avoid being ill, when the heat that ripens the early figs
brings the undertaker out, complete with his black attendants,
when fathers and doting mothers are pale with fear for their children,
when conscientious deference and the footling concerns of the Forum
bring on bouts of malaria and break the seals of wills.
But as soon as the winter covers the Alban fields with snow,
your lyric poet will go down to the seaside and take it easy,
curled up with a book. If you, my friend, will let him,
he will come and see you along with the zephyr and the first swallows.

That these words could ever have been interpreted as evidence that the friendship between Horace and Maecenas (to whom the first book of the *Epistles* is dedicated) had cooled is puzzling.¹⁵⁸ On the contrary, the poet expresses the warm desire to be with his friend, but complains that age and bad health debar him from doing so by constraining him to remain in the countryside, avoiding the burdens of social life in the city. All this amounts to the observation that Horace, after the completion of the first collection of the *Odes* and now that he was in his mid-forties, felt that he had grown old, was unwilling to cope any longer with a life of many social obligations, angry with detractors, and even less inclined to compose poetry; he was tired of producing in order to establish himself as a poet. In fact, he had established himself, and did not need to show off any longer.

This kind of creative crisis may seem to come rather early in Horace's career, yet Horace's prior life, as already noted, had been anything but easy. He was a highly ambitious and energetic early upstart, whose exceptional energy had secured him a high military position by his early twenties. He his social standing was threatened after he had been involved in highly dramatic military and political events. His life had been full of drama from the start. Horace had managed his affairs extremely shrewdly and cleverly, which explains why Horace could assume the role of the mature, elderly person with conviction and plausibility in his earliest work, the *Satires*.¹⁵⁹ In the *Odes*, when he portrays himself as a lover he often implicitly paints himself as an old man in hunt for a girl still too young.¹⁶⁰

There is every reason to believe that Horace, the "Epicurean" poet of pleasure in the face of imminent death from a very early age felt acutely that life had made him old too early. And quite apart from that, there are other examples of artists retiring more or less at Horace's age.¹⁶¹ Perhaps Rossini's is the most telling case. He, too, was a highly successful composer and businessman who knew how to profit materially from his art. At a younger age than Horace he retired from the opera stage in 1829, when he was only 36 years old. Yet this did not mean that he did not continue to compose at his leisure. And, when the occasion arose, he did not turn down a profitable offer, even though with his *Stabat Mater* he had to compose—and later revise—a major, beautiful, and highly successful work.

¹⁵⁸ See Becker 1963: 25 ff.; Günther 2010a: 21 ff.

¹⁵⁹ Günther 2010a: 68 f.

¹⁶⁰ Below, pp. 339 ff.

¹⁶¹ Günther 2010a: 69.

Similarly, Horace's creative crisis did not mean that he would stop writing poetry. In fact, he announces his retirement in the opening poem of his most recent work, a work that he introduces as both a kind of semi-poetry and the a fruit of his more serious concerns now that the limited nature of the life span still at his disposal must have become ever clearer to him. With his claim that what he is writing now, with the first book of *Letters*, is only semi-poetry he harks back to the *musa pedestris*, "the pedestrian muse" of the *Satires*. But with the first book of the *Epistles* Horace creates an entirely new genre, that of the poetic verse epistle.¹⁶² Horace opens his "Spätwerk" with what is his most original poetry.

6. THE LATE YEARS

Whatever the date of the second book of *Epistles* and the *Ars Poetica*, if Horace in both these works turns to poetry about poetry we may well take these works as a kind of poetic testament. In *Epistles* I Horace had turned to philosophy (and thus to philosophical poetry) in his search for the right way of life (*recte facere*, *Epist.* 1.1.60) in the face of ever more imminent death.¹⁶³ Thus, if Horace now turned to reflecting about his art in his poetry, this may be regarded as his ultimate search for the *recte facere*.¹⁶⁴ As such a reflection of an artist at the end of his career, these works resemble, if one wants modern examples, Goethe's *Märchen* and *Novelle*, Bach's *Art of the Fugue*, or Richard Strauss's *Capriccio*. Still, the book of the *Epistles* and the *Ars Poetica* are not the end of the story.

Probably as a consequence of the Caepio affair, in which Maecenas chose not to betray the brother of his wife Terentia, who was involved in a conspiracy against the princeps, Maecenas lost much of his influence and chose to retire from office.¹⁶⁵ As Maecenas's testament (*vita* 16 f.)¹⁶⁶ and *C.* 4.11.13–20¹⁶⁷ show, this did not mean that his friendship with Horace was diminished, nor did this exclude a relationship of mutual respect with Augustus. The story

¹⁶² Below, p. 468.

¹⁶³ See Günther 2010a: 69ff.; whereas *Epist.* 1.1 is often wrongly interpreted simply as ridiculing Stoicism, Reckford (1969: 108ff.), who rightly points out the attractions Stoicism apparently held for Horace in this situation, keeps the right balance between seriousness and irony in this immensely complex text.

¹⁶⁴ Günther 2010a: 178 f.

¹⁶⁵ This is doubted by Williams 1990; cf. also more recently Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: 39 f.

¹⁶⁶ Below, p. 48.

¹⁶⁷ Below, p. 47.

rather attests to the difficulties of friendship among politicians, of which Cicero speaks in *De amicitia* 17.64.¹⁶⁸ It appears to have become inopportune for Maecenas to play an official role in politics any longer. In any case, the first book of the *Epistles* is Horace's last work dedicated to Maecenas. Similarly, in Propertius's fourth and last book Maecenas's name does not even appear.

In any case, after his triumphant return from the East in 19 BC, the emperor himself appears to have taken cultural politics more and more into his own hands and he became increasingly interested in Horace. The *Vita* preserves several indications of the strong personal ties and the intimacy between Horace and the princeps, which the latter did not share with any other Augustan poet.¹⁶⁹ That Horace, who was socially so well versed, should have succeeded more than any other artist in winning the princeps's favor is all too plausible, in particular if one thinks of Horace's practical abilities and down-to-earth attitude, which would have attracted a man like Augustus. Thus, apart from Augustus's high esteem for Horace the poet,¹⁷⁰ the *vita* (18 ff.) tells us that Augustus at some point even offered him a post as his personal secretary:

Augustus epistularum quoque ei officium obtulit, (ut) hoc ad Maecenatem scripto significat: ante ipse sufficebam scribendis epistulis amicorum; nunc occupatissimus et infirmus Horatium nostrum a te cupio abducere. veniet ergo ab ista parasitica mensa ad hanc regiam et nos in epistulis scribendis adiuvabit. ac ne recusanti quidem aut succensuit quicquam aut amicitiam suam ingerere desiit.

Augustus even proposed to him the office of personal secretary, as he made clear writing to Maecenas as follows: "[H]itherto I was sufficient myself for writing letters to my friends; now, overworked and in bad health as I am, I want to abduct our Horace from you. He will thus come from this parasitic table to this royal one and will help us in letter writing." And not even when he refused was he angry in the least or stopped conferring his friendship upon him.

This would have been a demanding role, and Augustus's request is the ultimate proof how highly he rated Horace's proven efficiency in practical life and of the personal trust he put in him. Horace, tired, as we have seen, of social obligations, declined and Augustus accepted. Yet, Horace did not decline the princeps's demands on him as a poet. Augustus acquiesced;

¹⁶⁸ Günther 2010a: 123 f. n. 1.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. the intimate tone of letters of Augustus to Horace cited below, p. 44, and the nicknames he had for his poet friend.

¹⁷⁰ Below, pp. 44 ff.

Suetonius's words (*ne ... quidem*) show that this was not what one would have expected—at least not in Suetonius's time.

As regards the *Letter to Augustus* (*Epist.* 2.1.), already mentioned, Suetonius presents us with the testimony of a letter from the princeps to the poet, which incited Horace to write this piece (*vita* 43 ff.):¹⁷¹

... post sermones vero quosdam lectos nullam sibi mentionem habitam ita sit questus: irasci me tibi scito, quod non in plerisque eiusmodi scriptis mecum potissimum loquaris. an vereris ne apud posteros infame tibi sit, quod videaris familiaris nobis esse? *expressitque eclogam ad se, cuius initium est:*

*cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia solus,
res Italas armis tuteris, moribus ornes,
legibus emendes, in publica commoda peccem,
si longo sermone morer tua tempora, Caesar.*

... but after he read some *sermones* he complained that no mention was made of him as follows: "You should know I am angry with you for not talking to me rather than to others in your numerous writings of that kind; are you afraid that if you are seen to be a friend of mine it will tarnish your reputation with posterity?" and he pressed him to write a eulogy of him, which begins:

Since you carry so many weighty affairs on your shoulders, strengthening Rome's defenses, promoting decent behavior, reforming our laws, it would damage the public interest, Caesar, if I were to waste your time with a lengthy conversation.

The joking tone is an indication of intimacy; of course, Augustus is amicably teasing the poet (the text of the letter refutes Suetonius's *expressit*). Horace replies with the utmost urbanity in the *Letter to Augustus*, pretending not that a request had been made—this would be almost a humiliation for the eminent patron—but that the poet does not know whether he can take some of the princeps's precious time, which is devoted to matters of the utmost importance, for his humble art.¹⁷²

In fact, the letter soon abandons the topic of poet and patron and begins a long discourse on the value of modern poetry.¹⁷³ Only at the end does Horace

¹⁷¹ Cf. also Reinhardt, below, p. 503; in his attempt to show the unity of Horace's late work, Becker (1963) thinks he must defend Horace's artistic autonomy by rejecting, even in this case where we have Suetonius's explicit testimony, the idea that Horace ever wrote "Auftragsdichtung"; Becker's admirable interpretation, intent on developing the major trends of Horace's late poetry from their roots in his earlier work, remains valid, but there is no reason to play down the importance of the external circumstances that prompted these and other Horatian poems; see also below, pp. 471 f.; 485 f.

¹⁷² See Günther 2010a: 17 ff., and below, pp. 485 ff.; also Fraenkel 1957: 386 f.

¹⁷³ Below, pp. 494 ff.

return to the topic of good and bad panegyrics and praise the princeps for having the good sense to know that bad poetry exposes not only the artist but the subject of his art as well. Thus, Horace deems the princeps a worthy counterpart for a discourse on Roman poetry and his art, and can be certain that this was the kind of poetry Augustus would appreciate. This is the highest compliment the artist Horace could pay the emperor. That Augustus did in fact appreciate this poetry and value an artist like the Horace of *Epist.* 2.2 so highly is the most eminent sign of his greatness as a man beyond his qualities as an eminently successful politician: the empire that Augustus had built did not, of course, last forever, but good verse survives and binds some of the greatest poets of European literature to his regime and to his very person. Augustus left his stamp on poetry that is admired to this day, even by those who detest his regime and his politics.

Of Augustus's high esteem for Horace as a poet and his awareness of how important he would be for his aspirations of future glory we have the testimony of the *Vita* in the text immediately before the passage just quoted (*vita* 38 ff.):

scripta quidem eius usque adeo probavit mansuraque perpetua opinatus est, ut non modo saeculare carmen componendum (ei) iniunxerit, sed et Videlicorum victoriam Tiberii Drusique privignorum suorum (illustrandam), eumque coegerit propter hoc tribus carminum libris ex longo intervallo quantum addere ...

[H]is writings he held in such esteem and thought they would remain forever, that he induced him not only to write the carmen saeculare, but also to praise the victory over the Vindelici by his stepsons Tiberius and Drusus, and he forced him therefore to add to his three books of carmina after a long pause a fourth one ...

That Horace composed a poem to be performed by a chorus of boys and girls at the *ludi saeculares* of 17 BC, is recorded in an inscription (*CIL* 6.32323.149) that has survived to this day.¹⁷⁴ With this poem Horace became the poet laureate of the regime; no doubt, he felt deeply honored by the post, as Racine felt honored by winning the post of court historian to Louis XIV. The poet speaks of the event with pride later in *C.* 4.6,¹⁷⁵ and in *C.* 4.3: recalling his programmatic statement in *C.* 1.1, Horace humbly, yet proudly proclaims that the divine powers who had inspired his art had raised him, at long last, to his prominent position in Roman society; his youthful aspirations had

¹⁷⁴ Text, translation, and photographs of the inscription are found in Schnegg and Köhler 2002.

¹⁷⁵ Becker 1963: 116 ff.; Fantham, below, pp. 438 ff.

been fulfilled in a way that was, although different from what he had once expected, in accord with his true vocation.

With the request to compose the official poem for a great religious ceremony of utmost symbolic value for the regime Horace fully reached the position in society he had aspired to: he had not only succeeded in becoming a wealthy and respected citizen of equestrian rank, an artist recognized by the most eminent poets of his time, he had also actively taken part in the national resurrection of Rome. The *Carmen Saeculare* must have been for Horace the ultimate confirmation that he had become a national *vates* in the full sense of the word, a *vates* who had succeeded not only artistically, but in his political task: to equal, even to surpass his Greek models by transporting Greek poetry to Rome and thus endowing it with the superior civic values of Roman civilization.

In fact, as K. Reckford¹⁷⁶ has seen, when Horace in the *Letter to Augustus* (*Epist.* 2.1.126–133) speaks of the poet's task in general terms he also describes his path from his poetic origins, with a low and vulgar poetic genus, to his new stature as an official poet of the Roman state:

*os tenerum pueri balbumque poeta figurat,
torquet ab obscenis iam nunc sermonibus aurem,
mox etiam pectus praeceptis format amicis,
asperitatis et invidiae corrector et irae;
recte facta refert, orientia tempora notis
instruit exemplis, inopem solatur et aegrum.
castis cum pueris ignara puella mariti
disceret unde preces, vatem ni Musa dedisset?*

The poet shapes the tender faltering speech of a child,
already turning the ear away from coarse expressions.
Later he molds the disposition by kindly maxims,
using his voice to correct cruelty, envy, and temper.
He recounts noble actions, equips the new generation
with old examples, and brings relief to the poor and sick.
Where would innocent boys and girls who are still unmarried
have learnt their prayers if the Muse had not vouchsafed them a poet?

In the passage, cited above,¹⁷⁷ about Augustus's request, which prompted Horace to write *Epist.* 2.1, Suetonius speaks not only of the commissioning of the *Carmen Saeculare* but also of further lyric poetry to celebrate the victories of Augustus's two stepsons. The fourth book of *Odes* certainly

¹⁷⁶ Reckford 1969: 143; below, pp. 485 ff.

¹⁷⁷ P. 44.

resembles “Auftragsdichtung,”¹⁷⁸ but not only is the best poetry, as Goethe claimed, “Auftragsdichtung,” the fourth and last book of *Odes* is much more than that: it may appear—prima facie—a rather curious mixture of poems dedicated to Augustan nobles, the *jeunesse dorée* of the day,¹⁷⁹ including Augustus's two stepsons, the princeps himself and those on love and poetry, but it also sums up the possibilities of his previous poetry and opens up hitherto unexplored dimensions. Maecenas still appears in *C.* 4.11, though he is no longer the dedicatee. The warm words Horace uses in ll. 13–20 of this poem should disperse any doubt about their lasting friendship. In fact, Horace could not have found a more tactful manner to pay tribute to his friend, without causing offence in a situation where Maecenas appears to have had to step aside.

In the program cycle (*C.* 4.1–3),¹⁸⁰ Horace gives first place to love, and indicates thus that he is returning to lyric poetry in the style of the *Carmina*, as he characterized it in *Epist.* 1.1. There can hardly be any doubt that the commissioning of the *Carmen Saeculare* gave Horace's lyric production a new impulse. That Augustus should have asked to compose further panegyric poems on his stepsons' enterprises would be plausible, even if we did not possess Suetonius's testimony. However, the fact that *C.* 4.4 and 14 are not among the earliest poems included in book IV, suggests that this testimony is based on mere inference on Suetonius's part:¹⁸¹ book IV is not necessarily the result of a request by Augustus. Suetonius's *coegerit* (he forced) is, if one reads Horace's reply to the invitation in *C.* 4.2, as inept as his *expressit* in regard to *Epist.* 2.1. On the contrary: Augustus vested his request in words whose joking tone bears witness of the singular intimacy between Horace and the princeps. This intimacy is also attested by the two other fragments from letters that Suetonius adduces as testimony to their close friendship (*vita* 25 ff.) and by the nicknames that the princeps had for him.¹⁸² The two poems addressed to the emperor in the fourth book of the *Odes* (*C.* 4.5 and 4.15) owe their unique simplicity, charm, and sincerity precisely to this intimate relationship between two men across an enormous social divide.¹⁸³

Apart from the date of the *Carmen Saeculare* (17 BC) there is some uncertainty about the chronology of Horace's works after the first book of *Epistles*,

¹⁷⁸ Cf. also below, pp. 445 ff.

¹⁷⁹ For the dedicatees of book IV, see Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: 35 ff.

¹⁸⁰ See Günther 1999; Günther 2010a: 124 ff.

¹⁸¹ Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: 13 ff.

¹⁸² See Fraenkel 1957: 18 ff.

¹⁸³ Fraenkel 1957: 440 ff.; Günther 2010a: 142 ff.

published in 20 BC. The fourth book of *Odes* can certainly not have been published earlier than 13 BC, but it may have been published as late as 10 BC.¹⁸⁴ The *Letter to Augustus* (*Epist.* 2.1) is from 12/11 BC.¹⁸⁵ The common view has long assigned the *Florus-Epistle* (*Epist.* 2.2) to 19 BC,¹⁸⁶ but lately Harrison has convincingly argued for a much later date, close to the *Letter to Augustus*.¹⁸⁷ The date of the *Ars Poetica* cannot be determined with certainty, but it is probably Horace's last work.¹⁸⁸ In the *Florus-Epistle* Horace excuses himself for not sending the *carmina* (i.e., lyric poetry) he had promised (24 f.); in the *Ars* (306) he says that he is no longer composing poetry *stricto sensu*.¹⁸⁹

Horace died on 27 November 8 BC (*vita* 72), shortly after Maecenas, who had commended the poet to the princeps in his will, and the poet was laid to rest beside his friend on the Esquiline (*vita* 78 f.).¹⁹⁰ His poet friends Virgil (†19 BC) and Varius (†ca. 15 BC), as well as his younger friend Tibullus (†19/18) and probably also Propertius (†not later than 6 BC)—all great Augustan poets of the first two generations—were dead by then. Thus Horace's death marks a sharp caesura in Roman literary history. Ovid, who was born amid the destruction of the old order, was a product of the new age and not an Augustan poet in the sense in which the former poets were. He was, as H. Fraenkel aptly put it in the title of his well-known book, "a poet between two worlds."

7. HORACE, THE MAN¹⁹¹

Horace's poetry has been, in a way, a victim of its own success, but this is true of his character and personality as well. It is hard to find any artist or intellectual in European history who equals Horace's extraordinary career, which led the ex-slave's son from a provincial town in southern Italy to a personal friendship with the man who after the collapse of an old world

¹⁸⁴ Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 16 f.; the dates of the single poems are discussed in Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: l.c.

¹⁸⁵ Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 19 f.

¹⁸⁶ Becker 1963: 61 f.; Becker's (who argues for a chronological sequence *Epist.* 2.2, *Ars Poetica*, *Epist.* 2.1) interpretation of Horace's late work with a view to its unity and organic growth remains valid; it is not safe, however, to deduce a chronology from an internal comparison of motifs, and Becker (1963: 234) is aware of this.

¹⁸⁷ Approved by Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 18.

¹⁸⁸ Rudd 1989: 19 ff.

¹⁸⁹ See below, pp. 467 ff.; Becker 1963: 71.

¹⁹⁰ Fraenkel 1957: 22 f.

¹⁹¹ Cf. also Günther 2011.

established a new world order. It seems strange that this aspect of Horace's personal fortunes has not been duly highlighted in modern scholarship. Scholars such as Lyne and Armstrong have rightly emphasized Horace's extraordinary qualities as a "businessman," as a clever manager of his own affairs. Yet, Horace's political commitment in his youth, the efficient man of action, the ardent believer in the cause of a social elite to which he did not belong, these have not been truly appreciated hitherto.

I had already written my contribution for this volume when Kevin Newman's *Horace as Outsider* appeared. To him goes the credit for having described poignantly how a man of Horace's lowly origins must have felt moving in the circles he did in late Republican and Augustan Rome. He stresses, even more than what I have done, the traumatic experiences of a man of Horace's social position who arrived at the top of first the wrong, and later of the right, side of a historical upheaval without precedent. A man like Horace could never have felt at home in his life among the upper few, however cozy his circumstances might have become. Yet, Newman's book also made me even more aware that Hans Peter Syndikus was right when he pointed out to me (*per litteras*) that the Horace of *C.* 4.3 and 6 and of *Epist.* 2.1 is a different man from the outsider of *Serm.* 1.6. Horace's early poetry, in its choice of genres, is that of someone who felt himself a social outcast, however comfortable his living circumstances. In *Epist.* 1.1, when he declares that he is retiring from the scene and attacks his detractors and false friends, he writes the poetry of an angry man who appears to hit back because deep down his self-esteem is much more vulnerable to offense than his ostentatiously aloof ironic stance would suggest. But the dignified pride, accompanied by the humbleness of the artist toward the higher powers who inspire his art, does not ring of the triumphalism of a man who still feels the need to hide his hurt self-esteem, and the *Letter to Augustus* shows the poet perfectly able to handle an extraordinary relationship with supreme tact and unobtrusive self-assurance.¹⁹² Yet, a man with Horace's credentials would surely never have become just a nice and easy man; he cannot, in private relationships, just politely assent, he has to tease even the emperor about his literary taste. That a man like him managed to ascend to a position like his and maintain attests not only to his own abilities but also to Augustus's and Maecenas's intelligence, character, and appreciation of artistic and human greatness.

¹⁹² Below, pp. 485ff.

On the other hand, a man like Horace must inevitably have become suspect to contemporaries and future generations alike because of that very success. His poetry amply attests to the fact that he had to deal with social prejudice, snobbery, and envy from early on. Suetonius (*vita* 9f.) describes his climbing up the social ladder in rather unfavorable terms:

... *ac primo Maecenati, mox Augusto insinuat* non mediocrem in amborum amicitia locum tenuit.

... and first he insinuated himself into Maecenas's favor, later into that of Augustus and held considerable position in the friendship of both men.

If Suetonius interprets Horace's success as the result of cunning insinuation, this view is not necessarily restricted to the particular situation of his time. Everyone, in Horace's day as well as in ours, can choose to be cynical about the material success of an upstart, and often the cynic will be right; of course, how one judges another's way of life always depends on the standards one wishes to apply. Yet, as I have pointed out above,¹⁹³ there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that an artist should also have a healthy dose of egoism and a sense of his proper value, that he should think that his art should earn him a decent position in society and a comfortable life in terms of material wealth. But the trickery of a cunning cynic would be unlikely to produce the seemingly paradoxical image of a man who managed to buy himself a ticket into the company of the really well-to-do of his day and, at the same time, to present himself as a model of both a frugal pristine Roman and a modest Epicurean lifestyle. To portray oneself in public in utter contrast to the facts is not the most astute strategy: whoever employs it has little chance of succeeding for long, at least if he is an upstart very much exposed to the limelight. But above all, how could a mere cynic and ruthless social climber be able to write poetry that for ages has given comfort and relief to countless people in difficult hours and served as a model for centuries to come of how to cope with the difficulties of life? The effect of Horace's poetry across the ages attests to the fact that Horace was a man who, in a quite exceptional manner, was able to combine astute management of his external affairs with purity of heart and moral rectitude, and that he possessed the rare gift of being able to balance in difficult times both his material interests and his personal integrity. Surely there cannot be a better characterization of the man than Wieland's famous words, which I have already cited elsewhere:¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Pp. 18 ff.

¹⁹⁴ Wieland 1986: 117; see Günther 2010a: 117.

Horaz hatte wachend gelebt, und durch seine Erfahrung zwey große Schätze gewonnen, Weltkenntniß und Kenntniß seiner selbst. Zwar hatte er auch gespielt, und schämte sich dessen nicht; aber er wußte aufzuhören, und der Tumult des Lebens und der Ergötzung hatte sein Ohr nicht stumpf gemacht, die leise Stimme seines Genius, seines bessern Selbst zu hören, die ihn ermahnte, mit sich selbst zu leben, und in sich zu suchen, was die Menschen sonst überall suchen, als da, wo sie es finden würden, und sich dann verwundern oder ärgern, daß es nicht zu finden sey.

However, there are two further aspects of Horace's life and work that, inevitably, attracted particularly unfavorable opinions about his character as well. Of course, sexual gossip was as dear to ancient biographers as it is to moderns, who attribute the shift in Max Weber's scholarly interests from labor to power and charisma to a change in his sexual habits. Thus, a poet who writes poems about himself, like *Epod.* 11 and 12, or talks about his *mille puellarum, puerorum mille furores* (infatuation with hundreds of girls and hundreds of boys) (*Serm.* 2.3.325) should not be astonished if ancient biographical tradition (*vita* 15–18)¹⁹⁵ sees fit to tell stories about him like the one about Horace's notorious mirrors:¹⁹⁶

... *ad res venereas intemperantior traditur; nam specula to(to) cubiculo [scorta] dicitur habuisse disposita, ut quocumque respexisset (s)ibi [ei] imago coitus referretur.*

he is said to have been quite unrestrained; because one says that he had mirrors distributed all over his bedroom, so that wherever he turned his eyes they would meet a reflection of sexual intercourse.

It is quite amusing to see that scholars up to the present day (and I include myself) have discussed the story's plausibility. I imagine that few today would find it morally objectionable, if it were true. Today no one needs to apologize for having had a healthy sex life; that Horace should have had any monkish inclinations is quite unlikely—nor did Maecenas or Augustus.¹⁹⁷ Still, Jasper Griffin has a point—more even than he may know—when he states that “the private life of the Latin love poets [and that of Horace as well] will have borne little resemblance to that of a modern scholar.”¹⁹⁸ In fact, Archilochus's poem, which is among the models of Horace's *Epod.* 8 and 12,¹⁹⁹ has earned him the reproach of having been “ein schwerer Psychopath” by

¹⁹⁵ Fraenkel 1957: 21.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Williams in Harrison 1995: 311.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Günther 2010a: 32.

¹⁹⁸ Griffin 1985: 17.

¹⁹⁹ See p. 199.

one of his more recent editors.²⁰⁰ Yet, whether Horace was a sexual omnivore in real life, as some passages of his poems and ancient gossip suggest, is more than doubtful. One should not forget that Horace's self-ironic references to his picturesque sexual life are more than balanced by his recommendations of due restraint in general and restraint on excessive sexual lust in particular.²⁰¹ The sex lives of other notorious lovers such as Franz Liszt, appear, on closer examination, to have been not quite as promiscuous as legend would have it. If today's moralists, however, are more accommodating of promiscuity than their Victorian predecessors, they often take offence at the crudity of some of Horace's "sexist" remarks, not only about slave boys and girls, but about women in general; there are people who wonder why an enlightened humanist like Horace (or the ancients in general) was so unsympathetic toward mature women seeking due sexual satisfaction. And this is the point where one has to confront the issue of Horace's sex life, even if one is not interested in gossip of this kind simply for the sake of amusement. It may be worth reminding ourselves that people who call Horace a sexist poet employ a rather novel word. Societies for whom this concept did (or does) not exist, may view remarks, which would be distasteful to Victorians, feminists, or sexually enlightened liberals, and, as a consequence, the poet's character and work in a very different light from some of us today. Of course, in *Serm.* 1.2 or poems like *Epod.* 8 and 12 (and elsewhere), Horace intends to be crude; yet, behind his words is no more than a matter-of-fact and realist view of male sexuality, common not only in his day and society, but also, as I vaguely suspect, rather widespread even today. In fact, one rather should not ask what feminists think of Goethe's instrumentalization of his nude models, when traveling to Italy, or of the habits of a real omnivore like Gabriele D'Annunzio, who when arriving in Piraeus harbor after a long journey at sea went to the next brothel rather than take in Hellas's glorious ancient sites, to the amazement and disgust of his learned and educated French publisher and travel companion.

There is no reason to deny that texts like *Serm.* 1.2 reflect Horace's real attitude toward sex and, to some extent, his actual sexual habits (he—like Tibullus—appears to have been bisexual, with a distinct preference for women²⁰²), nor is there any reason to defend him: his old-fashioned Roman

²⁰⁰ Merkelbach in Merkelbach and West 1974: 113.

²⁰¹ Pp. 253, 305, 340 f., *passim*.

²⁰² On Horace's bisexuality, see also Shackleton Bailey 1982: 67 ff.; Lilja 1983: 70 ff., 83 f.; Griffin 1985: 14 ff. (with further references, p. 15 n. 152), 25 f. in particular.

father would have approved (*Serm.* 1.4.111 ff.). Of course, in view of Horace's origins and his apparent sympathy with the lives of little people, attested elsewhere, his crude and much-censured remarks on the use of slave girls or boys as sexual objects in *Serm.* 1.2.116–118 may come as a surprise: *tument tibi cum inguina, num, si/ ancilla aut verna est praesto puer, impetus in quem/ continuo fiat, malis tentigine rumpi?* (When your organ is stiff, and a servant girl/ or a young boy from the household is near at hand and you know/ you can make an immediate assault, would you sooner burst with tension?).²⁰³ They can seem even more surprising if we remember that the poet himself was keen on pointing out that his father was anxious to preserve his son's chastity.²⁰⁴ However, on closer reflection, it is precisely in this context that the crudity of this and other similar Horatian remarks becomes intelligible: Horace knew something of real life: he knew it from the perspective of the underprivileged, the people at the bottom of society as well as somebody who eventually made his way to the top in extraordinary circumstances. Horace was a man who knew that life is hard and, as he had no pity for himself, he had none for others. *Quocirca vivite fortes/ fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus* (So be brave and bravely throw out your chest to meet the force of fate!) was the advice his fellow citizen Ofellus (*Serm.* 2.2.136) gave him. In order to appreciate the implications of the crude manner in which Horace talks about slaves in *Serm.* 1.2.116–118, one should not forget that he is equally crude in gibing at an upstart who bears an astonishing resemblance to himself, in *Epod.* 4.²⁰⁵ Horace's words on slave boys as sexual objects are like when the ex-slave Phaedrus tells the fable of the wolf and the lamb. Both poets knew firsthand what they were talking about.

There is a lesson here for the modern scholar who spends his life comfortably between his writing desk and the open fire in his living room. If anyone today takes offence at "politically incorrect" passages in Horace's poetry on women, he differs little from those editors who once deleted *Serm.* 1.5.82–85 and *Epod.* 8 and 12²⁰⁶ from their texts and translators who left the latter poems untranslated;²⁰⁷ he even lacks the urbanity of commentators who once may have switched to Latin from their native tongue when it came to explain certain passages in Aristophanes. Horace's words do not testify to any extraordinary views or habits for a man of his time. It is rather strange

²⁰³ See also Courtney, below, p. 140.

²⁰⁴ Above, p. 21.

²⁰⁵ Below, p. 186.

²⁰⁶ Thus, e.g., Schimmelpfeng 1904.

²⁰⁷ E.g., Menge 1910.

that in a time as hostile to biographical interpretation as ours the discussion about the implications of such texts for the character of the enlightened father of urbanity goes on: it says much more about us than about Horace and has obscured a crucial point for the understanding of these texts as poetry. It is not at all remarkable that a great artist should hold views on sexual behavior that Horace does and behave as he at least pretends to do; what is remarkable is that such a man wrote poems like *Epod.* 8 and 12 or *Serm.* 1.2. And is it not astonishing that a classical poet like Horace wrote poems that continue to shock and appall readers no matter how views or attitudes about the relations between the sexes have changed? And, common as views like that expressed in *Serm.* 1.2 are and were at any time and in any society, to write moralizing poetry on such an unedifying topic, advocating, with all due qualification, the crudest views quite seriously, is not what great poets usually do. To propagate such views is not even all that common among moral philosophers. Bernhard Mandeville did not receive particularly good press for his recommendation of prostitution nor is he among the most widely read political philosophers of the day—but a classical poet? That *he* should engage in this way is even more scandalous. And though few readers of any epoch will likely rank *Serm.* 1.2 (or *Epod.* 8 and 12) among Horace's greatest achievements, could their artistic merit not consist precisely in their remarkably provocative crudity?²⁰⁸

However, Horace's "realistic" attitude toward sex—as in Goethe's or D'Annunzio's case—does by no means exclude human sensitivity or profound sentimental experiences transformed into poetry; the prevalent characteristic of Horace's love poetry is that it ostentatiously precludes precise references to his private life.²⁰⁹ Yet, it is worth pointing out that Horace does not only permit himself a nostalgic look back to the romantic adventures of his youth in *Epist.* 1.7.27 f.,²¹⁰ but his once-beloved Cinara reappears in a poem (*C.* 4.13) that revives, now in a very different manner, the "Vetual-Skoptik" of *Epod.* 8 and 12.²¹¹ If one realizes that Horace in the latter is as self-debasing as he is mocking libidinous elderly women, one begins to appreciate that—in contrast to many other ancient writers—there are no truly misogynous remarks in Horace, not even the misogynous asides of the frustrated elegist. On the contrary, Horace reveals himself as very much in sympathy with and

²⁰⁸ On *Epod.* 8 and 12, see below, p. 210.

²⁰⁹ See below, pp. 353 ff.

²¹⁰ Below, pp. 16, 54, 355, 462; also below, pp. 273 ff. on *C.* 1.9.

²¹¹ Below, p. 347.

much more perceptive of female psychology than a superficial glance at his poems suggests.²¹² Horace is ostentatiously crude in very few places, but is not particularly so with women (neither in *Serm.* 1.2 nor in *Epod.* 8 and 12). He is equally crude and brutal with men, above all with himself. If he has a preference for censuring the sexual excesses of elderly women, it should be remembered that they serve as a particularly unedifying mirror of uncontrolled lust, from which he dissuades men, too, above all. Thus, I cannot discern any really “sexist” attitudes in Horace’s, unless I am failing to understand modern terminology, which may well be the case.

Moreover, today’s obsession with sex and vulgarity or—as its inevitable complement—the neurotic prudishness of modern political correctness should not blind us to the fact that the crudity of *Serm.* 1.2 or *Epod.* 8 and 12 is very much the exception in Horace’s considerable erotic œuvre (and is thus even more remarkable²¹³). Most of Horace’s erotic poems lack even the slightest touch of vulgarity; as regards sexual details Horace is even less explicit than the love elegy.²¹⁴ In fact, as Hans Peter Syndikus reminds me, Horace’s love poetry displays a delicacy and psychological finesse without peer in ancient erotic poetry, except perhaps Sappho.²¹⁵ If to many this poetry lacks passion, I feel that it rather does not desire it.²¹⁶ Horace’s love poetry may lack romantic sentimentality, not only in the nineteenth-century sense of the word, it also lacks—explicitly²¹⁷—the sentimentality of the Roman love elegy; it is, however, far from lacking in sentiment. Donna Elvira’s aria in Mozart’s *Don Giovanni* is not as suggestive, but it is as passionate as *Isolde’s Liebestod*. Horace’s *C.* 4.11 is far from being as all embracing as Goethe’s *Marienbader Elegy* (it lacks any metaphysical dimension), but it is as touching as Rückert’s *Herz nun so alt und noch immer nicht klug*, without the latter’s touch of morbidity.

Sex is not the only topic that is as embarrassing today as it was in Victorian times. The second aspect of Horace’s life and work where similar tendencies prevail is his relationship with politics, in particular his social climbing. The interpretation of Horace’s political poetry is still heavily colored by explicit or implicit allegations about Horace’s character, suggesting that it is futile to pretend that we can appreciate Horace’s poetry without any reflection upon

²¹² Below, pp. 352f.

²¹³ Even in the *Satires* Horace avoids obscenities in book II.

²¹⁴ On the “ethos” of Latin love elegy, see Günther 1998: 12 ff., also id. 2002: 26 ff.

²¹⁵ Cf. also below, pp. 336f.

²¹⁶ Cf. Günther 2010a: 138f., and below, pp. 353 ff.

²¹⁷ Below, pp. 347 ff.

the man behind the work. The rather unfavorable judgment of Horace's character that one meets again and again over the centuries is combined with a more or less strong dislike of or at least lack of interest in his political poetry. I shall not go here into further detail as regards Horace's relations with Maecenas and Augustus or his sexual habits. What is relevant to the understanding of his poetry will be treated below in the interpretation of the relevant texts.²¹⁸ But it will be useful to conclude this overview of Horace's life with a few general remarks that put the problem of the interrelationship between poetry and life in Horace's political poems in its proper context.²¹⁹

Scholars who accuse Horace of mere opportunism, or—worse—explain away his partisanship for the Augustan system in order to be able to admire his poetry in good conscience, are falling into precisely the same trap as those who in the past (mis)used Augustus or Augustan poetry to support their own (petty or monstrous) chauvinist or imperialist aspirations. Such attitudes are colored by the likes or dislikes of their respective epoch and fail to reflect properly on the limits of one's own standpoint. Of course, we cannot read Horace (or any other text, if it bears any relevance to matters of real life) without relating his work to our own historical situation. The parallels between the political circumstances that gave rise to Horace's political poetry and that of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are too obvious to be simply set aside, even if Augustan culture had not been misused as shamelessly as it was in modern times.²²⁰ And surely, it can do us no harm if we cannot but feel somehow disgusted by reading lines that uncompromisingly condemn the marriage of prisoners of war to foreign women or that advocate, without qualification, wars for the sake of worldwide dominion. Yet, it may be worth reflecting that racism and imperialism must have a different dimension after white colonization of the entire world and the events of the past century. If we do, we shall realize that we would be better off ridding our conscience of the all too evident relicts of racism and imperialism in the present than exculpating ourselves by blaming our own sins on the ancients. To pause a little and ask whether it is not our modern "white civilization" that has committed the most monstrous crimes in world history (if

²¹⁸ On politics, see below, pp. 360 ff. and 373 ff.; on the erotic poems, see pp. 334 ff.

²¹⁹ For the reader who wants an alternative reading on the *status quaestionis* in modern scholarship, I recommend the highly perceptive papers of M. Lowrie in Harrison 2007a: 77 ff. and Davis 2010: 210 ff. The best modern overview of the political poetry of the Augustan poets is Fedeli in Günther and de Gennaro 2009: 135 ff.; excellent on Horace and Augustus, Doblhofer 1981 and Rudd 1989: 1 ff.

²²⁰ See e.g., Barchiesi in Woodman and Feeney 2002: 107 f.

there are degrees of monstrosity) puts many things in perspective, including the interpretation of ancient texts. Moreover, people often forget that there were times when western-style representative democracy was not the civic religion of all enlightened men—not even Cicero or Demosthenes, honorable as they may have been, were champions of Anglo-Saxon democracy, and, I fear, the latter has much more in common with Clemenceau than with Nelson Mandela. Nor need great poets always be fighters for liberty. In fact, Byron, Petöfi, or Mayakovsky were rather the exception; critical spirits are remembered more as great thinkers than as artists, even if they have been the latter as well as, Voltaire, for example, or, if one prefers a more recent example, Sartre.

Quite apart from Maecenas's and Augustus's sense for true poetic greatness and respect for artistic integrity, not easily paralleled from other political systems, let alone ours,²²¹ the fact that they invested money on the scale they did for Horace, Virgil, or Varius is not the least reason they made possible a culture bound to a specific political system and person. One need not be a Marxist to see that a society that invests in movie actors or pop stars produces a Hollywood, one that invests in poets, the culture of the Augustan or the French Classic. Whether or not we like Horace's political poetry or his character is our problem, not his. It is up to us to determine whether we find it worthwhile to understand Horace's political views in the context of his time, the ups and downs of his life, his political convictions. Neither Horace's character nor his political poetry require any "Rettung," the question is whether we renounce an aesthetic experience with his poetry that would be worthwhile, and whether enough is left of the poet if we reduce Horace to the poet of *carpe-diem*. I am afraid that many who like to speak of Horace as an apolitical hedonist fail to understand his *carpe-diem* as well and take him, unconsciously, for the individualistic hedonist of today's "Spaßgesellschaft."

²²¹ One only needs to think of the fortunes of the work of musicians like Pfitzner, Shostakovich, or Nono or poets like D'Annunzio, Pound, or Ritsos in order to appreciate the respect for great artists in modern western democracy. Or need we remind ourselves that the list of Nobel prize winners for literature is—with few exceptions—a list of mediocrities, dictated by philistine obtuseness and political convenience? Augustus was more successful in finding great panegyrists than are modern democracies. But that is, of course, a matter of taste; aesthetic judgments are subjective and there are people who see in the *entente cordiale* between Heinrich Böll and Willy Brandt an apex of German "Geistesgröße"; surely Jens in Jens and Vitzthum 1991: 93–95 is worth reading. Not even the crudest satire could reveal more poignantly the enormous gap that separates us from Augustan times, indeed from every period where culture and civilization meant what the words meant hitherto for several centuries.

It is difficult today to appreciate Horace's national pride; Fraenkel, not by chance, was sensitive to Horace's stance as few other people were. As I have already said, the "Roman Revolution," in which the old system collapsed and gave way to the principate of Augustus, has much in common with the history of Europe in the last century and the upheavals caused by the two world wars. This comparison, if not made on the simplistic level that is, alas, often employed, can help to understand similarities and differences. Ronald Syme's epoch-making book is not only precious for its enormous wealth of scholarship, which reveals Augustus in a different light from that in which he was seen before, it is indispensable for our approach to the history of the Augustan period precisely because Syme's work betrays its origins in the political situation of his day, and thus generates comparison of then and now.²²²

Fraenkel could understand Horace because, like Horace, he was still deeply rooted in an unquestioned tradition of national values, and he was profoundly shaken in his political convictions by the dramatic events of his time, events that in his case revealed to him that in fact he was—again, like Horace—an outsider. This acute personal experience gave Fraenkel a unique sensitivity to Horace's political attitude and the greatness of his political poetry, even more than Wilamowitz, who had also experienced the collapse of the system he belonged to and continued to believe in. Yet, precisely because it is difficult for us today to appreciate the truth of his statement, Wilamowitz's few words on Horace as a poet and man still best sum up the essence of Horace's poetry:

Zum Abschiede vom Lieben und Leben, zum Abschlusse des Buches ein letztes Lied. Dem Kaiser sein Buch zu widmen war Horaz zu bescheiden und zu stolz. Aber daß er es dem Kaiser verdankte, wenn er noch eine Epiphanie der Muse erlebt hatte, war ihm bewußt; nur war er auch das auszusprechen zu stolz und zu bescheiden [...] Und der am meisten griechische Dichter Roms scheidet mit einem schlichten echt römischen Bekenntnis des nationalen Stolzes, das durch die Jahrhunderte tönt und tönen wird, so lange noch ein Mann für das Hochgefühl patriotischen Stolzes empfänglich ist [...] *Romanae fidicen lyrae* war er, und diesen Dichter des vierten Odenbuches wird keiner verstehen, der nicht die maiestas populi Romani und ihren custos Caesar zu würdigen weiß, denen die Griechen nichts an die Seite zu stellen haben. Wenn er aber diese Lyrik versteht und die Episteln dazu, für die vollends bei den Griechen gar kein Vorbild war, dann weiß er auch, daß Horaz erstens ein

²²² If there is any need to prove how close an analysis of the politics of Horace's times brings us to our present, cf. Syme 1986: 454.

Stern von eigenem Lichte ist, nicht minder als die Griechen, und zweitens der rechte Vermittler zwischen uns und den Griechen, denen gegenüber er am Ende jene Freiheit gewann, die auch wir behaupten wollen.²²³

Our difficulty in appreciating this essential side of Horace's poetry, articulates itself in the modern discussion about the "sincerity" of Horace's political poetry. This becomes particularly evident when even scholars who do not share the view that Horace is "insincere," in the sense of having been a crypto-dissident, brush the problem aside by simply asserting that the personal convictions of the author are impossible to determine and that "sincerity" does not matter for our understanding of Horace's poetry.²²⁴ This very problem of "sincerity" poses itself in an analogous manner for both Horace's political and his love poems. Yet, the distorted discussion about "sincerity" in the context of dubious modern methodology has led to such confusion that the very term "sincerity" itself has become unhelpful. I therefore recommend speaking, as regards politics, simply of the poet's political convictions, and, as regards love poetry, simply of the problem of to what extent and how Horace's love poetry refers to his real love life.

As regards the latter, we simply lack external evidence about Horace's love life and thus it would be wise to resign ourselves to our inability to know, and not to look for correspondences between poetry and factual detail. To what extent a poet's love poetry mirrors single events of his love life is, of course, not completely irrelevant for our appreciation of poetry, yet, it is of minor importance, for Horace's in particular.²²⁵ But as regards political poetry, it is imperative to determine the concrete circumstances to which this poetry refers and under which it was written. In fact, Nisbet and Hubbard and Nisbet and Rudd, who deny the relevance of "sincerity," nonetheless implicitly acknowledge it when they remark, for example, that the situation under Augustus did not allow for straight thinking on political

²²³ Wilamowitz and Moellendorff 1913: 323.

²²⁴ "Der Begriff der politischen Dichtung hat lange Zeit zu denen gehört, die man am liebsten in Anführungszeichen schrieb oder dachte, freilich ohne daß man dabei aufgehört hätte, den Dichtern des Altertums ein Recht auf eine Haltung zuzubilligen, um derentwillen man geneigt schien, den Neueren scheel anzusehen. Wohin hätte man auch kommen sollen, wenn man aus der ohnehin spärlichen dichterischen Überlieferung der Griechen und Lateiner alles hätte verbannen wollen, das irgendwie nach Politik schmeckte. Wir lassen diesen Mangel an Folgerichtigkeit auf sich beruhen. Die Geschichte wimmelt von Beispielen ähnlich widerspruchsvoller Verfahren," Rudolf Alexander Schröder wrote in 1935 (!) (reprinted in Oppermann 1972: 37 ff.). It still applies today, only that today some have actually abolished the mentioned "Mangel an Folgerichtigkeit."

²²⁵ Pp. 353 ff.

matters²²⁶ or that one must ask what Horace could say and what not. But if we ask what were the demands of the social environment on the political voice of the poet, we automatically also ask how he responded to it as a real person, i.e., whether he was a more or less convinced supporter of the political ideas he professes in his works, even where these ideas echo only the ideological premises of his environment, or whether his political poetry is written without inner commitment to a political course, for the sake of convenience, material gain, or under pressure. Again, even Nisbet and Rudd put this question implicitly when they ask how Horace, as a hedonistic bachelor, could write poems hailing Augustan marital laws. In fact, everyone puts political poetry to this test more or less automatically; the question pops up as the necessary consequence of any reflection on the social and political environment of the poet. A poet, who writes political poetry without being supported by a political regime or who even writes against a political regime, is not the same as one who is used by a political regime as its mouthpiece. A poet in this situation is automatically under suspicion that his poetry reflects not his own convictions, but only those of his patrons. And this calls into question how these patrons induced the poet to write poetry suited to their wishes, whether perhaps by money or by pressure, and why the poet would have obeyed their wishes.

And this is not only a question of historical curiosity, it profoundly affects our appreciation of the poetry itself. One of the greatest panegyrists of European literature, Vincenzo Monti, was censured, and is almost forgotten today, precisely because he lent himself all too easily to every patron or political system that hired his services, all of which, highly antagonistic as they were, he served with poetry of the highest craftsmanship. His lack of political conviction and involvement, is a distinctive trait of his poetic personality, without which his work cannot be appreciated. In fact, the infamous dictum of Leopardi, who was instrumental in sealing Monti's fame as a mere court poet without true convictions, that he is a poet of the fantasy and of the ear rather than of the heart, is not so much a condemnation as a rather apt description of Monti's genius.²²⁷ Monti's political poetry lacks any content that could be relevant to and excite any reader except for those from the environment for which his poetry is written. Either we develop a liking for a poetic form that has no generally relevant content, although its high-flown stylistic pose pretends to have one and attracts us even when

²²⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 20.

²²⁷ Leopardi 1997: 56 f.; cf. Günther 2010a: 139.

that content appalls us—depending on our own political convictions—or we forego a worthwhile aesthetic experience, one, that is very Alexandrine. Thus, it is a problem whether Horace was a political panegyrist like Monti or whether he was a convinced partisan of the political cause he advocated in his poetry. I think, in view of everything we know about Horace's life and environment, the answer to this question is beyond the slightest doubt.

Horace's poetry is widely faceted; the poet assumes an immense variety of roles, though he does not identify himself completely with any of them. Yet, the poet, his real-life experience, the wealth of his inner life are present in every word he writes. Neither the poet nor the man can be tied down to one dimension of his work, and certainly not to what seems to be the dominant one, since this is only the surface under which he chose to hide the essence of his poetry and of his inner life. A poet may—although this is rather the exception—choose to hide behind the mask of the jolly clubman; there are, however, few jolly clubmen who write great poetry or have been great artists. Watching a video of Edward Elgar one might take him for the retired military officer his father-in-law was, and he was a member of an extremely distinguished gentlemen's club. But that he was perhaps the greatest British-born composer is not unrelated to the fact that despite his extraordinary life²²⁸ he never was a man of the establishment, not even the musical one, but was an outsider in every respect. He was certainly not an easy man, neither for himself nor others, and not for us: the humbly born Catholic who is mainly remembered for music that became a British national anthem and that had such an overtly imperialistic text by a Victorian homosexual that the composer later disowned it after his experience of the First World War. The freedman's son who fought at Philippi was neither a clubman nor a polite, enlightened, jolly hedonist and party animal, but his life experience would equally be unlikely to turn him into a thin-skinned romantic. Horace is neither of the two, but he is not less, he is infinitely more than any of these two alternatives. A poet as inexhaustibly rich as he will speak to everyone in his own voice. If "scholars who set out to describe" his poetry "often end up describing themselves and their own attitudes,"²²⁹ this is owing to a particular quality of Horace's poetic personality and is exactly what his work requests us and allows us to do, provided that we listen carefully enough to be able to find ourselves in him without imposing ourselves upon him. To take his poetry seriously does not entail turning him into a romantic or

²²⁸ Cf. Harper and Scott 2007.

²²⁹ Williams 1972: 20.

a metaphysician, nor does profundity necessarily entail a German “Ernst.” There are people who need to be reminded that a good chef must also be able to prepare a good dessert, but there also are those who forget too easily that a proper menu normally includes a main dish as well.

At any rate, the poet Horace, who toward the end of his career began to write poetry about poetry, was superbly conscious of his craft. In fact, as I have remarked elsewhere,²³⁰ adapting a bon mot of Busoni, no ancient poet reflected more profoundly on his art than Callimachus—except perhaps Horace. Horace, who so masterfully plays on an immense range of registers, is the poet *par excellence* who does not fit into any compartment. He can be crude, bizarre, polished, learned, ironic, and solemn, but he can also speak straight to the heart; he offers deep sentiment without a hint of cheap sentimentality, and he is able to do so precisely because his down-to-earth attitude, his hard-won, yet natural discipline, self-consciousness, self-control, and sense of proportion never let him slide into anything untrue or “insincere.”

²³⁰ Günther 2010a: 179 f. n. 14.

THE TWO BOOKS OF SATIRES

Edward Courtney

Abstract: The train of thought in each poem is analyzed. An overview of Book I concludes that attempts to detect a balanced structural pattern are unsatisfactory, and that it is better to read the book as a developing sequence with a central concern about living contentedly in an urban society. This means having a circle of congenial friends and establishing a canon, framed on Epicurean principles and the doctrine of the Golden Mean, of things to seek and to avoid. Those to avoid are illustrated by named individuals, as Horace's father had educated him and Lucilius had practised, those to seek implicitly by Horace's own way of life. An overview of Book II shows that unlike Book I it is largely framed on a balanced structure and that Horace, now proprietor of a country estate, emphasizes country life and argues less from his own mouth than by Platonic dialogue, in which he allows (unconvincing) Stoicizing characters to attack his outlook. This suggests that he may have been sensitive to criticism that Book I came across as too self-absorbed.

Keywords: Epicureanism, Golden Mean, urban life, country life

1. PREFATORY NOTE

I have taken Shackleton Bailey's fourth edition as the basis from which I work because, although I have many disagreements with it, it does show that thought has been applied, even if often misapplied, to its constitution, which one cannot say of many other texts. In this edition the many misprints of the earlier editions have been eliminated except that at II 6.76 *quid sit* for *quae sit* remains. I discuss places where disagreement with this text significantly affects the interpretation, but usually I do not where divergence makes little difference.

Nowadays it is inevitable that there has been an efflorescence of manic, undisciplined, self-indulgent over-interpretation (though 'interpretation' is hardly the right word); no space is wasted on this. Of course there also exists much constructive, or at least harmless, work on the Satires that I do not mention simply because it is not to my purpose. Naturally the books of Fraenkel and Rudd are constantly adduced. I also owe a large debt to Professor A.J. Woodman, who read nearly all of my draft and consistently

enlightened and challenged me, even when I remained obdurate; the few places where I specifically mention his striking comments represent only a tiny fraction of his contribution.

I was aware that many of the sentences in my draft were overloaded by qualifications of one kind or another, and I had intended stylistic revision, but in the end I decided to leave most such sentences as they were as a reminder of Horace's thematic continuities and the many factors that his readers must simultaneously keep in mind; I ask for their understanding as they labor over them.

References rendered as I 8 mean "Book I poem 8," those as 1.8 mean poem 1 of the book in question, line 8. References to Lucilius are given in Marx's numeration.

2. *SERM.* 1.1

When a Roman in touch with contemporary literary life first saw a work, probably in 35 BC, by a young poet named Q. Horatius Flaccus on the shelves of the Sosii, he no doubt already knew something about the writer, since various controversies had swirled around him, personal (about which we now read in I 6) and literary (I 4, where, however, see the end of my discussion, and 10). The purchaser of this book would then already know that Horace saw himself as writing in the same genre as Lucilius, i.e., as a satirist, though the actual term *satura* is not introduced until Book II. But the title *Sermones* would come as a surprise. It is difficult to find one English word that could satisfactorily convey its implications; in French, 'Causeries' would work better. Our envisaged reader might make a link with Lucilius's phrase (1039), *ludo ac sermonibus nostris*, if in context (as is usually, but perhaps over-hastily assumed), that was a reference to his own satires (not, of course, a title). When he came to 4.41–42 he would find that Horace sees himself as writing *sermoni propiora*, like Lucilius (*ibid.*, 57); in the context this refers to informal style and presentation. Much later he could have noted Horace's phrase, *Bioneis sermonibus* (*Epist.* 2.2.60; "chats in the style of Bion"), which, in that context points to, if it does not actually specify, the poet's own work.¹ The title had not been applied to any earlier Latin work, and among other things is a signal that Lucilius's vehemence is going to be toned down.

¹ Cf. Kindstrand 1976: 156–157; more on this later.

When our reader came to the actual text, the first words he encountered would have been, "Why does it happen, Maecenas, that nobody is content with his own lot, whether it comes from conscious choice or chance, and [everybody] praises those who follow different paths?"² This would have told him two things: first, that the book is dedicated to Maecenas, whose links with the poet he would have known from gossip (6.47); second, that ethical questions are going to be raised. He might make another connection. Discontent with one's lot had long been noted as a phenomenon and denoted by the word *μεμψομοιρία* (*nemo illa (sorte) contentus* would be exactly *πᾶς τις μεμψομοιρῶν*, "everyone blaming his lot"). A discussion of it would be particularly in place in the type of street preaching (*διατριβή*, "discourse"; a rather ill-defined term not securely grounded in ancient usage³) favored by itinerant preachers of philosophy in the Hellenistic world, which would fit under the designation of *sermo*, though not as explicitly as in the English derivative of that word (and likewise the English derivative 'diatribe' should be discounted). One such philosopher was Bion of Borysthenes, to whom Horace much later, as remarked above, would relate his *Sermones*;⁴ Diogenes Laertius 2.77 speaks of οἱ περὶ Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς, meaning probably just "Bion in his discourses" according to a common idiom.⁵ The actual word *μεμψομοιρῶν* is found in a passage of the diatribist Teles (p. 6.5 Hense: cf. Kindstrand 210), whose life may have overlapped with that of Bion (together they span from the mid-fourth to the end of third centuries) and from whom we derive most of our knowledge about him; this passage in fact twice (pp. 5.5, 6.8; F 16A–17 Kindstrand) refers to him. Later in the poem Horace represents himself as deliberately planting a statement (68) that will provoke an amused reaction in an audience, and then using this reaction to make a point. This pretence makes us think of oral interaction, not written

² This and other such quotations in English are to be taken as close paraphrases of Horace's meaning, not as literal translations. One might think that those whose unhappiness is due to fortune have more justification for complaint than those who have made a conscious choice of profession, and indeed the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* 368a (written perhaps contemporaneously with Horace) on this topic specifies the latter, but a sweeping generalization provides a more striking opening (cf. *omnibus* in 3.1); at the end of the poem 'nobody' becomes 'almost nobody' (*raro* 117).

³ See *OCD* s.v., Kindstrand 1976: 21–24, 97–99 and the controversy between Jocelyn (1982: 3–7 and 1983: 89–90) and Gottschalk (1982: 91–92 and 1983: 89–92).

⁴ This link has notoriously introduced a detail of Bion's life into the Suetonian biography of Horace.

⁵ See *LSJ* περὶ C I 2; Radt, *ZPE* 38 (1980): 50; Kindstrand 1976: 150–151, Gottschalk 1983: 91 n. 2.

communication. Again, in 95, about to recount an anecdote, he takes care to anticipate audience boredom by stating “It isn’t a long story”; likewise, Callimachus, in *Iamb.* 1 (= fr. 192). 32, introduces an anecdote told by the ghost of Hipponax thus, “An Argive man Bathycles—I won’t lead you on a roundabout path, my good fellow, don’t turn up your nose.” Now the reader can look back and see clearly that Horace is doing the same thing at 13–15 (“not to trespass on your time, listen to my summary”); a turn much like this recurs in 120–121 below and 3.137, with a similarly undefined ‘you,’ in 14 defined as an auditor (*audi*) and not to be taken as the dedicatee Maecenas.

This pseudo-oral avoidance of satiety is introduced by the statement that so many examples of discontent could be adduced that they would exhaust even “gabby Fabius.” According to the scholiasts, he wrote works on Stoic philosophy, so we have both a hint of rejection of Stoicism and a link with the Lucilian tradition in the uncomplimentary reference to a named contemporary, a reference, however, that is made incidentally and, as with the majority of such cases in Horace, not developed.

So Horace states (14) that he, unlike Fabius, will come to the point. If some god were to bring before him the just-mentioned professionals and say that he is ready to exchange their roles in life according to their wishes, so they can go off on this side and that, they would not accept the offer. This is a little pantomime, as is indicated by my word ‘roles’ (*partibus* in the Latin), and the actors are envisaged as exiting left and right from the stage. A very similar point is made at II 7.22 ff., not to mention C. 1.1.15–18, and a scene almost identical to this is found in one (15.1) of the ‘Lectures’ (διδασκαλίας), delivered in Rome toward the end of the second century AD, of the Middle Platonic sophist Maximus of Tyre. The relevant text is quoted by Kiessling and Heinze on 16 and translated by Rudd (1966: 20). The resemblance, which had long been noted, was first, so far as I know, attributed by F.A. Wolf⁶ to the derivation of both from some common source in Hellenistic moralizing literature. The whole scenario of ‘if some god’ (the traditional phrasing retained by Horace, though in 20 he specifies Jupiter) has widespread currency⁷ and ultimately goes back to popular wisdom on the topic of moral choice; it crops up again in II 7.24. One will note that the stagy setting appears in Maximus, too, but also that in his version those involved do exchange places and find themselves no happier than before, whereas in Horace they refuse to change places. This is because Horace

⁶ Wolf 1869: 1003.

⁷ Coincidentally, it appears in a context rather like this at Isocr. *Philip* 68.

wants to suggest a perverse self-satisfaction (an emotion that will later crop up in the Athenian miser of 63–66) amid seeming misery.

The refusal to change would justify Jupiter in puffing out his cheeks in anger. Then (23) Horace, with the Lucretian-style *praeterea*, moves on to what seems to be another point, though it actually turns out to be related. This he does in a remarkably involved and anacoluthic sentence, as if embarrassed at his undignified picture of Jupiter. “Not to treat the matter in frivolous style,” he begins, but then half justifies himself, “though it is possible to convey the truth in humorous fashion, like giving candy to kindergartners to get them to learn the alphabet” (which recalls the Lucretian simile of sweetening bitter medicine, 1.936 ff.) before his final statement of intention, “but let’s be serious.” At this point our cultured Roman reader will be hearing an echo of the Greek word σπουδ(αι)ογέλοιος ‘serio-comic,’ a word and concept anticipated by Aristophanes (*ran.* 391–392) but particularly associated with Menippus, though Stephanus of Byzantium mentions a Blaesus⁸ from Capri, σπουδογελοίων ποιητής ‘a poet of serio-comic matter,’ of whom nothing useful is known. So as well as noting the Lucretian didactic touch he will also observe that though Horace intends for the moment to remain serious he is also reserving his right to employ humor, a clearly programmatic declaration to be reinforced in 10.14–15.

Horace next (28) repeats in chiasmic order the paired list of discontented professionals, but replaces the juriconsult—who is in Maximus also, but theoretically received no remuneration—with the proverbially dishonest (cf. 5.4) innkeeper; a similar shift is forced on him at II 1.52–55. He does this because he is going to stress greed, of which the innkeeper is a better illustration, as a source of discontent.⁹ Not that those involved would admit to greed, instead alleging that their labor (picking up 5) is to accumulate financial sources for their retirement, as ants laboriously lay up store for the winter. Exemplification from the animal kingdom, particularly in fables, is a staple of popular moralizing, and there is some reason to suppose that Lucilius used the ant for similar purposes in the context preceding fr. 561–562 (Book 19). But one also notes that this tiny creature’s retirement is described in grandiose language, which gives it an epic status, *simul inuersum contristat Aquarius annum* (as soon as Aquarius makes the turning year gloomy); on Norden’s method¹⁰ the similar use of the rare verb *contristat*

⁸ See *RE* no. 4.

⁹ Note that ἕτερος πλεονεκτεῖ, “the other (way of life) is preferable,” in Maximus is rightly understood by Kiessling and Heinze and Trapp 1997: 134, but wrongly by Rudd 1966: 21.

¹⁰ See Norden 1995: 370 n. 1: “unquestionably correct”; O. Skutsch 1985: 777.

in *Georg.* 3.279 (*Auster*) *pluuio contristat frigore caelum* would suggest an Ennian precedent,¹¹ just as *immensum (te) argenti pondus et auri* (41), if based on Ennius (*uestigia* iv Skutsch, q.v. p. 780), would, by contrast, debase the picture of the miser burying his money. It is therefore likely that we are here introduced to another humorous technique of these poems, epic parody.

But Horace contradicts their excuse; their motive is not 'making their pile' (the word *aceruus* 44, to be repeated in 51, deliberately contrasts with the ant's pile in 34) as provision for retirement, but avarice and competition (40); this, we are told in 9.50–51, is not found in the circle of Maecenas. In this contradiction he picks out (38) one member of the group and directly addresses him as 'you,' a form of address that continues as far as 104 and confirms that the same was meant in 14. "Even if you reap a huge harvest from your estates, your belly will hold no more than mine," an apparent reference to Lucilius 554–556 from Book 18, two fragments that probably came near each other,

*milia tu centum*¹² *frumenti tollis medimnum,*
vini milli cadum
aeque fruniscor ac tu

You take away a hundred thousand bushels of cereal and a thousand jars of wine ... I derive as much profit as you.

He then argues that it is pointless to pile up money when a man who lives within the bounds of nature (49–50) and has enough to satisfy his needs (59) needs no more; these are Epicurean concepts, and behind Horace's words we can hear such vocabulary as τὰ ἀρκούντα, 'what is sufficient' (see Epicurus fr. 322 Usener). Another possible defence for the aspiring plutocrat, that wealth provides status,¹³ is dismissed; you can do nothing with the Athenian miser who holds this view except bid him not 'farewell' but 'fare ill,' οἴμωζε¹⁴ in his own language, since he suffers from the same perverse self-satisfaction as was noted in 19.

So far (35–67), Horace has been refuting the arguments of the greedy; now (68–91) he turns to proving the disadvantages of avarice. He makes as if to recount the story of Tantalus (a common moralizing comparison),¹⁵ but

¹¹ Note also *Georg.* 3.304 *extremoque inrorat Aquarius anno*.

¹² *tu centum Bouterwek, ducentum codd.*

¹³ The same doctrine in Lucilius fr. 1120 (not assigned to any book) *quantum* (so F. Dousa; *tantum* codd.) *habeas, tantum ipse sies tantique habearis*, but we should perhaps just class this as a commonplace.

¹⁴ Cf. 10.91 and see LSJ s.v. 2.

¹⁵ See Hense 1909: 34.

breaks off in view of the giggles of his pretended audience (see above on 13–14). The intended point, developed in general terms, is that the miser does not know the use (χρησις) of money (χρημα).¹⁶ Money is used to procure what nature requires (cf. 49–50); the Epicurean message is couched in vocabulary that recalls Lucr. 2.16–21, where we have *dolor* (cf. here 75) twice, recalling Epicurus's word ἀλγεῖν, 'to feel pain.'¹⁷ Better to be poor than live in a state of perpetual¹⁸ fear that your treasures may be burgled (recalling 41–42). Another likely consequence is that all relatives and acquaintances will hate you and refuse to help you in times of trouble, a predicament against which Epicurus had warned.¹⁹

Now a new section begins, obscured by faulty paragraphing in nearly all editions.

One train of thought was introduced by *praeterea* in 23, and it continues as far as 91, within which stretch a subdivision might be marked at 68. Now in 92 positive advice is marked as beginning by the equally Lucretian *denique*, for which cf. 3.76 and, for consecutive arguments marked by *praeterea*—*denique*, Lucr. 1.225–238, 346–358, 615–628 etc.; therefore a new paragraph should begin here. So the structure of the poem so far is this, and the paragraphing should be adjusted accordingly:

- 1–22 discontent
- 23–67 defense alleged by the discontented and its refutation as due to avarice
- 68–91 disadvantages of avarice
- 92–100 advice to limit acquisitiveness and the hard work that it involves
- 101–107 but not to go too far in the opposite direction.

Therefore (92) set limits (*finis* 92, *finire* 93) to acquisition and the toil involved therein, for which in 30 a specious excuse was given. Once you have enough, fear poverty less, and do not be like Ummidius, a cautiously introduced, as remarked above on 17, anecdote (*fabula*, like Tantalus 70); a popular audience will always relate better to concrete examples. Ummidius,

¹⁶ Norden noticed that Greek terms lurk here (1995: 288).

¹⁷ Cf. KΔ 21 and see Bailey, Lucr. II (Oxford, 1947): 796 n. 2 and Usener, Gigante, and Schmid 1977: 35–36.

¹⁸ 'Perpetual' is *noctesque diesque*, an Ennian phrase (*Ann.* 336 Sk, also in a context of worry) in which we have the poetic (for some modification of this word see Skutsch, p. 170) correlation *que ... que*. In all the other six cases in Horace's *Satires* in which we find two nouns combined with this correlation the first *que* means 'both,' not 'and,' so that a comma after *exanimem* is desirable. In three other cases the two nouns end the line; 10.27 (see p. 120 n. 166 there) may well reproduce another Ennian tag. Again, as in 41, elevated language contrasts with a sordid context.

¹⁹ Fr. 175 Usener, from Sen. *Ep.* 9.8.

who, like the Athenian in 64–65,²⁰ is *sordidus ac diues*, ended up poleaxed like Agamemnon by his freedwoman, an allusion that again debases through incongruity. For the diction one may compare Virg. *Aen.* 9.750–751: *mediam ferro ... frontem / diuidit* (cf. also *ibid.* 588–589) and Soph. *El.* 95–99 (referring to Clytemestra and Agamemnon) ὃν ... σχίζουσι κάρα φονίῳ πελέκει, “whose head they cleave with a bloody axe.” I would infer that the diction had a precedent in Roman tragedy.²¹

“Should I then live like the notorious spendthrifts Maenius [the manuscript reading Naevius is pretty certainly corrupt] or Nomentanus?”²² Horace’s answer is that one should not rush from one extreme to the other, neither be like Tanais (a eunuch) nor the father-in-law of Visellius, who suffered from a large hernia; this information comes from Porphyrio, who also adduces a Greek proverb: ἡ σπάδων ἢ κηλήτης (either eunuch or ruptured). Seek instead the golden mean (*finis* again as in 50 and 92–93). Aristotle formalized this concept, congenial to Greek thought generally (cf. μέτρον ἄριστον [limit is best] Cleobulus’s adage), but it could easily be applied without philosophical technicality; Lucilius 1331 has *quaerendae finem re scire modumque*, with *modus* as in Horace and a particular resemblance to 92 *finis quaerendi*, but simply lists this in passing (for once we do have the context). See further in my concluding overview of the *Satires*.

Horace now (108) stresses the informality of his argument by pretending to have strayed from the subject; one may compare 6.45 (which, as will be seen, recalls Lucilius and refers back to 6.6) with 7.9. “I return to the point from which I started,” namely discontent. “Is it acceptable that no-one, because of greed, is content with his own situation, and [everyone] instead envies those pursuing other ways of life?” This paraphrase is based on the reading *nemon* of the main body of manuscripts and agrees with the interpretation of Rudd 1966: 13 and 274–275; the lost *Blandianus uetustissimus*,

²⁰ This passage has motivated the corruption *quidam* 95, corrected by Bentley to *qui tam*; see Palmer’s note. With this emendation the parenthesis separates *diues* from its modifier *tam* as if Horace could not wait to put them together because of the signs of boredom on the faces of an audience (see above).

²¹ In a frivolous mood one might speculate a model such as *uirum securi Tyndaris fortissima / medium diuisit*.

²² The latter is a contemporary named several times in the *Satires*. Maenius, however, (if rightly restored) might be a type-name taken from Lucilius (so Rudd 1966: 140), though Porphyrio’s note on I 3.21, quoting Lucilius 1226, is not reliable. A Naevius is mentioned as thrifty and unsophisticated at II 2.68, so it seems unlikely that Horace would also apply the name to a spendthrift, though he does use the names Nouius and Albucius in different contexts, and probably also Ceruius, despite the variant at II 6.77.

a source of many valuable and some interpolated readings, has taken too literally the injunction to return to the beginning and has interpolated *qui nemo* from 1. My paraphrase is also intended to bring out the force of the subjunctive verbs in what is called a repudiating question (cf. 10.78, II 6.30); the question itself is framed on the model of 2–3, with the same verb *laudet* and the same glide from ‘no-one’ to ‘everyone,’ a common idiom.²³ Horace also takes up *auarus* (which in the above interpretation is given as the reason for discontent) from 103, where he reinforces his previous warnings against avarice (which, however, had not employed this actual word). One should note that, as pointed out by Rudd (l.c.) and Fraenkel,²⁴ this is not the original question, which has already been answered, but another series of questions the answer to which will emphasize the futility of greed, so that now, in conclusion, the two themes—discontent, and its cause, greed—are explicitly brought together again. The last of these questions is “Must [everyone] always toil to surpass first this man, then that? But there is always a richer man in the way.” These lines take up 40 (“nothing stands in your way as you try to ensure that nobody be richer than you,” with the same verb *obstare*), which is in the discussion of greed, not discontent.²⁵ But Horace does not keep these two themes as far apart as is thought by over-logical editors, who therefore look for elaborate explanations which seem to me to be uncalled for; contentment, even if misguided, has entered into the discussion of greed at 63–67.

The final summary is this: “That is why we can seldom [see note 2] find anyone who admits that he has lived a happy life [which they had refused to do in 19] and retires from life content, like one who has had a good meal”; ring-composition links *exacto contentus tempore uita / cedat* (118) with *contentus uiuat* (3), just as *inde fit* (117) shows that we now have the answer to *qui fit* (1). The simile of the well-fed dinner guest will recall another preacher in verse (Lucr. 3.938 and 959–960), and was used by Bion, among others.²⁶ “Enough, I shall say no more in case you [Maecenas? the reader or auditor?]”

²³ Cf. 6.107, and likewise 2.57–58 glides from ‘nothing’ to ‘something.’ See, e.g., my note on Juv. 3.120.

²⁴ Fraenkel 1957: 94–95.

²⁵ The statement that the miser can never win is illustrated by a simile from the racetrack, which begins with the same words, *ut cum carceribus*, as that which ends the first book of the Georgics, and presents (115) *equis auriga* in the same position of the line as in G. 1.514, but shows no other similarity of wording and has a different point, so I am more hesitant than many scholars to postulate a common model or Virgil’s dependence on Horace.

²⁶ See Hense 1909: 16.2, Kindstrand 1976: F 68 and pp. 281–282.

think that I have been plagiarizing the verbose [cf. 4.14] works of bleary-eyed²⁷ Crispinus," who, like Fabius (14), was an apostle of Stoicism. Stoics, who also appear at the conclusions of the next two poems, are not wanted here! Nor do we want to end on too serious a note; cf. 24–27.

3. *SERM.* 1.2

The general themes of this poem, which has strongly influenced Propertius 2.23, are often expressed by ancient authors, and it is probable that Lucilius made some similar points in Book 29 (863–867). Its main thesis, indirectly introduced, is that, at one extreme, amatory entanglements with married women are difficult and physically, perhaps also financially, dangerous, and at the other, those with freedwomen or slave whores lead to infatuations that ruin finances and reputations. It is best to discharge sexual tensions on slave girls or boys; some scholars have thought that C. 3.22²⁸ refers to the birth of Horace's child by a slave girl. Certainly after the impersonal I 1, in which all the first persons refer to Horace simply as its writer, Horace himself comes forward in most of the rest of the book, and in this poem emphatically in 119 ff. (cf. *non ego*; *namque* again at 5.101). This is a deeply unattractive piece, presenting women just as bodies referred to in crude sexual terms, commodities (*merces*) for purchase and sale. One observes that there is no mention of affectionate liking, what we would call love, between the parties, nor is there the option that the addressees could simply marry a woman themselves. Could one link this with Horace's own lifelong bachelorhood? But psychoanalysis of Horace is not a pursuit that can profitably be followed (the fact that he never mentions his mother has even been dragged in); we simply have to conclude that he did not rise above widely held Roman views on these matters.

The poem presents multiple difficulties, many of which I shall have to pass over when they do not affect the wider context; I shall also not refute in detail what I consider to be misunderstandings of matters of larger import.

As already stated, Horace approaches the theme of the poem indirectly by starting from a recent event (a technique often found in Seneca's letters), the death of the singer Tigellius Sardus, who also initiates the next poem. He

²⁷ Though Horace himself, like many others in the dusty ancient world, suffered from ophthalmia (5.30, 49), Romans would jeer at bodily ailments (cf. 105 and 2.91, 3.40 and 46–47, 5.56 ff., 6.30).

²⁸ See Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 257.

is mourned by the demimonde, ironically described in heavy and resonant terms, with two foreign words out of three in the first line.²⁹ The reason for their distress is that he was generous, *benignus erat*, which reads like an epitaph, as Fedeli, quoting parallels from *CLE*, remarks. This confirms that no criticism is implied here, cf. 51; in terms of the rest of the poem Tigellius emerges as the desirable mean. Horace shows no acrimony to him and does not criticize his failings, though many disliked him.³⁰ By contrast, another individual is so afraid of being considered a spendthrift that he would refuse to help a distressed friend financially. Another man squanders his inheritance, and borrowed money, too (9), on gourmet food because he does not want to be thought mean. His opposite is Fufidius, probably the son of a banker, now dead, mentioned by Cicero. He does not want to be regarded as a *uappa ac nebulo* (the words applied to the polar opposite of a miser in 1.104), though he is *diues agris*, *diues positus in faenore nummis*, a line that Horace repeats at *AP* 421 and humorously reverses in *II* 3.184 *nudus agris*, *nudus nummis*, *insane. paternis*.³¹ There is also Virg. *Aen.* 9.26, *diues equum*, *diues pictai uestis et auri*, from which we must infer that Horace is parodying some epic line. Fufidius makes risky loans at extortionate rates of interest to people like the previous example (9), but stints his outlay on himself, like Menedemus in Terence's *Hauton Timorumenos* (the link is reinforced by the use in 22 of a phrase employed by Terence 81 in allusion to his title).

The point of all this (23–24) is that fools, in avoiding one mistake, fall into its polar opposite, a point already made in *I* 1 and now emerging as the lead-in to the central point of the poem, the application to sex of the doctrine of the mean in behavior. Maltinus (so to be spelled; it is a cognomen of the Manlii) walks around with his tunics hanging low, a mark of effeminacy, whereas another does so with them hitched up obscenely high; the proper length would be to the knee. Rufillus smells of breath lozenges, Gargonius smells like a goat.³² Some men (and here we come to the specific focus of

²⁹ See Fraenkel 1957: 76.

³⁰ See my *FLP* p. 202 on Calvus fr. 3 and Hollis 79–81 on his fr. 36.

³¹ The repetition has motivated the deletion of one or the other occurrence, but to remove it here would deprive *II* 3.184 of its point, and invested money (*nummis*) also contrasts nicely with borrowed money (*nummis* 9).

³² The two diminutives (for the name Rufillus, see Schulze 1904: 461; *pastillus* appears to be a diminutive of *panis*) beside each other exude contempt. Between the macho-man of 25–26 and Rufillus the manuscripts offer the word *facetus* at the end of 26, which is quite unsuitable to the former and, if applied to the latter, involves a most unnatural punctuation and destroys the symmetry of 26. I propose to replace it with *uagetur*, corresponding to *ambulat*; in 27

the rest of the poem) will have dealings only with married women in their long dresses (a link with Maltinus), others only with low-class prostitutes working in a brothel, who would be naked. When a certain well-known man leaving such a brothel encountered Cato, the latter said, "Well done! When men feel horny, better this than grinding married women" (note that 33–35 *nam ... uxores* should be punctuated as part of what Cato said, which Shackleton Bailey, misunderstanding the train of thought, does not do). There is much to note here. First, as Fraenkel³³ points out, we have here "the simplest form of an ordinary αἶνος, one of those diminutive stories the only purpose of which is to provide the background for the witty or surprising utterance at the end. The form of the beginning, *quidam notus homo*, is typical," with examples. Second, Horace shows a somewhat ironic attitude to Cato's comment by the grandeur of its description as *sententia dia Catonis*, modelled on Lucilius 1316 *Valeri sententia dia*, which looks like a parody of Ennius,³⁴ and also by the mock-epic reference by personification, a feature going back to Homer for which cf. II 1.72, C. 3.21.11–12 *Catonis ... uirtus* ("the noble Cato"), Lucr. 3.371, *Democriti ... sancta uiri sententia* (note the parody in 7.1). This also carries on the stylistic level of *macte uirtute* (21–22; also in Lucil. 225); it is an acclamation of congratulation on outstanding military bravery,³⁵ and is not without irony in Cato's mouth. This irony appears, too, in his description of man's lust as *taetra libido* (the word *taeter* was used by him in an oration relating to adultery, ap. Gell. 10.23.4 = Sblendorio Cugusi, *orations* fr. 200, and see also 3.107 below; Shackleton Bailey is wrong to adopt the variant *tecta*), and in the sting in the tail of his 'compliment' by his sudden descent to the obscene *permolere*,³⁶ the first instance in the poem of this low level of sexual language. Thirdly, [Acro] reports the sequel of the story, namely that when Cato subsequently saw the man leaving the same brothel often, he said, "I praised you for occasional visits, not for living here," which is, in fact, the central point of the anecdote. Horace omits this because it would blur the contrast between Cato's disapproval, at one extreme, and Cupiennius's approval, at the other, of entanglements with married women. Hence, we have a condemnatory, not laudatory, tone in 31 *fornice* after *olenti in fornice* 30. "Praise like that of Cato is not for me," says Cupiennius (a

we have a perfect chiasmus (object, subject, verb, subject, object), and in 25–26 a repeated pattern: subject, circumstantial ablative, verb. Nisbet in Miller et al. 2002: 56–57 had already seen that a verb would be desirable here.

³³ Fraenkel 1957: 83 (cf. *ibid.* 119 on *Serm.* I 7).

³⁴ See Skutsch on his *Ann.* 60.

³⁵ See *OLD macte* 2.

³⁶ See Adams 1982: 153.

member of a family hailing from Cumae³⁷), who admires the pale cunts of Roman matrons (cf. 124), not those of whores lightly dressed (cf. 83–95) and therefore suntanned, or of dusky imports, like the girls from the Orontes and Euphrates mentioned by Prop. 2.23.21.³⁸ He here represents the attitude noted in 28–29.

Horace continues (37) that it is worthwhile for those who want adulterers to get away with it to listen to the many troubles that befall them, and how their pleasure, rare in any case (*atque haec rara* should be enclosed within commas), spoiled by much pain, evaporates among dangers often severe; this last clause has a strongly Epicurean flavor (cf. *Epist.* 1.2.55 *nocet emptā dolore uoluptas*).³⁹ These lines start off with a parody of Ennius *Ann.* 494–495, debased to the sordid topic of adultery:

*audire est operae pretium, procedere recte
qui rem Romanam Latiumque augescere uoltis.*⁴⁰

You who wish the Roman state to prosper and Latium to thrive will find it worthwhile to listen.

Horace then lists the misfortunes incurred by adulterers caught redhanded, which are approved by the general public.

The train of thought in the next lines can be better understood by a modern reader with the following suggested punctuation (47–49):

*“Tutior at quanto merx est in classe secunda,
libertinarum dico!” Sallustius in quas
non minus insanit quam qui moechatur.*

An imagined interlocutor (a common device in satire) introduces an objection to Horace’s argument with *at*, as, e.g., at 10.20. Horace then sarcastically

³⁷ See Schulze 1904: 283 and D’Arms 1967: 144.

³⁸ See Courtney 1996a: 267 and R.D. Brown (Brill 1987) on Lucr. 4.1160.

³⁹ Epicurus attached the highest value to katastematic pleasure, but gave some weight to kinetic pleasure like sex, classified as a natural but not necessary desire when it is not accompanied by pain (*Sent. Vat.* 21 and [now attributed to Metrodorus] 51), as it would be in adultery (fr. 583 = Diog. Laert. 10.118). Therefore limits should be set for it; for the idea of limitation in Epicurus see KΔ 10, 11, 20; fr. 465, 485.

⁴⁰ Like Brink 1987: 18 and Shackleton Bailey, I find Le Clerc’s emendation of the transmitted *non* in Horace to *rem* unavoidable (presumed in the above paraphrase). Not only is the weighty phraseology much more suitable as a warning to supporters of adultery, it also removes the problem of a use of *procedere* that is unparalleled, for Fraenkel’s (1957: 82 n. 2) alleged but incompletely quoted ‘parallel’ is not such; fully quoted, it is Livy 2.44.1 *eandem uiam, uelut processisset Sp. Licinio, ingressus*, where *uia* is to be understood as the subject of *processisset*. To avoid the problem some have felt constrained to adopt the interpolated *moechos* from the lower reaches of one family of manuscripts.

introduces his rejoinder with a relative pronoun, as at 1.36 the use made by the greedy of the ant is refuted by *quae*, which may be translated 'but it.' "How much safer a commodity [*merx*] consists in the second division [the word is a humorous application of the 'Servian' organization of the citizen body], that of the freedwomen," from whom the courtesans, *meretrices* (hence Horace's choice of the word *merx*) were largely drawn, but who were a cut above the slave *prostibula* of 30. It is hard to tell, and does not matter, whether Horace meant us to think of the latter as a *classis tertia* (or perhaps *proletariae* in Horace's republic of Roman women). What is important is that the freedwomen do not automatically represent the ideal mean, as Fraenkel and others argue; they can be just as dangerous, though in a different way, as wives and prostitutes (see below, on 63). The missing mean is to be found, as Dessen (1968) and Bushala (1970–1971) argue, not in any type of women but in the behavior of men.

The danger with these women is that with them one can lose all self-restraint, like Sallust; "But Sallust is as mad about them as any Casanova about married women" (48–49). Is this the historian, who died about the time of the publication of this book, but probably some years after the composition of this evidently early satire, aged just over 50? We must conclude that it is, since identification with his adopted son poses problems. Varro, according to Gellius 17.18, stated that Sallust was caught in flagrante delicto with Fausta (later mentioned in 64), who had been married to Milo since around 54 BC, and that he was whipped and had to buy Milo off (cf. 41–43). The pseudo-Ciceronian *Invective* against Sallust 16 says that Sallust openly admitted to adultery and that this was the reason for his expulsion from the senate in 50 BC. Other statements similar to these are derivative or of dubious credibility. Varro and others comment on the hypocrisy involved in the combination of immoral behavior and the moral attitudes presented in the historian's works. The problem is that Horace's Sallust positively rejects adultery (49, 54), and my answer would be to suggest that by the time Horace was writing, a dozen years or more since adultery had brought trouble to Sallust, he had learned his lesson and directed his sex drive away from married women.⁴¹ If this is right, Sallust is the most prominent man to be criticized by Horace, and is criticized at length, not just in passing, like most of Horace's victims (there are fourteen others, an exceptionally high number, in this poem).

⁴¹ On the whole problem, see Syme 1964: 278–284 (who tries to whitewash Sallust by impugning the credibility of the evidence, in some cases quite rightly); Rudd 1966: 135 (undecided); Whitehorne 1974–1975: 425–430.

Anyway, Sallust should have kept his prodigality to freedwomen within the limits of the mean (*modeste* 50; cf. *modus* 111, carrying on from 1.106) so that he would be no more than *benignus* like Tigellius; so, as I contended above, the true mean is to be found in behavior. Then he would not ruin his property and his reputation. He is like Marsaeus, who squandered his inheritance on the mime-actress Origo⁴² but boasted about his abstinence from married women (*alienae uxores*, the designation used by Cato in 34–35); however, his dealings with mime-actresses and courtesans damaged his reputation even more than his finances (cf. 52–53 *damno dedecorique*, for which see on II 2.96, and 61–62, plus a historical context in Livy 39.9.6⁴³). It makes no difference whether his passion⁴⁴ is for a married woman, a slave (*ancilla* is the normal feminine of *seruus*; *serua* appears in Horace only at C. 2.4.3) like the prostitutes of 30, or a courtesan,⁴⁵ the three classes of women by now introduced. In fact, Horace does regard adultery as worse, but not for the reasons argued here; the rest of the poem, taking up from 46, is devoted to this, so that from *matrona* in 63 we pass to one notorious one, namely Fausta, daughter of Sulla (the most prominent woman criticized by Horace, as Sallust is the most prominent man), and her lover Villius, probably the friend of Milo mentioned by Cicero, *Ad Fam.* 2.6.1 (53 BC); he is ironically called the ‘son-in-law’ of Sulla (cf. the suitors as *sponsi* of Penelope, *Epist.* 1.2.28⁴⁶).

Villius, taken in by the good omen implied by the name Fausta (whereas he himself is *miser*, i.e., *infaustus*, ‘ill-starred,’) found himself mistreated and with the door (*fore*; the singular is not elsewhere used by Horace and is here employed for a feeble pun) barred against him when Longarenus was (*foret*) inside; Villius was a decoy used to divert suspicion from Longarenus. If reflection, in the words of his prick (*mutto*), were saying to him, “I don’t

⁴² I have not been able to find any information about the name Origo; could she have been a Greek who Latinized her name Arche, for which see Solin 2003: 1286?

⁴³ Cf. Brown (n. 38) on 4.1123–1124.

⁴⁴ The verb *pecces* 63 conveys a double implication, moral condemnation from the writer’s viewpoint of losing property and reputation, but in the eyes of Marsaeus it can refer to an inoffensive peccadillo of falling in love (so C. 1.27.17, where see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970).

⁴⁵ *Matrona, ancilla, peccesne togata*. Three classes of women are meant here, as, e.g., Bentley understands it (cf. Olson 2002: 407–408 n. 30, and Bushala 1969: 1068–1070, who refers [1069 n. 5] to places where *ancilla* means a brothel slave; Mart. 3.33 *ingenua, libertina, ancilla*), not two, as some scholars take it, interpreting the last word as used adjectivally, not, as in 82, substantivally. Convicted adulteresses were obliged to wear a toga, not a stola like a matron (cf. 29, 71), and apparently courtesans did the same (Cic. *Phil.* 2.44, [Tib.] 3.16.3; not very informative), presumably to advertise their availability; cf. on 82.

⁴⁶ See Courtney 1996a: 268.

require a cunt sired by a great consul" (70), his only answer would be, "the girl is the daughter of a great father," an answer that just goes to show his fixation. "If X were to say" reminds us of 1.15 and, like it, represents a vivid way of making a point; cf. Lucr. 3.931: "If Nature should suddenly become vocal and chide us ... what answer do we have?," and Bion F 17 = Teles p. 6.8 Hense: "If things could become vocal ... poverty would say to its accuser 'Why are you fighting with me?' ... what response could you make?"⁴⁷ We note also the artistry in the imposing beginning of 70 punctured by the obscene final word⁴⁸ *cunnus*, which from the female side matches the male *mutto*.

Nature, with its inherent resources (i.e., with plenty of unmarried women available), would give a very different answer if one (i.e., specifically Villius) refrained from confusing the desirable with the undesirable. All this has a strongly Epicurean tone (cf. ΚΔ 15 'The wealth of nature is easily acquired,' *Ep. to Menoeceus* 130 and 133, fr. 469), and the terms *fugienda petendis* (cf. 3.114) represent φευκτὰ αἰρετοῖς, (what is to be shunned and what to be sought) (*Ep. Men.* 129). So stop chasing married women;⁴⁹ they produce only trouble (*laboris* 78 picking up 38 and 76).

So far Horace has emphasized disadvantages; now he begins to give positive advice. The next lines (80–82) bristle with difficulties;⁵⁰ the gist is that a courtesan (*togata*, cf. 63) can be even more physically attractive than a matron. Potentially prettier, she also displays her wares (*mercem*, cf. 47) openly (this shows that the word *togata* has been frozen into an indication of status and no longer specifically refers to dress⁵¹). She doesn't try to cover up defects, just as prospective buyers (*mercantur*, taking up *mercem*) have horses covered while they are being inspected so that an attractive overall appearance does not draw attention away from a defect in the hoof. Women as horseflesh! You may go into ecstasies like Philodemus, from whom a latinized phrase is quoted in 92 (*AP* 5.132 = 12 *GP* = 12 Sider), over specific features without noticing other defects because the *stola* covers them up (cf. 29), and they are never alone, so that frustration drives you mad with

⁴⁷ Many parallels are adduced by Kindstrand 1976: 212 and Norden 1966: 80–81.

⁴⁸ See Fraenkel 1957: 82.

⁴⁹ Though manuscript evidence is split, Horace in 78 appears to vary from his normal practice (to which there is one other exception at *Epist.* 2.2.151) of using the archaic deponent infinitive ending in *-ier* only in the fifth foot (as, e.g., 35 above). His probable motive is to recall another pursuer of a supposedly married woman, Pyrgopolynices (Plaut. *MG* 91 *omnes mulieres sectarier*).

⁵⁰ The problems are discussed by Courtney 1996a: 266.

⁵¹ See Olson 2002: 396, 2008: 50.

pent-up passion (96–97, cf. Philodemus *AP* 12.173.6 = 3259 *GP* = 11.6 Sider, “I desire everything that is guarded”; whereas Sallust’s madness was not pent up, 49). But a courtesan wears see-through clothes⁵² and you can assure yourself that she is free of the potential defects (big feet and short stature 102–103, picking up 93) that married women may have. You surely don’t want to be duped and have your payment snatched away before the wares (*mercem* again) are shown, a repetition of the crudely commercial vocabulary applied to courtesans since 83.

In reply (105), the deluded lover (not specified as subject of the verb *cantat*, just as *inquit* often appears with an undefined subject, e.g., at 3.126, 4.79 with a variant, II 2.99 among second persons) quotes an epigram of Callimachus (*AP* 12.102 = 1 *HE* = 31 Pfeiffer) remarking how a hunter chases a hare (as the devotee of wives chases them with the same verb 78) but wouldn’t touch it (as some lovers wouldn’t touch anything but a married woman 28) when laid out ‘like this’ (*sic* representing Callimachus’ τῇ τῶδε),⁵³ and then adds, as Callimachus also declares, “so my love passes by what is laid out in front of me and looks for what runs away.” This is the second reference to Greek erotic poetry, and there is one more to come; Horace is decrying the artificial sentimentality of attitudes that can be related to some specimens of this genre, though he is going (120) to approve a more realistic representative of it.

These are just empty maunderings (the diminutive *uersiculi*, contemptuous as at 10.32), which do nothing to subdue pangs and upsets; better consider the limits (*modum* 111 cf. 1.106; we are back with the notion of the mean) that Nature (reappearing from 74) places on desires, what the denial of such desires can tolerate and what it cannot without pain (cf. 39). These are deeply Epicurean concepts (cf. 1.75); Epicurus is a better guide than Callimachus! Thereby one will be able to separate the solid from the empty (*inane*), a little joke that applies the concepts of Epicurean physics, in which these terms apply to atoms and void, to ethics. When you are thirsty or hungry you do not need fine foods or drinking vessels (so Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 130–131), just as in 69–72 the futility of looking for a consul’s daughter was stressed. When you have an erection, any slave girl or boy who is available⁵⁴

⁵² As Marcus Argentarius (*AP* 5.104.4 = *GP* 1326) puts it, she is simultaneously seen and not seen. Perruccio 2000: 481 also compares Xenarchus fr. 4 (in Athenaeus 13.569a).

⁵³ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978 on C. 2.11.14.

⁵⁴ *Parabilis*, another commercial word, but in this context also referring to Cicero’s use of it to render εὐπόριστος in his discussions of the Epicurean doctrine (*Tusc.* 5.93, *De Fin.* 1.45, 2.90). This availability, combined with an inability to resist, means that one does not have

should do for the purpose (this in Horace's eyes is the remaining option if one rejects the types of women so far reviewed). When the reader comes to 4.111–114, he will link this with the advice Horace's father gave him that he should avoid shameful entanglements with whores and adulterous affairs (*ne sequer moechas*, cf. *sectarier* 78) when he could indulge in permissible liaisons.

Horace backs up his view (120) by adducing an epigram by Philodemus, *AP* 5.126 = 25 *GP* = 22 Sider, which in my view is probably the epigram meant, though Gow and Page (no. 30; they say, hypercritically, that 'the theme of xxv is quite different'), Sider (p. 139), and most scholars take the reference to be to another lost epigram; on the contrary, Philodemus specifically mentions the girl's cheapness and says that the man who goes to an expensive girl in fear and trembling should be castrated, to which Horace refers by saying that a girl who demands more (*pluris*), i.e., a *meretrix*, or has to wait until her husband (which is what *uir* here doubtless means) goes out, i.e., a *matrona*, is suitable for eunuch priests (*Galli*). Philodemus was referred to, not respectfully, in 92, but he does say things of which Horace can approve, such as his implicit approval of ataraxia in this epigram; after all he was an Epicurean, and guru of a number of Horace's friends (see on 5.40).

"Providing that the girl has reasonable looks [a specific recall of Quintia in Catull. 86, who is *candida, longa, recta*; see also the possible Philodemian words *λευκή καὶ μακρή*, "fair-skinned and tall," in Pap. Ox. 3724, Sider p. 210], when she sleeps with me I do not differentiate her from the mother of Romulus and the 'wife' of Numa". This is a reminiscence of no. 5 of the *Meliambi* of Cercidas, "Venus that paces the market ... here is no fear and no care ... son-in-law fancy yourself to Tyndareus";⁵⁵ the passage has much in common with Horace's general theme. Nor, continues Horace, do I have to fear the husband's (cf. 120) return from the country (a comedic situation) and the ensuing hubbub and danger to body, finances, and reputation, which recalls 41–47 and 59–62 and reads like the script of an adultery mime (II 7. 59 sqq. refers to a well-attested plot of such a mime). Fabius can testify how painful it is to be caught; this is presumably the Fabius of 1.14, but we do not know enough about him to be sure of the point of his mention here.

to consider the more difficult possibilities of spinsters, widows, or divorcees (or even a wife of one's own!). Horace's bisexual interests are exaggerated by Damasippus in II 3.325, but are not denied by Horace; note also *Epod.* 11.4.

⁵⁵ I quote the translation by A.D. Knox, *Theophrastus, Characters* (Loeb library) 204; see also Powell 1925: 207.

4. *SERM.* 1.3

Horace as in I 1 starts with a generalization (*omnibus*), which he applies to the deceased Tigellius Sardus.⁵⁶ His recent death had provided the introductory peg for 1.2, and here, too, he serves as an indirect approach to the central subject. Like ‘all’ singers, he had the fault⁵⁷ of never allowing himself to be persuaded to sing among friends, but when uninvited to do so he could never be stopped, even at the request of his friend Caesar *qui cogere posset*; this probably means only that Octavian could have insisted, cf. *Epist.* 2.1.228, and should not be taken to imply any kind of dictatorial power.⁵⁸ He would sing either bass or falsetto; there never was a creature (18–19; another generalization) who would switch from one extreme of behavior to another with such inconsistency; *nil fuit unquam / sic impar sibi* rounds off the points made since *nil aequale homini fuit illi* (9) with a ring composition. Consistency had long been valued as a moral duty,⁵⁹ particularly by Stoics (the Stoicizing Davus uses *inaequalis* as an insult II 7.10); Tigellius thus transgressed the norm of the mean, of which we have already heard much, though Horace does not underline this verbally.

Now, says Horace (19), someone may say to me “What about you? Have you no faults?” As at 2.23, and at approximately the same point of the poem, Horace thus passes to a wider issue. His reply is “Of course I have, but they are different and maybe smaller (*minora*).” Some editors, including Shackleton Bailey, take the last word to be a joke in place of the expected *maiora*, but this makes it impossible to find a train of thought into which the sentence can fit. When Maenius (attacked, according to a probable emendation, in 1.101–104) was criticizing his absent friend Novius, someone said to him “Don’t you know yourself [i.e., do you not follow the Delphic maxim γνῶθι σεαυτόν?] or do you think we don’t know you?” To this Maenius gives the deplorable answer “I pardon myself,” distorting his questioner’s *ignotum*, ‘unknown,’ as if it came from *ignoscere*, ‘to pardon.’ Horace, with his reply in 20, has deliberately shown himself culpable in exactly the same way. If your vision, continues Horace, is blurred when you contemplate your

⁵⁶ See above, p. 65 n. 2.

⁵⁷ *Utium*, a word that, significantly, appears 10 times in this poem. It does not inherently carry the connotations of English ‘vice,’ but fundamentally refers to a ‘flaw’ or ‘fault,’ such as a crack in an earthenware pot. When I use either of these words, it can be assumed that *utium* occurs in the Latin text.

⁵⁸ See Williams 1990: 269–270.

⁵⁹ See Rudd 1966: 27–28 and 138–139; Fraenkel 1957: 86.

own weak points, why are you so sharp-eyed about the faults of your friends? This familiar sentiment⁶⁰ is well illustrated by an apparently comic fragment (adesp. 291 Kock; not included by Kassel and Austin) adduced by Bentley:

τί τ' ἀλλότριον, ἄνθρωπε βασκανώτατε,
κακὸν ὁξυδορκεῖς, τὸ δ' ἴδιον παραβλέπεις;

Why, malicious man, have you sharp vision for the faults of others, but overlook your own?

It does not help in emending the corrupt text, however.⁶¹ Line 26 has unobtrusively introduced a new slant with the word 'friends.' Though Horace does not seem hostile to Tigellius, he does not present himself as his friend, either, but he is going to direct his theme to indulgence in judging the faults of friends, not people in general.

If you overlook faults in your friends, they will likewise overlook yours (27–28). Take a man who is rather quick-tempered (*iracundior*, the first of a number of comparative adjectives and adverbs stretching as far as *simplicior* 63 and suggesting excess), somewhat slow-witted, and carelessly dressed, but he is a good fellow, a friend to you, and has hidden qualities. You should therefore examine yourself to see whether nature or bad habits have made any faults take root in you; i.e., you should correct the attitude of 20–25, so that the point there introduced is rounded off by another unobtrusive ring-composition.

(38) The flaws of the beloved are not noticed or may even be appreciated by lovers;⁶² we should commit the same error in friendship, and *Virtus* (which seems to mean Stoic *recta ratio*, 'right Reason,' as at C. 2.2.19, where Nisbet and Hubbard quote Cic. *De Fin.* 2.65) should have given it a more respectful name (e.g., kindness) than *error*. If this interpretation is correct, this line anticipates the criticism of Stoic doctrine in 115 ff. The proposition is confirmed by another illustration, that of fathers who refer to physical flaws in their sons by euphemisms, a traditional point made with reference to lovers by Plato (*Rep.* 5–474d), Lucretius 4.1160–1169, and even Philaenis in Pap. Ox. 2891. Horace substitutes Roman parents for lovers, already used in 38–40, so that a Roman reader would think of a father giving one of the many Roman cognomina relating to physical features, such as Strabo,

⁶⁰ See Otto 1890: 60.

⁶¹ See Courtney 1996a: 270.

⁶² The same point is made by Theocr. 6.18–19 and before him by Alcaeus ap. Cic. *ND* 1.79 (not included by Lobel-Page) and the Epicurean speaker in the Ciceronian context. Here 2.91–93 are being reversed.

Pullus, Varus, Scaurus. Likewise, we should give euphemistic names (the first of these, *frugi*, is also a Roman cognomen) to flaws in our friends. This employment of euphemisms had been identified as a useful device by rhetoricians (Aristotle *Rhet.* 1.9.1367a32, referred to by Quintil. 3.7.25; Cic. *Part. Or.* 81; *Ad Herenn.* 3.6⁶³). This is the way to make and keep friends. But we, on the contrary, turn even good qualities upside down⁶⁴ by giving insulting epithets to good people (the first of whom, *probus*, is again a cognomen, a word that Horace uses in 58 to inculcate the point).

The last of the items specified (63) brings us into more direct contact with Horace and his friends than we have seen so far. The term *simplex*, 'straight-forward,' which in 52 was a euphemism for 'aggressive' and 'outspoken,' is now distorted to mean the opposite. It is how Horace would like to feel that he is coming across in his dealings with Maecenas, who is here revealed to be more than an impersonal dedicatee (1.1) and is indirectly praised for his tolerance; but⁶⁵ let such a man interrupt another who is reading (i.e., aloud, as was common, but not universal) or silent, and he is judged to be a tactless nuisance (*ἄχαριος*; cf. Theophrast. *Char.* 12). Such judgments are unfair (*legem ... iniquam*; this is immediately opposed by *aequum* 69 and 74, and this [98, 118] and *iniquum* [113], always placed at the end of the line, become important concepts in the rest of the poem, equity as opposed to the letter of the law). Not only do we disparage *uirtutes*, as we have been told in 55, we also ignore the widespread recognition⁶⁶ that everyone has his faults. A congenial friend should in fairness weigh up my faults and good points and let the majority of the latter outweigh the former, if, in fact, they do. If he bestows affection (reading *amare* in 71 with Shackleton Bailey) under these conditions (*hac lege*, contrasted with the *lex iniqua* of 67), they will apply in reverse when he wants pardon for his own offences, as is fair, and the disadvantage remarked in 27–28 will evaporate. 'Offences' in the Latin is *peccata*, a word that recurs five times and has the advantage of covering a wide range of culpability,⁶⁷ so that it can hint at the lower degree of this in a friend.

⁶³ See Rademacher 1916: 72.

⁶⁴ *Uirtutes ipsas inuertimus* may be illustrated by Val. Fl. 3.646–648 (Meleager) *potioribus ille/ deteriora fouens semperque inuersa tueri/ durus et haud ullis unquam superabilis aequis*, "supporting the worse cause by the better arguments, ever persistent in sustaining perversity and unyielding against the equitable course," and by Liv. 22.12.12, where Minucius criticises Fabius *ad fingens uicina uirtutibus uitia*, "inventing faults bordering on virtues."

⁶⁵ Reading *at* in 64 with A.Y. Campbell and punctuating as he does; see Courtney 1996a: 260–261. For *obtulerim*, see E.C. Woodcock, *CR* 52 (1938): 9.

⁶⁶ See Otto 1890: 1918.

⁶⁷ See above, p. 77 n. 44.

'To develop the argument' (*denique* 76, a use common in Lucretius), we can't extirpate the fault of irascibility (cf. *Lucr.* 3.310–311 *nec radicatus euelli mala posse putandumst / quin procliuius hic iras decurrat ad acris*; Horace is taking up the metaphor of moral weeds from 37) or any other of the faults (i.e., those listed since 29 *iracundior*) inherent in fools (*stultis*), which would be the status of ordinary men like us (cf. 140) in the eyes of strict Stoics, who allowed no mean between the perfect *sapiens* and the perfect fool. Horace here foreshadows the coming attack on Stoicism. Therefore reason (*ratio*)⁶⁸ should have a scale (literally, taking up the metaphor of 70–72) of punishments proportionate to the offences (*delicta*); Horace is drawing an analogy between crime and punishment on the one hand and on the other judgment of the faults of friends. It would show madness greater than that of Labeo (probably a figure from Lucilius) if a man should crucify a slave for licking superfluous food.⁶⁹ If a friend commits a small offence (*deliquit*), you should accept this and not loathe him,⁷⁰ because what would you do if he commits a big one? In 93–95, and below in 128–133, Horace amusingly mimics the Stoic style of argument, analyzed in my discussion of II 3, here turning it against them as he does in 115.⁷¹

(96) Some (i.e., the Stoics) hold the doctrine that all transgressions are more or less equal (actually they argued that transgressions are equal but differ in quality), which would rule out Horace's claim that his own faults are *minora* (20). But they are in a fix when it comes to real life; feelings, custom, and expediency, which are the foundation of justice and equity, protest.

⁶⁸ This turns back a favourite Stoic conception (see p. 138 on *Serm.* II 3.225) on themselves.

⁶⁹ Labeo almost certainly refers to C. Atinius Labeo, tribune of the plebs in 131 BC, who was about to have the censor Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus put to death, an act that Cicero (*De Domo* 123) characterizes as *furor* (cf. Horace's *furiosius*), when another tribune interceded. Editors present a full stop before and an exclamation mark after the words *quanto hoc furiosius atque / maius peccatum est*, with *hoc* understood as nominative neuter ("how much madder and greater this transgression is"). If this is taken to refer to what follows, it makes Horace say that intolerance of a small offence on the part of a friend is worse than crucifixion of a slave, which is inconceivable. If it is referred to what precedes, it is an inane repetition of the point that the cruel slave owner is madder than Labeo. Wiesen (1981: 87) punctuates with a comma before and a full stop after these words, takes *hoc* as masculine and ablative of comparison, and translates 'he would be called madder than Labeo ... to the degree that his offence was madder and more serious than Labeo's,' so that *hoc* 'than Labeo' will compendiously mean 'than Labeo's offence' (cf. a similar compression of meaning in 122–123). I agree with this except that I should still prefer to take *hoc* as nominative neuter and leave 'than Labeo's offence' to be understood from the context.

⁷⁰ 85 should be punctuated *habere insuavis, acerbus*: with an asyndeton as in 58. This is the opposite of a *dulcis amicus* (69, 139).

⁷¹ See p. 85.

Horace here has in mind Cic. *De Fin.* 4.55 *omnia peccata paria ... sensus enim cuiusque et natura rerum atque ipsa ueritas clamabat quodam modo non posse (se) adduci ut inter eas res quas Zeno exaequaret nihil interesset* (that all transgressions are equal ... for each man's feelings and the nature of things and truth itself proclaimed, so to speak, that they cannot be persuaded that there is no difference between those things which Zeno equated). This concept of justice as a social contract, not grounded in nature as the Stoics would have it, is Epicurean (ΚΔ 31, 33, 37; τὸ συμφέρον in these articles of faith = *utilitas*), and the following passage begins with a Lucretian account, with much Lucretian vocabulary (e.g., *more ferarum* 109 and *Lucr.* 5.932),⁷² of the stages in the development of civilization from the birth of the first men from the earth (*Lucr.* 5.822), like the animals whose name they share; *animalia terris* *Lucr.* 5.797 refers to animals rather than men, whereas in Horace 99 it refers to men, who are *mutum ... pecus*, like dumb animals, *mutae pecudes* as *Lucr.* 5.1097 has it (this was pointed out to me by Professor Woodman). Finally primitive man began to refrain from combat, founded cities, and set up laws against theft, brigandage, and adultery (no mention of the fact that there was still no law against adultery at Rome!). Yes, adultery, for Helen was far from being the first cunt (a word chosen to emphasise the brutality of pre-history) to cause conflict (a point developed in *C.* 4.9.13–27; cf. esp. 25–26 *uixere fortes ante Agamemnona / multi*), but we do not know anything about the casualties (whereas we do about Paris's death at the hands of Philoctetes).

One must accept (*fateare necesse est* 111, a phrase used ten times by Lucretius) that laws were invented through fear of injustice. Nature⁷³ cannot separate justice from injustice (only *utilitas* can, 98) as it can beneficial and desirable things from hurtful and undesirable (the terminology repeated from 2.75). 'Reason' (taking up 78) will not succeed in proving (perhaps a recall of *Lucr.* 5.735 *difficile est ratione docere et uincere uerbis*) that breaking off a neighbor's cabbages is on the same level as night-time theft from a sanctuary. Draco had laid this down in the laws that the Athenians found intolerable (*Plut. Solon* 17), except that 'night-time' belongs not to Draco but to Solon,⁷⁴ who considered this an aggravation of the crime of theft, and to Roman law (*Ulpian Dig.* 48.13.7). One must look for a standard that sets

⁷² See Munro on 5.1029.

⁷³ *Natura* is Epicurean, the opposite of Stoic *ratio* (115). It is prominent in I 1–3, e.g., 1.50, 2.111–113.

⁷⁴ See Ruschenbusch 1966: 113.

fair penalties for offences, for when you claim that theft (a civil offence) is equal to highway robbery (a criminal offence since it involves violence; the two resume 106) and threaten that you would allot equal punishment to great and small offences if men should appoint you king, then you may well impose penalties that are too heavy, but you certainly will not impose those that are too light. This paraphrase is based on adoption of Housman's⁷⁵ conjecture in 119–121, which is much the best solution to a notorious difficulty and makes the lines run thus:

*nam, ut scutica dignum horribili sectere flagello,
ne ferula caedas meritum maiora subire
verbera non vereor.*

Housman translates “for (though I daresay that you will inflict the *flagellum* on one who deserves only the *scutica*) I am sure from your talk that you will not be content with inflicting the *ferula* on one who deserves something worse”; the ascending order of harsh punishment is *ferula*, *scutica*, *flagellum* (‘cane, strap, whip’). Since 76 the message has been that Stoics would be too severe in judging the faults of friends.

“If men should appoint you king” (123–124). ‘You’ is the proponent of Stoic views, and now Horace has adopted a phrase that leaves him open to the riposte that if he is a perfect *sapiens* he and he alone is already a king according to Stoic doctrine; in illustration Porphyrio quotes Lucil. 1225–1226:

nondum etiam () haec omnia habebit
formosus diues liber rex solus +testatur+.*

Not yet ... will he have all these things, handsome, rich, free, the only king (...)

His reply, correct according to Stoic doctrine, is that Chrysippus has defined the *sapiens* as a king in *posse*, not in *esse*, βασιλικός (kingly) rather than βασιλεύς, (king) (see SVF 3.159.15–16 fr. 618). Maybe so, says Horace, but even if you are a king of kings (*rex regum* at *Epist.* 1.1.107), when young boys pull on your beard (which he would wear as a philosopher; II 3.35) as an impudent whore does to a Cynic at Pers. 1.133, all you can do is snarl (like a canine, κυνικός) and chase them away with your staff (regularly carried by Cynics and many itinerant Stoics, who were often hardly distinguishable from Cynics⁷⁶).

“To put it in a nutshell” (137, cf. II 1.57; here a concluding reminder of the central theme), while you go to the cheap public baths with only silly

⁷⁵ Housman 1972: 141–144.

⁷⁶ See *RE* s.v. *Stab* 1898.46.

Crispinus (1.120) for company, my delightful (69) friends (n.b. plural) will pardon any foolish (*stultus*, ironic as in 77 and here contrasted with the so-called *sapiens*) lapse on my part, and I any slip (*delicta*, cf. 84) on theirs, and I shall live happier as a private citizen than you as a king.

Whereas the Stoics valued self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρκεια*), Epicureans valued friendship and often lived in communes, as Epicurus himself did; some of Horace's closest friends spent time in such a commune (see on 5.40). But apart from theory, no one can be insensitive to the deeply felt personal involvement that permeates the poem. Friendship is and was important to any bachelor, and Maecenas (64) is introduced in this context; in a similar context, Maecenas overlooks Horace's own faults at 6.61–70.

The first three satires of this book, and particularly the second and third, are obviously of very similar character. Rudd notes that they are "alike in having an opening theme of about twenty verses ... illustrated in a series of antithetical pairs. A second, related theme then emerges and receives a much more extended treatment, though here, too, Horace avoids the appearance of a systematic arrangement by gliding casually from one topic to another. In two cases there is a short final section recalling earlier motifs, and in all three the end is enlivened by a gibe at the expense of a living person."⁷⁷ All deal with problems that affect the daily life of individuals in society. Passing uncomplimentary references to named Stoics develop into outright hostility to Stoicism and acceptance of Epicurean doctrine at the end of 3. But Horace is dealing with his topics in a way that is much more conversational (hence his title) than technical, content to direct his advice at the man in the street. As the above quotation indicates, the thematic structure of the poems evolves along informal lines. One device, to which I have drawn repeated attention in my analyses, is the strategic repetition of key words to help the reader follow the thread of the argument.

The fourth poem will set the book in a new direction.

5. *SERM.* 1.4

The discerning reader will have noticed that in *Serm.* I 1–3 he has met many uncomplimentary references to named individuals, and will have inferred that Horace is placing his writing in the line of descent from that of Lucilius. However, Horace was living in times politically very unlike those of

⁷⁷ Rudd 1966: 14.

Lucilius, and himself was personally in a very different situation from that of Lucilius (cf. II 1.74), which inevitably raises the question of how he was to deal with his Lucilian heritage. He makes a start with considering this question in this poem. He begins by evoking the three canonical poets of Greek Old Comedy, Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes, who exercised great freedom of speech (*libertas* = παρρησία) in pillorying the delinquents of the day by name (ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν, in the terms of those who disapproved of this; here, Horace, in the word *notabant*, “censured,” compares this to the Roman *nota censoria*, as does Cic. *Brut.* 224); Accius in his *Pragmatica* (fr. 12 in my *FLP* p. 63) speaks of this as *describere in theatro perperos / popularis* (to caricature undesirable fellow-citizens in the theatre), using the same word *describere* as Horace. The delinquents specified—thief, adulterer, assassin—correspond to the list in 3.106 of those against whom the first laws were laid down, and their description as *famosi* (of ill repute), like *notabant*, hints at a Roman concept, that of *infamia*. It should, however, be remarked that this is not an impartial list of the victims of Old Comedy, but an over-moralistic selection to suit Horace’s argument. Of course it would have been inappropriate here for Horace to mention, as he does at *AP* 282–284, that the *libertas* of Old Comedy became excessive and had to be curtailed by law, and that the same was true at Rome of the *libertas* (*Epist.* 2.1.147) of Fescennine verses (ibid. 132), with *describi* 153, as here. It is also worth citing Cic. *De Rep.* 4.11–12 *eiusmodi ciues* (the politicians attacked in Old Comedy) *a censore melius est quam a poeta notari ... ueteribus displicuisse Romanis uel laudari quemquam in scaena uiuum hominem uel uituperari*.

Lucilius, he then declares, is in all essentials totally dependent on them,⁷⁸ which gives the reader the impression that personal criticism is the essence of Lucilian satire, a one-sided and far from impartial view intended, as it will emerge, to defend Horace himself; the surviving fragments of Lucilius are too few in this area to establish whether Lucilius actually referred more to Old Comedy⁷⁹ than to iambic writers such as Archilochus, with whom the Romans sometimes associated him (*Apul. Apol.* 10, Diomedes *GLK* 1.485).

⁷⁸ Cf. Diomedes *GLK* 1.485 *satira dicitur carmen apud Romanos nunc quidem maledicum et ad carpenda hominum uitia archaeae comoediae caractere compositum, quale scripserunt Lucilius et Horatius et Persius*. Note that the list of writers does not include Juvenal, who may postdate Diomedes’s source and whose popularity may not yet have revived in Diomedes’s day.

⁷⁹ See Rudd 1957: 320 n. 3; but 836 looks more like Arist. *Vesp.* 184 than the Odyssean original.

Lucilius was witty, elegant, and (now praise begins to transpose into blame) *durus componere uersus*; that this refers to roughness of metrical technique and nothing else is shown by 10.1 and 57 (cf. *AP* 446). In the following lines I feel compelled to adopt the transposition suggested by Peerlkamp in his edition of 1867, thus:

... *durus componere uersus*.

- 11 *cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere uelles;*
 9 *nam fuit hoc uitiosus: in hora saepe ducentos,*
 10 *ut magnum, uersus dictabat stans pede in uno,*
 12 *garrulus. ...*

... harsh in framing verses.

In his muddy flow there was stuff that you would have wished to remove;
 for he was faulty in this respect: he would often dictate two hundred verses
 per hour standing on one foot, as if it was a great achievement,
 garrulous. ...

Otherwise not only is the expression jerky, since *garrulus* is loosely attached, but *nam* 9 lacks all sense. We have then a small digression as far as 21 on artistic rather than ethical questions. Lucilius's "muddy flow" carried along some flotsam and jetsam, as in the writings of those voluble poets criticized by Callimachus (*Hymn to Apollo* 108); quality, not quantity (*ut multum* 13 is contrasted with *ut magnum*), is what I (here Horace insinuates himself into the argument) respect (13), again a Callimachean (e.g., fr. 1.17–18) view.

Lo and behold (13), wordy (1.120) Crispinus challenges Horace to a bet: "Let's see which of us can write more in a specified time" (*hora*, the time in which Lucilius and no doubt Crispinus could compose 200 verses). We think of the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (not entirely pre-Horatian in its present state), or the contest in Aristophanes's *Frogs*. Thank God, says Horace, I don't have fluency of that type. Then the argument shifts from quantity to Callimachean exclusivity, as below 71–72. Fannius, an enemy of Horace (10.80), preens himself (*beatus*, cf. *Epist.* 2.2.108) by bringing, unasked, a bust of himself and caskets of book rolls (cf. 10.63), presumably to a bookseller who would use the bust for publicity (cf. *Epist.* 2.1.264–265) and have the unpublished writings copied for publication (this seems the most likely explanation⁸⁰). On the contrary, Horace claims that nobody reads his writings since

⁸⁰ An alternative idea is that Fannius might have donated these items to Pollio's new library, but if so they would have been politely declined, since Varro was the only living writer to have his bust there (Pliny *NH* 7.115).

he does not publicize them by giving public recitations, a claim repeated in 73 ff. Recitations had been, in some way that is hard to define clearly, institutionalized by Pollio,⁸¹ but authors had long given readings from their works.⁸² Horace's reason for abstention from this practice is that satire (tactfully not named, but indirectly indicated by *genus hoc*, as in 65) is unpopular, since many have to fear its criticism (*culpari dignos*, like the victim of Old Comedy *dignus describi* 3) for many reasons (less culpable than in the case of the comic victims), including infatuation (*insanit*) with married women (a link with Sallust's infatuation [*insanity*] with freedwomen 2.49) and boys (toward whom Horace's feelings are far from insane, 2.117), and the avarice, presented in sarcastically grand diction (29–31; cf. II 8.55), of a trader facing all sorts of hardships (cf. 1.38–39, etc.). Here we have the introduction of the main theme, the defense of the alleged malice of satire, and these back-references are because it will emerge that this poem is presented as an answer to criticism of the personal attacks of I 1–3. All of these people regard the poet as a savage bull (cf. *Epod.* 6.12), which would have straw tied to its horns as a warning sign (the Romans, as we learn from Plutarch, attached this image to Crassus). Their advice is to avoid him (cf. Callim. *Iamb.* 1.78–79); provided he can raise a laugh, he will neither spare himself nor anyone else (this is Aristotle's definition of the buffoon, *Eth. Nic.* 4.14.1128a34, cf. *ibid.* 4–8⁸³) and will want the general public (including slaves, *pueros!*) to know everything he has scribbled.

Horace will now (38) offer a few counter arguments (cf. Lucil. 1027). His first line of defense against such attacks (38 ff.) looks on the surface like a mere quibble. He has spoken in 33 as if those with a bad conscience loathe all poets, not just satirists; now he replies that he wouldn't count himself as a poet. All this is in the interest of a serious, though slight, discussion of what actually constitutes poetry; it doesn't just mean writing metrically, nor

⁸¹ See my *FLP* 256.

⁸² Cf. perhaps 3.89 and see Mayor on *Juv.* 3.9.

⁸³ *Sibi non, non cuiquam parcat amico* is the reading of one family of manuscripts; some members of the other family read *non hic*, but its important representative K has just one *non*, which clearly shows the origin of the corruption in haplography. Add this to the Aristotelian parallel, and we have no option but to adopt the reading quoted above and swallow Housman's objection (1972: 771–772) that “the Romans in Horace's time did not say *non cuiquam*; they said *haud cuiquam*” [as at I 9.27, II 1.39] “and *non ulli*.” One might quibble whether the negative goes more closely with the verb than with the pronoun at 3.5–6, II 2.116–117, and *Epist.* 1.14.37, but *Prop.* 4.7.23 does seem a satisfactory parallel, though I admit that I do not know why Horace did not write *ulli* here, and sometimes wonder if we should read *unquam*.

does the term cover conversational (*sermoni propiora*, alluding to his title) material like Horace's own, but requires genius, inspiration, and resonance (cf. Virg. *Georg.* 3.294 *magno nunc ore sonandum*; a case for the application of Norden's method?). Horace is opportunistically focusing on the most elevated type of poetry; Callimachus certainly disapproved of stress on resonance (fr. 1.19). This is why the status of comedy is controversial (as it was to Cicero; *Orator* 67 *apud quos* [comic writers], *nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est*⁸⁴ *aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis*), because it lacks these qualities in both diction and subject matter and differs from everyday speech (*sermo merus*, "unalloyed conversation," 48, which takes it a stage beyond satire's *sermoni propiora*) only in having a fixed metrical form (as contrasted with the varied clausulae of oratorical prose). We observe that, whereas Horace had called the poets of Old Comedy *poetae* (1), 48ff. make it plain that he is here thinking of New Comedy, which is more tied to the banal events of everyday life. So it is not enough *puris uersum perscribere uerbis*; this takes up 40–41 and introduces a term associated with Terence (*Haut.* 46 *pura oratio*, Caesar poems fr. 1.2 *puri sermonis amator*; see my *FLP* 153–154), because if you took away the fixed (*certa* 58, cf. *certo* 47) meter and dissolved the verse,⁸⁵ you would have just *soluta oratio*, prose. The same applies to Lucilius and Horace himself; if you were to take away the meter, change the word order, you would no longer find the poet's mangled limbs (as well as the metaphor here think of a literal reference to Orpheus), whereas if you dissolved the verse of Ennius it would still be poetry,⁸⁶ fitting the definition of 43–44. Horace is thinking of an elementary school exercise; Quintil. 1.9.2 *Aesopi fabellas ... narrare sermone puro ... uersus primo soluere*. In short, this whole discussion has been intended to clarify the appropriate style for satire.

But, leaving that aside (63), Horace promises (not, however, with any intention of fulfilling it) a future discussion of the topic whether satire (*genus hoc*, as in 24) is proper poetry or not, repeating *necne poema* from the question of comedy in 45; one may note that Lucilius 1013 referred to *nostra poemata* (no doubt intending some sort of reference to Ennius *Ann.* 12 Skutsch, as Professor Woodman points out to me). For the moment as

⁸⁴ The indicatives *est* in Cicero and *inest* in Horace 47 show that these are to be regarded as statements of fact and not reports of views held by others; contra Freudenburg 1993: 177.

⁸⁵ For general references to upsetting the meter by changing the order of words, see Janko 2000: 227; one might add Isocrates *Euag.* 11, where we meet the verb διαλύειν.

⁸⁶ The poetic quality of the Ennius quotation outweighs the fact that it is already in acceptable prose word order.

his second line of defense, Horace will only enquire (so this is a *quaestio* like that in 46) whether it deserves its dubious reputation. Sulgius (so spell) and Caprius walk around loudly assailing highway robbers and compiling written denunciations (*libelli*), but the innocent have nothing to fear from them. Even if you are like such robbers, Horace notes, I wouldn't want to be like Sulgius or Caprius (he tactfully leaves unspoken the question whether Lucilius would), so you need not fear (as those with a bad conscience did in 33) anything from me. I wouldn't want booksellers to promote my works (*libelli*, a modest diminutive that in sense contrasts with the *libelli* of Sulgius and Caprius), as they apparently did those of Fannius (21–22), to be pawed over by the uncultured, including Fannius's friend (10.80) and Horace's bugbear Tigellius Hermogenes, the freedman of Tigellius Sardus and his professional successor. Horace, who has approvingly referred to Callimachus in 11, here adopts his attitude of exclusivity (cf. e.g., fr. 1.29–30), countering the accusation of 37–38 that he wants general diffusion of his poems by representing them as intended only for private circulation among elite friends; yet he offers this defensive argument in the published edition! Moreover, whereas Sulgius and Caprius are hoarse (like the reciters at Juv. 1.2) from vocal denunciation, Horace recites (taking up 23) only to these friends, and that only when they compel him,⁸⁷ unlike those who recite anywhere at any time to anybody.

But an objection is raised (78), namely that Horace's attacks on named persons are due to deliberate malice, as Lucilius's critics had alleged in his case (1015 *gaudes cum de me ista foris sermonibus differs; laedis* 1035, a word again applied to Lucilius in II 1.67 as well as by Trebonius ap. Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.16.3, and to Horace in II 1.21 as well as 78 here⁸⁸). Horace's associates will corroborate that this criticism is baseless.⁸⁹ There are people who carp at (*rodit*) the absent, fail to defend friends who are under attack (this refers us back to 3.21), betray secrets (cf. 3.95), and the like. Such a one is a blackguard (*niger*), *hunc tu, Romane, caueo*, a parody not only of epic (cf. Virg. *Aen.* 6.851 *tu ... Romane, memento*) but also of oracular style (cf. in particular Livy 5.16.9 *Romane caue* and Zosimus 2.1.6 *μεμνησθαι, 'Ρωμαῖε*⁹⁰); as Fraenkel⁹¹

⁸⁷ Epicurus (fr. 564 = Diog. Laert. 10.121) had said that the wise man will give readings ἐν πλῆθει, but only under compulsion. Ovid heard Horace recite from the *Odes*, *Trist.* 4.10.49–50.

⁸⁸ The verb *laedere* is also applied to Horace's critics in 10.80 and to an attack on Lucilius himself from the stage (*Ad Herenn.* 2.13.19).

⁸⁹ Cavajoni (1994: 34) sees here an echo of Plaut. *Trin.* 217–219.

⁹⁰ See Nisbet and Rudd (2004) on C. 3.6.2.

⁹¹ Fraenkel 1957: 117–118.

suggests, we may have to think of an oracle reported by Ennius. Others lose control of their tongues when Bacchus (*Liber*) betrays their true character (*in uino ueritas*, cf. *uerax* 89); you think them witty and outspoken (*liber*), you who hate blackguards! But if I have laughed (as I did in 2.27, here quoted) at Rufillus and Gargonius, do you interpret this as malevolence and backbiting (*mordax* 93, carrying on the metaphor of *rodit* 81)? Note the emollient word ‘laughed’ here. If the peculations of Petillius Capitolinus, referred to again in 10.26 (he was *triumuir monetalis* in 43 BC or a little later, *MRR* 3.156) come up in conversation, you would ‘defend’ (cf. 82) him by saying “He is and has been my friend, but I can’t think how he got acquitted”; this is really the ink of a black (*nigrae*) cuttlefish (a transferred epithet, since cuttlefish are actually white! Horace is recalling 85 *hic niger*), i.e., spite, a fault which, I promise, shall be absent from my writings, and, a priori,⁹² from my mind.

But (103) if I do say something too outspoken (3.52 shows how this can be excusable, though the comparative *liberius*, used also by Trebonius, quoted at the end of this chapter, admits a degree of excess) or flippant, put it down to my father’s training, who taught me to avoid faults by criticizing (*notando*, which like *liberius* takes us back to 5) specific individuals who exemplified them, one of them, Albius, looking back to 28. He urged me to live content (*uiuerem contentus* would avoid the problem raised in 1.3) with his legacy, but admitted that his advice on what to avoid and what to follow was not based on logical philosophical analysis; he simply wanted something practical and suitable to his son’s youth, until he was old enough to form his own judgments. “Avoid and follow” takes us back to 2.75 and 3.114, from which we see that when Horace grew up he took Epicurus as his guide. Horace’s father is using means superior to the comic father of 48 ff., who can only storm and not point to a specific deterrent (as is done in 111) when his son takes up with a courtesan. He produced concrete examples to follow (*iubebat*, i.e., *quid petitu melius* 115) as well as to avoid (*uetabat*, i.e., *quid uitatu melius*; Horace no doubt would have preferred to use the supine of *fugere* if that existed); thus 115 is taken up in chiasitic order. We can now interpret his father’s influence as behind Horace’s naming of Villius and presumably Fabius in I 2 as examples of the trials of adulterers caught in the act (*deprepsi* 114, cf. 2.134) when they could have turned to *concessa*

⁹² This paraphrase prefers the punctuation (*atque animo prius, ut si quid*) and interpretation of Lambinus to that of Housman, taking into account Heinze’s reference to *ut si quis* at Suet. *Tit.* 7.3. See Courtney 1996a: 271.

uenus, “permitted amours” (115, cf. 2.119). The point of his teaching was to *notare uitia*, “censure faults” (106), and *notare homines*, “censure men,” was only done for the sake of concrete illustration, whereas it was the central point of Old Comedy (even if the victims deserved it, 3) and Lucilius (1–6). The presentation of this whole passage leans on Demea’s account of his upbringing of his son in Ter. *Ad.* 411–418. He claims that Ctesipho is *similis maiorum suorum* (cf. Horace 117), that this is due to his own training (*consuefacio* 414, cf. *insuevit* Horace 105), and that he encouraged him, *inspicere ... in uitas omnium / ... atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi* (415–416); he lists specific norms with a series of neuter pronouns, *hoc facito ... hoc fugito ... hoc laudist ... hoc uitio datur* (417–418, cf. Horace 122–124 and 27 ff., above).⁹³

As a result, Horace claims (129) that he is free from harmful influences and has only minor, pardonable flaws (cf. 3.20); perhaps even these will be reduced by long life, an outspoken friend (so to be *liber*, as in 103, can be beneficial), and his own reflection. For when he is at leisure he is silently examining himself; “Such and such a course is better (*rectius hoc est*); in this way my friends will be glad to see me (*dulcis amicis*, the other side of the coin of 3.69 and 139); so-and-so in doing such-and-such is not acting nicely (*hoc quidam non belle*, taking up the adverb from the adjective used by his father in 114); shall I ever unintentionally do anything like that?” Horace is taking over his father’s *hoc ... hoc*, and with the last item he is following Plato, who is reported by Plutarch four times in the *Moralia* as being in the habit of saying μήπου ἄρ’ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος (I’m not like that, am I?) when he saw men misbehaving. Epictetus (2.21.8sq.) recalled Plato in following the same course of self-examination, and, like Horace (129–130), felt himself improved by it (4.4.7). Demea’s advice is applied in this way not by his son, but in parody by his slave (425–426) as instructions to his fellow-slaves, with *hoc ... hoc ... hoc* and *illud recte* (cf. Horace 134) providing Horace’s structural framework. Just as Demea’s advice did not, as it turns out, ameliorate Ctesipho’s behavior, so Horace implies that his father’s instruction has left minor flaws in him, one of which, it now (138–139) appears, is scribbling (*illudo chartis*; cf. *chartis illeuerit* in the mouth of his critics 36), i.e., writing satire! This, however, he only does when he is at leisure (*otium*), from which we must infer that the serious business of his life (i.e. *negotium*) is self-improvement! So criticism of his satires is blunted, he hopes, by a joke! If you should refuse to pardon this flaw, a great crowd

⁹³ For all this, see Leach 1971: 618–620.

of poets (for nowadays poets outnumber non-poets! Cf. *Epist.* 2.1.117) would come to his aid and force you to join their number. Note that “their”; it seems that despite 39 sqq. Horace is a poet after all! But of course he is not seriously implying that this crowd of ‘poets’ matches the qualities specified in 43–44.

The plethora of exclamation marks in the last paragraph will underline how lightly we are to take Horace’s last (from 103 onward) excuse for personal attacks; ‘It’s all Daddy’s fault!’ Of course, we are not to suppose that Horace is either making up, on the model of Terence, or devaluing his father’s training; all is in the interest of keeping the tone light.

Horace speaks as if at least I 2 were generally known before he wrote this poem, despite his aversion to publishing (22, 71) and public recitations, but perhaps this interpretation is too literal. It may be preferable to think less of a historical sequence of events and more in terms of the world of his book, in which the readers will have encountered 1.2 before they come to this poem, just as they read this poem before they come to the reference back to it in I 10; see the excursus below. This is not to deny that Horace had been involved in literary feuds, as shown by the uncomplimentary reference in 10.79–80 to Fannius. With regard to the issue of personal criticism, it has been noted that in 44 BC the tyrannicide Trebonius had written (apparently as a *jeu d’esprit*, with no mention of contemplated publication) a verse attack seemingly aimed at Antony (indirectly referred to in *turpitudine personae eius in quem liberius inuehimur*), modeling himself on the *libertas* of Lucilius.

6. EXCURSUS ON THOSE NAMED IN THE SATIRES

In 4.105 Horace tells us that his father conducted his moral education not on abstract principles (115–116) but, as another father is represented as doing at II 3.175, by pointing out the result of failings in living exemplars (106); hence, he tells us (not, of course, in full seriousness), his own practice of naming names in his satires. Someone (not named, and perhaps not a real person; for this use of bare *inquit* cf. 3.126, II 2.99 and my *ALP* 2) attributes this practice to deliberate malice (79, 93). Horace says that his associates will corroborate that this criticism is baseless (80–81) and firmly rejects it (101–103).

Horace does not mention one exception to this, namely that a tone of personal animosity is clear in his references to those with whom he was embroiled in literary feuds, Tigellius Hermogenes, Fannius, Crispinus, Panti-
tilius, three of them mentioned in this very poem; his attitude to Furius Bibaculus is less clear-cut. Otherwise the only serious accusations that

he makes against anyone are that Voranus is a thief (I 8.39) as is Petillius (I 4.94 ff.), as seems to have been generally accepted despite his acquittal; that Caelius and Birrius are highway robbers, no doubt notorious as such (I 4.69); that Scaeva is a poisoner, and Canidia would at least be willing to be (II 1.48–56); and that there is a skeleton in Tillius's cupboard (I 6.25). Note that we have no information about most of these people, and, though I have, for convenience sake, referred to them in the present tense, some of them may belong to the past (see below); for instance, Tillius⁹⁴ was probably dead. No doubt some of those accused of sexual immorality in I 2 (and also Trebonius I 4.113–114) felt seriously aggrieved, particularly the prominent, but socially disgraced Sallust, and, if she was still alive, Fausta.

Otherwise, nobody is accused of anything serious, and Horace passes off at least one uncomplimentary reference as a joke (I 4.9; cf. also I 5.35). Critics of satirists accused them of irresponsibility when they could raise a laugh (I 4.34), not unjustifiably ('nonentities also have feelings' Rudd 1966: 134, cf. 150–151); certainly, the presentation of Nasidienus (II 8), clearly a real person, reeks of snobbery (though that concept was not isolated and defined until the nineteenth century), and this is also true to a lesser extent of the treatment of Aufidius Luscus (I 5.34–36). That raises the question of the Lucilian inheritance of the genre, which in this respect carried more weight than Horace's training by his father. At the beginning of I 4, Horace in fact stresses personal criticism as the defining feature of Lucilian satire, and there is no doubt that Lucilius did prosecute personal quarrels in his writings, but, though the anonymous critic associates Horace with Lucilius by using the verb *laedere*, to harm (78; see ad loc. on this), Horace seems in the main to be justified in his claim that whereas Lucilius *notabat homines*, censured men (I 4.5–6), he himself *notat uitia*, censures faults (106), like his father giving concrete illustrations as deterrents (128–129); note, in particular, the pairing *luxuriam et Nomentanum* (II 3.224) as if they were synonyms. Some of those named by him figured or may have figured in Lucilius,⁹⁵ others, though dead, lived on by reputation (as, in America, Claus von Bulow, and, in Britain, John Profumo and his cohort; Rudd reminds us of Dr Crippen); such is Labeo (1.3.82).

⁹⁴ See below, p. 106 n. 121.

⁹⁵ See Rudd 1966: 140–143.

7. *SERM.* 1.5

The complex argumentation of the preceding four poems has tested the reader; now Horace gives him a respite. In the spring of 38 BC, a meeting between Octavian and Antony at Brundisium was arranged, but never took place. One did take place in 37, when, as Plut. *Ant.* 35 relates, Antony tried without success to get access to Brundisium and then sailed on to Tarentum, where Octavian, accompanied by Maecenas and Agrippa, came to meet him. In this poem Horace describes how he traveled from Rome on the Via Appia as far as Forum Appi, and then through the Pomptine marshes by the Decennovium canal as far as Anxur in the company of the rhetor Heliodorus.⁹⁶ Here they had a rendezvous with Maecenas, L. Cocceius Nerva, who was friendly with both Octavian and Antony (Appian *BC* 5.60, 64; both places referring to 40 BC); and Antony's friend C. Fonteius Capito, and proceeded on the Appian Way to Sinuessa, where Plotius Tucce, Varius Rufus, and Virgil (cf. 10.81 for this group) met them, no doubt taking a break from their Epicurean studies with Philodemus at Herculaneum. Then on to Beneventum, at which point they left the Appian Way for the more northerly Via Minucia (cf. *Epist.* 1.18.20), later Traiana; their subsequent route is discussed by Coarelli (1993) and Brink,⁹⁷ and can be conveniently followed in the Barrington Atlas 44–45.⁹⁸ This road took them to Brundisium, where Horace's narrative stops before it reaches Tarentum; he would not want to get his story entangled in political maneuvering. In fact, we do not learn that there is a political purpose in the journey until 28–29, where indirect and understated reference (*auersos soliti componere amicos*; for *soliti*, see on 7.34) is made to the mediating role that these grandees had played in bringing Octavian and Antony together at Brundisium in 40 BC; now they are *missi magnis de rebus uterque / legati*, perhaps recalling Ennius *Ann.* 569 Sk: *olli cernebant magnis de rebus agentes*. After this the political background completely fades out. No mention is made of the armed body-guard that must have escorted the delegates. Despite their peaceful mission,

⁹⁶ Morgan still upholds an overly speculative identification of this man with the author of *Supplementum Hellenisticum* (ed. Lloyd-Jones and Parsons) 472 in Heyworth 2007: 113–140 at 137 n. 52, after Kiessling and Heinze, who express doubts.

⁹⁷ Brink in Harrison 1995: 267–271.

⁹⁸ Note however that the Atlas puts Trivicum (? -ium; 79–80), which, misunderstanding Horace, it calls *Trivici Villa*, on the site of modern Trevico, which cannot be squared with Horace; the place name must have shifted since antiquity, as sometimes happens, if indeed there is a historical link.

the actual journey is punctuated by episodes of discord (11, 22–23, 51ff.). We gather that Horace is present purely in a capacity of friendship, though at this time his relations with Maecenas were still not close; II 6.40 refers just to gossip on the journey, whereas later (50–58) he is, or is supposed to be, privy to political news. In this poem, pretending that his sheet of papyrus is full, he prefers to tantalize us by leaving us thirsting for more, just as at the ends of I 1 and I 3 he makes a point of not going on for too long.

This poem is framed as a counterpart to Lucilius's account in Book 3 of a journey, for purely personal purposes, as far as the Strait of Messina, and after the criticisms of Lucilius in the previous poem this one invites the reader to compare Horace's treatment of the theme with that of Lucilius. That had stressed Lucilius's garrulity (4.9–12), and, while Lucilius had evidently taken a whole book for his narrative, to Horace (104) even a poem of 103 lines is long; we cannot miss the irony in this adjective. Note, too, that he asks the Muse for a brief (51 *paucis*) account of the brawl discussed in my next sentence. Horace clearly intends us to contrast some of the episodes that he describes with comparable episodes in Lucilius (117–122, a battle of *scurrae*, "buffoons," causing [137] general laughter as in Horace 57 and 70; the provision of firewood [131] as in Horace 46; the recording of distances traversed, one of them identical in wording, *quattuor hinc*, "four [miles] from here," in Horace 86 and Lucil. 117). It should be mentioned that poems describing a journey constituted a minor genre. Caesar wrote one, perhaps in an iambic meter, describing his journey to Spain in 46 BC (Suet. 56.5), and Valgius fr. 3–4 *FLP* = 167–168 Hollis⁹⁹ came from a poem of similar character. Such poems continued to be written in Silver Latin, culminating with Rutilius Namatianus. This poem, too, begins (as far as 26) as if it is to be just a travelogue, and for the end Keller (1925) brilliantly compares the last sentence of Pomponius Mela's geographical treatise, *Ampelusius ... operis huius atque Atlantici litoris terminus*.

Lucilius, we are told (148), parodied the tragedies of Accius in this poem of his; Horace correspondingly has much epic parody. First is the description of nightfall in 9–10 (cf. II 6.100–101) introduced by the *iam*¹⁰⁰ regularly used to indicate a new time of day marking a new episode; similarly in 20 we have *iamque dies aderat*, with which one may compare Virg. *Aen.* 2.132 *iamque dies infanda aderat*. The former introduces a non-epic brawl as does

⁹⁹ See my *FLP* 183, 475–476 and Hollis 296–297.

¹⁰⁰ See my *FLP* 330 and Kenney (Bristol 1984) on *Moretum* 1.

the invocation of the Muse in 51–54, *nunc mihi paucis/ Sarmenti scurrae pugnam Messique Cicirri/ Musa, uelim memores*, ἔσπετε νῦν (= *nunc*) μοι, Μοῦσαι (“now follow me, Muses”; Horace probably has in mind the occurrences of this line in *Iliad* 11.218, 14.508), cf. *Aen.* 1.8 *Musa, mihi causas memora* (here, as in Horace, the verb is meant to remind us that the Muses were daughters of Mnemosyne, a point surely based on an earlier epic poet); [Acro] remarks the occurrence of *nunc* in similar invocations marking a new episode, *Aen.* 7.37 and 641 (where 645 reads *et meministis enim, diuiae, et memorare potestis*). As for the brawl, while in the invocation and in 56 it is *pugna* (battle), in 54 it is reduced to *lites* (quarrel), an unexpected object for the verb *conferre* (engage in). Consider, too, that in *Iliad* 11.218 and *Aen.* 7.37 the invocation is followed by accounts of the backgrounds of the warriors now introduced; likewise here Horace promises to tell us *quo patre natus uterque*; in the case of Messius his *clarum genus* consists of the Oscans, a widely despised ethnic group, and of Sarmentus his former female owner is still alive, i.e., he is an ex-slave, who therefore in Roman eyes had neither father nor ancestors, *maiores* (55, cf. I 6.10). Then in 71–74 there is the description of a fire in a humble kitchen, which bears some resemblance to *Aen.* 2.310–312

*iam Deiphobi dedit ampla ruinam
Volcano superante domus, iam proximus ardet
Ucalegon.*

Now the large house of Deiphobus collapsed as Vulcan triumphed, now Ucalegon next door is afire.

Again, we are tempted to conjecture an Ennian original; in any case, we notice the artistic word order *uaga* (a) *per ueterem* (b) *dilapso* (c) *flamma* (A) *culinam* (B) *Vulcano* (C) and the alliteration of *u*, as well as the elevated use of *lambere*. Finally, there is the reference in 92 to the foundation of Canusium by Diomede, meant to contrast the heroic past with the place's present condition, home of scanty water and gritty bread.¹⁰¹

Unlike I 1–4 this delightful poem does not present a complex argument that needs to be unravelled in detail, and its essence is the pleasure derived from recalling incidents unimportant in themselves but sharpening the sensation of experiences shared with a group of congenial friends (cf. 35,

¹⁰¹ Bentley's deletion of this line enfeebles the passage, and his objection to *condere locum* fails in view of Suet. *Aug.* 98.4 *conditor insulae*, Pliny *NH* 7.109 *Aristotelis patriam condidit*, Justin 42.2.10 *Armenia ... condita est ... ab Armenio*; see also LSJ s.v. κτίζω 1.

39–44, 93, 98). 44 in particular encapsulates the heart of the poem; those readers who have desiderated reports of weighty conversations have missed the point. The reader can be left to enjoy the poem himself, but three aspects deserve comment.

First, we meet (34–36) the pompous Aufidius Luscus,¹⁰² formerly a *scriba* (administrative official), but now a magistrate at Fundi (cf. Liv. 23.19.17), proud of his incense burner (presumably a symbol of his right to perform official rituals), his *toga praetexta* (purple-bordered toga), and the *latus clauus* (broad stripe) on his tunic (a mark of senatorial status to which it seems that municipal magistrates were not entitled; nor indeed was the *eques* Maecenas); one assumes that he came in all his grandeur to welcome officially these important visitors. Horace punctures his pomp by speaking as if he were consul (*Aufidio Lusco praetore*, “in the praetorship of A.L.”) and using him absurdly to date their departure; in fact he was not even praetor, since the officials in Fundi were three aediles, but the term was sometimes applied loosely to municipal magistrates.¹⁰³ Then we have another ridiculous *scriba*, the freedman *scurra* Sarmentus. He enjoyed some sort of patronage from Maecenas,¹⁰⁴ who had presumably brought him along. Of course, Horace himself was a *scriba*. He was also, though not a freedman himself, derided (probably unjustly; see on 1.6 init.) as son of a freedman. We would infer that he found amusement in the foibles of his colleagues in this respectable position.

Secondly, there is the most developed episode, the clash between the *scurrae* (52–70), a frequent item in both Greek (cf. the buffoon, γελωτοποιός, in Lucian *Symp.* 18–19) and Roman (cf. *Epist.* 1.15.28–30) dinner parties. Those involved were Sarmentus and Messius Cicirrus, who was an Oscan, perhaps a denizen of Caudium, living in Cocceius’s villa, where they were staying. Hesychius tells us that κίκίρρος means ‘cock,’ and presumably Messius had this name conferred on him as a metaphor from cock-fighting;¹⁰⁵ we have to hope that La Penna (1967) 156 was not right in suggesting that it may have been just a cognomen like Asina or Catulus. Sarmentus begins

¹⁰² Suetonius’s contradiction (*Caligula* 23.2) of Caligula’s allegation that Livia was descended from a decurion of Fundi by affirming that Aufidius Lurco was actually a magistrate at Rome involves a confusion of the names Alfidius and Aufidius; see D. Hurley’s (Atlanta 1993) commentary ad loc. and *MRR* 3.29.

¹⁰³ Indeed, a verse inscription from Fundi, *CIL* 10.6193 = *CLE* 1466, speaks of *praetores*; see *RE, municipium* 617.37.

¹⁰⁴ See my *FLP* 475–476 and Badian 1989: 591.

¹⁰⁵ See *DNP* s.v. *Hahnenkampf*.

by comparing Cicirrus to a unicorn,¹⁰⁶ a fabulous creature first referred to by Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 45q = D. Lenfant's Budé Ctesias pp. 182–183 and 203). Ctesias speaks of it as a wild ass (Herodotus alleges the existence of horned asses in Libya, 4.191) as big as a horse, perhaps confusing it with a rhinoceros (a creature that did exist at that time in India; Lenfant n. 871); in the Lucilian correspondent (117) one participant with projecting front teeth is in fact compared to a rhinoceros. This is the game of εἰκασμός or εἰκασία;¹⁰⁷ the comparison is going to be based on a physical deformity.¹⁰⁸ “Granted” replies Messius, shaking his head as if threatening with his horn; his forehead is described as shaggy (61), the overhanging hair resembling a horse's mane. Sarmentus fastens on a scar on the forehead, alleging that the horn had been cut off here, and then he asks Cicirrus to give a dance as a Cyclops (cf. *Epist.* 2.2.125, Aristoph. *Pl.* 210; not to be called a pantomime, as that genre was not yet properly established) with the eye in the middle of his forehead blinded;¹⁰⁹ he would not need either mask or elevated boots, as he was already ugly and tall enough. Cicirrus in reply enquires whether Sarmentus had yet dedicated his slave fetters (thinking of the popular verse composed about him, *sic Sarmentus habeat crassas compedes*, *FLP* 476), as one dedicated the implements of one's craft on retirement; he indicates that Sarmentus is not a freedman but a runaway slave, *fugitiuus* (cf. *fugisset* 68), whose former female owner still had rights over him; he was so skinny that one pound of grain, about a quarter of the usual ration of slaves, would be enough for him, so he would have had no reason to run away. The company greatly enjoyed this ding-dong; nowadays, we might find it less hilarious.

Finally the conclusion. Gnata (97), we are told, was built *Lymphis iratis*, (under the anger of the Water Nymphs), which, like II 7.14, is an adaptation of the common phrase *dis iratis natus* (II 3.8); the unspoken consequence is that its inhabitants are *lymphati*, crazy. They allege that in a temple there incense would spontaneously ignite; Pliny *NH* 2.240 reports at second-hand the spontaneous kindling of wood placed on a sacred stone

¹⁰⁶ See *RE* and *DNP* s.v. *Einhorn*; all reports subsequent to Ctesias derive from him. Rudd (1966: 282 n. 19) correctly argues that *equus ferus* elsewhere means simply ‘wild horse,’ but his attempt to see this sense here leaves the insult unintegrated. The equine reference in Ctesias seems enough to justify the name here given.

¹⁰⁷ See Fraenkel 1960: 52, 162, 422 = 2007: 42, 115, 408; E.S. Thompson (London 1901) on Plato *Meno* 80c (p. 112), Dover on Plato *Symp.* 215a.

¹⁰⁸ P. 72. n. 27.

¹⁰⁹ The reading *laeui ... oris* in 61 must be corrupt. When I wrote 1996: 269–270, I had overlooked Goins's (1987) conjecture *laesi*, but this leaves the difficulty of *frons oris*.

there. The travelers found this claim ridiculous, and Horace emphatically (*non ego: namque*, cf. 2.119) denies it credence, saying that only the Jew Apella (perhaps an adaptation of the Jewish name Abel) could believe it; Gow suggests that somehow behind this claim lurk Leviticus 9.24 and 1Kings 18.38, which speak of the spontaneous combustion of offerings on an altar. Horace's counter is a reaffirmation of his Epicureanism. He has learned, in the words he quotes from Lucretius 5.82 and 6.58 (*bene qui didicere deos securum agere aeuom*), that the gods live a life free of concern. Natural phenomena are therefore due to Epicurean Nature, which we have met in 2.74, 81; 3.113, rather than the gods, who feel no disturbing emotions such as annoyance (*tristes*) to make them show their displeasure with men by sending threatening phenomena. The second passage of Lucretius just adduced introduces explanations of curious natural phenomena.

8. *SERM.* 1.6

We were introduced to Horace's father in I 4; he now takes a central place in this poem. Horace here refers to him as a freedman three times (6, 45–46), and Gordon Williams (1995) argues that in all three places this is a phrase “used derisively by others.” From 45–46 it is clear that the term freedman was certainly coined as such, but, even if it was intended to give a false impression, there must have been some sliver of factual justification behind it. Williams (with a few predecessors who did not go deeply into the matter) convincingly contends that we must not think of the father as, say, a Syrian ex-slave (no doubt the impression that Horace's detractors intended to convey), but rather as a native Italian caught up in the Social War, in which Venusia was the only Latin colony to join the rebels, so that it had to be reconquered by the Romans in 88 BC. Three thousand prisoners were taken then, and Horace's father might have been among them and been enslaved, like a citizen of Larinum mentioned in Cic. *Pro Clu.* 21. Subsequently he would have been emancipated and, like all Italians, enrolled as a Roman citizen. Horace was born in 65 BC, when his father must have been at least 40. By the time the father was directing his son's education he owned a small farm (6.71), which he had acquired himself (4.108); hence his warning to his young son not to squander his inheritance (4.110–111). This warning was overtaken by the outcome of the Civil War, in which Horace chose the wrong side and the farm was confiscated, reducing Horace to what he calls *paupertas*, in a not entirely serious context (*Epist.* 2.2.50–51). The father too

is called *pauper* in the first of these passages, a word implying not 'poverty,' as we understand it, but a modest sufficiency, the ideal of the peasant-farmer community of early Rome.¹¹⁰ The father was also in business as a *coactor*, 'a type of banker who financed auction sales,'¹¹¹ in which capacity he would derive fees (*mercedes*), which his son calls small (6.87). Horace must be deliberately representing his father's income as much lower than it actually was, since otherwise he could never have afforded the education he gave his son at Rome and Athens.

Williams's theory accounts for so much that it compels assent with but slight adjustment. Horace was well aware that one does not suppress rumor simply by countering with the facts, so he counters by avoiding questioning the grain of truth in it, adopting it for himself, and wearing it as a badge of honor; Lyne even speaks of "inverted snobbery."¹¹² On the detailed interpretation of 6, see below; in *Epist.* 1.20.20–22, after fifteen years or so, he revives the insult to stress that it actually magnifies his achievement in life.

The first part of this poem incorporates several complex problems, and it is impossible here to give an exhaustive account of the many proposed solutions, but my wording should warn the reader when my version is open to serious challenge.

The third word of this poem is the vocative *Maecenas*, which was in the same position in I 1; this is a reminder to the reader of the book's dedicatee, who is to play a more integral part in this poem. Maecenas, we are told, belongs to the aristocracy of Etruria, descended from great generals (4, cf. *Lucr.* 3.1028 *magnis qui gentibus imperitarunt*, strongly suggesting an Ennian model), but for all that he does not turn up his nose at those born of obscure or, like Horace himself, freedman parentage. This paraphrase is based on Palmer's conjecture, adopted by Shackleton Bailey after J.H. Kells:¹¹³

Ignoto aut, ut me, libertino patre natos

Men born from a base or, like me, a freedman father.

Most editions present the line thus:

Ignotos, ut me libertino patre natum

Men of base birth, like my own birth from a freedman father.

¹¹⁰ See my notes on *Juv.* 6.295 and 9.147, Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) on *C.* 1.12.42–44, Kay on *Mart.* 11.32, etc.

¹¹¹ See Williams in Harrison 1995: 299; cf. Fraenkel 1957: 4–5.

¹¹² Lyne 1995: 16.

¹¹³ J.H. Kells, *CR* 9 (1959), 204–205.

But there are serious problems in the manuscript tradition. First, *ut* has scant authority; most manuscripts read *aut* or *aut ut*. Second, while *natum*, which could be due to assimilation to 45–46, has respectable authority, so do variants *natus* and *natos*. *Ignoto patre* matches well 36 *ignota matre inhonestus* (though, to be fair, *ignotos* can be supported by 25). Horace should here be introduced as unobtrusively as possible, since the poem opens mainly with generalities and Horace's own case only comes to the fore in 21 as a surprise, on which see below; we do not yet know that Horace is weakening the force of a reproach cast against him by representing himself as one of a nevertheless worthy class that included Cn. Flavius, low-born but elected curule aedile in 304 BC¹¹⁴ and the only other person, as Professor Woodman remarks,¹¹⁵ who is ever referred to in classical Latin literature as *libertino patre natus*. He was, like Horace, a *scriba* (not that the reader knows from the text before Book II that Horace held this position). Maecenas accordingly says that, provided that one is of free birth, the status of one's father does not matter; this implies, says Horace, that even before Servius Tullius, who according to most accounts was born a slave since that was his mother's status, many ex-slaves (who cannot be specified because Servius was the first recorded instance; cf. 3.107 and C. 4.9.25 there adduced) had gained office (*honoribus*; cf. 15, 19, 49) as well as respect (an orator in Livy 4.3.12 stresses *Ser. Tullius ... patre nullo, matre serua, ingenio uirtute regnum tenuisse*; cf. 10 here *nullis maioribus ortos*, cf. on 5.55). These lines (10–11) are marked by a striking sound pattern pointing to the antithesis,

multos saepe uirOS nullIS maiorIBUS ortOS
et uixisse probOS amplIS et honorIBUS auctOS.

Many men born of no ancestors often lived honorably and won splendid offices.

But how does this harmonize with Maecenas's reservation *dum ingenuus* (not to be referred to the father as by Williams 310), since the logic of the passage establishes that Horace cannot be thinking of versions in which Servius was born free? We do not know the context in which Maecenas made his remark, assuming that Horace reports him correctly. I think that Gow was right in supposing that he was not expressing a personal social attitude (after all, think of his own relations with the freedman Sarmentus)

¹¹⁴ See my *ALP* 141–143.

¹¹⁵ Woodman 2009: 158–160.

but was rejecting a widespread prejudice, with no basis in law, against sons of freedmen in politics, an area of life to which Horace is going to turn the argument. The political status of freedmen's sons was an issue at the time; apart from the attitude of the censor of 50 BC (see on 20–21) note Dio Cass. 43.47.3 (45 BC) and 48.34.4 (39 BC). In that case, Horace is unobtrusively strengthening Maecenas's statement *a fortiori*, noting that there have been meritorious freedmen, so it is no wonder that there have been meritorious sons of freedmen. Why would he do this? I suppose, as a subtle tribute to his own father. But the reader must be warned that other explanations have been sought for this difficulty, and indeed I myself have held different opinions at different times.

The opposite of these men is

*Laeuinum, Valeri genus, unde Superbus
Tarquinius regno pulsus fugit*

Laevinus, the progeny of Valerius, by whom Tarquin the Proud was driven from sovereignty into exile

Here *regno*, when related to *ignobile regnum* in 9, draws attention to the contrast between the worthy freedman king, Servius, and the degenerate aristocratic king, Tarquin. Attention is also drawn to the contrast between the iconic Valerius Poplicola and his worthless descendant Laeuinus by the grand style, *genus* (cf. II 5.63 etc.), and *unde*, meaning *a quo*.¹¹⁶ We know nothing about Laevinus except that according to Porphyrio he never got beyond the quaestorship (date unknown).¹¹⁷ He was always counted, to use a phrase in the back of Horace's mind, as *homo minimi preti*, a man of trivial worth, and it was the general public, not a censor, that put this mark of disapproval on him,¹¹⁸ though it often gives *honores* to those who do not deserve them (unlike the worthy recipients in 11) simply on the grounds of distinguished ancestry.

¹¹⁶ Cf. II 3.238 and Fraenkel 1957: 102 n. 2.

¹¹⁷ Hanslik (in *RE*, *Valerius* no. 212) suggests that Pliny *NH* 35.8 (*exstat Messallae oratoris indignatio quae prohibuit inseri genti suae Laeuinorum alienam imaginem*) indicates a reaction to this Laevinus by Horace's contemporary Messalla Corvinus, but this is rather a stretch.

¹¹⁸ Palmer rightly saw that in the phrase *notante iudice quo nosti* the word *quo* is an interrogative adjective, not a relative pronoun, and that the sense could be expressed in full as *quo autem iudice notante sic licuerit nosti, nempe populo* (you know in whose censorial judgment he was so valued, namely the people), with the interrogative placed last in its phrase as at *Epist.* 1.16.40.

“What should we do, we who stand far, far apart from the vulgar mob?”¹¹⁹ Let us grant for the sake of argument [19] that the people would have preferred to elect Laevinus rather than the ‘new man’ Decius [who was consul in 340 BC], and that Appius would have ejected me from the senate if I were not the son of a freeborn man.” This is another highly controversial passage. At one time I followed Palmer’s interpretation (there are many others), which saw the reference as being to Appius Claudius Caecus, who as censor in 312 BC admitted sons of freedmen to the senate, but now prefer the general opinion that it is to the censor of 50 BC, who expelled such sons of freedmen from it. The first example would then mean that the people would have preferred to elect Laevinus but felt unable to do so because of his worthlessness. “If” (21), once we accept Williams’s view that Horace’s father was actually of free birth, is perfectly in point. It makes it look as if Horace is merely a theoretical illustration as in 6; only with the next line do we realize that his personal situation is displacing the argument, which has so far been conducted in general terms and is becoming central to the poem. After 19–21 we expect an apodosis along the lines of “we would disapprove of this.” Instead, we find the most extreme twist in Roman poetry: “quite right, too, since I would not have rested in my own skin,” like the fabled ass in the lion’s skin (cf. II 1.64). So the original theme, that merit should outweigh birth, is swamped by the specific vision of the senator Horace, a vision that he characteristically rejects; he feels entitled to undertake office despite his allegedly low origins and his detractors (49–50 *forsit honorem / iure mihi inuideat quiuis*), but he knows that he is temperamentally unsuited to this.

It is Vanity (*Gloria*),¹²⁰ suitably described in pretentious terms (cf. *Epist.* 2.1.177), that drags along *ignoti* like Horace as well as *generosi* (men of distinguished family like that of Laevinus; though the *generosus* Maecenas, 1–2, has to count as an exception since he steadfastly refused to rise above the status of *eques*) as captives behind her triumphal chariot. For election to office incites envy, as in the case of Tillius.¹²¹ As soon as a man, who

¹¹⁹ The *populus* in a political context (15, 19) becomes the *uulgus* when it is a matter of outlook; there is a similar switch between the two terms at *Epist.* 2.1.196–197. Shackleton Bailey is unjustified in adopting *uos* (perhaps just a misprint of the Aldine edition) in 18 after Bentley (addenda, pp. 446–447), whose argument is purely subjective. Compare rather 97–98, where Horace admits that avoidance of office would be considered mad by the *uulgus* but perhaps (a tactful word avoiding presumption) sane by Maecenas. But the reader will encounter other interpretations of *nos*.

¹²⁰ See *OLD* s.v. 4.

¹²¹ Much controversy swirls around this man (the latest discussion is by Toher 2005). My own tentative opinion is that he is identical with the praetor mentioned in 107 and doubtless

would have to be mad to do so, puts on senatorial attire, everyone begins to pay attention (*curare*, cf. 32) and enquires “Who is this man? Who was his father?” (cf. 29). “Has he got the skeleton of an obscure (*ignota*) mother in his closet? How can the son of a Syrian slave presume to condemn citizens to death by being thrown from the Tarpeian Rock [around this time there are references to this happening in Appian *BC* 3.3 and Dio Cass. 44.50.3; the tribunes were authorized to supervise this] or handing them over to the public executioner?” The latter would be particularly involved in crucifixions, as had been envisioned in the case of Rabirius in 63 BC.¹²² The man’s response is that his colleague Novius (hardly the name of an actual person, though a man of this name was tribune in 58 BC, but one chosen by Horace to fit the context; there is no link with 121) is not just a freedman’s son but is himself a freedman. If there is any substance in this it may be connected with the enrollment of actual slaves in the senate in 39 BC (Dio Cass. 48.34.4–5). Horace’s response to the response is that Novius’s status gives his colleague no justification for boosting his own status.

Now, says Horace (45), I return to myself (a turn adapted from Lucilius 1227 *nunc ad te redeo*; cf. 1.108, 7.9), who have disappeared from view since 22. Everyone¹²³ attacks (*rodunt* recalling 4.81) my alleged status as son of a freedman nowadays on the grounds of my association with Maecenas, as formerly (so detraction of him started early) on the grounds of my command of a legion as *tribunus militum* (an exaggeration of course, since a legion was commanded by a *legatus* with six tribunes under him); we recall that Maecenas’ ancestors also commanded legions (4)! The two things are on different levels; there might be some justification for grudging (*inuideat*, cf. 26) military-political advancement, since exposure to envy is fair punishment (*merito* 22) for surrendering to the vanity of ambition, but not the social

with L. Tillius Cimber, one of Caesar’s murderers (probably now dead) and thought to have been praetor in 45 BC. 107 means *obiciet nemo sordes mihi quas tibi, Tilli, (omnes obiecerunt)*, the idiom remarked on 1.108; for a historic present after *cum* cf. II 3.61, 277. He would seem to have been expelled from the senate (hence *depositum clauum*; hardly, as Toher and others think, to have retired voluntarily from it) and then to have regained membership of it through election as *tribunus plebis* (so 25 is a hysteron proteron). He appears to be an illustration of *ignotos*, and in fact no previous Tillius had been an elected magistrate. No reliance can be placed on the statements of the scholiasts. It is worth noting that this poem has remarkably few personal attacks; they would only have distracted from the case that Horace is making for himself.

¹²² See Cicero’s speech 10 and 16; the actual phrase *carnifici tradere* (to hand over to the executioner), *ibid.* 12, and also Suet. *Claud.* 34.1.

¹²³ “Everyone” (cf. 27) strengthens “most people” (5); cf. above, p. 65 n. 2. Dover on Aristophanes *Nub.* 557–558, which is quite similar, compares this passage.

advancement represented by the friendship of Maecenas. Elsewhere in the *Satires* Horace complains of such envy, which clearly distressed him greatly (its memory is still alive at *C.* 4.3.16), at II 1.76–77: “envy will reluctantly confess that I associated with the great” (*cum magnis uixisse*, cf. *conuictor* 47 here), and II 6.41 ff. “ever since Maecenas began to regard me as belonging to the number of his friends [*suorum in numero*, cf. *in amicorum numero* 62 here] I have become ever more subject to envy” (cf. also II 3.13). The criterion for this friendship is merit, not birth; Maecenas is careful to pick friends who deserve this and are not just social climbers (*praua / ambitione procul*, “far from corrupt self-seeking”; so probably to be understood, cf. 10.84), the sort of person who will later be illustrated in I 9. The notion of ‘picking’ leads to what follows. The deserving Horace is not just lucky, as his detractors asserted (II 6.49); Virgil and Varius had brought his merits (presumably mainly stressing his poetic gifts) to the attention of Maecenas. When he met Maecenas personally, he could only stammer (the stammering is mimicked by alliteration in 57) his true situation, not pretending that his father had been distinguished or that he rode around his estates *Satureiano caballo*.¹²⁴ Horace’s point is that he does not possess the traditional three qualifications for equestrian status, *equus et pater et res* (*AP* 248). Maecenas responded with a brevity (60–61) matching Horace’s own (56) and kept him under observation for nine months, an illustration of his caution (51), though one has to remember that he was absent from Rome for some time at the beginning of 38 BC (Appian *BC* 5.92).¹²⁵ He then summoned Horace back and invited him to count himself as an *amicus*, a term which to a Roman often implies a kind of formal relationship. Horace expresses his pride in this, because Maecenas separates honorable men from base not by birth but by merit, *turpi secernis honestum / non patre praeclaro* (the last two words taking up 58). These words should be punctuated as a unit, with

¹²⁴ The low stylistic register of the noun, ‘nag’ (cf. 103, etc.) undercuts the grand adjective and punctures any potential boast by Horace. This adjective is usually referred to the town of Satuirum, whose name survives in modern Saturo, on the coast 12 km. southeast of Tarentum, but this poses problems of morphology (it should be *Saturino*) and of sense, since this town has no connection with horses or anything to the point here. We would do better to follow L. Mueller in supposing that there was a breeder of high-class horses called Satureius (a man of this name was tribune in 133 BC).

¹²⁵ Plaza (2006: 285) sees *infans* 57 (‘inarticulate’ rather than ‘infantile’) and *nono mense* 61 as suggesting a new birth, with Maecenas as ‘father,’ but references to nine months, whether lunar or solar, as the period of gestation are rare (see the ragbag collected by Pease on Cic. *ND* 2.79) as against the usual ten lunar months. Modern exegetes often seek to derive more meaning from a text than is in it.

the adjectives of 63 understood as masculine, like *confusus turpis honesto* AP 213; *honestus* is not applied to birth by Maecenas, as its opposite was in 36 by “everybody,” but to merit. Here we recall a point made by Rudd¹²⁶ after Hendrickson,¹²⁷ that this poem shows a wide range of statements framed on the pattern ‘not A but B’; Rudd comments that the feature “represents an attempt to re-educate the moral judgment.”

But (65), says Horace, aware that this will sound boastful, if my nature has only a few unimportant flaws (as he had claimed in 4.130; the concession of faults minimizes the boast, cf. Plutarch *De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando* 13.543f.¹²⁸), if I observe the mean between avarice and meanness (a point occurring in 1.65 and 95–96) and do not frequent brothels (as the man did in 2.30ff.), if my pure life (a desideratum of Maecenas, 64) makes me dear to my friends (as in 4.135 he strove to be), I owe this to my father, a suggestion of whom was introduced in 64; given how he has been presented until now as a drawback, this comes as a great surprise. Though not rich (see above on this) he refused to send me to the local school, populated as it was by the burly sons of burly centurions. One cannot miss a bitter tone about both the sons, who no doubt would have bullied the pint-sized¹²⁹ Horace, and their fathers, alien and dominant intruders, perhaps Sullan veterans settled in Venusia.¹³⁰ Instead, Horace’s father brought him to Rome to get him the quality of education¹³¹ that an *eques* or senator would procure for his offspring (denoted by the lofty word *prognatos*; cf. 2.70 and Fraenkel there referred to); in this way differences in social status are eliminated. He provided clothes and escorting slaves of a standard suggesting inherited wealth (whereas the father in fact was a self-made man, 4.108); these would be *cap-sarii*¹³² to carry Horace’s schoolbag. The burly boys of Venusia would carry their schoolbags themselves (74). The father acted as protector (*custos* 81, cf. 4.118), avoiding the risk of corruption common in *paedagogi* and seeing that the boy incurred no suspicion of immorality (cf. Quintil. 2.2.14). He was not burdening his son with great expectations. Horace would not have

¹²⁶ Rudd 1966: 52.

¹²⁷ Hendrickson 1902: 396.

¹²⁸ Adduced by Hendrickson 1902: 391.

¹²⁹ See II 3.309, *Epist.* 1.20.24, and a letter of Augustus quoted in the Suetonian biography.

¹³⁰ Cf. Lucil. 89 *municipem ... centurionum*, and see Fraenkel 1957: 2–3.

¹³¹ Reflections of Horace’s schooldays are in *Epist.* 2.1.69–71, 2.2.41. We may recall that *artes* (77) embraces moral as well as intellectual qualities (*OLD* s.v. 4), but perhaps we should not overemphasize their share in the education of the sons of *equites* and senators.

¹³² See Blümner 1911: 131 n. 20; Marquardt 1886: 113.

complained if he had followed his father in his profession, but, as matters now stand, he is all the more grateful that his father did not shrink from educating him above his possible station.

Now (89) Horace returns from the description of his father's careful upbringing to the point last made in 64, that of social status based on parentage. He would in no way, he states, feel dissatisfied with such a father, and would never defend himself by saying, as many do, that it is not their fault that they do not have parents (or 'ancestors'; cf. C. 2.20.6) who were freeborn (again for the sake of argument implying acceptance of the trace of truth in the reproach of 45–46) or distinguished (looking back to 58). If Nature should allow one to retrace one's life¹³³ and choose other ancestors, Horace would be content with those he had and not opt for aristocrats. Nature here takes on the role that a god played in 1.15 ff., also in a context involving contentment (1.3), and in Cicero, quoted in n. 133; Epicureanism has become stronger and stronger as the book has progressed, culminating at the end of the preceding poem. The vulgar mob might think me mad, says Horace, but you (the contrast as in 18) would no doubt (*fortasse*, a word that avoids presumption) think me sane (reinforcing 89) for not undertaking the burdens of public life to which I have never been used, acquisition of wealth,¹³⁴ the morning levee (*salutatio*), a retinue of companions, grooms, a stable (degraded by the term *caballus* already met in 59), vehicles.

So we have now transitioned from parentage back to political life, and in particular the disadvantages that cause Horace to repeat from 21–22 his rejection of it. As matters now stand (104), Horace can go all the way to the extreme southern tip of Italy on a gelded mule (an unpretentious mode of transport, unlike 59), which carries his luggage (since he does not have any of the wagons just listed to carry it) as well as the rider; he has in mind Lucil. 1207, *mantica cantheri costas grauitate premebat*, perhaps from Book 3 (if so, when Horace began to arrange his Satires in a book the preceding poem may have brought this to mind). Nobody will accuse him of meanness (a fault of which, in 68–69, he claimed that he could not be accused), whereas when the senator (a rank Horace had rejected for himself in 20–22) and praetor Tillius¹³⁵ travels in similarly humble fashion he is open to this reproach.

¹³³ Cf. Cic. *Cato* 83 *si qui deus mihi largiatur ut ex hac aetate repuerascam et in cunis uagiam, ualde recusem*. The *a certis annis* that follows in Horace is not unintelligible, but seems pointless; I have a note that Birt suggested *teneris* 'youthful,' but unfortunately I have lost the reference.

¹³⁴ See my *ALP* 50.

¹³⁵ See p. 106 n. 121.

So, Horace says (110), in countless ways he lives a comfortable life, and then describes his daily routine, beginning with the evening: wandering on his own (112; remember that as a public figure he would not have been able to travel on his own, 102) around the city, with its markets and diversions, then back home to a modest meal made from the vegetables and cereal¹³⁶ of which in his stroll he has enquired the price from the vendors (112), and then to bed; rising late in the morning,¹³⁷ followed by a walk; alternatively he is anointed with good-quality olive oil (for, as we have been told, he is not mean) and exercises in the Campus Martius, then goes to the public baths when it gets hot (125; the elevated word *ast*, here as at Virg. *Aen.* 3.410 in the combination *ast ubi* and elsewhere used by Horace only at 8.6, and also at Epode 15.24 in the common combination *ast ego*, indicates parody; cf. Skutsch on Enn. *Ann.* 93). Then Horace has a frugal lunch, followed by relaxation at home until the evening. I console myself (gentle irony; cf. II 6.117 somewhat more seriously), he says, with such pursuits and will live more agreeably (as in 110 he declared that he lived more comfortably than Tillius) than if I were descended from a family of quaestors; with this he scornfully indicates that honor can be cheaply acquired from the lowest rank in the politician's career, the *cursus honorum*, a rank above which Laevinus, we are told, did not rise.

This poem has more of a formal structure than its predecessors, and can be analyzed in three parts, each subdivided into two, of almost equal length; attention is drawn to the beginning of the second part by the wording of 45. For this it will be sufficient to refer to Rudd¹³⁸ and Van Rooy,¹³⁹ and just outline the structure as I (a) 1–22, the irrelevance of birth in determining merit, and (b) 23–44 the folly of ambition; II (a) 45–64 Horace's merits, and (b) 65–88 Horace's obligations to his father; III (a) 89–111a freedom, and (b) 111b–131 a day in Horace's life. Thus I is concerned with opposite aspects of eminence, II deals with merit (45–48 linking with 1–6), and III (a) leads back to I (b) with Tillius (107–111) recalling 24–26.

¹³⁶ Ullman (1912), whose article gives the impression that he had never tasted Italian food, refers this to minestrone, one ingredient of which is some form of pasta, the *laganum* here, like macaroni.

¹³⁷ Is this when Horace did his writing? Bentley and others understand his reading or writing (122–123) to take place then, but the Latin makes this difficult and suggests rather that it was an alternative to a walk. Editors might like to consider a forgotten conjecture in 122, *aut lego: lecto* (so Willems 1873). In any case, I think that *lecto* refers to reading aloud (cf. on 3.64) and that, with a slight inexactitude of expression, *tacitum* relates only to *scripto*.

¹³⁸ Rudd 1966: 42.

¹³⁹ Van Rooy 1970: 47.

9. *SERM.* 1.7

This is the shortest of Horace's satires, and is entirely devoted to an ἀἴνως, a brief anecdote of which the whole point is that it leads up to a punch line; Horace had already used this form in 2.31–35, except that for a particular reason he there omitted the punch line known from the scholiasts. Here we have the repartee in a lawsuit. One of the litigants was Rupilius Rex, who was apparently praetor in 43 BC but, after being proscribed by the triumvirs, fled to Brutus, who was in some capacity in charge of Asia (referred to by Horace in a non-technical way as praetor).¹⁴⁰ The other was Persius, a wealthy businessman who is described as *hybrida*, a half-breed (2), and *Graecus* (32); presumably he was a Greek who had acquired Roman citizenship.¹⁴¹ The two were bitter enemies, seemingly because of a dispute involving Persius's business interests at Clazomenae (4–5); there is reason to believe that Rupilius was involved in tax farming, which would provide obvious possibility for conflict. The trial was presided over by Brutus, and when Persius was getting the worst of it he appealed to Brutus's record as a killer of tyrants (*reges*; i.e., Julius Caesar) to persuade him to suppress this Rex.¹⁴² This pun provides a weak climax, and Horace (who himself appears in the poem only in two first-person verbal endings, 2 and 9) admits that the story is well-known, but he must have seen potential for enlivening it with characterization and mock heroics.

First, there is the epic color, stronger than in I 5, given to this squabble. The details are discussed in the various editions; it begins in the very first line with a parody of a Homeric form of expression, for which see on 2.32.¹⁴³ I shall just remark that μῆνις οὐλομένη (deadly wrath) is reduced to fusty *ira capitalis* as befits the legal setting, and *discordia* (15) is ἔρις.¹⁴⁴ The two

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *Epist.* 2.2.34 and *OLD* s.v. 2C.

¹⁴¹ Val. Max. 8.6.4 says that Q. Varius, tribune in 90 BC, was given the cognomen *Hybrida* *propter obscurum ius ciuitatis*. Suet. *Aug.* 19.1 mentions another *hybrida*.

¹⁴² Brutus's one-time tyrannicide is exaggerated into a habit, *consueris* (34), cf. *soliti* 5.29. This is a rhetorical technique, for which see Leo 1962: I 149 ff. and add Juv. 10.180.

¹⁴³ The cognomen is placed before the nomen (cf. 5.32, 9.61 etc.) in order to give prominence to the former, which will provide the climax, and to underline the contrast between *proscripti* and *regis*. Apart from this climax, the man is Rex four times in the rest of the poem, Rupilius only in 19, for metrical convenience. Horace feels that this man needs no introduction to Roman readers; Persius, however, does (2–8), and only after this does Horace return to Rupilius (9).

¹⁴⁴ This line has to be understood thus, *duo si discordia uexet inertis* (*ambo discedant salui*) (if hostility should stir up two sluggards, (both would depart unharmed)) or the like, with

litigants are first presented as Homeric heroes, so it is even more of a letdown when they are finally compared to gladiators (19–20) making their theatrical entrance (*magnum spectaculum, procurrunt*¹⁴⁵) as if into the arena. Homeric heroes, too, receive ironic treatment. The friendly resolution of the conflict between Diomedes and Glaucus (*Il.* 6.119–236) by the exchange of armor initiated by the former (213, 230) is debased by the implication that the latter initiated it (*ultro*, 17) because of cowardice (*pigrrior*, *ibid.*); actually, Glaucus in Homer (120, 125–126) is keen to fight. One should note that the comparison of Persius to a *flumen hibernum* (27), i.e., χειμάρρους, a river in winter flood, which probably recalls Ajax in 11.492–495, is followed by *fertur quo rara securis*, which is not just a piece of romanticism, as has sometimes been supposed, but implies that Persius's speech could do with pruning (see below).

Second, we note the ethnic contrast between the fluent half-Greek and the rough Italian. The former combines literary reference (25–26) with a well-worn topic of rhetorical flattery in his comparison of Brutus and his retinue to the sun and stars,¹⁴⁶ enlivened by his equation of Rupilius with the baneful star Sirius (*Canem* would be better for a capital letter) introducing the dog days, a comparison applied to Achilles in *Il.* 22.26–31; perhaps we have to think of him as specifically an Asianist orator (whence *tumidus* 7, cf. 27). On the other hand, we have the Praenestine Rupilius with his “Italian vinegar” (a pungent phrase that has been found useful even by modern scholarship), which washes away (*perfusus* 32) the salt of Greek humor (28; cf. already *sermonis amari* 7), for which cf. [Virg.] *Catalepton* 9.62, Cic. *De Or.* 2.217, where as usual it is particularly associated with Attica (Cic. *Or.* 90¹⁴⁷). Rupilius, too, trades insult for insult like a rough (*durus* 29; but the adjective applies to Persius also, 7) vine-pruner,¹⁴⁸ overwhelming a passer-by

such a supplement needing to be evolved from 17–18; the same thing happens at *Il.* 2.9sq. (see Housman 1972: 546), and Faraone 1989: 294–296 interprets Verg. *Buc.* 8.80–81 similarly.

¹⁴⁵ There is a variant *concurrunt*, not recorded by Shackleton Bailey, in the manuscripts Ea, which has to be accounted inferior even though *acres concurrunt* (cf. 1.7) might seem to reproduce *Il.* 6.120 συνίτην μεμαῶτε μάχεσθαι.

¹⁴⁶ See Fraenkel 1957: 121 n. 2 and the references there given; add Price 1980: 32 n. 4 3, Weinstock 1971: 381–384, Doblhofer 1966: 17–21 (esp. 19 n. 8), and for the rhetorical background, Menander rhetor, Russell and Wilson, p. 94 (instructions for a speech on the arrival of a governor).

¹⁴⁷ See Otto 1890: 200.

¹⁴⁸ The insults are *expressa arbusto* (29), squeezed out from the tree on which the vine would be trained, like bad wine (*acetum*, cf. 32) from grapes; cf. Pliny *NH* 6. 161 *uinum ... palmis exprimere*.

who had shouted ‘cuckoo’ at him, implying that he had left his pruning until the cuckoo had already arrived, which was too late; we have here an earthy glimpse of Italian country life, which is why Rupilius, in contrast to the *Graecus* (32) Persius, is designated as originating from the country town Praeneste.

10. *SERM.* 1.8

“Once I was the trunk of a fig-tree, a useless piece of timber, when a carpenter, uncertain whether to make a pedestal or a Priapus, preferred that I should be a god. So god I am” (Brown). The Roman reader, used to firm generic distinctions, would find himself perplexed by this beginning. Is he about to read a Priapeum? This idea would be favored by the fact that the speaker is Priapus himself reporting seamy nocturnal events, and by the self-deprecating humor not only about his poor material (for a figwood Priapus cf. Theocritus *AP* 9.437.2, *Anth. Plan.* 86.3–4 [anon.]¹⁴⁹) but also by the fact that he owes his creation as a god, narrowly beating out a pedestal,¹⁵⁰ to a low-class human. Cf. *Priapea* 10.4–5 *lignum rude ulicus dolauit / et dixit mihi ‘tu Priapus esto,’* Epicharmus 129 ἐκ παντὸς ξύλου / κλωός (v.l. κύφων) γένοιτ’ ἄν καὶ θεός (a pillory [or penal collar] or a god could be created out of any piece of wood). Or is it a dedicatory epigram, in which the dedicated object compares its former state as raw material and its present state as crafted object?¹⁵¹ But the hexameter is too grand for either genre; elegiacs might do. When we come to 47 another solution presents itself; we might have an aetiology accounting for a split in the rear of the image, but again Horace avoids being pinned down. The poem skilfully incorporates all these elements (what we now know as ‘Kreuzung der Gattungen’), but in its setting it is framed as an anecdote to match 1.7; in both of these the seeming loser gets his revenge (7.2, 8.44) on the prevailing party.

This effigy is placed on the Esquiline, where outside the Servian wall there had been a communal burial ground in which the corpses of slaves

¹⁴⁹ One may note the imitation of *inutile lignum* in *Priapea* 73.3.

¹⁵⁰ In Babrius 30 two prospective buyers of a statue of Hermes want it either for a grave-stone or an image of the god himself; in a dream Hermes says to the sculptor, “You will make me either a corpse or a god.” Such humorous expressions nevertheless imply a sense that the god is immanent in his statue, that in a way the two are identical; see my note on *Juv.* 13.115 and also Faraone 1992: 72 n. 87; *RAC* s.v. *Götterbild* 714–716; Elsner 1996: 528 ff., Gordon 1979: 7–8. This feeling was fueled by reports of such portents as statues moving, etc.

¹⁵¹ See Fraenkel 1957: 121–122; Buchheit 1962: 63 n. 3; Hallett 1981: 341 n. 2.

and paupers were thrown into pits (Varro *LL* 5.25). There were, however, also some large tombs (36¹⁵²) to which the inscribed notice of the burial ground area (12–13) must have applied; hence Cicero (*Phil.* 9.17) proposes that Servius Sulpicius be interred there. Maecenas had cleared the insalubrious area and turned it into a park, offering a pleasant vista to strollers on the wall. Priapus exerts his usual function of keeping away thieves (which must imply that Maecenas had planted fruit trees), birds,¹⁵³ and even wild animals (which seems to mean wolves; cf. Epode 5 [on which see below] 99–100, *post insepulta membra different lupi / et Esquilinae alites*). The birds (crows are specified in 38, a carrion breed) had probably been drawn by exposed human flesh and are consequently described as ill omens, *importunae* 6 (cf. Virg. *Georg.* 1.470, *Aen.* 12.864; the preceding *ast* in Horace perhaps implies a specific model, cf. on 6.126); one notes that Priapus is linked with birds only by Romans, and in fact only once in the extant collection of Priapea, 61.10–12 (and also in the ‘Virgilian’ Priapeum ‘quid hoc noui est?’ [*OCT* p. 151] 11–13). But rites of sorcery are Priapus’s main problem (17–22), and their perpetrators are not so easily kept away as the above pests.

The witch Canidia appears as a central figure in two poems, *Epod.* 5 and 17, as well as this. Of these Epode 17 contains clear references to this poem (see especially below on 44) and must have been composed as a sequel. In it a man (Horace) who has offended Canidia asks for relief from the torments to which she has subjected him; his offence is that he has publicized Canidia as an immoral witch, one of her complaints being that he has derided (*riseris* 56) secret erotic ceremonies, just as Priapus in 50, taking a phrase *risu(s)que ioco(s)que* from the derision of superstition in 5.98, thinks that any spectator would have laughed at the ignominious flight of the witches. Another complaint is that her victim denounced *Esquilini uenefici*¹⁵⁴ (58), i.e., the rites described in this Satire. Whereas Priapus exacted punishment for these (*non inultus* 44), Canidia will not allow her victim to get off scot-free (*inultus* 17.56). The relationship in time of composition between this poem

¹⁵² For these, see Ryberg 1940: 83 n. 4, 85 n. 15. For the graveyard in general, see Hopkins 1983: 209–210; Bodel 1986: 38–54, with map on p. 43; Graham 2006: 64–84; more bibliography in Edmunds 2009: 126 n. 6.

¹⁵³ With Horace’s *furum auiumque / maxima formido* (3–4) cf. Virgil *Georg.* 4.110 *custos furum atque auium*. This is a case in which we should not apply Norden’s method, but rather accept that Virgil has Horace in mind.

¹⁵⁴ The noun *uenenum* does not specifically refer to poisoning, cf. *OLD* s.v. *la*, and is derived from *uenus* (see *RE* s.v. 831.67–832) because it originally referred to love-magic; there can even be *bonum uenenum* (Gaius in *Dig.* 50.16.236, Marcian op. cit. 48.8.3.2). See my note on Juv. 6.626. Canidia is linked to toxic *uenenum* at II 1.48.

and Epode 5 is not clear. In the latter Canidia, after the failure of the usual erotic magic means, attempts to win back her husband (?) Varus by threatening to bury a helpless boy up to his neck and use his bodily parts when he dies of hunger. In dramatic time the Satire, in which conventional magic is still being tried, is apparently intended to predate the Epode, as it predated it in date of publication; hence Horace can make a casual reference to Canidia in Epode 3.7–8 as a figure already known to his readers. In Epode 5 Canidia has a coven of helpers, one of whom is Sāgāna, who also appears in the Satire. This is not a Roman name, and it is unwarranted for Acro, quoted by Porphyrio on *Serm.* I 8.25 (where there is a slight corruption), and Priscian (2.120 *GLK*) to link it with *sāga*; I do not know the answer to this problem. In I 8.25 she is described as *maior*, which presumably means ‘elder’ (cf. *minor* 6.121), implying a younger sister of the same name, which seems to suggest some sort of historical reality behind the witches. Acro, quoted by Porphyrio on I 8.23, and Porphyrio himself, on Epode 3.7, give three alleged details about Canidia, two of which can be derived from Horace’s text (and in such cases it should be presumed that this is indeed the case). The third detail is that Canidia is a pseudonym for one Gratidia, but this is unlikely because, apart from nicknames, satire does not deal in pseudonyms,¹⁵⁵ nor for that matter does epode.¹⁵⁶ The mention of Canidia at II 1.48 seems to imply some sort of historical reality. I conclude that there was an actual woman of this name who was supposed to be a witch, and that on this basis Horace built imaginative constructions that would not have appeared totally fantastic to his readers, since sorcery was believed to be widely diffused throughout Rome and the ancient world generally. It seems strange that the theme would have appealed so strongly to Horace, but, since all else is pure speculation, we can only accept that it did have such appeal for him that the last line of his satires (II 8.85) contains a reference to it. This poem, though it describes rites terrifying to Priapus, at least ends on a comical note that would be alien to an aggressive epode.

Canidia, on her introduction, appears *nigra succinctam palla* (23), a phrase that, as Leich¹⁵⁷ remarks, raises a difficulty, namely that, though she needs to be unencumbered (cf. *expedita Sagana* in Epode 5.25), knots, which would be needed for hitching up her robe, were taboo in magic (as with Canidia’s feet and hair in 24); he quotes Virg. *Aen.* 4.518 with Servius ad loc.

¹⁵⁵ Rudd 1966: 147–149.

¹⁵⁶ For such improvised names in scholia, see Mankin 1995: 300.

¹⁵⁷ Leich 1910: 23–24.

His answer is to cite Virgil's description of Tisiphone, on whom one of the witches calls in 34, as *palla succincta cruenta* (her bloody robe hitched up) (*Aen.* 6.555, where see Norden), since Canidia is referred to as a Fury in 45 (cf. *Epod.* 5.15–16, where she has snakes entwined in her hair), and to infer that both are drawing on an Ennian description of a Fury. She and Sagana are both pale (25; cf. *pallida Tisiphone* Virg. *Georg.* 3.552, *Aen.* 10.761); they practise both erotic magic (30–33) with two 'voodoo dolls' (referred to in *Epod.* 17.76–77¹⁵⁸) and necromancy (26–29). They seem to be trying to keep the new park as the cemetery it used to be, and, though Priapus now defines his function as keeping away thieves, perhaps he was originally there because of his association with cemeteries, specifically cepotaphia (tombs in a garden setting), as Edmunds (2009: 128) points out. He is terrified by their rites, the enormity of which he seems to exaggerate; one doubts that he could see serpents and the hounds of hell (34–35), and after Maecenas's efforts at beautification it is hardly likely that there were bones (cf. *Epode* 5.23) lying around to be picked up (22); the latter statement is specifically contradicted by the imperfect in 16: *albis informem spectabant ossibus agrum* (ironically, a golden line). Like the moon, the comely face of which has peeped out at 21–22 (probably a reminiscence of high poetry; cf. Virg. *Aen.* 8. 589–591 *Lucifer ... extulit os sacrum caelo*), he is a witness (44) to these doings, which in an epic-style *praeteritio* (*singula*, "the details," is [τὰ] ἑκαστα, as e.g., Hom. *Od.* 12.165, 13.191) he briefly lists. Unlike her, however, who blushes in lady-like fashion (a reddish color is often remarked in the moon with various implications¹⁵⁹), he cannot hide to avoid being a witness (35–36). Eventually, he reacts with a thunderous fart, which he can do because fig wood is so weak (*inutile* 1) and which he perhaps does not through fear,¹⁶⁰ but deliberately, knowing that this gastric misfortune can disrupt a cult ceremony.¹⁶¹ It is as loud as the bursting of a bladder, *displosa sonat quantum uesica*, a parody of one Lucretian explanation of thunder by wind shut up and then bursting out of a cloud (6.130–132), which, if Lachmann's conjecture is right, is shattered, *fissa*; this is illustrated by the phenomenon that *uen-sicula parua / saepe ita det +paruum+ sonitum displosa repente*. At any rate,

¹⁵⁸ One would be male and one female; see Faraone 1989: 298–299.

¹⁵⁹ See Nisbet and Hubbard (1978) on *C.* 2.11.10; *ThLL* s.v. *luna* 1837.9.

¹⁶⁰ See Henderson 1991: 195–196.

¹⁶¹ See Cato ap. Fest. 234 M = *orationes* ed. Sblendorio Cugusi fr. 60, adduced in O. Jahn's classic discussion (1855: 48–49), who in *tafel* 4.4–6 reproduces figurines that illustrate this. 9.70 perhaps hints at something similar. It is amusing that the stately *RE* has an article on farting (*Porde*) in which this passage is duly noted.

the witches are terrified and run back into the city, abandoning dentures, tall headdress (?), and magic threads.

11. *SERM.* 1.9

As Horace is out for a walk, a distant acquaintance, an aspiring poet, waylays him and cannot be shaken off; it emerges that his purpose is to use Horace in order to insinuate his way into Maecenas's circle, which, however, as Horace points out, does not operate on such lines. Eventually, they run across the opponent in a lawsuit; Horace is enlisted as a witness and his *bête noire* is dragged off to court. *Sic me seruauit Apollo*, concludes Horace, thinking not only of ἐξήρπαξεν in *Il.* 20.443, but also of εἰρύσατο (*ibid.* 450).¹⁶² Cairns (2005) refutes an attempt to claim that Horace would have had to follow to court.

The universal appeal of this poem's humor, unsurpassed elsewhere in Horace's writings, is demonstrated by the fact that the scenario and characters could be translated almost bodily to today's world. I have traced the plot and its undertones in Courtney 1994: 1–8, and refer the reader to that article, since my views have not changed and problems arose with permission to reproduce it here; when I wrote it, I had not seen Fedeli's article (1993), which operates on similar lines. I would note that, unlike Shackleton Bailey, I there punctuated *paucorum hominum et mentis bene sanae* in 44 as Horace's reply to the pest's enquiry about Maecenas.

12. *SERM.* 1.10

"Well, yes, I did say that the verses of Lucilius ran on hobbling feet," *incomposito pede* (an obvious pun). This reference back to 4.8b (where we have *componere*), expressed as if it came in the middle of a discussion, seems too abrupt a beginning to someone who prefixed eight spurious verses appearing in one family of Horatian manuscripts; they will be ignored here. The fact, Horace admits, is undeniable, but he points out that in the very same poem (6–8a) he praised Lucilius for scouring the city with salty wit. So it is not enough (cf. 4.53–54) to make one's listener cackle, meritorious though this is. One also needs brevity (a quality conspicuously absent in Lucilius; 4.9–13) and variety of tone; humor (11 *iocosus*, 14 *ridiculum*; cf. 1.24–26) is usually more effective than intensity (11 *tristi*, cf. II 1.21, Lucil. 1014; 14 *acri*). The

¹⁶² So Schmitzer in: Koster 1994: 26.

writers of Old Comedy (the wording of 16 is closely modelled on 4.2) knew this very well and should be imitated in this (whereas Lucilius had imitated them in criticizing people, 4.6). Horace had indeed praised Lucilius for wit (4.7–8), but here he seems to be concentrating on the respective proportions of humor and intensity and implying that Lucilius had too little of the former and too much of the latter. Lucilius was undoubtedly *urbanus* (65), but, it is implied (13), lacked the side of *urbanitas* that involves understatement, εἰρωνεία.

Lucilius's defenders counter by claiming (20) merit in his admixture of Greek vocabulary, but the merit that they claim, sweetness of diction, is not one to which Lucilius himself would have laid claim.¹⁶³ In reply, Horace addresses them as *seri studiorum*, demonstratively avoiding the term ὀψιμαθεῖς (late-learners) employed by Cicero (*Ad Fam.* 9.20.3; Gellius 11.7.3 renders ὀψιμαθία by *sera eruditio*), just as at 9.78 he renders into Latin a Homeric phrase that Lucilius had quoted in Greek. The point implied by the term is that, since at least one of this group admired the poets of the preceding generation (of whom probably only Furius Bibaculus, whom Horace despised [36, II 5.40] was still alive), they are out of date.¹⁶⁴ Horace himself has only a modest admixture of Greek words,¹⁶⁵ and on the whole this is true of the Augustan poets, proud of their creation of a national literature that could match the Greek.

Horace argues, first that such a mixture is easy for anyone to achieve, even Pitholeon from Rhodes (Bentley's identification of him with a known Pitholaus has no foundation); of course it is a *reductio ad absurdum* to equate the argument of Lucilius's partisans with a Greek who presumably had learned Latin as a second language and still peppered his Latin with Greek words. His second argument is that when listening to a forensic speech one would not forget one's native country and father Latinus (the archetypal speaker of Latin; Varro *LL* 5.9 speaks of vocabulary *quod ... rex*

¹⁶³ See Rudd 1986: 172.

¹⁶⁴ Rudd l.c. n. 1.

¹⁶⁵ Most of Horace's Grecisms fall under the headings of medicine, gastronomy, and games; some refer to objects of vulgar use or had been thoroughly incorporated into Latin; see Rudd 1966: 111–114 (but *hybrida* I 7.2 is not a Greek word). More interesting are words related to *moechus*, found six times against only once for *adulter* (I 3.106; legal); such words around this date occur in prose only in the slangy Caelius and in Festus, p. 173 M (perhaps taking it from Lucilius, to whom he refers), but prevail in informal verse, so that, e.g., Plautus has *adulter* only at *Amph.* 1049 (cf. Haffter 1934: 123 n. 3); see Adams 1983: 350–353. *Puga* I 2.133 (previously only in Novius *Atell.* 19) comes in the same semantic area, but strikingly induces Horace to coin the hybrid *depugis* I 2.93 = ἀπυγός.

Latinus finxisset) and prefer Pedius Poplicola, Messalla's brother-in-law, and the purist (Sen. *Contr.* 2.4.8) Messalla Corvinus himself to stir a few Greek words into their oratory;¹⁶⁶ Lucilius himself would disapprove of this (see his criticisms of Albucius, fr. 88 ff.). The result would be that they would be bilingual, like an inhabitant of Canusium. The population of many towns in the south of Italy, including Horace's own hometown of Venusia,¹⁶⁷ had a considerable Greek-speaking element; Porphyrio here quotes Lucil. 1124 *Bruttace bilingui*, which parodies Ennius and may come from Book 3.

The argument then (31) shifts to the writing of Greek verse by a Roman; one wonders if Messalla's Greek bucolics ([Virg.] *Catalepton* 9.13–20) were on Horace's mind. Horace alleges (not in full seriousness, though it is not impossible that he may have dabbled in writing Greek verse, like some Romans included in Philip's Garland) that when he attempted to write Greek verse, Quirinus, the most essentially Roman god, appeared to him in a dream after midnight, when dreams are reliable,¹⁶⁸ and told him that this would be pointless. When a Roman god was not required, Apollo would later warn Horace against writing epic (C. 4.15.1), just as he had advised Callimachus (fr. 1.21 sqq.) about the proper course to follow, and a few years before this had deterred Virgil from epic (*Buc.* 6 init.; 3–6 there provide a model for Horace 31–35). So Horace declares that, while 'Alpinus' (i.e., Furius Bibaculus) is spouting his turgid rubbish,¹⁶⁹ he plays around (*ludo*, cf. *illudo* 4.139) with the present bagatelles, not intended to be judged by Tarpa in the contest for winning stage production¹⁷⁰ nor to be repeatedly (*iterum atque*

¹⁶⁶ I can see no objection to this obvious interpretation, despite Fraenkel 1957: 134–135; a subject for *intermiscere* is easily supplied from the preceding clause. With Fraenkel's interpretation *bilinguis* would be nom. sing., whereas I take it as acc. plur. (gen. sing. is less likely). Bentley's *oblitos* might well be right, but does not seem imperatively required. *patriaеque patrisque Latini* has an Ennian ring (Norden 1915: 55 n. 1); for *-que ... -que* see p. 69 n. 18.

¹⁶⁷ See Adams 2003: 483 on a later Jewish community there.

¹⁶⁸ For this belief, see my note on *CLE* 1109 = Courtney 1995: 183.7 and Pease on Cic. *De Div.* 1.61.

¹⁶⁹ For the problems of reading and interpretation here, see my *FLP* 197–198.

¹⁷⁰ Sp. Maecius Tarpa was an esteemed critic who in 55 BC determined the choice of the plays for performance at the dedication of Pompey's theater (Cic. *Ad Fam.* 7.1.1), and apparently his critical advice continued to be sought (AP 387, with *iudex* again). The temple at *Epist.* 2.2.94 *uacuam Romanis uatibus aedem* may well be that of Apollo on the Palatine with attached Greek and Latin libraries, but that is unlikely to be meant here since it had only recently (36 BC) been started and was not dedicated until 28 BC. The scholiasts say that here the temple of Hercules Musarum, which seems to have been associated with the *collegium poetarum*, is meant. Val. Max. 3.7.11 refers to *uoluminum certamina* in the *collegium poetarum*, but, unlike Horsfall 1976: 82–86, I take this to be purely metaphorical.

iterum) so produced (though good non-dramatic work can expect a second [*iterum*] reading, 72). Of course, this reference to drama does not imply that Horace had ever thought of composing plays, but is meant to stress his avoidance of publicity (cf. 4.23) and to introduce the first illustration of literary fields from which the existence of contemporary masters debars him (so he alleges), the master of comedy being Fundanius, who reports on Nasidienus's dinner party in II 8 and whose *comoediae* are punningly referred to as *comis libellos*, i.e., in the tradition of Terence *quiddam come loquens* (Cicero *FLP* 153). He and Aristius Fuscus, not named here because each genre has to have one dominant representative, may not even have intended their works for production. Pollio rules in the area of tragedy,¹⁷¹ Varius of epic (we do not know that he actually produced work specifically in this area; see *FLP* 271), Virgil of bucolic.¹⁷² Varro Atacinus and a few others (such as Seuius Nicanor, Pompeius Lenaeus, and L. Abuccius) had attempted satire, but without success, so this was the niche left open for Horace, even if he was inferior (as he again admits at II 1.74–75) to Lucilius, who was its first inventor, πρῶτος εὐρετής, a title always regarded with respect (cf. *AP* 275 on Thespis; the satires of Ennius were not highly regarded), and receives a handsome tribute. Of course we are not to suppose seriously that Horace chose to write satire because all other genres were occupied; the lack of success by other writers was a much more potent stimulus.

But now (50) Horace turns to another of his criticisms of Lucilius, the 'muddy flow' of his writing (4.11, here strengthened by an added 'often'). His defense of this criticism is that his "learned" critics also criticize Homer (in the tradition of the Homeromastiges such as Zoilus), as Horace himself was later to do at *AP* 359, and that Lucilius himself wittily suggests improvements in Accius¹⁷³ and Ennius (e.g., 1190), while, like Horace himself (48), putting on no airs of superiority. So we are justified in considering whether Lucilius's own nature and the circumstances of his times (2.76 validates this

¹⁷¹ g's reading *regum fata*, which as often may represent V, should not be ignored even though Ovid *Am.* 3.1.25 gives *facta (fata Bentley) uirorum* as the subject of tragedy.

¹⁷² Note that to Horace *epos* (a word previously used by Lucilius 343 according to Lachmann's emendation and apparently spelled in Greek letters) includes bucolic, since both are written in hexameters, so the *forte epos* of Varius is contrasted with the *molle atque facetum epos* of Virgil. Quintilian (6.3.20) found the epithet *facetum* here so odd that he took the trouble to explain it as *decoris ... et excultae cuiusdam elegantiae appellatio*. Often the country and the town are contrasted as embodying *rusticitas* and *urbanitas*, hence combinations like *rus durum* (Calvus fr. 2) and *inficetum* (Catull. 22.14, 36.19); Virgil's *Bucolics* break this mold.

¹⁷³ The precise meaning of Porphyrio's note is analyzed by Schmidt 1977.

interpretation) prevented him from writing verses with more polish (*euntes mollius*, taking up the metaphor of *incomposito pede*) than those consisting simply of six feet (Lucilius wrote in other meters, but his use of the hexameter dominated), poured out at the rate of 200 before dinner and 200 after (cf. 4.9–10), in the style of Cassius Etruscus. This poet, like Lucilius (4.11), resembled a river in torrent and left such a quantity of writings and drafts that they apparently served as fuel for his funeral pyre,¹⁷⁴ though they left the corpse only scorched (*ambustum*), like that of Clodius (see Kiessling and Heinze). We can grant, says Horace, that Lucilius was charming (*comis*, taking up 53) and witty (*urbanus*, taking up 13, where it is a requirement for a satirist), qualities that can slip into the undesirable (4.90), and also that he was more polished (with the metaphor of a file, cf. *AP* 291) than a composer (cf. *AP* 46 *carminis auctor*) of rough verse unhandled by the Greeks (i.e., any of the writers of Saturnians) and the crowd of older poets (i.e., Ennius).¹⁷⁵ Yet if fate had postponed him to our days he would drastically prune his writing (as the ideal poet would; *Epist.* 2.2.122).

From Lucilius, Horace passes to general advice (72) and then to his own case. You should erase often (cf. *AP* 292–294), he writes, if you want your work to be read and re-read, and not look for popular applause but be content with a select readership (cf. on 4.71–72). It is madness to want to have one's poems dictated in low-class schools (dictated because the pupils would not have their own texts, cf. *Epist.* 2.1.70–71), and he certainly would not want this (cf. *Epist.* 1.20.17–18, where *in uicis extremis* implies the same as *uilibus* here). I am not, he says, disturbed by the attacks of such bugs as Pantilius, whose name is a real one which is also significant in the context if we compare it with *uellicet* in the next line and derive it from *πάν τιλλειν*, 'to pick holes in everything' (for the verb so used see Anacreon 349 Page); Rudd¹⁷⁶ suggests that it may have been "a nickname for some carping critic of the day," perhaps a play on such a name as Pantuleius. Other such critics are Demetrius (who attacks Horace when he is not there, cf. 4.81) and Fannius (4.21), who slanders (*laedat* 80, cf. on 4.78) Horace and is the boon companion of Tigellius Hermogenes; both of these re-appear in 91–92, and the latter has been criticized in 17–18 for ignorance of Old Comedy (pardonable, one would have thought, in a musician, though 4.72

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Lucilius *Anth. Pal.* 11.133.3–4 on a musician cremated with twelve lyres and twenty-five boxes of his compositions.

¹⁷⁵ In the interpretation of this passage, I follow Rudd 1960: 40–44.

¹⁷⁶ Rudd 1966: 144.

suggests that he kept an eye on the contemporary literary scene). In 18–19 he is linked with an “ape” who reserves his admiration for Calvus and Catullus, Demetrius, according to the scholiasts, who may be guessing; my guess would be Fannius. Because of his links with Hermogenes this ape’s exaltation of his favorite poets takes the form of *cantare*, which basically means to have for ever on one’s lips, like the *cantores Euphorionis* of Cic. *Tusc.* 3.4,¹⁷⁷ but here has an extra point (cf. 3.129, 9.25); *doctus*, in the context of 19, though certainly not everywhere (cf. 87), is doubtless a hint at the common perception of Calvus (Prop. 2.34.89) and Catullus (*passim*).

Horace now (81) turns from his opponents to those whose approval he desires, the “few readers” of 74, an impressive list, which would certainly attract readers of his book, as he perhaps intended. First come professional literary men, headed by Plotius Tucca, Varius Rufus, Maecenas (here by courtesy), and Virgil, a group already listed in 5.40 (a line repeated here with one inevitable adjustment) and, with the exception of Maecenas, linked as students of Epicureanism under Philodemus.¹⁷⁸ Then the versatile poet Valgius (later to be mentioned in C. 2.9), the historian Octavius Musa, Aristius Fuscus, who wrote comedies and humorously let down Horace in I 9¹⁷⁹ and the two Visci (one of them mentioned in 9.22 and II 8.20, and also in the Gallus papyrus¹⁸⁰), who were famed for literary discrimination. Oddly enough, Fundanius (42) is not named here. “All empty ostentation aside”¹⁸¹ Horace can name Pollio (cf. 42) as one of this group, followed by a number of men whose acquaintance Horace had probably made either in his student days in Athens (Messalla and a Bibulus) or in the army of Brutus and Cassius (the above-mentioned, plus Messalla’s half-brother, see below); some of these became temporary or permanent partisans of Antony (Pollio, Messalla and his half-brother, a Bibulus, Furnius), an interesting document of split loyalties at the time. Messalla was already mentioned in 29; his half-brother was probably L. Gellius Poplicola, cos. 36 BC. The next name, according to the generally accepted emendation of Muretus, is that of L. Calpurnius Bibulus, son of Porcia and the consul of 59 BC, but the manuscripts offer the plural Bibuli, which is also in the mss. of Cic. *Ad Brut.*

¹⁷⁷ See *FLP* 213. This is *OLD*, *canto* 4 rather than 3.

¹⁷⁸ See *FLP* 271 and 2nd ed., addenda 519.

¹⁷⁹ See Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) on C. 1.22.

¹⁸⁰ For this, see *FLP* 263 and 267, Hollis 224 and 248.

¹⁸¹ Cf. 6.51–52. I take this with what follows, despite Fraenkel’s (1957: 132 n. 2) labored argumentation.

22 (= 1.14).¹, that too generally emended. Whereas it is usually thought that the elder Bibulus had three sons, two of them now certainly deceased, Syme (1987) argues that he had four (accepted by Shackleton Bailey in his last edition). Then follows Servius, i.e., a Sulpicius Rufus. Syme (1981) identifies him as homonymous son of the famous jurist, cos. 51 BC, but since in 63 BC he was already old enough to join his father in prosecuting Murena, I think that we would do well to follow L. Mueller and Kiessling and Heinze in thinking of a third homonym, son of this son and grandson of the jurist, as brother-in-law of Messalla and father of the Sulpicia known from the Tibullan corpus; he is likely to be meant by Horace.¹⁸² Finally, there is the orator Furnius.

With these as supporters Horace bids 'fare-ill' (*iubeo plorare*, cf. 1.63, II 5.69) to Demetrius and Tigellius Hermogenes, rounding off the paragraph with a recall of 79–80, among the armchairs of their female pupils; for the musical education of respectable (and less respectable, like Sallust's Sempronius, *Cat.* 25.3) Roman women, see the complaints of Scipio Aemilianus (with bibliography listed in my *ALP* 122–123) and Horace's allusion to the skill of Licymnia (*C.* 2.12.13), about whom there is of course much uncertainty. Columella 1 pr. 5 also mentions *scholas musicorum*.

"Go, slave, and quickly add this as a postscript to my little book" (*libellus*, cf. 4.71); the slave has presumably taken this poem down from dictation (as Lucilius dictated, 4.10). The poem is thus presented as an afterthought, as the abrupt beginning hints, to back up the points made in I 4 and to give the impression of spontaneity, rather than of deliberate, planned composition. At the end of my discussion of that poem I suggested that the reference in it to I 2 might refer to pre-knowledge derived from reading the book, not from public diffusion of I 2 on its own. Here 79–80 make it plain that Fannius had actually abused Horace, but there is no implication that this abuse was based on knowledge of I 4.

13. BOOK I AS A COLLECTION

On the conventional, and I believe correct, dating of Virgil's *Bucolics*, that collection of ten poems had been published a few years before Horace's first book of satires. The end of the fifth *Bucolic* and the beginning of the

¹⁸² The problems are not satisfactorily faced by either *RE*, *Sulpicius* no. 96, or *MRR* 3.203. Note that Shackleton Bailey 1979: 257–258 challenges the assumption that *Cic. Pro Muren.* 56 refers to Sulpicius's co-prosecutor as his son.

sixth clearly guide the reader to think of the ten poems as divided into two halves of almost equal length; at least some poems in each half correspond to poems in the other. This is very plain with 1–9, 3–7, somewhat less so with 2–8, but, since Virgil avoids fastening himself in a straitjacket, is harder to demonstrate for the remaining poems (thus the two Gallus poems, 6 and 10, are not distributed between the halves, and a certain relationship can be seen between 4 and 5). Horace's book has the same number of poems, and attempts have been made to fit it into a similar scheme. 4 and 10 are certainly consistent with this, and the fact that 6 begins with an address to Maecenas in the same position of the line as in 1.1 has been taken as a signal of the beginning of a new group. But it is far from clear that this is so; in 1 Maecenas has no integral role in the poem, whereas in 6 he has. Moreover, although both poems deal with contentment (1.3, 118; 6.96) and discontent, and in both superhuman forces are envisaged as changing the present state of affairs (1.15, 6.93), yet in 1 the source of discontent is greed whereas in 6 its potential source is ambition. Besides this, as one reads 6, it is impossible to divorce the picture of Horace's father's share in his education from that in 4; both 4.108 and 6.96 stress the resulting contentment, and 4.135 and 6.70 the affection in which Horace is held by his friends. To assert that *chartae*, sheet of paper, (5.105) marks the end of the first half of the book, as *libello*, little book, (10.92) does the second, is a big stretch. One can point to links between 5 and 9, but the picture of relationships within Maecenas's circle in 9.43sq. also connects with 6.49ff. More striking are pairings within the 'halves,' 2 and 3, each opening with Tigellius Sardus, and the amusing anecdotes 7 and 8. Fabius and Crispinus also link 1–3 in a triad.

My conclusion is that it is much better to treat the book as a unified whole (this is the main thrust of Zetzel's article¹⁸³) with continual cross-references between poems, which I have taken pains to point out as they occur; one can then see certain dominant themes emerging, and these will be discussed in my final overview. One such theme not there discussed is the issues posed in being a writer, particularly a writer of satire who derives his material from the external world, especially its follies and vices. This view of the work implies that we have to see the book as moving steadily forward, and that is relevant to the question whether we are to see priority in dissemination or simply priority in the sequence of reading in those

¹⁸³ Zetzel in Freudenburg 2009: 17–41.

poems that refer back to others in discussing literary principles. At the end of my account of I 4 I have briefly voted with Zetzel for the second option.

14. *SERM.* 2.1

After an interval of 5–6 years, Book II opens with Horace's third poem on the literary theory of satire; if we may leave aside uncertainties about Lucilius, this is unique among satirists, and betrays a sense that I 4 and 10 have not exhausted the subject. This poem takes the form of a mock legal consultation with the famous and genial jurist C. Trebatius Testa, and opens with the dilemma that to some Horace's satires seem too vehement (*acer* as used in I 10.14, where the implication appears to be that Lucilius could be criticized on these lines) and beyond the bounds of the legitimate, *ultra legem*; this phrase, as Horace represents its use by his critics, refers to the *lex operis* (AP 135), the formal rules of the genre now mentioned by its formal name *satira*, which was not used in Book I (nor is it found in the fragments of Lucilius), but in the immediate context it will convey the non-metaphorical meaning of statute, coming to the fore in 81, to Trebatius. We can already foresee the general tone of the poem; Horace is respectful to the older man, but knows that he has a sense of humor and will not mind having his obsession with the law and legal lingo made the butt of jokes, such as Horace will level again in 80–86.

Others judge Horace's work to be spineless (*sine neruis*, cf. AP 26) and lacking in character; I doubt if such critics really existed (certainly they are ignored in the rest of the poem) and think that they are here only to hint to the reader that Horace has in fact attained the golden mean, though he pretends to feel obliged to get legal advice.

Trebatius's first prescription is that Horace should retire from writing. When Horace dismisses this solution, Trebatius suggests that writing an epic on invincible Caesar's wars would be a profitable idea (note the *munera*, which the princes bestowed on Virgil and Varius, *Epist.* 2.1.246). Lucilius (620–621), in the earliest of his poems, represents similar advice as given to himself, and Horace refers to this in 17. Horace replies that he would love to do this (with his word *cupidum* cf. the panegyrist of Messalla 35 *tuas cupidi componere laudes*) but does not have the strength (cf. *Epist.* 2.1.259 *rem ... quam uires ferre recusent*; see below on this passage) to describe epic battles (which, ironically, he briefly does in grand style). The *Ad Herennium* 3.6.11 advises that in the exordium of an epideictic speech, when praise is

intended, one should say *uereri nos ut illius facta uerbis consequi possimus*, and the panegyrist of Messalla 1–7 follows this. But in Horace, where a choice between options is involved, we have what in modern times has been christened a *recusatio*.¹⁸⁴ Whereas in Callimachus (fr. 1.21 ff., hymn to Apollo 105 ff.), Virgil (Buc. 6.1 ff.), Propertius (3.3), and Horace himself (C. 4.15.1 ff.) Apollo deters the poet from epic, here the situation, with Trebatius taking the role of Apollo, is inverted. In this passage, as so often in Augustan poetry, it remains obscure how far we should assume the poets to be evading hints and urgings from Maecenas and others.

Well, says Trebatius, if not an epic, then a panegyric lauding both Caesar's bravery in war and justice in peace (so the panegyrist of Messalla 39 *castrisue foroue*; he then goes into detail about these two spheres in chiasitic order). Lucilius sensibly did this for Scipio, and Horatian scholiasts allege, but probably wrongly, that Varius did this for Augustus.¹⁸⁵ Horace says that he will follow up this suggestion when Caesar can give his attention,¹⁸⁶ because if you stroke Caesar the wrong way he kicks back (a revealing remark; cf. *Epist.* 1.13.3–5, 2.1.1–4 and also Vitruvius pr. 1 for the need to choose the right time to approach Caesar).

Better that, replies Trebatius, than incurring *odium* (cf. I 4.33), even among those untouched by abuse from Pantolabus (perhaps a nickname, like Pantilius) and Nomentanus, as in I 8.11 here quoted. I can't help it, answers Horace (24); everyone has a different passion, good or bad (so Lucilius had said in his earliest poem, 628–629 from Book 26), and mine is for arranging words metrically (an unassuming way of putting it, cf. I 4.40, 10.59). This is an instance of a 'priamel,' a form so named by modern scholarship, in which a writer leads up to the main point by an enumeration of related items that contrast with it or by comparison fall short of it.¹⁸⁷ Lucilius employed such a metrical arrangement of words, revealing his whole life in his writings; this is a side of Lucilius that Horace had not previously

¹⁸⁴ On this see, e.g., Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) on C. 1.6; Lyne 1995: 31–39.

¹⁸⁵ See *FLP* 275, Hollis 273–275.

¹⁸⁶ With *attentam aurem* compare the rhetorical precept that in the exordium one must *auditorem beneuolum, attentum, docilem parare*; see Lausberg 266 ff., and Doblhofer (1966) 40–41, who stresses this passage's background in rhetorical theory, in which, as is shown by Cicero's *Topica*, Trebatius was interested. In 20, Caesar is anything but *beneuolus*. Parker (2000: 455–456 and 460) gives a salutary warning against reading too much into Horace's reference to himself as Flaccus, as if we were to think of the meaning 'floppy-eared'; likewise, in view of Williams's article (see on I 6 init.), we are not to think of a slave name given to Horace's father.

¹⁸⁷ See, e.g., Fraenkel 1957: 230–231, Race 1982: 122–129, esp. 124.

remarked, and that for the moment diverts attention from his invective. Because these lines break the train of thought, Horace must have keenly desired to introduce them, presumably because he felt that his previous discussions of Lucilius had left untouched a central aspect that had paved the way for his own self-presentation, on which see my final overview. I follow him, says Horace (34), meaning, as it immediately emerges, not in his autobiographical aspect but in his use of invective. Horace claims to have inherited his bellicosity from his Samnite ancestors, a relevant point in the question concerning his 'freedman' father.¹⁸⁸ But, he claims, this stylus of mine (an instrument that, because of its sharp point, could also be used as a dagger) will not attack anyone unprovoked. He is here promising to use aggressive satire only in self-defense, which was certainly neither his previous attitude nor easy to square with 47–56 in this very poem; his critics, such as Fannius, have been silenced, and he is now warning off any others. Just as everyone has a different pursuit (27), so everyone has his own means of self-defense (47 ff.; another priamel); this is true also of the animal kingdom (cf. Xen. Cyr. 2.3.9 etc.), and in humans this defense can turn into aggression, as with the poisoner Scaeva. To put it briefly (57, cf. I 3.137), Horace states, whether I live to a quiet old age or the black wings of Death are already flapping around me (a phrase redolent of epic phraseology¹⁸⁹), whatever the complexion of my life I shall continue to be a writer (and therefore inevitably, because of the genre of my writings, shall have to make personal attacks).

Thus he rejects the advice of Trebatius, who in fatherly fashion (cf. 12), as Thetis in maternal fashion in the model at *Il.* 18.85, expresses concern (60) that Horace may not be long-lived and someone among his influential friends may smite him with a cold shoulder (*frigore* contrary to expectation for *fulmine*)! Is the reader to think of Maecenas, who would correspond to Laelius and Scipio in the case of Lucilius? Horace adduces them as counter-examples, since they did not drop Lucilius when he attacked (*laeso* 67, cf. 21 and on I 4.78) members of the Roman aristocracy, Lucilius who was the first to set the norm of satire, the *inuentor* (I 10.48; as there, Ennius here is ignored since he did not employ personal abuse). Roman poets regularly draw attention with the word *primus* (e.g., *Epist.* 1.10.23; *princeps*

¹⁸⁸ See on I 6 and Williams in Harrison 1995: 302–304. Note that *Sabellus* (36, cf. I 9.29) means primarily 'Samnite'; see Sonnenschein 1897: 340b; *RE* s.v. *Sabini* 1570–1571; *OCD* (3rd ed.) *Sabelli*.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Grattius 347: *Orcus ... nigris orbem circumsonat alis*; Peek 1955: 632.4: Αἴδης οἱ σκοτίας ἀμφέβαλεν πτέρυγας ('Hades cast his dark wings around him.').

in C. 3.30.13) to their primacy in composition, specifically in importation of a Greek genre; that is not what is meant here, but is rather setting the aggressive tone for an already existing genre. Lucilius tolerated only Virtus, excellence (this specifically alludes to his longest fragment, 1326 ff.) and its friends (in particular Scipio; 72 *uirtus Scipiadae*). Moreover, in private, Scipio and Laelius would engage in horseplay with him; they are both referred to in the epic style already encountered at I 2.32 and 7.1. Horace admits that he is far below Lucilius in social status and talent (67, cf. I 10.48–49), but claims that even detractors (see above on I 6.50) cannot deny his association (I 6.47) with the great (later Augustus, in a letter quoted in the Suetonian life, invites Horace to behave as a *conuictor* to himself). Pleasing the great is a boast not only to Horace (I 6.62–63, *Epist.* 1.17.35, 20.23) but also to Terence (*Ad.* 18sq.), the great in his case being primarily Scipio. Perhaps, in this regard, Horace wishes us to see a parallel between Scipio's *uirtus* and Laelius's *sapientia* (cf. 17) on the one hand and similar qualities in Octavian and Maecenas on the other.

Trebatius, invited to challenge Horace's claim, cannot, but nevertheless warns him to take care not to get into trouble through lack of expertise in the laws;¹⁹⁰ he quotes *si mala condiderit in quem quis carmina, ius est / iudiciumque*. This appears to be an amalgam of two distinct laws of the Twelve Tables (8.1a and b), one of them relating to magic spells (*mala carmina*) and the other (which in its original form probably ran *si quis occentassit siue carmen condiderit quod infamiam faciat flagitiumue alteri*; for *carmen condere*, as in Horace, see also Cic. *Tusc.* 4.4 quoted p. 130 n. 195) to causing a disturbance by *flagitatio*, public outcry, but both of them now obsolete; Fraenkel's discussion¹⁹¹ of the complex and still much-disputed issues, which cannot be analyzed in detail here, remains fundamental. Horace seems to have two motives in mind. First, having made Trebatius impute *inscitia legum* to him, he jokingly makes Trebatius himself confused, which of course he would not have done if he had not felt able to rely on Trebatius's sense of humor, attested in Cicero's letters (*Ad Fam.* 7.6–15) to him in Gaul (Cicero's letters on his side are full of jokes). Second, he is going to pun by the use of terms, like *legem* 2, that have both a legal and a literary sense, *mala carmina* as poems aesthetically bad (5.74, *Epist.* 2.2.106) or contrary to law (*Epist.* 2.1.153¹⁹²),

¹⁹⁰ *Caueas* is the technical word for advice on the limits of legality given by a lawyer in a consultation; cf. Cic. *Ad Fam.* 7.6.2 (to Trebatius): *tu, qui ceteris cauere didicisti; De Leg.* 1.17 *quemadmodum caueamus in iure aut quid de quaque consultatione respondeamus*.

¹⁹¹ Fraenkel 1964: II 398–425.

¹⁹² See p. 130 n. 195.

iudicium as legal procedure and *iudice* (84; see below), referring partly to aesthetic criticism (I 10.38, *Epist.* 2.1.245 are comparable to an extent). Of course, the historical Trebatius knew very well that in the Twelve Tables *carmen* meant neither ‘poem’ nor ‘song’ but ‘chant,’ any structured utterance that by its cadences could whip up a crowd.¹⁹³ Was Horace really in danger of prosecution? At some point Sulla’s *Lex Cornelia de iniuriis* was extended to cover libel, but there is no evidence that this had yet happened. What was liable to punishment was defamation in the general hearing,¹⁹⁴ since this could cause public disorder, e.g., in a *flagitatio* or in Fescennine verses.¹⁹⁵ All the pseudo-legal discussion in this poem is just ‘shadow-boxing’ (Rudd’s term). This runs counter to Muecke’s view¹⁹⁶ that Horace in 1–2 primarily intended the legal sense of *legem*, a view that eliminates the humor of Trebatius’s misunderstanding.

Horace’s reply (83) is that all that is very fine for *mala* (i.e., aesthetically bad) *carmina*, but what about poetry judged good by Caesar (presumably in the leisure desiderated in 18–19)? Or poetry written by an irreproachable man attacking an immoral one who deserves it (I 4.3 and 25)? The latter situation would be covered by a plea of justification (Paulus *Dig.* 47.10.18 recognizes this in relation to the section of the praetor’s edict dealing with defamation under the heading of *iniuria*); in the former, the *iudex* in the legal sense would already have made up his mind before trial. The outcome, says Trebatius, would be that the Twelve Tables will dissolve in laughter (cf. Val. Max. 4.3.5 *uultum risu soluit*); this seems to me the probable sense, cf. *Epist.* 2.1.23–24, *tabulas ... quas bis quinque uiri sanxerunt*, and note *sanxerunt* there with the punning *sanctarum* (‘sanctioned’ and ‘revered’) in 81. Thus, in the end, you will be discharged (*missus*) without ever coming to trial.

¹⁹³ See my *ALP* 9.

¹⁹⁴ Note Festus 181M: *occentassit antiqui dicebant quod nunc conuicium fecerit dicimus, quod id clare et cum quodam canore fit, ut procul exaudiri possit* (“the ancients used to call *occentare* what we now call *conuicium facere* [make a public outcry], because that is done loudly and with some resonance, so that it can be heard from a distance.”).

¹⁹⁵ In *Epist.* 2.1.145 ff. Horace outlines how harmless insults in Fescennine verses began to become abusive and attack *honestas domos*, a revealing indication of the source of the ensuing reaction in legal sanction and the penalty of death by cudgeling; this refers to Twelve Tables 8. 1b mentioned above, by which those convicted of issuing what Horace non-technically refers to as *mala* (i.e., abusive) *carmina* (hence the contrasted *bene dicendum* 155) were, according to Cicero, subject to the death penalty. In relation to 23 above and what I have just said about public disorder, note *Epist.* l.c. 151–152: *fuit intactis quoque cura / condicione super communi*. Note, too, Cic. *Tusc.* 4.4: *duodecim tabulae declarant condi iam tum solitum esse carmen, quod ne liceret fieri ad alterius iniuriam lege sanxerunt*, bearing in mind that in the Twelve Tables *iniuria* means bodily harm.

¹⁹⁶ Muecke in Harrison 1995: 206.

15. *SERM.* 2.2

After one line which acts as a heading for the satire, Horace explains that the poem reports not a discourse (*sermo*) of his own, but the precepts of the countryman Ofellus on simple living. This puts him in the line of those Platonic characters who shift responsibility for a statement to others (Socrates himself, *Apol.* 20e; Eryximachus at *Symp.* 177a, quoting the *Melanippe* ‘the Wise’ of Euripides; Euripides *Hel.* 513, also attributing it to “some wise man”). Ofellus too is *sapiens*, but an unorthodox and homespun¹⁹⁷ philosopher. This does not mean that we are to suppose that Horace is verbally reporting Ofellus’s words (when he wants us to suppose this he makes it plain in 112 sqq.), but rather that he is giving the gist of Ofellus’s precepts in his (Horace’s) own words. He wants (6) the addressees, the *boni* of 1, to listen “here” (which I take to mean ‘here and now’) “and before lunch” (*impransi*, meaning, as at 3.257, with the mind clear and not made torpid by a good meal). If they are to consider frugal living (*uiuere parvo*¹⁹⁸), they would not be impartial judges if corrupted (8–9, cf. 25) by the hearty food that would normally precede any postprandial discussions of such topics. My next sentence shows that there is a reason for specifying lunch and not dinner, after which would be the usual time for philosophical discussion (6.63 ff.).

When you (now [9 ff.] the originally plural listeners become singular) have engaged in hard exercise (which you would normally do before the *prandium*; I 6.25–27) and thus whetted your appetite, or when delicacies are not available, you will not despise cheap food (cf. I 2.115–116¹⁹⁹) or demand the famously best mead, Falernian wine mixed with honey from Hymettus (cf. 4.24; generic honey is unhealthy); a proverb²⁰⁰ is appropriate to the persona of a “homespun” philosopher, and the “bread with salt” of 17 is another (Pliny *NH* 31.89). The greatest pleasure is derived not from the aroma of expensive food but from yourself. Of course it will be hard to convert you from preferring peacock to chicken because it is dearer and,

¹⁹⁷ *Abnormis*, a word not found elsewhere and formed by hypostasis (see my *ALP* 55) from *ab normis*, diverging from the norm; *enormis*, too, is post-Augustan. To the instances of *crassa* (“coarse-woven”) *Minerua* (an appropriate goddess who suggests both wisdom and spinning) quoted by Otto (1890: 119) add another in Fronto, adduced in Häussler 1968: 110.

¹⁹⁸ See Nisbet and Hubbard (1978) on C. 2.16.13.

¹⁹⁹ Similar ideas were expressed by Bion, Hense *Teles* p. 7.7 = fr. 17 Kindstrand (q.v. pp. 216–217), and also by Epicurus (see Vischer [1965]: 71–75). For the construction of 9–13, see above, on I 7.15.

²⁰⁰ See Otto 1890: 839.

when alive, more handsome (cf. Lucil. 716), but when it is cooked, the feathers are gone, and after all there is no real difference in the flesh,²⁰¹ a statement gourmets, a class to which Ofellus does not belong, would certainly challenge.

Similar examples follow (31–46); among them the sea bass caught in the Tiber “between the two bridges” attained a particular vogue in Lucilius’s day (1176, Macrobian *Sat.* 3.16.12 ff.). Not so long ago the table of the auctioneer (not a respected profession) Gallonius was notorious for serving a huge sturgeon (see Lucilius 1238–1240, clearly a reference that comes from Horace, not from Ofellus, since it would be out of character for him to be acquainted with Lucilius). But nowadays turbot has supplanted sturgeon, just because C. Munatius Plancus (known after adoption as L. Plotius Plancus), appointed praetor by Caesar for 43 BC after failing to win the election, promoted it and stork chicks.²⁰² If someone now (51) were to issue an edict (like a praetor) declaring roast seagulls (scavenger birds with poor flesh) delicious, he would be heeded by the Roman populace, which is easily led astray; *Romana iuuentus* quotes and degrades Ennius, *Annals* 563 Skutsch *optima cum pulcris animis Romana iuuentus*.²⁰³

Simple living (*tenuis uictus* 53), in Ofellus’s opinion,²⁰⁴ will not be the same as niggardly living, a sentiment with which Kiessling and Heinze compare Epicurus, *Sent. Vat.* 63. There is no sense in rushing from the extravagance of Gallonius to the stinginess of Auidienus,²⁰⁵ nicknamed Canis, which implies a filthy life (*mundus* 65 can be contrasted with *immundus canis*, *Epist.* 1.2.26). This gives special point to a proverb in 64, ‘caught between the dog and the wolf,’ where the latter conveys overtones of yet another proverb, *lupus esuriens*;²⁰⁶ see above for proverbs represented as used by

²⁰¹ On the text of 29–30, see Courtney 1996a: 266–267.

²⁰² On the identity of this man and the gastronomic background, see *FLP* 472, and note that he is here not named; there are very few personal names in this poem because that would be alien to the persona of Ofellus.

²⁰³ Note that *iuuentus* does not mean ‘youth,’ as Rudd (1966: 166) and Muecke have it.

²⁰⁴ Ofellus might refer to himself in the third person instead of *me iudice*, but it is simpler to take this as a reminder that Ofellus is not being quoted directly. The reminder is even more forceful if *distabat*, the transmitted reading, is retained with Kiessling and Heinze; my paraphrase presumes the conjecture *distabit*.

²⁰⁵ There are no solid grounds for altering this name. It relates to Auidius, and that to Auius, as Nasidienus (2.8) to Nasidius and Nasius (for the latter, see Schulze 1904: 275); there are over thirty other names in -idienus, many of them showing a similar pattern (e.g., Saluidienus, Saluidius, Saluius). There is no reason why the initial vowel should not be long.

²⁰⁶ Otto 1890: 979.

Ofellus. So the golden mean is (cf. I 2.24, 6.107) advocated (65–66) yet again. One can show good taste, opposed to the *pauperies immunda* of *Epist.* 2.2.199 (unfortunately a dubious passage), without being niggardly like Albucius or unsophisticated like Naevius.

So the *uictus tenuis* of 53 has now been defined. Next (70) Horace returns, with the tone of a lecturer appearing in *accipe nunc*, “listen now” (cf. 3.46), to the point from which the poem started, namely what and how many (*quae quantaque*, cf. 1 *quae uirtus et quanta*) benefits this way of life brings. First, better health, whereas (77) junk food depresses the mind, a particle of the divine breath that, according to the Stoics, permeates the universe; this is a sarcastic Epicurean joke at this belief, a joke that belongs to Horace, not Ofellus. The following passage generally resembles Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* 131.²⁰⁷ The abstinent man, on the other hand, is more vigorous and can afford to relax his austerity occasionally on holidays (whereas Auidienus cannot, 60–62) or in the case of ill health or old age. These last two contingencies are repeated in chiasitic order (note *ualidus* 87, *ualetudo* 88). The glutton will be unable to cope with these situations because he has used up all his indulgence (*mollius* 85, *mollitiem* 87) in youth. This is followed by a strange passage (89–93); the ancients did not eat boar fresh, but rancid, because rather than the host eating it fresh he would keep it for the delayed arrival of his ‘guest-friend’ (cf. 118). Would that I had lived in those primitive days, when hospitality trumped gourmandism!

The second benefit (94) is a good reputation, which occupies the ear²⁰⁸ of men to more pleasurable effect than poetry (here again the voice is that of Horace, joking at himself, not Ofellus). On the contrary, gluttonous repasts bring disgrace, which matches them in size, and also financial ruin (*damnum* and *dedecus* form an alliterative pair as at I 2.52–53²⁰⁹). This ruin is specified as so complete that, as with spendthrifts in comedy, not even enough money is left to buy a rope to hang oneself; the scolding paternal uncle (97), however, though he appeared in Philemon according to Apul. *Flor.* 16a, p. 24.17 Helm, relates to Roman society, not to that depicted in Greek comedy.²¹⁰ Even if you are rich, you could put your riches to better use, one use specified being repair of the crumbling temples.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Hudson (1989: 75), after a useful discussion of the moral implications attached by the Romans to such a diet, unfortunately thinks of Ofellus, not Horace, as an expert on Epicurus.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Virg. *Aen.* 3.294 *fama occupat aures*, tempting us to draw the usual conclusion.

²⁰⁹ To Wölfflin's (1933: 257) references add Plaut. *As.* 371, *Bacch.* 67, Cic. *phil. fr.* V 81.

²¹⁰ See Nisbet and Rudd on C. 3.12.3.

²¹¹ Cf. C. 3.6.2; Nisbet and Rudd 97 refer to private benefactions to this end.

Horace now (112) brings himself forward. He recalls from his boyhood that even then, before Ofellus's farm was confiscated by a retired soldier (such confiscations affected Venusia generally [Appian *BC* 4.3] and Horace himself), he lived frugally; thereafter he rented part of the farm (or perhaps the soldier paid him to cultivate the land). The name Ofellus, though it has Latin cognates, seems to be Oscan and to be found only on one inscription from Capua;²¹² this strongly suggests that Ofellus was a real person actually known to Horace. Horace purports to report Ofellus's reflections in direct speech. He claims (126) that he still enjoys the same standard of living as before the new settler (*incola*, not in the true sense "owner," *erus* 128–129) Umbrenus arrived, and that any fresh commotion will not diminish it. In his turn, Umbrenus will be likely to lose the farm through his shortcomings or through passing it on to his heir on his death.²¹³ The farm, as he puts it in the terms of Roman law, gives no title of ownership (129, 134) to anyone, but is merely usufruct passing from one (in this case Ofellus) to another.²¹⁴ So, he exhorts, live with a stout heart (like himself, 115), my sons (115, 128), and confront adversity bravely (136, a resounding golden line in conclusion).

16. *SERM.* 2.3

The length of this satire precludes detailed discussion; the commentaries of Muecke and Kiessling and Heinze provide much of use, and Lejay's introduction, though wordy, is also helpful.

The poem starts with a temporarily undefined speaker criticizing Horace for his lack of productivity (this at the head of his longest satire!) because of his incessant revision (cf. I 10.72–73); will he continue so?²¹⁵ Horace, he says, guiltily blames his indulgence on sleep and wine (has he taken the advice of Trebatius, 1.9?), but the critic anticipates²¹⁶ that he will claim

²¹² See *RE* s.v. and Schulze 1904: 291.

²¹³ See 3.122, 145–151 and Nisbet and Hubbard on C. 2.14.25 for Roman distaste at this thought.

²¹⁴ For these concepts cf. *Epist.* 2.2.158 ff., Lucil. 550–551, Bion fr. 39b with Kindstrand 248, and often elsewhere, e.g., *Anth. Pal.* 9.74 = Page *FGE* 354.

²¹⁵ This paraphrase is based on adopting the variant *scribes*. The alternative *scribis* is inconsistent with Horace's metrical usage (he employs such artificial lengthenings only with 3rd-person singular verbal endings in -t), as is *tumidus* at I 7.7, where *tumidusque* should be accepted. When the only two potential counter instances to a limitation otherwise observed each show a substantial variant, it is irrational not to accept that variant.

²¹⁶ *At* (4) is frequently used, like the more specific *at enim*, in anticipation (*occupatio*) of what the other party will say in discussion.

in his defense that he has now sought refuge here from the drinking of the Saturnalia. "Here" presumably means at the Sabine estate (*uillula* 10, a diminutive sarcastically meant to represent Horace's affection) about which we hear in II 6; how the critic happens to be there is left undetermined. What was the point of packing up volumes of Plato and Menander, from both of whom a writer can learn the art of characterization (for Plato see *AP* 309 ff.), dialogue (a form that plays a large part in this book and indeed this poem), and other less tangible qualities, and of Eupolis and Archilochus, poets who respectively can give hints for satire (cf. I 4.1) and epodes? The outlook behind this is that to a classical writer it is important to place himself in a literary tradition and that, to a greater degree than a romantic one, he derives inspiration from the writings of his predecessors; see how Catullus 68A.33–36 declares that he cannot respond to a request (10) for a poem because he has brought from Rome to Verona only a tiny packet (*capsula*) of books. Falling silent, says the critic to Horace, will not appease those who envy him, for whom see on I 6.50.

Horace's reply reveals his interlocutor to be Damasippus, an acquaintance with whom Cicero had been involved in the contemplated purchase of an estate and some statues. Horace admits the justice of his advice, teases him about his beard, which shows (cf. 35, I 3.133) that he has turned to philosophy, and asks how he knows Horace so well; it is just ironic politeness that makes Horace seem to admit the charges against himself. Damasippus answers that since his bankruptcy, now that he can no longer pursue his interests in art and real estate, he pokes his nose into other people's business; this is not usually something to be recommended²¹⁷ though Epictetus 3.22.97 says that a Cynic-Stoic who advises others out of concern is not just a busybody. Horace, however, (I agree with those who think that he speaks throughout 26–31) speaks of this as a new disease replacing the old one of connoisseurship (about which Horace waxes ironical, *Epist.* 1.6.17–18), but waves him off with a 'whatever.' Thereupon (31) Damasippus abruptly informs him that he and pretty much (*prope*; this is not intended to admit exceptions, but simply to soften the tone, cf. I 3.96 and 98) all "fools" (in the Stoic sense of non-*sapientes*, those who have not attained the perfection of wisdom) are mad. So now, by a circuitous route, we have come to the central topic of the poem. He has learned this Stoic doctrine from Stertinius (also referred to at *Epist.* 1.12.20, with a hint that some might consider him mad!), from whom he has copied down (*descripsi*) the following wondrous

²¹⁷ Otto 1890: 62, to which add Sen. *Ep.* 70.10.

precepts. So he is repeating his lecture notes! This might help to explain the situation at 77 ff., if we assume that Damasippus has mechanically copied down not just the gist of Stertinius's teaching but also his spiel for drawing an audience (something similar happens at 4.46, q.v.); I have to assume that his exhortation to adjust the toga is purely metaphorical, and substantially means 'get ready for a long lecture.' He urges people to come close while he is systematically proving that they are all mad (this paraphrase is based on punctuating in 82 with Palmer, Kiessling and Heinze, and others after *ordine*, not after *uos*); he is putting into effect what had been envisaged in I 4.25 *quemuis media elige turba*.

Stertinius appeared like a *deus ex machina* when Damasippus was about to throw himself into the Tiber because he did not want to be thought mad (40), as people considered him (47–48), calling him "madman" whereas they had previously called him "Mercury's favorite" (25). He dissuaded Damasippus by pointing out that everyone else, too, except the *sapiens*, is mad (according to the proverb²¹⁸ to be mad among the mad is no shame) and converting him to philosophy. To relieve Damasippus's guilt Stertinius explains (43) that he means 'madness' in the Stoic sense, namely folly and ignorance of the true good. The idea of madness so defined is central to the Stoic paradox that all fools are mad, with no distinction drawn between folly and actual insanity, despite Horace's view (305–306); these ultra-orthodox Stoics are not going to admit Panaetius's concept of progress (*προκοπή*) toward wisdom, so to them all *stulti* are equally mad (cf. 128 ff., where the calculating murderer of his wife or mother is as mad as the caster of stones), just as all *peccata*, misguided actions, are equal (I 3.96). Several editors reproduce Teuffel's impressive list²¹⁹ of 11 different positive designations of insanity in various degrees and 6 put interrogatively, some of both categories occurring more than once. The idea that madness is a disease, *morbus*, repeatedly appears (80, 121, 254; cf. *aegrotare* 307), helped by the etymology of *in-sanus*, literally 'not healthy' (cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 3.8–9, 4.23); in the Stoic view this is caused by disturbing effects of emotions, just as bodily ailments have physical causes.

Stertinius lays out his argument in systematic style (41), first the definition of *furor* (41), then the proof (46 *nunc accipe*, cf. 2.70) of its universal scope, which embraces even *reges*, but with the *sapiens* excluded. Of course in Stoic belief, at which Horace is poking fun, the *sapiens* actually was *rex*, at

²¹⁸ Otto 1890: 744.

²¹⁹ In Kirchner 1857: 61.

least potentially (see on I 3.133)! His proof is based on examples and is subdivided into (A): folly can take opposite forms (note the repetition of *nihilo sapientior* [-ius] in 52 and 56), e.g., that of Damasippus, who squanders his money on fine statuary and that of the man who lends him that money;²²⁰ and (B) (77): those suffering from ambition (158–223), avarice (82–157), *luxuria*, i.e., self-indulgence (224–246), superstition (281–295), or anything else (specified as love, 247–280), a list that bears some resemblance to the victims of satire in I 4.25–26. The last three items are much shorter than the preceding two; the characteristic Stoic fault of verbosity has left him short of breath.

The initial discussion of avarice, which in 97 the deluded Staberius (84) claims achieves Stoic *sapientia*, is ended (99–103) with the counterexample (used by Bion, fr. 40A Kindstrand) of Aristippus, who had gold (or money) thrown away in the desert because of its weight; he is no saner than the miser.²²¹ Lejay²²² analyzes well Stertinius's technique of argumentation, which employs questions (like the manuscript reading in 99), often with the interrogative adverb *qui* joined with a comparative (such as *sanior* in 241, 274, 311) and often in the form of what Cicero, in introducing his *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, refers to as *minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis* ("pricks"), which give the listener no breathing space to muster counterarguments (e.g., 158–160; see Cic. *De Fin.* 4.7). Many of these questions are devoted to showing that seeming opposites are equally absurd on the Stoic principle *paria esse fere peccata*; e.g., 166, where the interrogative *differt ...?* comes to the same thing as the direct statement *nec quicquam differre* of 251. Much use is also made of the form 'if you admit A, B will follow' or 'won't B follow?' (both forms are combined in 104sq.). Note also the quasi-syllogistic structure of 220–223, which falls within the class of *consectaria Stoicorum breuia et acuta*, "the brief and pointed syllogisms of the Stoics" (Cic. *De Fin.* 3.26). Lejay 383 aptly quotes Fronto's description of Chrysippus's style (p. 141.21 vdH 1988 = SVF 2 fr. 27): *num contentus est docere, rem ostendere, definire, explanare? non est contentus, uerum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat ... interrogat, describit, diuidit, personas fingit ...* (the last item

²²⁰ In his final edition Shackleton Bailey has removed his unmetrical conjecture *nunc* in 62, which has misled at least three competent scholars.

²²¹ Shackleton Bailey (1985: 165) himself doubted the emendation of 99, which he printed in his text; for the manuscript reading cf. Cic. *ND* 3.15 *quid simile medicina ...?* Aristippus is labelled *Graecus* because, in deference to his audience, Stertinius takes all his nonliterary examples from Rome except this and Polemon (154).

²²² Lejay 1911: 359 ff.

explained as *προσωποποιεῖν*, the introduction of fictitious persons). Most of this is applicable to Stertinius; for exaggeration, see 69–70, 116 (and note 61), where inadequate sums are increased. As for *prosopopoeia*, see 288 ff., but there are also many anecdotes, which Fraenkel²²³ calls αἶνοι, though most do not fit his own definition of the term on p. 83; most of them (see, e.g., the story of Aristippus in 100 ff.) would be better classed as *χρεῖαι*, brief anecdotes that instruct on the basis of actual events.²²⁴ He permits himself only one technicality; in 208 *species capiet* is calqued on φαντασίας καταλαμβάνειν, the Stoic theory of knowledge accruing by “mental grasping of concepts,” a process that, as the adjectives there show, cannot produce reliable results in the case of madness.

The topic of ambition, a folly first mentioned in 165, is indirectly approached by a reminder (158 ff.) that freedom from one folly does not automatically imply freedom from another, and that extravagance and meanness, the treatment of which is strongly reminiscent of I 1.38–99 (compare especially 110 here and I 1. 71–73), are equally culpable; this is another reminder of the golden mean. This last point is picked up by a father’s deathbed warning to his sons (168 ff.; one notes that like Horace’s father he uses examples in 175), and he ends with an injunction against engaging in politics (179–181), which would involve heavy expense (182–184, cf. I 6.100); this is developed in what follows (182–223). In 132–141, Stertinius had used an example from Greek tragedy (a little inexactly; 140–141 refers to Eur. *Orest.* 264, correctly in the case of Electra but incorrectly in that of Pylades); now he uses another (187 ff. = Soph. *Ajax* 1047 ff.; Soph. 43 agrees with Horace 197–198, though in the rest of the play Ajax thinks that he has not yet killed Odysseus). This is combined with allusions to Homer (191 = *Iliad* 1.18, 193 = 17.279–280, but also Soph. 1339–1341, 195 = 1.255–256) and possibly Ennius (194 in relation to Virg. *Aen.* 6.837 *caesis insignis Achiuis*); note that *Atrida* 187 means Agamemnon (cf. 199 and Soph. 1050, 1109), not his messenger Menelaus.

Next (*nunc age*; 224 sqq.), reason will prove that dissipation and self-indulgence, too, are mad; *uincet ratio* (cf. 250, I 3.115) is a phrase redolent of Stoicism (ὁ λόγος αἰρήσει²²⁵), which laid stress on *ratio* (see 83, I 1.2 and 3.78, where note *stultis* 77), in their view an attribute of the divine breath, *diuina aura* (2.79), which permeates the universe (see e.g. *SVF* 1.25.17–18; 2.299.11,

²²³ Fraenkel 1957: 143 n.

²²⁴ See Lejay 1911: xvii–xx; Lausberg 1117–1120.

²²⁵ See LSJ αἰρέω A II 5 and *SVF* 4.92b–93a.

310.24–25). But it will also prove (250) that *meretricis amor*, against which Horace's father had warned at I 4.111, is even more stupid, as is illustrated by a close adaptation of the first scene of Terence's *Eunuchus*, similarly applied by Cic. *Tusc.* 4.76, in which Horace shows striking metrical virtuosity in fitting the words of Terence's iambs into his own hexameters.²²⁶ Such amours can in fact drive one to murder and suicide (by jumping from a height),²²⁷ on which Horace comments (278–280) 'You, who refuse to class amours as madness, couldn't really [could you?] call this crime rather than madness' (*cognata uocabula*, "related terms," not in any linguistic sense but belonging to the same general semantic sphere of deviation from the norm); he is thinking of the rhetorical device (remarked on I 3.49) of referring to transgressions by euphemisms, and pointing out that in this case this would only make matters worse, since it would remove the impunity conferred by insanity.

Finally (281), superstition. Such, says Damasippus (296), are the weapons that Stertinius provided me with for use against those who would call me insane (47–48); with these I can turn the insult back on them.²²⁸

Having listened to all this, Horace asks (300–307) what kind of madness he himself suffers from, since he thinks himself sane, though for the sake of argument he admits that he is a fool and even a madman, which is a distinction that Damasippus would not grant (Stertinius uses the two as synonyms, 159); he prefaces his request with the adjuration "as you hope to sell your property at a higher price" to satisfy your creditors. Damasippus replies that, first, Horace is in the process of building. He is presumably having some modest development constructed on his Sabine villa (cf. Colum. 1.2.4), but Damasippus equates this with the lavish construction boom of the time, much deplored by moralists, including Horace himself (cf. *Epist.* 1.1.100). He is clearly thinking of Maecenas's splendid house (*Epod.* 9.3, *C.* 3.29.10), though Horace himself hardly intends any criticism.²²⁹ Damasippus represents Horace as a dwarf imitating those taller than himself (see on I 6.72), a metaphor for those of higher rank such as Maecenas; he here uses the idiom of replacing a simile with an identification, as in 71, I 7.29, etc.²³⁰ He is like the frog of fable who ran the danger of bursting by trying to match the size of a calf; fable is a staple of the diatribe, and Stertinius has alluded to one

²²⁶ See Fraenkel 1957: 349.

²²⁷ See Fraenkel 1964: I 465 and Courtney 2001: 146.

²²⁸ This is a proverbial phrase; Otto 1890: 205; Häussler 1968: 96.

²²⁹ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 290.

²³⁰ See Mayer 1994: 28–29.

at 186. His second accusation is that Horace writes poetry, which on Democritean principles is an enterprise for which the frenzy of the possessed is a requisite (7.117, *AP* 295–298); he is grasping at every stone and forgetting that the poem began with his exhortation to Horace to write more poetry. Third, he exaggerates the quick temper to which Horace admits (*Epist.* 1.20.25, *C.* 3.9.23) into *horrenda rabies*, at which point Horace, finding this too near the bone, asks him to give over. However, he proceeds to assert that Horace's get-up (cf. *Epist.* 1.14.32) or perhaps his way of life generally (cf. 2.66), *cultus*, is beyond his means (at which Horace again asks him to desist), and finally that he is over-amorous both of girls and boys (cf. I 2.116–119, Epode 11.3–4), again with exaggeration to a thousand of each. At this Horace caves in; “madman,” (a *tu quoque* thrust) “you are my superior, spare your inferior” (some editors appear to think that *maior insane* could mean ‘greater madman,’ which does not seem Latin to me).

Damasippus, like Ofellus in II 2, is dispossessed, he in the city, Ofellus in the country; they lecture others on the basis of their own misfortune, so that both poems are in their own ways in dialogue form. Stertinius's lecture, as Damasippus reports it, is intended largely to ridicule the violence of the diatribe. The prolixity of the lecture, characteristic of some Stoics at least (I 1.13 and 120, 4.16), by design tires the audience and reader by its monotonous assertiveness rather than convinces them, as Cicero remarks (*De Fin* 4.7 already adduced); *tandem* 326 implies weariness. This verbosity is the ironic answer to Horace's own slowness of composition; Damasippus, who attributes that merely to writer's block, does not appreciate how fundamental it is to Horace's stylistic standards.

17. *SERM.* 2.4

Classen's article (1978), though I dissent from its conclusion, is fundamental to the interpretation of this poem, and I make much use of it. We here meet three people, Horace, Catius, and Catius's guru. Who is Catius? He is generally taken to be the Epicurean writer who had recently died when Cicero wrote *Ad Fam.* 15.16.1 in 45 BC; in reply, Cassius (15.19.2), himself an Epicurean, classes him as one of the “bad translators” of Epicurus. By this he admits the barbaric nature (Catius is described, perhaps ironically, by Cicero as an Insubrian) of his Latin equivalents for Epicurean technical terms, Cicero having ridiculed his rendition of εἴδωλα by *spectra*. The subject of this poem turns out to be gastronomy, and Epicureanism could easily be, and often was, misrepresented as a justification for leading a volup-

tuous life; put this together with a distortion of Cassius's comment, as if it concerned subject matter,²³¹ and with reminiscences of Lucretius, to be discussed below (in fact they relate only to didactic style), and many scholars arrive at an interpretation of the poem as Horace's humorous rejection of a degraded form of Epicureanism, embodied in Catius. All the links leading to this conclusion are weak indeed, and one must ask whether one who struggled over translating Epicurus's scientific vocabulary would be likely to have fundamentally misapplied his ethics, and whether Horace would have represented himself as conversing with a man now dead.

As Horace meets Catius in the street, he asks where he is coming from and where he is going to, as he greets Fuscus in I 9.62 and as various Platonic dialogues begin,²³² particularly the *Phaedrus*. Catius replies that he has no time for conversation, as he wants to record (see below on this, and compare Plato *Theaetetus* 142d–143a) a new gospel, which will beat out those of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. The latter two are a reminder to the reader of the Platonic dialogues. About the former Classen²³³ makes the intriguing remark that Athenaeus 320f. refers to the gastronomic work of Archestratus, on which see below, as χρυσᾶ ἔπη, “golden verses,” which is the title of a pseudo-Pythagorean poem. Horace apologizes for his interruption, saying that if for the moment Catius forgets something, he will later recover it through his innate power of memory or by one of the mnemonic techniques practised in the ancient world. Catius answers that he was concerned about recollecting everything, as the topic consisted of *res tenuis tenui sermone peractas* (a line framed like 2.39), “subtle matters conveyed in subtle language,” though in a moment it becomes clear that he has fallen into an unfortunate ambiguity, since the sense ‘trivial’ for *tenuis* would apply well to his actual lore, though *tenuis* (36) is a term that to Catius means ‘gastronomically refined,’ whereas to Ofellus (2.53, 70) a *uictus tenuis* was one that rejected this quality.

The mention of *sermo* provokes Horace to ask about the instructor's identity and nationality, *Romanus an hospes* (10), just as, after Socrates in Plato's *Protagoras* has been asked where he is coming from, he is also asked (309c) whether the person who has entranced him is ἄστωρ ἢ ξένος, “citizen or foreigner.” The last word will account for Horace's *hospes*, a stylized substitute for *peregrinus*. His word *ede* is also pretentious (cf. 5.61, 7.45), suggesting an

²³¹ So Classen 1978: 344.

²³² See Rudd 1966: 301 n. 21.

²³³ Classen 1978: 340 n. 52.

oracle, and the tone is maintained when Catius says that he will enunciate (*canam*, again like an oracle, as Ovid *Met.* 15.147 makes Pythagoras himself preface his lore) the actual precepts, but declines to reveal their source, *celabitur auctor*. There is no reason in the text why he should do this, and at the end he does not demur to Horace's request to accompany him to the instructor. At this point a brief review of gastronomic literature is necessary.

Food had played a large part in Greek comedy, and the Middle Comedy introduced the figure of the Boastful Chef (the title of a useful book by J. Wilkins [Oxford 2000]), which continued to play a large role in New Comedy. In this genre cooking is an art that must be learned from a teacher²³⁴ and its practitioners are proud of their inventions,²³⁵ with much use of εὐρίσκω, "discover," and its cognates. For textbooks on the subject, presenting cooking as a τέχνη (*artem* in Horace 35), see Wilkins 363–365. Naturally, controversies also erupt, as in this poem two are touched on, introduced by *nec (nequaquam) satis est* (37, 48).²³⁶ Gastronomic expertise also came into hexametrical poetry, mostly in the form of parody;²³⁷ notable here are Archestratus of Gela, the title of whose poem is uncertain and which I, unlike Wilkins, would not call a parody tout court, and Ennius's *Hedyphagetica*, "Delicious Eating." In Horace's poem 31–34 particularly recall the style of the former, and 45–46 may be compared with fr. 134 in Lloyd-Jones and Parsons, *Supplementum Hellenisticum*. Apuleius *Apol.* 39 tells us, without quoting the actual words, that Ennius specified which fish were best baked and which stewed, a point alluded to in Horace 38–39. In prose, there was a Menippean satire of Varro (fr. 403–404 B) attacking, in a dialogue, connoisseurship of this type in contrast to the study of philosophy. There was also Horace's contemporary C. Matius; he gave his name to a variety of apple and to a *minutal* ("stew") *Matianum* (Apicius 4.3.4). In his writings, his aim was *urbanas mensas et lauta conuiuia instruere* (Colum. 12.46.1), which he apparently did with some pomposity (*quasi quoddam tributum uictui humano conferre dedignati non sunt ... C. Matius*, id. 12.4.2). Catius is certainly not a pseudonym for him, but we may want to think of Catius's teacher. It seems to me that by Catius's unmotivated suppression of his identity Horace is using his mouthpiece to

²³⁴ Ibid.: 340 n. 21.

²³⁵ Ibid., n. 58.

²³⁶ See below on this phrase. It is in this connection that we meet the only person in this poem attacked by name, 24. In 2.15 Ofellus criticizes those who specify honey from Hymettus for their mead; here, Aufidius is criticized for using the stronger, not the milder strain of Falernian wine.

²³⁷ See Wilkins 2000: 354–363.

invite the reader to make an identification and choosing the name Catius to direct his thoughts in the direction of Matius.

We left the text in 11, knowing only that we would be reading *praecepta* superior to those of the great philosophers. Now the first of them, introduced in good didactic style with *memento* (cf. 89, 5.52), is about choosing the best eggs! What a letdown! From this we go into a list of gastronomic precepts extending to 87. The arrangement is roughly that of a Roman *cena*, beginning with the hors d'oeuvre of eggs and ending with the dessert of apples (70–75), cf. I 3.6–7. The hors d'oeuvres (*promulsis*) duly include *mulsum* (mead) (24–27), but 17–20 and the mention of lunch in 22 seem out of place; perhaps we are to assume that Catius's memory was not as good as he thought. The entree follows (37–50), passing into advice about the wine (51–57), which would lead into the *commissatio* and the *mensa secunda* (58–62, 70–75; see 2.121), again interrupted with emphatically introduced (63, with which cf. I 2.37) advice about sauces (63–69), which have been incidentally mentioned in 38. Finally, come precepts about the serving (76–87). The products favored by Catius and his teacher are nearly all Italian, with exceptions in 58, 66, 68; Cato *De Agr.* 112 shows that the Coan wine of 29 need have no more connection with Cos than American 'Swiss' cheese has with Switzerland. By contrast, the products that Varro criticized are all foreign except for the oysters of Tarentum (cf. its scallops here 34), which may count as a Greek city. This may be taken to confirm that behind Catius's teacher lurks a parodied Roman writer, but one must recognize that some of his advice strikes a superficially serious note; he despises amateur extravagance (37–39, 76–77), but also meanness (81–87), and this is not totally undercut by the exaggerated language of 76 and 82 (cf. 2.69).

The style of didactic poetry is plain in Catius's report of his teacher's lecture. The recipient of his advice will be *doctus* (19) and *sapiens* (44), this latter a pun (cf. Cic. *De Fin.* 2.24 and Plaut. *Cas.* 5) on the literal meaning 'having taste,' cf. *sapor*, flavor 36, 54. The expert on cookery needs to be qualified *exacta tenui* (cf. 9) *ratione saporum* 36, "by having studied the subtle science of flavors"; if we met the first three words in Lucretius, for example, the last would be contrary to expectation, like *palatum* in 46. Lucretius is indeed behind some phraseology; with 46 and 94–95 (in the latter place Horace is catching the Lucretian mode), cf. Lucr. 1.926 ff. *auia Pieridum peragro loca NULLIUS ANTE / trita solo, iuuat integros accedere FONTIS / atque HAURIRE ... coronam / unde PRIUS NULLI uelarint tempora Musae*, with 48 cf. Lucr. 6.703–704 *RES quarum UNAM dicere causam / NON SATIS EST* and with 63–64 Lucr. 6.379–380 *NATURAM fulminis ipsam / PERSPICERE* and 1.949–950 *dum PERSPICIS omnem / NATURAM rerum*. Catius himself is associated with

Lucretius 2.581–582, *illud in his obsignatum quoque rebus habere / conuenit et memori mandatum mente tenere*, which links with 2 *ponere signa nouis praeceptis*, 8 *cuncta tenerem*, 11 *memor*, 90 *memori pectore* (after *memento* 89, as 11 is followed by *memento* 12), and indeed shows what is meant by the first of these phrases (Caius is going to go over these new precepts in his memory and thereby seal them up for safekeeping), which has been misunderstood by editors (Gell. 17.7.5 is a deceptive verbal ‘parallel’). We may recall the emphasis on accurate recollection at the beginning of Plato’s *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus*.

Though he professes to be just a reporter, Caius applies the first person to some of the precepts (46, 73–74), and in the latter place claims to be the *πρώτος εὑρετής*, first discoverer (as chefs often did; compare the passages listed by Classen, referred to above, and also 8.51–52); for this conception in the literary field, see above, p. 121 on I 10.48.²³⁸ Evidently, he has memorized mechanically the words of the instructor and retails them without adjustment; much the same thing seems to have happened to Damasippus (3.77–81).

After all this, Horace addresses Caius as *docte* (88), thereby putting him on a level with Plato (3) and perhaps implying a link with *catus*. He asks Caius to take him with him wherever he goes (i.e., to whatever part of Rome the instructor is lecturing) as an auditor, since he feels that even an accurate reporter will not match the real fount of wisdom (for the Lucretian undertones see above²³⁹); Caius is *beatus* (92) to have seen this teacher in person, now Horace wants to absorb the *praecepta* (95, cf. 2, 11), which will lead to a *uita beata* (95). The irony is palpable.

18. *SERM.* 2.5

The pursuit of legacies, though not unknown before, comes into prominence in the late republic. Cicero *Parad.* 39 refers to the ‘slavery’ of the pursuers (cf. Horace 99 and 91–92, where the submissive posture of a comic

²³⁸ In 74, I find Palmer’s conjecture *inuenio* very plausible; for the construction with the infinitive, see *ThLL* s.v. 149–146. The tense would be what HS 306 call a ‘registrierende’ or ‘tabulare’ present (some of the examples listed in KS 1.118–119 without clear definition also belong here), so that *inuenio* will be understood as *inuentor sum*. At 5.60 *donat*, where Bentley wished to introduce *donauit*, will fit here. See also Traenkle 1960: 73–74.

²³⁹ Locarini 2001: 108–109 also compares Pluto *De Curios.* 516c, which reports Aristippus’s thirst for direct intercourse with Socrates, but he does not make a link with the mention of Socrates in 3 above, where Socrates does not arouse as much enthusiasm as Caius’s preceptor.

slave is recommended), and Catullus 68.119–124 speaks of the late arrival of a grandson as a mockery (*derisi*, cf. Horace 57) of the hopes of a more distant relative, spoken of as a vulture 124 (see Ellis ad loc. and cf. Horace's raven or crow 56). This satire introduces the term *captare* (23, 57), to hunt, which, with its cognates becomes standard, and Horace briefly reverts to the topic in *Epist.* 1.1.77–79. Here we have the form of a *προτρεπτικός*, a genre in which an authority figure gives advice on how to conduct one's life. Horace himself is totally absent from the poem, as in I 8 (and 7 in all essentials), and uses irony to deride a social problem that has, so far as we can tell, absolutely no relevance to himself; this is why it is often seen as a forerunner of the mode of Juvenal and most subsequent satire.

The authority figure chosen is that of Tiresias, who as a ghost in *Odyssey* 11 informs Odysseus about the suitors of Penelope who are consuming his assets (116, cf. Horace 6–7); Odysseus puts to him a question about his mother (140), and after answering it Tiresias departs. Horace imagines that before that Odysseus has consulted him on what wiles and methods, *artes atque modi* (for the former word cf. 26, for the latter remember that Odysseus is *πολυμήχανος*, ingenious, and is so addressed by Tiresias in *Od.* 11.92) he can repair his ruined finances, and that Tiresias ironically comments on his attitude that returning to his ancestral house gods, *patrii Penates* (which is what he has been yearning to do in Homer) is not enough. The Latin phrase, in this exact form, is found also in *Aen.* 2.717, and therefore perhaps was in Ennius; it hints that the poem has a Roman reference, reinforced by the mention of the Lar in 14. Ulysses (so I shall henceforward call him) replies that according to Tiresias he is to return destitute, which Tiresias does not explicitly say in Homer and which ignores the treasures bestowed on him by the Phaeacians and concealed by him on his return; Horace has adjusted the Homeric narrative to suit his point. Since Ulysses unambiguously values affluence over *genus et uirtus* (cf. *Epist.* 1.1.53–54), Tiresias instructs him (*accipe* 10, a didactic touch; cf. 2.70, 3.46) to present dainties, whether given to Ulysses or produced on his farm, to a rich old man instead of to the Lar, and to dance attendance on him, however disreputable he may be. Ulysses jibs at the idea of walking on the outside of a Syrian ex-slave, another Roman allusion (he has not hitherto conceived to what depths his contempt for *genus* may take him), but when warned that in that case he will be poor he acquiesces in 'this,' since he has put up with worse in the past (so his comment to this effect in *Od.* 20.18 becomes like an epic formula repeated from this earlier occasion!). For the moment, the reader might think that 'this' means 'poverty,' but revises that opinion when Ulysses asks Tiresias how he can make his pile.

Tiresias's answer (23) is that he has to devote himself to the technique (ars, cf. 3, Sen. *De Ben.* 6.38.4) of *captatio*. The old men from whom he is to hunt legacies should, of course, be rich and childless, and they are compared to fish nibbling at the bait (25, 44; the verb *captare* is applied to fishermen by e.g., Seneca, *Anth. Lat.* 415R.53). One important service is to support them in court (27–44; *Foro* is another Roman touch, like the names in 32), even when the other party, if he is married or has children, is in the right, even if he is the aggressor posing as the defender (30, 34), and even if he is an ex-slave (like Dama 18) who has now acquired praenomina (32–33). This will involve being outside in all kinds of weather,²⁴⁰ the winter described by a parody of Furius Bibaculus fr. 15 *FLP* = Hollis 80,²⁴¹ and the summer probably also parodic of something;²⁴² naturally, if we wish to be pedantic, we may wonder how Tiresias has read Furius! Ulysses, of course, is an able orator in Homer, and he is also long-suffering, *πολύτλας*, *patiens* (43). He must flatter his targets with the assertion that their merit has won his own disinterested friendship (33, after Lucr. 1.140 *sed tua me uirtus tamen et sperata uoluptas / suavis amicitiae quemuis efferre laborem / suadet*). In order to conceal his true designs, he may even target a man with a son, but only if the son is unhealthy, so that in the best (!) case Ulysses may supplant him if any event sends him to the afterlife (*si quis casus puerum egerit Orco*, a suitable recall of the the Homeric Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν; perhaps taken over from Ennius, as *Aen.* 9.785 *miserit Orco* and 527 *demiserit Orco* might suggest), and in the worst (!) case he may be designated heir in the second degree, *secundus heres*.

If the *captatus* invites you to read his will, says Tiresias (51), so that you can see that you are mentioned in it and will therefore continue pandering to him, politely decline (so that you may seem altruistic), but take a quick peep. In the future (*quandoque* 55, Shackleton Bailey's fine emendation), a minor official named Coranus with a new lease on life as a *scriba* (this invites a knowing grin from those who know that this latter was Horace's own profession) will make a laughing-stock of his *captator* Nasica. Horace here ingeniously makes the prophet foretell an event that, by the time of

²⁴⁰ See my note on Juv. 7.173.

²⁴¹ Furius is referred to as "blown-out by fatty tripe," where *pingui* (cf. 6.14–15 and *OLD* 7b) is the Callimachean *παχύς*, epigr. 1340 HE = fr. 398 Pfeiffer, cf. fr. 1.23–24.

²⁴² *Rubra Canicula*, the ruddy Dog-Star, probably involves a transferred epithet (cf. I 4.100), which strictly applies to the blazing heat of summer (see Lejay), not to the actual color of the Dog-Star (on which see Muecke). This star splits not, as would be expected, the fields (Verg. *Georg.* 2.353, Tib. 1.7.21), but the speechless statues listening in the forum, which would complain about the heat if they could talk.

writing, will have taken place at Rome, but overuse would blunt this device, so (Furius discounted) these are the only Roman figures named in the poem. Ulysses is unsure whether Tiresias is in a prophetic frenzy or is consciously puzzling him, and Tiresias replies with a piece of prophetic and oracular caution, “whatever I say will either happen or not,” which on the surface is just obfuscation but, when challenged, could be defended as meaning ‘what I say will happen will happen, and what I say will not happen will not happen’; it is like destroying a great empire (which one?) by crossing the Halys. Tiresias bolsters his authority by deriving his gift of prophecy from Apollo’s gift; he is recalling *Iliad* 1.72 (of Calchas) ἦν δὲ μαντοσύνην, τὴν οἱ πόρρε Φοῖβος Ἀπέλλων (“through his prophetic ability given to him by Phoebus Apollo”) and Ennius *Ann.* 15–16 Skutsch *Anchisesque, Venus quem ... fari donauit, diuinum pectus habere*. The appropriateness of the Homeric reminiscence outweighs the pedantic objection that his gift was in fact given to him by Zeus and/or Athena.

In order to clarify Ulysses’s puzzlement, Tiresias gives details of the story (64–69) about Coranus and Nasica, which actually leave it as obscure as ever, introduced with oracular pomp (61–64), “what time a young man dreaded by the Parthians, a scion descended from Aeneas of old, shall be powerful by land and sea. ...” *Tempore quo* is the ἀλλ’ ὁπότε, which often introduces oracles; *iuuenis*, i.e., the now 33-year-old Octavian, suits oracular vagueness;²⁴³ *ab alto / demissum genus Aenea* (for *genus* cf. *I* 6.12) closely resembles *Aen.* 4.230 and 6.500 *genus alto a sanguine Teucris*, from which we may draw the usual conclusion (remember that Ulysses knows Aeneas very well); *tellure marique* (cf. *Epod.* 9.27) reflects the imperial propaganda now taking shape, as in *Res Gestae* 4 *ob res ... terra marique prospere gestas*, *ibid.* 3.13, etc. The Parthians have already appeared in 1.15, and of course the need to avenge the disaster of Carrhae remained a preoccupation of Roman poets and Augustus himself until he reached a face-saving solution in 20 BC. Norden²⁴⁴ plausibly conjectures that Horace is reflecting the language of prophecies circulated after the battle of Actium (note *Aen.* 6.798–799, *huius in aduentum iam nunc et Caspia regna / responsis horrent diuom*, and with the penultimate word cf. Horace’s *horrendus* 62). The epic tone spills over into the sordid story when Coranus is described as *fortis* and his wife as *procera* (64), since height is a desired attribute in epic women.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ See Fraenkel 1957: 244–245.

²⁴⁴ Norden 1995: 322 f.

²⁴⁵ See *Od.* 18.195, with the notes of Stanford and Russo, and 249.

Then (70), Tiresias advises lauding those who have influence over the senile testator, as well the testator himself and, if need be, his bad poetry; we may guess that Horace puts this in because out of tactfulness he sometimes had to do the same when appealed to for his opinion. This leads to the advice that if the target is a dirty old man, Ulysses should offer Penelope to him without waiting to be asked. One might expect an indignant reaction from Ulysses, but he merely asks whether the chaste Penelope would acquiesce, with a spitting alliteration of *p* (77) portraying her reaction as foreseen by Ulysses; she is also imagined as applying the word *perducere*, to pimp or pander (*OLD* s.v. 1e), to that situation. The suitors could not seduce her, because, according to Tiresias, they were not only more interested in feasting (so Horace again alleges at *Epist.* 1.2.27–28) than in sex, but they are also stingy, a reproach made to them by Penelope (*Od.* 18.279), while the disguised Ulysses is pleased that he will acquire such gifts (282) as the suitors are shamed into presenting (291sqq.). Penelope's thrift (*frugi* 81, taking up Ulysses's word from 77, a word that, like *pudica* *ibid.* is often applied to women in epitaphs) is of the same type; if she gets a taste of a little profit from just one man, she will be like a dog, impossible to deter from a carcass.²⁴⁶ The point is that the victim has to be dead before the legacy hunters can devour his estate; the same is implied by the comparison to a carrion crow (cf. I 8.38) in 67, a comparison that established itself²⁴⁷ (cf. the culture in Catull. 68. 124, remarked above).

Tiresias next (84) embarks on a story that took place in his hometown of Thebes when he was an old man, *me sene* (if he were not a ghost the natural expression would be 'when I was a boy,' *me puero*, cf. *AP* 174), indicating that legacy hunting flourished in heroic times and illustrating the tenacity of a legacy hunter. He then gives advice about tactful handling of the victim while alive and regretful reaction to his death, "poor old Dama, my dear friend" (101), ironically repeating the name that had aroused Ulysses's disgust (18). "Where will I ever find so fine and loyal a friend?," *tam fortem tamque fidelem*; the alliterative pair²⁴⁸ reappears in Trimalchio's epitaph (Petron. 71.12; one may compare, with *fidus*, *CLE* 488.2, 1988.8). If any co-heir has a bad cough, offer to sell him a farm or a house from your share for a song (thus setting up another target). But, Tiresias breaks off, *imperiosa*

²⁴⁶ On this passage, see Williams (1959). In 83, the comparandum merges with the comparison; see Mayer 1994: 29.

²⁴⁷ See Courtney 2001: 178–179.

²⁴⁸ See Wölfflin 1933: 260.

Proserpina (ἐπαινῇ Περσεφόνηα) is summoning me; *uiue ualeque* (cf. *Epist.* 1.6.67), a conventional goodbye the first item of which cannot apply to Tiresias himself.

19. *SERM.* 2.6

In this poem Horace describes his daily routine in Rome as contrasted with that on his Sabine estate, which he sees almost entirely as it appears to him amid his occupations in Rome. These occupations are bothersome, but have a bright side (32) in that they are linked to his association with Maecenas, though this association also contributes to the bother (32–58). The Sabine estate is in Horace's possession in *Il* 3 (5–12), a poem to which the mention of Agrippa's aedileship (185) combined with an allusion to the Saturnalia (4–5) gives a dramatic date of December 33 BC, and this furnishes a terminus ante quem for the acquisition of the estate. The scholiasts say (not necessarily from independent knowledge) that Maecenas presented this estate to Horace, and *C.* 2.18.12–14, 3.16.29–38 point in this direction; that is a reasonable assumption, though it has been challenged.

Horace had wanted a little rural retreat, but his prayers have been answered by more than that; he has nothing left to request (*C.* 2.18.11–12) from Mercury, the god of gain (3.25, 68), except that he make Horace's right to this property inalienable, unlike the farm of Ofellus (2.134–135) and Horace's own confiscated paternal property. If (which in effect means 'since,' giving the grounds of a request in asking a favor from a god),²⁴⁹ he says, my assets have not been acquired wickedly, and if I am not going to reduce them through negligence or misconduct; if I do not pray greedily for more, but gratefully enjoy what I have (so Horace has followed his father's advice about contentment, *I* 4.107–108); then, Mercury, make my flocks (of which Mercury-Hermes has oversight²⁵⁰) and everything else, except my head, fat (for a fat head is inimical to poetic composition; cf. 5.40, Callim. fr. 1.23–24 there listed and Verg. *Buc.* 6.3–4 imitating Callimachus; Hermes is particularly sharp-witted [*Iliad* 20.35] and gives ἐνμάθεια "teachability," Callim. fr. 221); continue, too, to watch over me as is your habit (e.g., at Philippi, *C.* 2.7.13), *ut soles*, a phrase that, like the *si*-clauses, tactfully puts moral pressure on a god to grant what is requested, cf. Catull. 34.23. The god will

²⁴⁹ See Appel 1909: 151.

²⁵⁰ See *ML* 1.2377; *RE* s.v. Hermes 775.

be aware that he is also the patron of poets (C. 2.17.29 with a probable astrological side-glance at the planet Mercury). Very similar prayers recur at *Epist.* 1.18.104–110.

The following lines, in my opinion, should be read in the order suggested by J.F. Habermeldt in 1800:

16 ergo ubi me in montis et in arcem ex urbe remoui,
 18 nec mala me ambitio perdit nec plumbeus Auster
 19 autumnusque grauis, Libitinae quaestus acerbae.
 17 quid prius illustrem satiris musaque pedestri?
 20 Matutine pater, seu lane libentius audis, / 21 ...
 22 tu carminis esto
 23 principium.

So when I remove myself from the city to the mountains and my citadel, I am not troubled either by deplorable self-seeking or the leaden South Wind and oppressive autumn, the source of profit to pitiless undertakers. What should I first expound with my satires and my pedestrian muse? Father Matutinus, or Janus if you prefer to be so called, be the beginning of my song.

There are two reasons for changing the transmitted order. First, in that order we would expect the answer to the rhetorical question of 17 to be that Horace will begin by extolling life in the country, whereas in fact he proceeds (23 ff.) to criticize life in the city, and country life does not get its turn until 60 ff. Second, *prius* is not to be watered down to mean *potius*, ‘by preference,’ but literally means ‘first,’ as at C. 1.12.13–14 *quid prius dicam solitis Parentis / laudibus ...?*, where it is followed by indications of ordering in 19 and 33. Here the question of priority is answered in 22–23, and the answer should not be separated from the question by 18–19, lines misleading where they stand. So the upland estate is his citadel (*arcem* in a double sense), his refuge from the self-seeking (*ambitio*, cf. I 6.129; no one English word covers its whole range of meaning) and unhealthy climate (cf. *Epist.* 1.7.1–9) of Rome, but the city is a more suitable topic for a *musa pedestris*, with which cf. *AP* 95 *sermo pedestris*, the language of comedy, *Epist.* 2.1.250–251 *sermones ... repentes per humum*, Callim. fr. 112.9 Μουσέων πεζόν ... νόμον (“the footpath of the Muses”), probably meaning his Iambi; the combination is almost an oxymoron, since ‘true’ poetry flies in the chariot of the Muses. The implication is that Horace is writing neither prose (which in Latin can be called *pēdēstris oratio*) nor verse (cf. I 4.39 ff.); in referring to the blend of the two in Menippean satire, Lucian *Bis Acc.* 33 makes ‘Dialogue’ say “I am neither a foot traveller nor have I mounted meter”:

οὔτε πεζός εἰμι οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν μέτρων βέβηκα.

Yet Horace immediately undercuts his alleged humility by the elevated style of 20–23, perhaps emphasized by the designation *carmen*, as Fraenkel²⁵¹ argues (I myself would not press the point, since Horace 1.63 refers to Lucilius's compositions as *carmina* and makes Damasippus refer to his own compositions with the verb *canere* 3.4). This elevation consists in the adoption of proper prayer formulations,²⁵² such as the address to the god under alternative appellations and the specification of his function in a relative clause as appropriate to the circumstances under which he is addressed. The god invoked as the starting point is not Jupiter, as in C. 1.12 or, e.g., Virg. *Buc.* 3.60 *ab Ioue principium*, but Pater Matutinus, a god invented by Horace on the analogy of Mater Matuta,²⁵³ or, to put it more plainly, Janus, the god of beginnings (and particularly beginnings of human activity) regularly named first in prayers; the topic is to be the city and its occupations, which begin in the early morning. This timetable for Horace's day contrasts with I 6.119, where he had no commitments in the early morning; now his relationship with Maecenas has become better known and acquired its disadvantages.

Janus, then, urges Horace to hurry to such commitments as standing security (cf. *Epist.* 2.2.67), even in bad weather, and then incur curses as he pushes through the crowd on his way to Maecenas's morning levee, the *salutatio*;²⁵⁴ "Do you think that you can shove aside every obstacle on your way to Maecenas?" I must admit, says Horace, that 'this' gives me pleasure, 'this' probably meaning primarily 'to be on my way to Maecenas,' but not excluding 'to be generally recognized as an intimate of Maecenas.' But as soon as I come to the 'black' Esquiline, the *salutatores* inflict their concerns on me; so 'black' refers not only to the graveyard past (I 8) of the site of Maecenas's palace, but also implies 'ill-starred' for Horace (cf. I 9.73). One such concern is that the *scribae*, Horace's (ex-?)colleagues, remind him of an important meeting, which he has to attend, concerning all of them, presumably including Horace himself though he has just called such things other people's business, *aliena negotia*; he is ingratiatingly addressed by his praenomen, but he

²⁵¹ Fraenkel 1957: 139–140.

²⁵² See Muecke (1993) on 20.

²⁵³ Though Lucr. 5.656, followed by Horace, associates this deity with the dawn, that seems to be due simply to misapplied etymology and, despite Dumézil 1970: 50 ff., to have no basis in cult. However, Wissowa (1912: 110) notes an African inscription (*CIL* 8.11797), which seems to couple her with Janus.

²⁵⁴ Bentley's emendation is much the best way of restoring the meter in 29, but any emendation would be preferable to Shackleton Bailey's wild alteration.

lets the reader know that he no longer regards himself as an active civil servant. Another person wants Horace to ensure that Maecenas puts his seal on a document (this may mean Octavian's seal, entrusted to Maecenas during his absence from Rome in 31–30 BC²⁵⁵). If Horace says that he will try, the answer is “you can do it if you want to,” thus taking away any excuse.

That leads Horace to define his relationship with Maecenas (40). It is now almost eight years since Maecenas admitted him to his friendship (I 6.62), at least to the extent of taking him in his *raeda* as a traveling companion (a clear reference back to I 5.86, which took place in 37 BC) and sharing trivial conversation with him on topics that would not matter if leaked (not that Horace would leak!). Progressively during all this time “our friend” (Horace is looking at himself as others see him, a turn also implicit in *dixeris* 39, “you” [rather than “I”] “say”) has been becoming more subject to envy (see on I 6.46 ff.), and people “consult” him like a prophet because of his association with the “gods” (i.e., the elites, just as Augustus is casually referred to as ‘Jupiter’ at *Epist.* 1.19.43), trying to get political news out of him, such as what is going on with the Dacians, who had been supporters of Antony and against whom M. Licinius Crassus waged a campaign in 30 BC, and whether soldiers discharged after the battle of Actium are to be settled in Sicily or Italy (the latter, in the event²⁵⁶). Horace can swear that he knows nothing, but people regard him as an εἰρων, “dissembler” (*derisor* 54) and incredulously think that he is not ignorant but a uniquely discreet person.

Such things consume the whole day (59), while Horace can only frame more wishes in the vein of those that he had reported satisfied (1): “When will I ever get back to the country, live a life of reading and bucolic ease” (cf. *Epist.* 2.2.77–78), “forget the worries” (*sollicitae*; in I 6.119 he was *non sollicitus*) “of life, and live on vegetables greased with bacon so that they do not need olive oil?” (cf. 2.117; actually he had said in I 6.115 that in Rome too his diet was vegetarian). So our thoughts are back in the country, where his dinners²⁵⁷ are like those of the gods, with slave children born on the farm and fed with titbits from the table, and guests who are not constrained by rules laid down by a president of drinking, *magister bibendi*. The conversation consists not of trivial gossip but of serious problems of ethics (cf. Cicero's idealized picture in *Cato* 45–46 of Cato enjoying *conuiuium uicinorum ... in*

²⁵⁵ See Reinhold 1988: 126.

²⁵⁶ See Reinhold 1988: 127–128.

²⁵⁷ Note the superiority of the evening (*noctes*) in the country over the morning (20) and day (59) in the city.

Sabino), listed in catechetical style (cf. Persius 3.66 ff., with parallels quoted by Jahn and Kissel; see also *Epist.* 1.2.3 and 18.96 ff., *AP* 312–316, Lucr. 6.26 ff.), though they will of course have been discussed in the manner of the *abnormis sapiens* Ofellus.

The garrulous neighbor, Cervius (or Curvius, a substantial variant not mentioned by Shackleton Bailey²⁵⁸), makes his contribution to such topics (77) in the form of “old women’s fables”;²⁵⁹ Quintil. 5.11.19 remarks that countrymen like fables. In particular, he illustrates the question (74) whether riches, which bring worry (*sollicitas* 79, cf. 62), also bring happiness with the story of the town and the country mouse (or rat); this passage is carefully discussed by West.²⁶⁰ Though Cervius is unaware of this, this story fits Horace’s own situation vis-à-vis the two locations; the two are placed in sharp antithesis by Latin literature’s most dazzling chiasmus in 80–81, where we have a fourfold series (trumping the triple one at 2.84–88), nominative adjective, accusative adjective, accusative noun, nominative noun: accusative adjective, nominative adjective, nominative noun, accusative noun. Once upon a time (*olim*, a common beginning for a fable, cf. *Epist.* 1.1.73; Ademar’s prose version of this fable, printed by Postgate as Phaedrus *fab. nov.* 9, opens with *quondam*), the town mouse visited his country cousin, who provided a simple rustic diet, like that of Ofellus; vegetables and bacon again (84–86, cf. 64), and also a berry, presumably a raisin (cf. 2.121). Nothing like the bacon is on the menu in the other versions of the fable; it is there to anthropomorphize the mouse and recall Ofellus. He is *pater domus*, which elevates him to human status, cf. 8.7; his hole is also a human “house,” cf. 98. Despite his thrift (82) he can relax his austerity when a *hospes* (81; cf. 2.118) arrives. Finally the politeness of the town mouse, who despises this food like the human city dwellers, according to Ofellus 2.14 (note *fastidia* here 86 and 2.14), wears out, and he urges his friend to live a less austere life, one that is *beatus* (cf. 4.95; on the question raised in 74 he would vote that riches, which permit gourmet food, and not *uirtus* bring beatitude, a goal that he advocates in 96), and accompany him to the town. His exhortation is based on the brevity of life and the inevitability of death (*letum*, a grand word elsewhere used by Horace only in the Odes) for both great and small (like us!); note the

²⁵⁸ For the former, see 1.47 and Schulze 1904: 234; for the latter, which would avoid potential confusion with the man of 1.47, *ibid.* 155.

²⁵⁹ For the phrase, usually disparaging, see Otto 1890: 121; Häussler 1968: 96, 134, 261; Massaro 1977.

²⁶⁰ West in Woodman and West 1974.

occurrence of *dum licet* and *breui aeuo* next to each other at C. 2.11.16–17. Just as the elevated stylization of the word order in 80–81 contrasted comically with the little mice, so here (93–97) the concerns of humans are attributed to them; Horace has added this element to the other versions of this fable (e.g., Aesop 314 Hausrath and Hunger), though of course human behavior is often attributed to animals in fable. Throughout Horace's narrative a careful balance is kept between human and animal concerns; the very word *mus* does not reappear after 80, where it is immediately followed by the human *hospes*. When these words (*haec ubi dicta*, a common epic tag, but elsewhere syntactically independent) persuade the country mouse (or should I call him the countryman?), they set off together for the delights of civilization, *propositum peragunt iter* (99), as the Sibyl and Aeneas *iter inceptum peragunt* (*Aen.* 6.384) to the Styx, a resemblance from which we should draw the usual inference. With the favorite idiom of high poetry, *iam* followed by an inverse *cum* (see on I 5.9–10), at midnight they arrive *in locuplete domo* (a contrast to the *pauper cauus* [80–81] of the country mouse), where purple coverlets gleam over ivory couches, a color contrast favoured by poets since *Iliad* 4.141;²⁶¹ note that 104 is a golden line and 103 is near-golden. The country mouse reclines on these coverlets, very unlike the chaff on which he reclined in his hole (*porrectus* both 88 and 106), though there the stipulation that it is this year's chaff represents his avoidance of meanness, *sordes* (cf. 2.53, 65). Meanwhile, the town mouse keeps the courses coming and²⁶² acts not only as host but also as waiter.²⁶³ The country mouse is in seventh heaven when suddenly (this marks the peripeteia) the doors clash as they open and shut, and the house echoes to the barking of the watchdogs, to the agitation of the mice, vividly conveyed by historic infinitives. "This life is not for me," says the country mouse; "I am going to return to my safe hole" (which is like Horace's 'citadel' 16) "which with its modest food will content me" (*solabitur*, cf. I 6.129; 'modest' is *tenuis*, another Ofellian word, cf. 2.53 and 70).

²⁶¹ See Leich 1910: 45 and Muecke.

²⁶² *Nec non*, 'and moreover,' 108 is rather grand; the combination was introduced in the 50s BC, and is not found elsewhere in Horace.

²⁶³ However, while like the country mouse he brings in the food in his mouth (85) through anatomical necessity, whereas his country cousin abstained from the best morsels (89), he cannot refrain from licking the food before he serves it. As a butler he is like a *uerna*, a homebred slave, but, contrary to the expectations raised by *fungitur officiis*, a felonious *uerna* (contrast the other mouse, *pater domus* 88–89). This explanation, for which see Courtney 1996a: 268–269, retains the manuscript reading *praelambens*.

This is the only poem in Book II totally devoted to Horace himself and his outlook on life. It is generally and justly regarded as his finest satire, and from a literary viewpoint is full of happy touches, many of which I have had to pass over.

20. *SERM.* 2.7

"I have been listening (*ausculto*) for a long time and I want to have a brief word with you, though as a slave I am nervous." "Is that Davus?" A little scene has already been set up. Even before we meet the word 'slave' the verb *auscultare* takes us into the world of comedy, in which this verb is found over 70 times and seldom anywhere else (not elsewhere in Horace, only once in Cicero). What has Davus been listening to? I think probably to Horace dictating one of his satires (specifically, perhaps, II 6) to an amanuensis (cf. on I 10.92); this is going to provide Davus with material to turn against the author. Why is Horace uncertain of the identity of his interlocutor? Because one of them has been inside the study and one outside. Why is Davus nervous? Because of Horace's hot temper (see on 3.323). Davus then confirms his identity, and declares that he is well-disposed to Horace (therefore what he has to say is in Horace's own interest). So Horace encourages him to use the Saturnalian privilege of outspokenness; we recall that Damasippus in II 3 also tackled Horace on the Saturnalia, but a slave has positive reasons for taking advantage of the festival's protection.

Davus starts off in truly Horatian vein (6–20). "Some men are hardened sinners, others veer between good and bad; take Priscus as an example of the latter and Volerianus of the former." It might be Horace himself speaking; Davus has picked up favorite Horatian phraseology (e.g. I 1.61 *pars hominum*; with *inaequalis* cf. I 3.9, q.v.), and in 22 ff. Horace's own style is used to criticize him. In short, Horace is undercutting ('subversion' is the vogue word) his own diatribe, taking care, however, not to make this undercutting too plausible.

Davus has cautiously (a slave needs this quality), like Horace himself often (e.g. in I 2–3), adopted an indirect approach to his point, but his owner is impatient: "When will you ever (*hodie*) get to the point of this rot, you gallows-bird?" He has adopted the idiom of a slave, with the irritable *hodie* and the allusion to a slave punishment in *furcifer*, to be hurled back in 66. "You are the point," replies Davus, to Horace's puzzlement; "you praise" (taking up 22) "the old-fashioned way of life" (which looks back to 2.92–93; cf. I 4.117), "but if some god gave you the chance to return to it, you

would adamantly refuse," a parody of I 1.15 (cf. also Cic. *Cato* 83, quoted on I 6 n. 133); note that the slave speaks of such a life as moral, *rectum* (25–26), but the master has no firm attachment to that concept. "At Rome you long for the country" (cf. 6.60), "in the country for Rome," a hit at what Horace sees as a prevalent malaise of restlessness; cf. 111 ff. and *Epist.* 1.8.12 in reference to himself and more generally *Epist.* 1.1.32 ff. and Lucr. 3.1066 ff.,²⁶⁴ Horace is as inconsistent as Priscus, but in the second half of his assertion the slave can see what Horace, in the mood described in the preceding poem, would have denied. "If you have no invitation to dinner, you praise your vegetarian meal" (cf. I 6.112–115, II 6.64): "but if Maecenas sends you a last-minute invitation" (he dines very late because he is so busy) "you hustle your slaves²⁶⁵ and rush out, deserting your own already assembled parasite guests. One of them might well admit that food is what he is after, but claim that you are as bad as himself and maybe worse; nevertheless you criticize him as if superior and find fine words to cloak your shortcomings" (i.e., designate *obsequium* to Maecenas, with which Horace is charged in 6.30–31, as *amicitia*, cf. I 3.43 ff., II 3.278–280; never mind that Maecenas had clearly not intended to invite Horace). "You may be even a greater fool" (this word soon acquires a special point) "than I am." At this point (43–44) Horace scowls, as Davus had anticipated (2) that he might, and Davus tells him to restrain himself while he proclaims (*edo*, a pompous word, cf. 4.10, 5.61) the lessons he learned from Crispinus's doorkeeper. Now the Stoicism implicit in *stultior* 42 becomes overt; Horace himself had rejected any dependence on Crispinus (I 1.120), and Davus does not have direct access to him, but the two slaves have more in common. If Davus had had personal contact with Crispinus, and if he were the ideal *sapiens* he claims to be (73, cf. 83), he might have appreciated that to a strict Stoic all 'fools' are equally foolish; but he repeatedly uses the comparative degree in a non-technical way (19, 47, 63, 96).

Davus then (46–71) contrasts himself with Horace in respect of sexual morality, opening with an apparent repudiation of Horace's attitude in I 2, "You are entranced by someone else's wife, I by a little whore; which of us is more deserving to be crucified? When I enjoy any girl" (which he describes in language matching the grossness of I 2.33 and 116²⁶⁶), "I leave

²⁶⁴ See Norden 1966: 42 for more.

²⁶⁵ For the form of the impatient questions in 34–35, see my note on Juv. 15. 16–17.

²⁶⁶ Adams 1982: 37 thinks that *cauda* 49 is an ad hoc metaphor, not current slang, but he does not mention I 2.45.

with no detriment to my reputation" (contrast I 2.59, 61, 133; I 4.114) "and no jealousy. But when you put off the attire that marks you as a citizen and an *eques*²⁶⁷ and disguise yourself as a slave, you turn into what you pretend to be" (since according to the Stoics all 'fools' are slaves). "Passion and fear alternate; concealment in a cramped clothes chest" (a situation often staged in adultery mimes) "is no better than selling yourself to a *lanista* as a gladiator and submitting to servile punishments. The husband of an adulteress has the right to punish her, but even more the seducer; will you with your eyes open submit to the servile stocks" (with which Horace had threatened Davus in 22) "and entrust your property, your life, your body and reputation" (*famam*, see above on 51) "to a furious master?²⁶⁸ Suppose you escape; surely you will be more cautious in future; not a bit of it, you look for new opportunities to quake" (*paueas*, picking up *pauore* 57) "and meet disaster, repeatedly putting yourself in the position of a slave" (whereas slavery happened only once to me).

Davus now (72) anticipates Horace's objection that he is not an adulterer, which is literally true (I 2.119 ff.). However, Davus explains that as a strict Stoic he is equating desire and accomplishment; remove fear of punishment and Horace will be as adulterous as the best of them (cf. I 2.127 ff.). He is not really master of Davus, since he himself is subject to so many restrictions that even repeated emancipation could not free him from fear; likewise, Davus is not really his slave, but his co-slave, a point taken over from Cic. *Parad.* 37 (an unfortunately garbled context). Horace, in fact, is a puppet manipulated by strings, a *νευρόσπαστον*, an image common in Marcus Aurelius.²⁶⁹ That raises the question (83), which Cicero l.c. 33 also raised, of who is free. The answer is the *sapiens*, who has no one to give orders to him (carrying on 75, 81) but himself, and can argue against desires, *responsare cupidinibus* (like a slave being cheeky to his owner!); he is also self-sufficient (the second Stoic paradox, cf. Cic. l.c. 17 *in se uno sua ponit omnia*), free from external constraints. (88–89) "Are you? You are in subjection to a courtesan

²⁶⁷ There is little doubt that Horace, even if he had lost his inheritance after Philippi, by now held this status, presumably because gifts from Augustus (mentioned in the Suetonian life) and Maecenas had satisfied the property qualifications. Discussions of the question are listed by Muecke (1993) ad loc.

²⁶⁸ Sources do not draw a clear line between what was customary and what was legally permitted in cases of adultery at this time, a question relevant also at I 2. 37 ff., 130 ff.; the crux of the question is 'your life' in the above paraphrase and *ad mortem caesus*, whipped to death, l.c. 42. For risk to property, cf. I 2.43, 133; to body, *ibid.* 45–46, 133. See Treggiari 1991: 264–275, esp. 271. On the reading and interpretation of 63–65, see Courtney 1996a: 262–263.

²⁶⁹ See Jahn and Kissel on Persius 5.128 and Schröder 1983.

who mistreats you" (cf. 3.262 ff., based on Ter. *Eun.* 46 sqq., and also Cic. l.c. 36). That 'you' is not meant to be factually applied to Horace, but introduces a merely hypothetical situation, which in any case does not involve a married woman. "Cast off your yoke, say 'I am a free man,' but you can't, you are a slave to your passions" (cf. 81) "even while you resist them."

Davus next argues (95) that connoisseurship (*callidus* 101, a word applied to Damasippus in 3.23) of paintings by great masters involves a trance of admiration (*torpes*, cf. *Epist.* 1.6.14), a point made also by Cic. l.c. 37. This over-involvement he regards as a *peccatum*, and consequently addresses Horace as *insane*; Horace himself inculcates imperturbability, ἀθαρμασία, in *Epist.* 1.6. Davus personally admires rough graffiti of gladiatorial combats, such as are found at Pompeii,²⁷⁰ just as Trimalchio (Petron. 29.9) loves paintings of gladiators.²⁷¹ This connoisseurship confers no superiority on Horace. Davus dotes on the ancient equivalent of a hot dog, and this gets him into trouble, but Horace cannot resist expensive (cf. 2.25–26) gourmet foods (this reinforces his rush from his own simple meal to Maecenas's table in 29 ff.), and that causes him trouble too, namely bad health (cf. 2.71 ff.) and impoverishment. Finally, Davus (111) accuses Horace of discontent with himself in that, unlike the *sapiens* (86), he is restless and can find no way to escape himself, with a recall of Lucr. 3.1068 'flee oneself' (a passage referred to on 28; cf. too C. 2.16.19–20). Even the snoozing (cf. Lucr. 3.1066) and leisure that he had vaunted at his country estate at 6.61–62 do not help, and he has been discontent with the writings produced by such snoozing, coupled with wine as here (3.3); worry is a black companion (cf. C. 3.1.40) following him everywhere.

By now (116) Horace's patience is exhausted; he looks for a stone or an arrow (not meant literally) with which to chastise Davus, who has retreated to a distance so that Horace needs a missile and thinks that Horace's demand for arrows must imply that he is either mad or writing verses (which comes to the same thing, 3.321–322!); to throw even stones at slaves is a sign of madness, 3.128–129. The arrows may allude to Eur. *Or.* 268,²⁷² where the mad Orestes wants to shoot them at Electra. But Horace has the last word, "Be off at once, or you will be sent to work in the fields," a dreaded punishment for an urban slave (see my note on Juv. 8.180), which puts the Sabine estate in a

²⁷⁰ See, e.g., Jacobelli 2003: 49–51, 74, 84–85.

²⁷¹ Lejay (1911: 560) refers to a curious remark by Venuleius, *Dig.* 21.1.65 (in a slave) *animi ... uitium est, uelut si tabulas pictas studiose intueatur*.

²⁷² So Diggle (2004: 375 n. 86) suggests.

wholly new light; to its owner it is a secure retreat, an *arx* (6.16), to the staff, for instance the *uilicus* (*Epist.* 1.14), it is more like a prison.

This poem obviously forms a pair with II 3. There Damasippus, following Stertinius, chose examples from men other than Horace (that is, until he comes to his conclusion in 300 sqq.) to establish the fourth Stoic paradox that all non-*sapientes*, such as he himself used to be, are mad; here Horace's slave argues the fifth paradox that only the *sapiens* is free, both the paradox and his authority for it matching his own status, and uses his knowledge of his owner to introduce illustrations proving his point. Since Mulvius (36) may well be an invention, the only other figures employed as examples are Priscus and Volanerius (9–20), and the diffuseness of Damasippus is avoided. The normal situation of the diatribe satires is reversed; Davus (6) starts off his lecture in Horatian vein, Horace (21) is like the interlocutor puzzled to catch the drift (cf. I 2.23). Like Damasippus, Davus has picked up something of the Stoic style, in that he proceeds largely by questions;²⁷³ in 83 he supplies the answer himself, like Damasippus at 3.158. Horace allows him to make a few hits, but delicately reminds us of his servile instincts (at 72–73 he admits his inclination to theft, even if he does not put it into practice), his resemblances to slaves of comedy, including his name and his eavesdropping, and his imperfect grasp of a philosophical technicality (see on 42). Yet at the end Horace is so stung that the only resort left to him is violence, just as with Damasippus finally he can only cringe.

21. *SERM.* 2.8

This poem describes a dinner at which Maecenas, but not Horace, was a guest; it was put on by one Nasidienus, and turns into a fiasco. Nasidienus is a real Roman name,²⁷⁴ though very rare, and clearly belonged to a real person²⁷⁵ because (a) Horace would not have invented a name that causes a problem of prosody, since in 1 it has to be scanned Nasidjenus; (b) he has a cognomen Rufus (58), which the reader knows to apply to him and not to his guest Varius Rufus; (c) satire does not use pseudonyms (see on Canidia 1.8.24). Horace hears about the meal from the comic poet (I 10.42) Fundanius (on the form of dialogue that this implies see my discussion of II as a collection), whom he had wanted to invite to dinner on the previous day, but had been

²⁷³ See Lejay 1911: 545.

²⁷⁴ See above, p. 132 n. 205.

²⁷⁵ See Roos 1959.

informed that Fundanius was enjoying his cocktails with Nasidienus; he had started doing this at a scandalously early hour, which of course had been set by the host, but Horace jokingly accuses Fundanius of dissipation. Horace has known something of Nasidienus, since he ironically (jealously?) calls him *beatus*; *diues* he may have been, but no more *beatus* in the proper sense than Catius and his preceptor (4.92, 95; this poem has a strong relationship with II 4, which will emerge in my discussions of its details and its place in the book). To Horace's enquiry how he had enjoyed himself Fundanius replies ambiguously that he had never had a better time; we may assume that the two are so much in tune that Horace appreciates the ambiguity, or that Fundanius's facial expression indicates it, or that Horace has to wait for a few lines. At any rate, he asks Fundanius to report the first course, and phrases his request to suggest an epic invocation (for the allusion to the beginning of the *Timaeus* claimed by Fraenkel²⁷⁶ is not very striking); he probably begins with *da* (cf. Val. Fl. 5.218) rather than the variant *dic*, "Tell me what food first appeased your angry stomach," which stylistically is above the level of "soothing the barking stomach" of 2.18 and carries hints of epic *ira*, i.e. μῆνις.

Fundanius begins with the *gustatio* (antipasto, hors d'oeuvres), cold boar from Lucania, caught when the south wind was gentle; both of these specifications are gourmet recommendations (for the first cf. 3.234, for the second 31–32 below), as the host does not fail to point out; this sign of his ill-breeding will be repeated (and is one of the many traits that Petronius picked up from this poem for his characterization of Trimalchio). The south wind could blow hard enough to make the boar rancid (2.41), but here it is mild enough to give it just a high flavor. It is surrounded (cf. 4.75) by sharp tasting tidbits, including those which Catius or his preceptor had boasted of discovering (4.73). When the remnants were removed and the maple-wood (hence expensive) table wiped (11; so the *cena* of Granius in Lucil. 568 *purpureo tersitum latas gausape mensas*), then high-quality wine was served;²⁷⁷ again the host, like Trimalchio (48.1) implicitly boasting about his cellar, offers Maecenas (never mind the other guests!) a choice of different vintages, should he prefer; this is a clear hint that Nasidienus is a social climber, to an extent resembling the pest of I 9, seeking to use Maecenas as a step up the ladder. Horace (18) reacts scornfully to this (his *diuitias* seeming to accept one interpretation of *beati* 1, but *miseras* putting it in its proper light), and asks

²⁷⁶ Fraenkel 1957: 137.

²⁷⁷ On the interpretation of 15, see Courtney 1996a: 274.

Fundanius about the other guests at this delightful (as Fundanius had ironically claimed in 3–4) occasion.

So Fundanius lists the diners and describes the seating plan,²⁷⁸ as apparently Lucilius did for a dinner with 751. Starting from the *summus in summo lecto*, Fundanius himself, and going round the three couches from right, as one faces them, to left, the remaining places on the first couch were occupied by two other literary men, Viscus Thurinus²⁷⁹ (one of the Visci of I 10.83, cf. I 9.22) and the poet Varius. On the middle couch were two *umbrae* ('shadows' of a guest brought along by that guest but not named by the host as invitees) of Maecenas, namely Vibidius and Servilius Balatro, and Maecenas himself (after this Horace tactfully says not a word about his reactions). Finally, there were Nomentanus, the host (*ipsum* 23, but probably not 32; 'himself' in what used to be the parlance of Irish servants) and the aptly named Porcius.²⁸⁰ Nomentanus occupies the position normally taken by the host so that he can point out to Maecenas the refinements of the dishes (25–26); his extravagance, often remarked by Horace, has brought him down to being a parasite (cf. *Epist.* 1.18.10–14). With the arrival of the entrees (26) he exercises his function on the company generally; he sends over to Fundanius (29) morsels of fish (*passeris* here means 'flounder') that nobody has tasted (if that is what *ingustata* means²⁸¹) in order to demonstrate their novel flavor.²⁸² He also informs Fundanius of the phase of the moon at which honey apples are at their best (Pliny *NH* 15.59 specifies the best time of the lunar month for picking apples).

By now (33) the two *umbrae* can no longer maintain their politeness. Vibidius says to Balatro "If we don't drink our host bankrupt, we shall die

²⁷⁸ See the diagrams in Gow 1909: 122 and Lejay 1911: 595.

²⁷⁹ Or Taurinus? So Solin in Eck 1993: 7 n. 21.

²⁸⁰ Rudd 1966. 143 remarks names "chosen solely on account of their derivations," but one must allow that the aptness of names could sometimes be due to Providence; my father told me that at one time he worked in the law offices of Messrs. Petty and Fogg. Balatro was clearly attached to Servilius as a cognomen because of his buffoonery (cf. I 2.2), which he puts into action in 64 and 83.

²⁸¹ See Shackleton Bailey 1982: 87.

²⁸² The dash which Shackleton Bailey, in his edition but not in 1982: l.c., puts after *sucum* 28 seems to indicate ambivalence between the views that *ut ... patuit* illustrates *monstraret*, with *nam ... sucum* in parenthesis, or, as I prefer, *celantia*. I do not know why the actual order of the meal is reversed in 27, fowl (86), mollusks, and fish (42). I am glad to restore to L. Mueller the emendation *porrexit is* (30), which I carelessly repeated in Courtney 1996a: 273. The verb exemplifies the usage *qui facit per alium, facit per se* (see my note on *Juv.* 16.13); since Nomentanus could not be seated farther from Fundanius, he must have had a waiter carry the morsels over.

unavenged," *moriemur inulti*, a line-ending found twice in the Aeneid, which can plausibly be traced back to Ennius (cf. also Aesch. *Ag.* 1279); its point here is that drinking will be their revenge for Nasidienus's vulgarity (cf. 93). His request for larger cups, which etiquette would not allow so early,²⁸³ turns the host, contemptuously referred to as *parochus* ('commissary,' cf. I 5.46), pale, either because the *umbrae* are liable to become abusive (cf. I 4.87–89, with *liber* go contrasting with the comparative *liberius* 'too frankly' here), or because (and here his conceit comes into play) the wine will blunt their palates. In a line (39) of heavy spondees and massive words they pour out gargantuan drafts into large cups from Allifae; everyone follows their lead except Nasidienus and his two clients.

The fish course consists of an eel (or lamprey?) surrounded by scampi "swimming" (as if in their natural medium; likewise at Trimalchio's dinner 36.3) in sauce; these are the *conchylia, piscis* of 27, cf. Cic. *In Pis.* 67. On its arrival the host explains that the eel's fine flavor is because it was caught (cf. 7) pregnant but before spawning (this is the proper *aetas* of 4.45). He then lists the ingredients of the sauce, including olive oil from Venafrum (also specified at 4.69, but here with the extra refinement that it is from the first pressing) and Italian wine infused during the boiling, after which he adds the gratuitous information that Greek is preferable after the sauce has been boiled. Finally (51), he boasts of his own innovations in cooking (we recall 4.73–75, also with *primus*). He has improved on the recipe of Catius's predecessor, who had had to add the brine in which salted fish were packed (4.65–66), by adopting the innovation of Curtillus, who used unwashed sea urchins.

Suddenly (54), disaster strikes, evidently before they can taste the fish; the canopy of tapestries falls down, bringing with them a cloud of the dust that they were meant to catch (Varro ap. Serv. *Aen.* 1.697). This is introduced by *interea*, used by Virgil and others to indicate not simultaneous but successive events.²⁸⁴ The company at first fears even worse (i.e., collapse of the actual ceiling), but then "picks itself up" (Muecke's equivalent for *erigimur*) in a double sense. Marchesi (2005) cleverly shows that Horace is recalling to his readers the story that Simonides could remember the placement of all the guests at a dinner party, as here Fundanius can (20 ff.), when the ceiling collapsed (this is the conclusive proof, added to Varro's evidence, that *aulaea* does not refer to wall hangings) and mutilated their

²⁸³ See Fraenkel 1957: 73.

²⁸⁴ So perhaps I 5.31; see *OLD* s.v. c; *ThLL* 2183.52; Heinze 1914: 387–388.

bodies beyond recognition. The host bows his head and weeps as if for the death of a son (actually his real baby is the dinner party, *cenae pater* 7), but Nomentanus seeks to raise him (*tolleret* 60–61) in body and spirit with a brief and trite philosophical reflection on the power of Fortune for good and ill, which entitles him to the ironical adjective *sapiens*. Varius can barely conceal his laughter; he must have been engaged on his *Thyestes* at this time, and we may feel that this comedy has about it something of a *tragicomoedia*, at least in Fundanius's eyes. Balatro sarcastically carries on the philosophical theme. "That's life, and therefore your hard work and worry in laying on a gourmet meal" (taking up 45 ff. by specifying the sauce) "elegantly served up for my entertainment" ("my" is highly ironical, coming from one who was not even an invited guest) "does not gain the respect it deserves. Think, too, of potential disasters like the collapse of tapestries, or a groom tripping up and breaking a dish" (hinting that Nasidienus has pressed livestock slaves into service as waiters; see my note on Juv. 5.52, including a reference to Cic. *In Pis.* l.c. above). "But it takes misfortune to show the caliber of generals and hosts" (a notion taken over from Lucr. 3.55–56, where we have *aduersisque in rebus*). Either Balatro or Fundanius has taken the color of 67–70 from Ter. *Ph.* 337–342, a passage spoken by the parasite Phormio and previously recalled in 2.77. Nasidienus does not see through this irony, but praises Balatro as a courteous guest (*conuiuia*; Balatro has referred to him as *conuiuator* 73). He then leaves the table to show his generalship by supervising that things are put right. The guests, in a strikingly sibilant line (78) might be seen whispering to each other; 'seen,' not heard, a quite common usage²⁸⁵ when seeing and hearing at the same time are involved, but here intended to lead up to the effect indicated in my next sentence.

Horace intervenes to comment (79) that there is no entertainment he would have preferred to see, and enquires of Fundanius what next aroused his laughter; it is as if Fundanius were among the audience watching one of his own comedies. Vibidius asks the waiters whether the fall of the canopies, in addition to everything else (*quoque*), has broken the flagon from which he and Balatro had imbibed (40), and complains that they are not replacing his cups evidently broken in that fall; Nasidienus has clearly instructed them to that effect. Balatro backs him up (perhaps the suggestion of *secundo* 83 is that he is deuteragonist in a comedy, cf. I 9.46) with the kind of malicious fictions condemned in I 4.84 (*ingere*). Nasidienus's return is marked by an

²⁸⁵ See e.g. *FLP* 248, Munro and Bailey on Lucr. 4.598.

epic-style apostrophe (85²⁸⁶) and a historic present, determined by stylish serving to put a better face on the ill fortune (84–85) for which Nomentanus had consoled him (61); cf. Ter. *Ad.* 741 *illud quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas*. So the fowl course (27) now (85) arrives, together with hare's wings (the gourmet's favorite part, cf. 4.44) pulled off from the loins to enhance the flavor (*suavius* 89).²⁸⁷ All this would be very delicious (*suavis*) if the host did not explain (as in 43 ff.) their derivations²⁸⁸ and natures, a matter researched by the preceptor of Catius (4.45).

The guests have had enough; they depart (or “run off,” as Fundanius puts it), having taken their revenge (cf. 34) by tasting nothing, as if Canidia, worse than the snakes of Africa, had blown venom (cf. the accusation in 1.48) over the food. Horace intends this to be read in the light of Epode 3.5–8, where it is suggested that the foul taste of a dish may be due to snake blood or handling by Canidia; so he ends his aggressive Satires by linking them with his aggressive Epodes, as he did with I 8.

22. BOOK II AS A COLLECTION

Whereas it seems futile to seek an overarching compositional scheme in Book I, II shows a very clear pattern. It falls into two halves, with each poem having a counterpart in the other half in an identical sequence. 1 and 5 are consultations with authority figures, though there is no relation in subject matter. 3 and 7 report criticisms of Horace, for his own good, made to his face by Stoic-based but unconvincing interlocutors; in each case, Horace ends up stung by the criticism but unable to provide an effective refutation. The other pairs are a little less close. 2 and 6 concern simple living in the country, and both end with a disquisition in direct speech by an emblematic rustic figure stated to be known personally to the poet (in 2 this figure is also, to an undefined extent, represented as behind the substance of the earlier part of the poem), but 6 is not so confined to the dietary aspect of country life

²⁸⁶ See Endt 1905.

²⁸⁷ The unusual feminine gender (preserved by the lost Blandinian manuscript, like the feminine gender of the hare at 4.44) of the goose that provides the foie gras, and also the equally unusual masculine gender of the crane, together with the specification that the pigeons are served without the rump, normally regarded as the best part, indicate some sort of refinement; hence Nasidienus's explanations.

²⁸⁸ *Causas*. The comic poet Damoxenus in a cookery passage (fr. 2.47 ap. Athen. 3.102f.) speaks of τὰς αἰτίας, there meaning the principles of combining ingredients; here we think more of an aura of didactic poetry.

and emphasizes the contrast with the town, of which Ofellus in 2 has no experience. 4 and 8 present characters inordinately proud of their *recherché* gastronomic knowledge, but 8 puts this in the larger context of ridicule of a crass upstart. So 2 and 6 warn against excess, 4 and 8 demonstrate it.

Two particular features of the book deserve emphasis. First, Horace, apart from his participation in the consultation of Trebatius, hardly uses his own voice outside 6, and is totally absent from 5; directly after his introductory poem he disavows, or pretends to disavow, his personal role in 2.2. The book is dominated by dialogue, in the case of 4 (and also 2) with a Platonic introduction; that is why he takes work by this master of dialogue with him to the country (3.11). In 8 the dialogue assumes the form of an ἀπομνημόνευμα, a report of what took place on one occasion by a participant to one who was not present, also a form employed by Plato (e.g., in the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*). So what there is of diatribe in II is presented indirectly, and, though there is clearly irony in the depiction of the hot-gospeller Stoics of 3 (see on 45) and 7, and no sympathy is betrayed for the theoretical basis of their creed (ironically referred to at 2.79), nevertheless they are allowed in practice to hit some targets, and in fact turn the tables on Horace himself. On the other hand the sometimes doctrinaire endorsement of Epicureanism in I has been almost totally eliminated, despite recalls of Lucretius; on looking back I find that I have adduced Epicurean material, non-technical at that, only twice (on 2.53 and 79sq.).

The other striking feature of II is the prominence given to food; on 4 I have outlined the literary history of this theme. Despite Horace's repeated inculcation of what *tenuis uictus* has to recommend it, Davus, who is not addicted to strict accuracy, is allowed to accuse him of liking *cenae opimae* (7.103). What directed Horace's attention to this particular topic, not prominent in his other works, cannot be known; one tentative but not unproblematic suggestion might be that he is responding to the works of Matius, for whom see on 4. Tacitus (*Ann.* 3.55.1) dates the flourishing of gluttony from the battle of Actium, and perhaps Horace observed its first stirrings, but one cannot say that it was unknown under the Republic. Whatever the answer, it seems to me personally that II 4 did not need to be so long in order to make its point, and my reaction to II 3 is the same.

23. OVERVIEW OF HORACE'S SATIRES

The varied genre of satire does not permit all of Horace's productions to be fitted into one mold, yet the recurrence of some themes marks them as

central to his thought. That core is, to put it briefly and bluntly, centered on the individual and his relations with society, the question how to live contentedly and at peace with oneself in the circumstances of daily life, which is the subject of the introductory poem, but important also in I 6, and still an issue in II 6.13. In the ancient world, one would naturally look to philosophy to supply the answer. One such answer was provided by Epicureanism, which saw human life as overshadowed by fear of the gods and denied the validity of this fear; it followed that morality was based solely on a social contract, as Horace argues in I 3. The Stoics gave a different answer, namely that the world was permeated by a divine, rational breath (see on II 2.79, 3.255) from which objective standards of right and wrong were derived; contentment would come from living in accordance with what is interpreted as reason. Horace in Book I (less prominently in Book II) firmly adheres to the former opinion, which means that he has no objective path to contentment. His solution is practical, not theoretical, and is based on several practical measures.

The first of these is to create a private world, distinct from the mundane world of day-to-day life, and to become a member of a circle of congenial friends; see I 3.139–140 (contrasted with those who hold false values and consequently lack friends 138–139, cf. 1.84–87), 4.135, 6.70. Between the last two references I 5 (see especially 44, 93) is strategically placed. The whole point of this poem is to stress the pleasure given by the company of such friends and to avoid the political questions that actually led to the journey; that is why the account stops at Brundisium, because such questions would have been unavoidable had it continued to Tarentum. Failure to grasp this point has caused some readers to feel disappointed in this poem. I 10 includes an impressive list of Horace's friends, some of them going back to his student days in Athens, and others with experience of communal life such as Epicurus himself practised.

The second measure is to establish one's own canon, consisting of:

- (a) things to seek (*petenda*), particularly a simple lifestyle (I 6 fin., II 2, II 6 fin.) and observance of the Mean, which Horace later memorably christened 'Golden' (I 1.92–107 q.v., 2.24 and 50, II 2.53–69 and 113–114, 3.166–117 and 176–178; also implicit in I 3.1–19). Horace is well aware of the technical role that this concept plays in Aristotle (see *Epist.* 1.18.9), but himself generally applies it in a non-technical way.
- (b) things to avoid (*fugienda*), particularly greed in both its forms, accumulation (the metaphor of 'making one's pile [*aceruus*]' occurs at I 1.44, 51; II 2.105, 5.22) and meanness (*sordes*; I 1.65 and 96; 6.104 and

124, II 2.53–69). Such greed is identified as the main cause of discontent in I 1, q.v. *passim*; cf. I 4.108, with *uiuerem contentus* recalling 1.3.

One can find both (a) and (b) as one conducts one's life in the urban world of I; in II the country provides a private world for Horace and thus comes to the fore for (a).

Certain consequences follow:

- (1) A pattern sometimes emerges in which a refutation of (b), often naming names of those subject to such faults, is followed by an affirmation of (a). Thus I 1 up to 91 is negative, and positive advice involving the mean begins in 92; I 2 follows a similar course with 80 as the turning point. II 2 begins (9–52) with a destructive assault on lavish dining, including attacks on Gallonius (47) and the *praetorius auctor* (50), who was well-known but is not named because it is more pointed to imply that because of his political stature he carried absurd weight in gastro-nomic matters. This is followed by clarification that a simple diet does not imply meanness (53–69, with three named examples), and constructive praise of such simple living (70–111), which Ofellus himself exemplifies (112–136).
- (2) Naming of individuals to illustrate (b) is one way in which Horace links himself to the Lucilian tradition (see the excursus on I 4); not entirely seriously he attributes to his father his inclination to illustrate follies and vices, which have to supply his staple subject matter, by living or notorious examples of them. Since some attention has to be given to attaining the opposite of these follies and vices, what about following the same course in relation to (a)? As noted above, this can be seen with Ofellus, in large part a mask for Horace, and Horace himself and his lifestyle constitute the main positive exemplification, as, e.g., at I 2.119; likewise, in I 6 Horace (100 ff.) is contrasted with Tillius (107) and other ambitious men (129). In I 4, after the examples listed by his father as a warning (109 ff.), Horace himself is the counter instance (129 ff.). A similar structure appears in relation to controversies about writing; thus Horace himself is the writer's model in I 10.72 ff., contrasted with others (17–19, 36–37, 78–80, 90–91). This involves what is often called 'self-revelation,' a pompous term ('self-disclosure' is not much better) that carries an unfortunate aura, as if the procedure were in itself, quite apart from the use to which it is put, a literary and moral virtue; 'self-presentation' and 'Selbstdarstellung' are more impartial. Fraenkel²⁸⁹

²⁸⁹ Fraenkel 1957: 153.

states that “Lucilius and Horace ... produce pictures of their own βίαι not because they want to unburden their soul and clear their mind, but because they consider their day-to-day life with its many facets highly suited to their capacity for neat and suggestive description and to their bent towards sincere, if not always profound, meditation on human affairs.” This, though correct as far as it goes, is inadequate, because, first, it ignores the fact that much of this feature presents a far from impartial defense of Horace’s own career and way of life, and, second, it fails to integrate the feature into any larger design. Whatever may have been the case with Lucilius (of whose self-presentation Horace speaks approvingly in II 1.30–34), Horace, by presenting himself, can effectively put over his moral lessons; ‘the moralist has to have the authority of his own life-style’ remarks Russell²⁹⁰ (of course he has the option to keep himself out of his writings). But Fraenkel’s ‘if not’ clause touches and evades a problem. Lessons of this nature can only be put into practice by those who possess leisure and affluence, such as Horace himself derived from a rich patron. One may well question whether moralizing of the type that we find in many of the Satires, much of it of doubtful applicability outside a small section of society, can match the universal message of the very finest literature, even if it projects an agreeable picture of the author. It looks as if Horace himself recognised that a whiff of perceived self-satisfaction might have aroused aversion in some of his readers of I, and therefore toned down his personal appearances in II (with the exception of 6) by the adoption of the dialogue form and by putting his message in the mouths of other exponents.

²⁹⁰ Russell 1993: 436.

THE BOOK OF *IAMBI**

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Abstract: I give an overview of the chronology and genesis of the book, paying special attention to Horace's adaptation of his Greek models, namely Archilochus. The single poems are analyzed in thematic order.

Keywords: iambus, Archilochus, Callimachus, imitation

1. CHRONOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

1.1. *Chronology*

The book of poems, which Horace himself calls *iambi* (*Epod.* 14.7; *Epist.* 1.19.23), is known today as the book of *Epodes*,¹ a title attached to it by ancient Grammarians and not attested earlier than Porphyry's commentary;² it probably contains some of the earliest poetry of Horace that survives. *Epod.* 7 and 16, at least, were written before Horace was introduced to Maecenas; *Epod.* 16 can hardly be earlier than 38 BC (after Virg. *Ecl.* 4);³ *Epod.* 7, written a little earlier, belongs to late 39–early 38 BC.⁴ *Epod.* 10, which as *Epod.* 16 refers to Virgil's *Eclogues*,⁵ may also be very early.⁶ There are affinities in character between the obscene attacks on libidinous old women in *Epod.* 8 and 12 and *Serm.* 1.2; the latter may be a rather early piece of *Satires* I, as it is already presupposed by *Serm.* 1.4; but this is uncertain and such

* The English translations of quotations from Horace in this and all chapters written by me are taken from Rudd (1973) and Rudd (2005), for Virgil's *Aeneid* from Ahl and Fantham (2007), for Greek lyric poetry from West (1993) or Page (1955), for Epicurus from Bailey (1989).

¹ For the original meaning of the term, see Hephaest. 7, 2 p. 71.1–15 (Consbruch); cf. Kannecht in Nesselrath 1997: 352 f.

² Mankin 1995: 12.

³ See above, p. 24 n. 82.

⁴ Watson 2003: 271.

⁵ See below, pp. 108 f. and above 24 n. 82.

⁶ Fraenkel 1957: 31.

affinities cannot be used as a reliable criterion of date.⁷ *Epod.* 5 is probably later than *Serm.* 1.8,⁸ but again this is by no means certain. Only *Epod.* 1 and 9 can with certainty be dated shortly after Actium.⁹ Thus, as far as it can be documented, the composition of the *Epodes* ranges from at least 38 BC to 30 BC, when the book was probably published, more or less at the same time as *Satires* II. But if we bear in mind the all too obvious difficulties Horace must have encountered in embarking on the entirely new metrical experiment of the *Epodes* it is impossible that a piece like *Epode* 16, which strays far from Archilochian invective *stricto sensu*, was Horace's first attempt at the form; we can be certain that Horace attempted to write in epodic meter—presumably in pure iambics—before 38 BC. Thus, it is quite likely that some of the minor compositions from *Epod.* 1–10, not only *Epod.* 7, were written earlier.

We have little opportunity to trace the development of Horace's early poetry. But it emerges that during the first ten years or so for which his activity as a poet can be documented, he published two books of hexametrical poetry (in a Roman genre) of ten or eight long pieces, both books of well over one thousand lines (1028 and 1083); in parallel, Horace began to try his hand at new meters and models from archaic Greek poetry. It is clear that this new experiment required much harder work before it produced results that were satisfactory to the poet; the book of *Epodes* contains only seventeen pieces of together 625ll., all but four (*Epod.* 2, 5, 16, and 17) rather short; one of the longest, *Epod.* 17, is composed not in epodic meter but in stichic iambic trimeter.¹⁰ Even though Horace uses six different epodic meters, he does not exhaust the variety of metrical forms of his professed model Archilochus, and ten poems are written in pure iambics. Five pieces are in iambodactylic meter;¹¹ only one pattern is used twice (*Epod.* 14 and 15), and *Epod.* 12 is dactylic. Both the small number of poems and the restriction to a few metrical patterns, with marked preference for the most simple one, surely attest to the difficulties Horace had when he first embarked on his experiment.

⁷ It is a more likely guess that *Serm.* 1.7 is early (see above, p. 24 n. 82) because it recounts an episode of Brutus's Asian campaign and perhaps also because it is by far the shortest (only 35ll.), but this is far from certain.

⁸ Fraenkel 1957: 62.

⁹ See below, pp. 191 ff.

¹⁰ Cf. Mankin 1995: 22.

¹¹ If the pattern of *Epod.* 16 (hexameter + iambic dimeter) is not attested in Archilochus, this is probably chance, see Watson 2003: 44 f., but Cavarzere (1992: 27) may well be right to assign Arch. fr. 125 West to this meter.

Fraenkel, while noting the big difference in character between *Epod.* 11–15 (already looking ahead to the *Carmina*) and *Epod.* 1–10,¹² drew attention to the considerable time-lapse between *Epod.* 7/16 and 1/9. He also saw that *Epod.* 14 may allude to difficulties in completing the book of *Iambi*;¹³ one suspects that ll. 5–8 reflect the fact that it was Maecenas who pressed a perhaps rather reluctant and/or unsatisfied Horace to publish at least some of his iambic poetry. One reason why Horace was attracted by Archilochus was, of course, the affinity of iambic invective to the *Satires*, as the genre was conceived by him, but soon other Greek models may have seemed more attractive to the poet, who quite obviously was interested in exploring the limits of the genre and broadening its range. Soon after *Epod.* 9 Horace wrote another victory poem, on the capture of Alexandria, C. 1.37,¹⁴ that can hardly have been his first attempt at Aeolic meter, and there is every reason to date some poems that he included later in the first collection of *Odes* earlier than 30 BC.¹⁵ For Horace, Archilochus mainly was a rung on the ladder to lyric poetry;¹⁶ as soon as he mastered the metrical forms of archaic Greek poetry well enough, Archilochean poetry *stricto sensu* became too narrow for him. He continued to use epodic forms in the *Odes*, yet all but one do not repeat those already used in his *Iambi*.

1.2. Book Structure

In any case, the book of *Epodes* contains the small collection of poems Horace wrote in the meters of Greek iambus during the early years in Rome and that in 30 BC he still deemed worthy of publication. To some extent this may also be one of the reasons for the book's structure¹⁷ and its odd number of poems (17). The poems are arranged according to meter. First, there is a cycle of ten *epodes* in iambs; the remaining six *epodes* are arranged in the following sequence: one iambodactylic poem (*Epod.* 11), one dactylic (*Epod.* 12), four dactylo-iambic poems (*Epod.* 13–16; *Epod.* 14/15 identical).

¹² Fraenkel 1957: 69 ff.

¹³ *Epod.* 11 opens the second part of the book, see below, pp. 200 ff.

¹⁴ See below, pp. 211, 242 f., 360.

¹⁵ Whether one agrees with the early dates proposed for some of the *Odes* (see below, pp. 211 ff.; e.g., C. 1.14, whatever its date, surely was written before Actium) or not, C. 1.37 cannot be Horace's first attempt at Aeolic meter.

¹⁶ Becker 1963: 240 ff.; see below, pp. 191 ff.

¹⁷ The survey in Watson (2003: 20 ff.) collects everything that is of importance from previous research.

At the end, Horace appended *Epod.* 17 in stichic iambs.¹⁸ Arrangement by meter was the Hellenistic method of compiling books of ancient poetry.¹⁹ It has been noted since the publication of the *Diegeseis*, the 'summaries' of Callimachus's works, in 1934, that they contain no indication that the four so-called 'lyric' poems (fr. 226–229 Pfeiffer) that follow the thirteen *iambi* were part of another book.²⁰ Although the thirteen *iambi* constitute a corpus of their own, marked by the closural character of *Iambus* 13,²¹ it is likely that Horace knew a book of seventeen poems by Callimachus, in his *iambi*, with an appendix of four poems of different character and metrical form.²² This must have appeared to Horace to be a suitable model of arranging his dispersed poems into a book. In doing so, Horace did his best to organize a rather incoherent corpus, for which he selected from the sketches composed over the years those poems that still met with his approval in 30 BC; he enriched the corpus by others, including two new poems celebrating a recent major event (*Epod.* 1 and 9).²³

Apart from the two pieces on Actium, the topics of the other poems range from politics to love; some predominant interests are detectable and one can detect strong thematic affinities between poems that allow all but *Epod.* 13 to be arranged in thematically corresponding pairs.²⁴ Quite obviously these pairs (1/9; 3/14; 4/6; 5/17; 6/15; 7/16; 8/12; overlapping parallels can also be observed between 1/10; 2/16; 3/15 and 3/5²⁵) do not stand together but are split apart; thus thematic framing contrasts with metrical uniformity. Only in pure iambic meter Horace did compose a 'perfect' cycle of ten poems that conforms to the normal conventions of Augustan poetry books,²⁶ not only in its decimal number of poems:²⁷ *Epod.* 1 and 10, linked by their common affinity to a propemptikon, frame the section and one even may detect a

¹⁸ The last word, *exitus*, puns on the end of Canidia's speech as well as on the end of the book (Watson 2003: 584); *Epod.* 14.5–8 may also be regarded as a marker that we are nearing the end of the book; cf. *Serm.* 1.10.92. Similarly, Prop. 4.2.57 looks ahead to the poem's end.

¹⁹ E.g., the edition of Sappho, see Page 1955: 112 ff.; not so for Alcaeus (see Pardini 1991, Lyne 2007: 293 ff.), Simonides, or Pindar (see Kerkhecker 1999: 288).

²⁰ See Kerkhecker 1999: 271–282.

²¹ Clayman 1976.

²² Clayman 1980: 7; Watson (2003), who, with caution, agrees (p. 16), duly takes note of the different character of *iambi* 14–17 (p. 17).

²³ These compositions also show Horace most obviously at the height of his powers; see below, pp. 191 ff.

²⁴ Porter 1995: 129; Watson 2003: 20 f.

²⁵ See Fraenkel 1957: 69.

²⁶ See below, pp. 213 ff.

²⁷ Skutsch 1963: 238 f.

division in the middle, given the quasi-programmatic character of *Epod.* 6.²⁸ Of course, *Epod.* 11 reflecting on the relationship between love and writing verse is a fitting introduction to the second part, which is dominated by love poetry.²⁹ Certainly there are elements of pseudo-dramatic arrangement in the sequence of poems:³⁰ *Epod.* 9, which itself displays the pseudodramatic structure of the 'running commentary',³¹ refers to the same event as *Epod.* 1, but from a later stage. An analogous relation can be observed between *Epod.* 14 and 11. When David Porter notes that the sequence of the poems creates a diminuendo from the upbeat to a somber mood from *Epod.* 1 to 7 and again from 9 to 16, he describes the impression conveyed by reading the poems consecutively. That Horace used this device intentionally is beyond proof; Heyworth's³² description of the book's internal generic and personal dynamics is simply the inevitable result of the fact that it mirrors both Horace's first and continuing attempts at various poetic forms and a time of personal instability and change. We can, however, be reasonably certain that Horace, in placing the poems in sequence, paid some attention to so-called 'associative bridging',³³ a technique that has its origins, it appears, in the arrangement of garlands.³⁴ The book of *Epodes* is, in view of the conditions of its composition—and like the first collection of *Carmina*³⁵—something like a garland, but Horace arranged it so that a carefully organized book emerged.

2. THE EPODES AND THEIR LITERARY CONTEXT

2.1. *Horace, Archilochus, and Callimachus:* *The Code of Horatian Imitatio*

2.1.1. *Epist.* 1.19

In the passage at the end of his first book of *Epistles* (1.19.19–34), quoted above, Horace defends his lyric poetry, both that of the *Epodes* and of the *Carmina*, against his detractors. The textually difficult passage constitutes an invaluable piece of explicit self-interpretation by the poet that complements the apologetic passages in the *Satires*. In *Epist.* 1.19 Horace says that

²⁸ See below, pp. 185 ff.; for bipartite structures in Augustan poetry books, see below, pp. 213 ff.

²⁹ See below, pp. 200 ff.

³⁰ Cf. below, p. 220.

³¹ See below, p. 199 n. 148, Nisbet 1995: 179.

³² Heyworth 1993: 91.

³³ Watson 2003: 23 ff.

³⁴ Gutzwiller 1998: *passim*.

³⁵ See below, pp. 213 ff.

the *Epodes* have Archilochus as their model (in *Epod.* 6.13 f. he alludes to Archilochus and Hipponax³⁶ without mentioning their names), as the *Odes* have Alcaeus and Sappho. Moreover, he goes to some lengths to explain what imitating a Greek model means for him.

As a consequence of the poet's own statement one is bound to identify archaic Greek iambus as the primary source of the *Epodes* as Lesbian lyrics are the source of the *Carmina*. Yet, since Reitzenstein³⁷ and Pasquali³⁸ have amply documented Horace's debt to Hellenistic poetry, scholarship has become increasingly aware of the profound influence of Hellenistic poetry, Callimachean aesthetics,³⁹ and Neoteric poetry on Horace as well. Modern scholarship has made tremendous progress in exploring the pervasive influence of Alexandrian poetry and poetics on Augustan poetry in general, as well as in investigating the way in which Augustan poetry is rooted in the stylistic achievements and the aesthetical creed of Neoteric poetry; Horace's poetry, of course, cannot be seen in isolation from this general context. There can be no doubt that Horace, both in the *Epodes* and in the *Odes*, owes a great debt to Catullus, the Neoterics,⁴⁰ and their Alexandrian predecessors.

The attention, however, the Neoteric and Callimachean influence has received in recent research has created a somewhat messy picture of the relations between Horace, Callimachus, the Neoterics, and their Greek models—Archilochus, Hipponax, Sappho, and Alcaeus—and of how Horace's imitation of his professed models and his implicit adaptation of Hellenistic motifs and techniques relate to each other;⁴¹ I must thus go to some lengths just to revive old truisms. Today's confusion is caused by the fact

³⁶ See below, pp. 185 ff.

³⁷ Reitzenstein 1963: 1 ff.

³⁸ Pasquali 1920/1964.

³⁹ Wimmel's groundbreaking book (1960) is fundamental—despite its slightly awkward style and presentation of the material.

⁴⁰ Tarrant in Harrison 2005: 70 ff.; for the *Epodes* already Leo 1960: ii 145; recently, Watson (2004: 17 f.) has drawn proper attention to the importance of Catullus for the *Epodes* and has done a lot to define Catullus's lasting influence on the *Epodes* in his highly perceptive interpretation of single poems; but see below, pp. 176 ff.

⁴¹ The best recent account is Barchiesi in Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 141 ff.; I shall constantly refer to his extremely perceptive and subtle treatment, which I strongly recommend for further reading. I do not know, however, why he then states: "This is not to say that Horace's literary criticism is a transparent window into his writing practice" (p. 149)—in my opinion it is—and then speaks of a "deconstructive inflexion." Horace, in writing poetry on poetry, does not employ the style of a manual; his expressions are dense and complex, but what he says is entirely clear to the perceptive reader.

that in concentrating on an analysis of the confluence of various strands of tradition one has sometimes lost sight of the poet's explicitly programmatic statements, in particular by engaging in overly subtle metapoetical readings of the text. It is naive to describe the character of Horace's poetry simply according to a count of parallels and hypothetical inferences (one no longer speaks of intentions) and then put an accent on the one or the other side according to a kind of statistics underpinned by mere hypotheses, when we have the statement of the poet himself on how he views his handling of literary tradition as a creative imitator. The fallacy of this procedure becomes plain when gross overstatements of the significance of Horace's reliance on Alexandrian poetical technique and his use of Hellenistic models lead, in consequence, to statements like that of Gagliardi cited by Watson,⁴² statements that practically annihilate the difference between Horace's poetical physiognomy and that of a Neoteric poet. To attach to the Horace of the *Epodes*, and even the Virgil of the *Eclogues*, the label 'Neoteric' is a gross misuse of language; it bluntly contradicts Horace's explicit statement in *Serm.* 1.10.1–19, where, at first sight, he appears to be closer to Cicero than to the *cantores Euphorionis*.⁴³

When we are lucky to possess an explicit and detailed description, by Horace himself, as in *Epist.* 1.19, it is wise to try to understand first what precisely the poet himself says about his method and then look at the traces of this method in the work. In any analysis of the influence of various strands of the literary tradition on the *Epodes* early Greek iambus must take first place not for reasons of chronology, but because Horace cites Archilochus, not Callimachus (nor, for that matter, Catullus), as his model; implicit references can only be understood correctly in the context of Horace's declared poetic aims.⁴⁴ Thus, I start with an excursus on how precisely Horace himself describes his relation with Archilochus and on what this means in the context of Augustan poetics in general. Only then can I proceed to explain the relation between the Archilochean and the Callimachean element of the *Epodes*.

⁴² "Without fear of exaggerating, one can say that Neotericism is the key to reading the *Epodes*," Gagliardi 1971: 61 as cited by Watson 2003: 17.

⁴³ Thomas in Harrison 2005: 50. Tilg 2006 is utterly unconvincing.

⁴⁴ When Watson (2003: 6) says: "In having been established that Horace acknowledged a key debt to both archaic and Hellenistic verse, we must now consider the nature of that indebtedness. Chronology suggests discussion of early iambus first," he betrays the root of the fallacies of recent research.

Though Horace owes a fundamental debt to Hellenistic poetry and Callimachean poetical ideals⁴⁵ he never speaks of the latter or of any other Hellenistic poet as his Greek model, but recurs to Archilochus in his *Iambi* and to Sappho and Alcaeus in the *Odes*: this very silence vis-à-vis explicit reference is already an indication, 1) that Horace's relation to Hellenistic poetry is different from that to his declared models, and 2) that his relation to Greek literature is different from that of the Neoterics of Catullus's generation. Turning their backs on the preceding Latin poetic tradition, the Neoteric poets wholeheartedly embraced the Callimachean 'Kunstideal' and in his wake rejected the grand form and solemn style in search for polish and diligent craftsmanship displayed in minor forms and genres. Determined by this aesthetic creed, they turned to Greek poetry, including older Greek poetry. When Catullus imitated Sappho or Archilochus he regarded them as exponents of a genre and style in tune with Callimachean poetics and viewed them with Callimachean eyes; his Archilochus is the Archilochus who was the model for Callimachus's iambic poetry. This attitude of opposition to the Latin tradition via a Callimachean aesthetic creed provoked the controversy with the advocates of archaic Latin poetry that resulted in Cicero's deprecatory description of them as νεώτεροι.

In contrast, for Horace, as for Virgil, the Alexandrian refinement that the Neoterics brought to Roman poetry was already a matter of course. It was the basis on which they could build their style and formal design, and, of course, they were highly conscious of the Callimachean ideal of polish and hard-earned craftsmanship that inspired the grace and elegance Roman poetry had won with the Neoteric input. Yet, Horace did not, as he points out in *Serm.* 1.10.1–19, share the general disrespect for archaic Latin poetry that the successors of Catullus's and Calvus's generation perpetuated, nor did he share, as his practice and his explicit statements in the second book of *Epistles* and in the *Ars*⁴⁶ show, the outright rejection of grand style and manner, not even of epos or Pindaric praise. On the contrary, with a poem like *Epod.* 16 Horace aspired from the very start of his career to a poetic voice that would enable him to treat more serious topics than the *nugae*, the 'trifles,' of Neoteric poetry.⁴⁷ He appears to have found his Greek model

⁴⁵ See Syndikus 2001: I 8f.; cf. also Thomas in Harrison 2005: 50ff.; Barchiesi provides a highly perceptive re-appreciation of the whole literary context of the *Epodes* in Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 141–164.

⁴⁶ Syndikus 2001: I 8 with n. 33; 10f.

⁴⁷ For the aesthetics of Augustan poetry as differing from that of the Neoterics, cf. Fraenkel 1964: 209ff.; in relation to Greece, *ibid.* 591ff.; also Klingner 1961: 340ff., 353ff. The particular

for a style of poetry that was congenial to him in archaic Greek lyric, first in Archilochus and later in Alcaeus.

The external circumstances in which the aesthetics of Augustan poetry, with its aspiration to monumentality without renouncing Callimachean polish, could flourish has been described perhaps most clearly in Fraenkel's essay "Il carattere della poesia augustea,"⁴⁸ and I shall not repeat what he said. It should suffice to note that Horace's poetry developed in analogy to that of Virgil, who already in *Ecl.* 4.1ff. makes explicitly clear his aspiration to grander poetry, and states this desire even more emphatically in the preface to the third book of the *Georgics* (3.8ff.), where he had already adopted the grand form of didactic epos, and thus arranges his poetry in ascending order.⁴⁹ For both Horace and Virgil, the return to archaic Greek poetry meant adopting a style of poetry that would transcend the limits of Neoteric manner, a style that would allow them to integrate new themes and concerns that had been eschewed by the Neoterics into their poetry, without foregoing the stylistic achievements of the Neoteric experience. On the contrary, the style of both poets marks a definite refinement and enrichment of the linguistic achievements of the previous generation, yet it went in a certain 'classicistic' direction,⁵⁰ a direction that also separated the Augustans from their Neoteric past.⁵¹ This new poetic vision entailed a new look at Greek poetry. When the Neoterics turned to Alexandrian poetry they modeled themselves on a poetry that was very conscious of its place in a long literary tradition and that had embraced its literary heritage by integrating it in a highly selective and reflected manner. Of course, even Neoteric poetry via its Hellenistic model could not remain untouched by ancient Greek poetry, and, as Catullus's two poems in Sapphic meter show,

character of Augustan poetry, that of Virgil and Horace in particular, between Callimachean aesthetics and a new poetical ethos is described most perceptively with regard to the *Odes* by Syndikus 2001: I 1ff. ("... er war ein Mensch, der durch die Schule raffiniertester Techniken und höchster Reflexion hindurchgegangen war. Die einfache Linie ist bei ihm nicht mehr naive Frühe, sondern spät gefundene, mit Bedacht gewählte Schönheit"). Mutatis mutandis, Syndikus's description of the relationship between Horace's *Carmina* and their literary background is also true for the *Epodes*. My own remarks, in what follows, are nothing but an application of Syndikus to Horace's iambic poetry.

⁴⁸ See the preceding note.

⁴⁹ Acknowledged by Prop. 2.34.62ff.

⁵⁰ Syndikus 2001: I 12 f.; for the parallel development of the figurative arts cf. Simon 1986: 52ff.; Zanker 1997: 85ff., 248ff.

⁵¹ As regards the stylistic achievement of the Augustan poets one should not forget that Cicero's poetry is much more important for the mastery of epic meter and poetic style than is commonly acknowledged.

the Neoterics randomly confronted themselves directly with the adaptation of archaic Greek lyrics. Yet, they viewed archaic Greek lyrics as Callimachean poetry. Catullus adopted a large variety of Hellenistic metrical forms, but direct imitation of the meter of Lesbian lyric remained a random feature until Horace's time, so that he could rightly claim that he was the first to transfer the meters of both Archilochean iambus and Lesbian poetry to Rome.

Horace, in his *Epodes* and later in the *Odes*, and Virgil, in the *Georgics*, turned their attention to archaic Greek models and viewed them in contrast to Hellenistic poetry. The latter had already been made at home in Latin literature by the Neoterics; creative progress only seemed possible by referencing older models in their difference to Callimachean and Neoteric limitations. Therefore, in his programmatic statements, Horace emphasizes the archaic Greek models.⁵² Toward these, the archaic Greek models, these poets turned their attention; their debt to Hellenistic and Neoteric poetry was a matter of course, and neither needed to be cultivated as carefully as the fresh adaptation of a new model would nor did they feel the need to make it explicit. Thus Horace in *Epist.* 1.19 talks only of Archilochus and Sappho and Alcaeus.

Let us now look in more detail at what Horace says about his relationship with these models: what they stand for, how they are present in his poetry, and how he thinks he should handle them? The interpretation of Horace's statement in *Epist.* 1.19 remains much disputed. Yet, regardless of a contestable interpretation of the text, in defending his poetical achievement in the *Odes* and *Epodes* Horace provides a code for the right manner of imitation, and recurs to Sappho and Alcaeus, his models in the *Odes*, who, he claims, had adapted Archilochus in a manner parallel to that of Horace himself.⁵³ In ll. 24 f., Horace claims that he took over Archilochus's meter and the spirit (*numeri* and *animus*), but not his subject matter (*res*). Ll. 27 f. show that Horace meant that Sappho's and Alcaeus's treatment of Archilochus is equal to his. This is, of course, a justification of his procedure since it shows that he is not a slavish imitator but, as Sappho and Alcaeus, a creative poet; it is obvious that in ll. 29–31 he ascribes to Alcaeus the same change in subject matter that he claimed for himself in l. 25, only that now he adds the

⁵² That epic poetry was regarded as something that would surpass the capacities of a Callimachean poet is made particularly clear by Prop. 2.10.

⁵³ See also below, pp. 179 ff.; for further literary analogies in *Epist.* 1.19 see Barchiesi in Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 150.

licence to change *ordo*, i.e., the *dispositio*, the arrangement of the material.⁵⁴ If Alcaeus's procedure is parallel to Horace's this licence applies in retrospect to Horace as well.

In the passage about Sappho and Alcaeus Horace adds new facets to the process of creative imitation that complement his statement about himself in ll. 23–25. The problem rests with the construction and meaning of 28f.: *temperat Archilochi musam pede mascula Sappho*. Fraenkel,⁵⁵ in his long and careful treatment of the passage, has argued for constructing the genitive *Archilochi* with *musam* and taking *temperat* in the sense of 'moderate, render less violent.' His interpretation has been contested by Nisbet and Hubbard⁵⁶ and by Mayer.⁵⁷ I had initially been convinced by Nisbet and Hubbard myself, but pondering the whole question I am now prepared to opt decidedly for Fraenkel's view. To take *Archilochi* against the word order with *pede* renders the text, with its already complex meaning, completely obscure,⁵⁸ even more so because, when Sappho and Alcaeus, in 29f., correspond to Horace, i.e., *ego* in ll. 23–27, *musam* corresponds to *numeros animosque* and *modos et carminis artem* and should thus naturally refer to Archilochus's art, not to that of Sappho and Alcaeus. If one insists that a strict analogy between Horace and Sappho should exclude any alteration of Archilochus's meter on her behalf because Horace claims he adhered to it, one has to assume that Horace saw no fundamental difference between Archilochean and Lesbian meter. However, this by no means corresponds to Horace's actual practice. In the *Epodes* he restricts himself to metrical forms that can be documented from early Greek iambus; in the *Odes* he uses the meters of Lesbian poetry. Where he uses epodic forms they overlap with that of the *Epodes* only once. Horace's adherence to Meineke's law in the *Odes* shows beyond any doubt that he regarded the stanza form as an essential genus marker and that he drew a clear line between iambic poetry and Lesbian lyrics.⁵⁹ The

⁵⁴ Heinze 1972: 248f. Moreover, if anything, sense of proportion, care for the *σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων* is the key element of Horace's classicistic style; Günther 2010a: 178; also Syndikus 2001: I 18 ff. and below, pp. 199, 316f.

⁵⁵ Fraenkel 1957: 341ff.; see also Syndikus 2001: I 2.

⁵⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 390.

⁵⁷ Mayer 1994: 264f.

⁵⁸ It is not good method to argue from an example like *C.* 35.6, where *ruris* may be superfluously awkward, but is perfectly easy with *colonus*, in regard to the complex case in *Epist.* 1.19.

⁵⁹ Page argued this point forcefully in the discussion following Wistrand's (1964) contribution in the Fondation Hardt volume (pp. 282f.); Wistrand drew proper attention to points of contact or rather to the overlap between Archilochean and lyric poetry, but grossly

consistent adherence to and perceptive imitation of the metrical practice of his Greek model, which he claims for himself in ll. 24 and 27, is a hallmark of his procedure. If Horace nevertheless puts himself in a line with Sappho and Alcaeus as imitators of Archilochus he must accept a slight difference in respect to meter. Why then should we credit him with a statement on meter that is patently false and contradicts his own practice?⁶⁰ Moreover, it speaks in favor of Fraenkel's view that, if we take *temperare* in the 'weak' sense of 'organize,' the emphatic anaphora at the beginning of ll. 28f. is pointless. But surely there must be a point in *temperare*, and this can only be the difference between Horace's process and that of Sappho and Alcaeus. Horace should mention explicitly in this context that imitation may curb excesses in aggressive character—there is a hint at that in l. 25; that is exactly what we expect in view of Horace's self-defence in *Serm.* 1.4 and 2.1, where he emphasizes that, despite their basically polemical character, his *Satires* are not harmful but a socially acceptable kind of teasing.

We have already seen that when, in ll. 29–31, Horace emphatically repeats the statement of l. 25 he slightly varies his expression by adding the new element of *ordo*, and that this applies also to his own *imitatio*. I think the meaning of the whole 26ff.⁶¹ becomes clear by the following paraphrase, which slightly expands on Horace's highly condensed style: "and lest you should crown me with a scantier wreath because I feared to change the tune and the form of verse (know, it was not out of the fear of a slavish imitator that I adhered literally to Archilochus's meters:), Sappho, by her rhythm (which entailed slight metrical modification), moderated the Muse of Archilochus, and so did Alcaeus. But rather by differing in themes and arrangement (not just by making these little changes in metrical form)"⁶²

overstated it by overlooking the differences. The interpretation advocated below keeps what is correct in Wistrand's interpretation, eliminating the errors pointed out by Page's criticism.

⁶⁰ "Mere arm-chair theorists might class Archilochus and the Lesbians together in a loose and general way as lyrical poets, but nobody knew better than Horace that the meters of Lesbian poetry owe practically nothing to Archilochus, and that it is wholly the former (i.e. Alcaeus), in no sense the latter, whom Horace is imitating in his stanza lyrics," Page loc. cit.; the same is true for Horace and Callimachus. That an interpretation, which takes *Archilochi* with *pede*, runs into extreme difficulties is shown by Heinze's (1972: 244 ff.) tour de force.

⁶¹ One should print a period, rather than a comma, after *Alcaeus*.

⁶² "I can only suggest that the contrast implied by *sed* lies in the alleged slightness of the change made in the metre with the much greater change made *rebus et ordine*," Page on Wistrand 1964: 284. This interpretation corresponds to the metrical derivation theory Horace knew (Heinze 1972: 205 ff.), outright identification of Aeolic and Archilochean verses does not.

he did not tell the same aggressive stories as Archilochus (and thus had a decisive impact in remodelling Archilochus's poetry)." Horace thus accents themes and arrangement; they make the real difference, they mark creative imitation, much more than small and permissible changes in the metrical form. Hence, his strict adherence to Archilochean meter is not a sign of slavish dependence on the model, which must exclude creative impact.

In stressing his strict adherence to Archilochus's meter, Horace has a point. When he says that Sappho and Alcaeus moderated the Archilochean 'fighting' spirit⁶³ by tampering with Archilochus's meter, he shows sensitivity for the relationship between metrical form and poetic tone. Later, in *Ars* 79 ff. and 251 ff., he explicitly ascribes a particular character to the iambic (and spondaic) foot and relates iambic meter to Archilochean invective.⁶⁴ Thus, Horace's close adherence marks a particular closeness to Archilochus's spirit. That in the *Odes* there is an analogy between metrical form and tone is a triviality: stichic—epodic—strophic meter corresponds to an ascending line of tone. But Horace also displays his sensitivity for the relationship 'meter—tone' in the *Epodes*: the division of his book according to meter between pure iambs (1–10) and dactylo-iambs or dactyls in 11–15 is accompanied by a marked change in poetic tone, as we shall see below:⁶⁵ except for *Epod.* 12 forceful invective is concentrated in the first half, which restricts itself to iambs that, according to the passages from the *Ars Poetica*, represent invective best. Moreover, the fact that Horace, in the mimiambic representation of dramatic dialogue in *Epod.* 17, which is even more distinctly separated from the rest of the corpus, writes in stichic iambs respecting Porson's law (not observed in epodic iambs⁶⁶ and absent from Republican drama)—whereas he nonetheless keeps to the norm of Bentley and Luchs⁶⁷—shows that Horace's sensitivity for the specific tone of different metrical forms is based on close observation of the metrical practice of his Greek originals. Since the discovery of the Cologne Papyrus we know that Horace closely adhered to archaic and not to Hellenistic practice

⁶³ It is impossible to catch all connotations of *animus* in a translation, it means here *audacia*, *fortitudo*, and *mores*.

⁶⁴ Cf. Barchiesi in Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 144 ff. In *AP* 251 ff. Horace stressed the need to study closely the meter of the Greek originals.

⁶⁵ See pp. 200 ff.

⁶⁶ Mankin 1995: 19, who does not note that *Epod.* 17 is an exception; thus it is probably due to chance that Archilochus seems not to respect Porson's law in the epodic fragments we have.

⁶⁷ See Questa 2007: 371 ff.

in employing asynartete verse:⁶⁸ “in claiming to have written ‘numeros ... secutus | Archilochi,’ he meant precisely what he said.”⁶⁹ By adhering to metrical forms that Archilochus used (if absence of the meter of *Epod.* 16 in Archilochus’s fragments is exclusively accidental), Horace distinguishes himself from Callimachus, who models himself in relation to and contrast with Hipponax. Callimachus, of course, used stichic choliambics—a meter that Hipponax was credited with inventing—in six of his thirteen *iambi*. At the same time, he uses epodic forms (attested for Hipponax as well) and probably even invented new ones,⁷⁰ anticipating Catullus’s complete metrical indifference.⁷¹ In view of what I shall say below⁷² Horace’s metrical fidelity to his model is an implicitly anti-Callimachean statement.

In any case, Horace saw no need to conceal the difference between him and Sappho and Alcaeus as imitators of Archilochus; Horace transfers Archilochean verse to Latin. If he compares his *imitatio* to the adaptation of a model in the Greek poetic tradition this comparison can be only a close analogy. In his comparison of his adaptation of a Greek model with what he defines as creative imitation in Greek literature he emphasizes that originality in adapting a Greek model into Latin verse lies in changes of subject matter and arrangement, whereas adherence to the model should be a strict formal imitation. This imitation also entails adherence to the basic character of the model, the *animi* or the character, because character and form are linked by the request for *decorum*. Yet, there is a margin in which modification can occur: the differences in meter between Archilochus and the Lesbian poets retain a similar, but not identical character. The same is true in regard to subject matter, as long as it reflects the general spirit of the genre; and it is in this respect and above all in respect to *ordo*, ‘arrangement,’ that the Latin imitator has to show his proper individuality.

Elaine Fantham,⁷³ in her essay on the *Epistles* below, points out that it is remarkable that Horace does not simply reiterate the old theme of priority as we find it in Ennius, Lucretius, and the *Georgics*.⁷⁴ He claims credit for

⁶⁸ Similarly in the *Odes*; for the meters of the *Odes* and that of their Greek models, see below, pp. 221 ff.

⁶⁹ Watson 2003: 361 (with bibliography in n. 13); see also pp. 43 f.

⁷⁰ See Kerkhecker 1999: 123, 214. For Callimachus’s metrical practice, see Bühler 1964: 228 f.

⁷¹ See Heyworth in Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 117 ff.; for the difference between Catullus’s and Horace’s handling of the Sapphic stanza, cf. Syndikus 2001: I 17.

⁷² See pp. 185 ff.

⁷³ See below pp. 413 f.

⁷⁴ See Häussler 1976: 303 f.

his creative adaptation of his model and he vindicates this adaptation by showing that there is a parallel in the poetic tradition before him.⁷⁵ In his description of his procedure and of that of Sappho and Alcaeus he is remarkably precise and acutely conscious of his place in the poetic tradition; at the same time he betrays the general vision of literary history and the aesthetic concepts that inform this consciousness.

In contrast to Aristotle's teleological interpretation of literary history as a process of potentially progressive perfection Alexandrian poetics attests a different, and as such new, aesthetic approach. I have elsewhere⁷⁶ compared the situation in which the Alexandrian poets found themselves to that of composers of the generation after Beethoven. Beethoven's music was felt to be such an overwhelmingly comprehensive model—a model that already had expressed everything that could be expressed in the traditional musical genres—that the composers of the generation of Mendelssohn and Schumann, in particular, found it difficult to express themselves in the forms mastered by Beethoven, and thus the new form of the small romantic 'Klavierstück' was born. Similarly, ancient Greek literature, that of Homer in particular, was viewed as something that in its greatness and perfection was unrepeatable and, as such, a burden to the creative mind, who, traditionally, would see himself in an unbroken tradition of creative reproduction. Creativity seemed impossible within the limits of imitation of the hitherto common manner, which had entailed a kind of linear continuity; one felt the need for generating a new form that was not simply cut off from the past but that, in its emphasis on selection and hybridization, put the accent on discontinuous adaptation instead of continuity. This acute awareness of the need for novelty—a value as such unprecedented—entailed, at the same time, a different appreciation of the old: a particular awareness of the older in its archaic remoteness and uniqueness, and an appreciation of the archaic as something that had its particular attraction in its being remote and somehow mysterious and peculiar. Hence, a new sense and taste for the specific, the particular, and, indeed, the grotesque and bizarre developed. As a contrast to the teleological view of Aristotle, which stressed continuity, the Alexandrian turn can be seen in a certain analogy to Schopenhauer's aesthetics that springs from his rejection of Hegel's teleology and the

⁷⁵ In this respect he is also different from Callimachus. Of course, the prologue of the *Aitia*, the claim to choose an 'untrodden path,' is behind all programmatic statements of Augustan poets, that is a triviality; yet Callimachus emphasizes discontinuity, Horace continuity.

⁷⁶ Günther 2002: 37f.

aesthetics the latter entails. Schopenhauer's defense of the perfection of every work of art in its very individuality, its unrepeatable uniqueness as the very essence of art, is the radical consequence of the Alexandrian experience. With slight overstatement one could define Schopenhauer's romantic ideal of the integral perfection of individuality in art as the blending of Alexandrian aesthetics with the 'Geniegedanken' of the eighteenth century.

For the Alexandrian poets, their claim to originality did not entail disrespect for the literary tradition. On the contrary, it sprang from overwhelming respect and admiration, which regarded the past as an unrepeatable, because unsurpassable, ideal. As Roman poetry shaped itself from its beginning with an eye on Greek culture, for the Neoterics the situation was different. When they adopted Alexandrian aesthetics they did so with the claim to do better than previous generations in adapting Greek poetry; hence, the Neoterics' hostile stance toward their own literary past. Their sense of discontinuity was diametrically different from that of the Alexandrian poets. This meant that they did not focus on differences in the Greek literary tradition; for them there was no fundamental difference whether they looked back to Archilochus and Sappho or to Callimachus. They always saw Greek poetry from an Alexandrian perspective.

When Horace and Virgil turned to archaic Greek poetry to widen their register beyond the limits imposed by a strictly Alexandrian credo they automatically developed an acute sense for the very difference between Hellenistic and archaic Greek poetry and thus for the multilayered character of Hellenistic poetry as a result of the complex relation of Alexandrian poets to their literary past. It also entailed a different relation to older Latin literature. Whatever his sources might have been, Horace in the *Epistles* and in the *Ars* clearly adopted a teleological Aristotelian view of literary history.⁷⁷ This view also shines through in his remarks on Sappho and Alcaeus, moderating Archilochus's aggressive tone and thus rendering his poetry less offensive and more serious.⁷⁸ That is exactly what Horace also claims for himself. This inclination to progressive perfection also entailed another look at Latin poetry; it was not seen as simply a primitive stage to be completely rejected but as something immature that could be used and reshaped into something more perfect. Equally, grand form and solemn style assumed a new position. Aristotelian teleology, as adapted to literary criticism, entailed a positive view on the more serious, grand, and solemn as the more perfect

⁷⁷ See below, pp. 486 ff. and Reinhardt, pp. 505 ff.

⁷⁸ See above, pp. 179 ff., below, pp. 185 ff.

Thus, Aristotle's teleological poetics must have appealed to Horace in his drive toward a poetry that could accommodate more serious topics and the solemn style suitable to them.

2.1.2. *Epod. 6* (Quid immerentis) and *15* (Nox erat)

This extensive excursion was necessary in order to appreciate Horace's dealing with his ancient models and his Hellenistic predecessors, Callimachus in particular. Against this background we understand much better Horace's other programmatic statement about his iambic poetry in the book of *Epodes* in *Epod. 6*.⁷⁹ In this poem he attacks an iambic fellow poet⁸⁰ without bite, who only attacks the weak and helpless, and he provokes him to take on the iambic poet Horace as his target instead. This leads to a self-description of Horace in his role as an iambic poet, *Epod. 6.11–14*:

*cave, cave: namque in malos asperrimus
parata tollo cornua,
qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener
aut acer hostis Bupalos.*

Take care now, take care! For I am utterly ruthless against villains, and now toss my horns in readiness, like the son-in-law rejected by the treacherous Lycambes, or the fierce enemy of Bupalos.

Horace compares himself to Archilochus (by reference to the same notorious story about him which he also refers to in *Epist. 1.19*) and Hipponax (again not named directly, but referred to by Bupalos, a figure he attacked in his poetry). In the context of Horace's poem the reference to the two poets stresses the dangerous character of Horace's iambics, their vigor and aggressiveness contrasting with the helpless victims of his target and the toothlessness of the impotent iambic antagonist himself. Thus Horace defines himself in contrast to Callimachus, who at the beginning of his first *iambus* announces the civilized character of his iambic poetry by evoking the very spirit of Hipponax from the grave and has him announce that he comes (fr. 191, 3 f. Pf.):⁸¹

⁷⁹ For a more detailed discussion of the poem, cf. Watson 2003: 251 ff. who calls the poem pseudo-programmatic. My interpretation below is indebted to the advice of Hans Peter Syndikus (*per litteras*).

⁸⁰ There can be no doubt about this identification of the poet's enemy, cf. Watson 2003: 253 f.

⁸¹ For the whole scene, see Kerkhecker 1999: especially 33 ff. and his summary 293 f. (with reference to Archilochus).

φέρων ἱάμβον οὐ μάχην αἰειδόμενα
τὴν Βουπάλειον.

not bringing an iambos singing of the fight against Bupalos.⁸²

However, things are not quite as simple as they might appear at first sight. Not only do Horace's verses depict his *Iambi* exactly as what *Epist.* 1.19 states they are not: everyone who has read the previous poems in Horace's book has not yet experienced Horace as a particularly vigorous and courageous iambic athlete (and which reader who recalls Horace's stance in the first book of *Satires* would expect him to be?). On the contrary, in *Epod.* 3 Horace had ostentatiously converted iambics into harmless amicable teasing of his high-ranking friend and patron. He grossly overstates the latter's crime (to have poisoned him with garlic), which is the cause of his anger. He then presents his curse as a mere wish for the future, and only if further offences occur. The punishment he envisages (lack of sexual response by Maecenas's female bedfellow because of the garlic-poisoner's bad smell) is a mere joke. In *Epod.* 4 the iambic poet's fierce attack on an anonymous upstart⁸³ is nothing but a bitter expression of his outrage and helpless anger in view of his enemy's success. Moreover, the opponent, as a freedman who ascended to the rank of a *tribunus militum* in Caesar's army, is a slightly modified mirror of the poet's own career.⁸⁴ By referring to the indelible stigma of low birth his charges against his target mirror the fate that Horace elsewhere had declared to have suffered himself at the hands of his snobbish detractors. *Epod.* 4 can only be read as a piece of remarkably sarcastic self-parody and self-deflation, in which Horace inverts the trick of ironic self-humiliation he otherwise plays so often by putting himself in the shoes of the ruthless detractor.⁸⁵ Perhaps the embitterment, which surfaces in Horace's violent attack on himself and his enemies, reveals something of the poet's helplessness not only against his enemy, but even against the inferiority complex he elsewhere tries to hide so cleverly by dwelling on his humble origins with an air of disengaged aloofness.

⁸² Hipponax's proverbial enemy, as Lycambes was that of Archilochus.

⁸³ The parvenu from ancient comedy and Roman political satire, see Watson 203: 148f., who refers to Cat. 52 and 84; Calvus fr. 17, 18; cf. also Jacoby 1914: 459–461; Fraenkel 1957: 58.

⁸⁴ Of course, Horace's target displays several traits that distinguish him from Horace (the opponent was a slave himself, he is ruthlessly ambitious); thus, Horace implicitly dissociates himself from upstarts who owe their success to improper means.

⁸⁵ To emphasize slavish descent was one of the ten topics of rhetorical invective identified by Süß 1910: 247 ff.; for self-irony, see pp. 37, 188, 193 *passim*.

Yet, even if seen in isolation and without being prepared for a certain interpretation by other poems preceding *Epod.* 6 in the book, the boast of the iambic poet in *Epod.* 6 sabotages itself immediately as mere ironic self-deflation. The speaker of *Epod.* 6 directs his attack against an anonymous iambic poet, explicitly defined as a harmless coward, not guilty of any crime toward his attacker: not a convincing match for Archilochus's Lycambes. Thus, the speaker of *Epod.* 6 claims for himself an Archilochean or Hipponactean character completely out of keeping with the actual situation in which he positions himself.

With his attack on a fellow poet Horace puts himself in a situation quite similar to that of Callimachus at the beginning of his first *iambus*. As the *Diegeseis* (VI 1), the 'summaries,' tell us, Hipponax is depicted in gathering the φιλόλογοι, 'learned literates,' in the temple of Serapis. He tells them to refrain from envy and quarrel; not only this poem but also *Iambus* 4 (fr. 194 Pf.) is directed against quarrels between fellow poets. However, in the concluding *Iambus* 13 (fr. 203 Pf.), we find Callimachus polemizing against his detractors. Obviously, Callimachus is more aggressive than he claims to be, as Horace is much less harmful than he pretends to be. There is an analogy between Horace's and Callimachus's poetic stance: both poets explicitly refer to their poetic selves, and both sabotage the image they paint of themselves. Yet, the image Horace paints of himself is the precise opposite of that which Callimachus paints of himself. The speaker of *Epod.* 6 claims for himself an anti-Callimachean character, a character that defines itself as the original, more aggressive one of Hipponax and Archilochus, from which Callimachus dissociated himself.⁸⁶ By claiming this spirit in a purely literary conflict with a harmless anonymous opponent this claim deflates itself as a vain boast of one of the silly, quarrelsome φιλόλογοι whom Callimachus's Hipponax revenant ridicules in *Iambi* 1 and 4. Yes, Horace's Anti-Callimachus is a 'dove' and by posing as an anti-Callimachean *Hipponax redivivus* Horace distances his 'spirit,' as one recurring to Callimachus's sources, from that of the Alexandrian poet. But, by deflating this very spirit at the same time, he dissociates himself from Hipponax and Archilochus as well and assumes a less aggressive character. By implicitly deflating his own claim of aggressiveness he defines his invective as a mere literary play and, in line with his statement in *Epist.* 1.19, banishes from his poetry any really hurtful trait. This stance is in some respects parallel, but by no means

⁸⁶ For Callimachus and Hipponax, see Depew 1992.

identical, with that of Callimachus:⁸⁷ Horace defines himself as a new Horatian Hipponax or Archilochus in analogy to Callimachus's self-definition as new Callimachean Hipponax; Horace's relation to Archilochus/Hipponax is parallel to that of Callimachus to Hipponax as it is parallel to that of Sappho/Alcaeus to Archilochus in *Epist.* 1.19. As we have seen, Horace poses as a Callimachean iambic poet by deflating his anti-Callimachean stance. The main characteristic of Horace as *Callimachus redivivus* is self-negating irony, present in Callimachus's *Iambi*, too, but neither as the key element of Callimachean ethos nor as an ostentatiously vigorous deflation of violent attack. Self-deflating irony is above all a facet of archaic Greek iambic poetry, sexual self-humiliation in particular.⁸⁸ Self-deflating irony of a more subtle kind is one of Callimachus's means of moderating the violence of iambic invective⁸⁹—not the only one and not one displayed in the programmatic first *iambus* as far as we know—. In Callimachus it may have sexual overtones: in his third *iambus* the poet reveals that unrequited love for a beautiful boy was the cause for his moralizing attack on φιλοκέρδεια; this sounds very much like the Horace of the *Satires*.⁹⁰ Of course, subtle irony and self-deflation is one of the most prominent characteristics of Horace's poetry. It is the essential stratum of the moralist of the *Satires*, with his claim of *ridentem dicere verum*,⁹¹ and one should not forget that it is, of course, an old rhetorical topos of invective.⁹² In his groundbreaking study on Lucilius and Callimachus⁹³ Mario Puelma has identified in Callimachus's *Iambi* the founding spirit of Lucilius's *Satires*. In the 'Callimachean' re-polishing of Lucilius's style in the *Satires* (*Serm.* 1.4 and 10), Horace went back to the Callimachean roots of his model; it is natural that he should, in consequence, explore the roots of Callimachean iambs by going back to its origins in archaic Greek iambus.

Self-deflating irony makes mockery socially acceptable and renders it harmless, as required by Horace's critics in *Serm.* 1.4 and 2.1, because attack is thus balanced by the impotence of the attacker, who is exposed by ironic

⁸⁷ Barchiesi (Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 158) has a point in referring to Cat. 116, but there I agree with Heyworth (Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 123 f.) that *carmina Battiadae* must refer to translations, not to iambic poetry in the Callimachean manner.

⁸⁸ Watson in Harrison 1995: 189 with n. 6.

⁸⁹ Watson 2003: 256 n. 30.

⁹⁰ See also Watson 2003: 256 n. 30.

⁹¹ See Günther 2010a: 65 ff.

⁹² See Süß 1910: 257 f., who calls it "ironische Selbstbescheltung"; also above, p. 186.

⁹³ Puelma Piwonka 1949; see also Edwards in Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 77–98 on Callimachus' fourth *iambus*; cf. also Clayman 1980: 73 f.

self-negation.⁹⁴ By appropriating to his poetic ego the spirit of ironic self-deflation, Horace defines his role as *Archilochus redivivus* in the social reality of his personal position in contemporary Roman society, which was quite different from that of his model. Of course, we cannot know for certain to what extent the poetry of archaic Greek iambographers reflected events of their real lives, whether the characters they attacked were all real persons or to what extent their poetry already indulged in literary play with conventional topics and stock characters. Yet, apart from the fact that literary topicality and real-life experience are by no means mutually exclusive—as in Horace's case—and apart from the fact that Horace's position in Roman society was certainly different from that of Archilochus, historical reality is less important than Horace's perception of it. It is a truism to say that Horace could not recreate Archilochus's polemics in their original social context whatever the latter was. In the wake of ancient biographical tradition,⁹⁵ Horace perceived Archilochus's poetry as autobiographical in the vulgar sense; he and his audience viewed Lycambes and Neobule as real persons and the lot they suffered from Archilochus's attack as a real event.⁹⁶ He could not with any credibility lay claim to the role he and his contemporaries perceived Archilochus to have had in his real surroundings; in presenting himself as a violent attacker à la Archilochus he could only avoid ridicule by ridiculing himself.

Self-deflating irony as a character marker of his particular manner of iambic poetry is an attitude Horace adopts in analogy to Callimachus, yet this is not the whole story. There is another important point we have omitted so far. The Horace of *Epod.* 6 exhibits a character quite different from that of the witty and sophisticated Callimachus. He poses as a dangerous animal, a wolf, a Molossian dog, a bull.⁹⁷ In the end he indignantly protests that it is impossible for him, like a weeping little boy, to refrain from hitting back:

*an, si quis atro dente me petiverit,
inultus ut flebo puer?*

Am I expected to weep like a child, without retaliating?

⁹⁴ ἀμυχανία as a prime characteristic of Horatian iambics has been highlighted by Watson in Harrison 1995: 188–222.

⁹⁵ For the 'Archilochus-legend,' see West 1974: 26 f.; Lefkowitz 1981: 25–31.

⁹⁶ Barchiesi (Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 143, with reference to Feeney in Rudd 1993: 41 ff.) rightly stresses Horace's awareness of the huge historical gap between Archilochus and modern times.

⁹⁷ For animal imagery as a stock motif in the *Epodes*, see Watson 2003: 27 ff.

There is another passage, in which Horace ironically displays his virility in erotic self-deflation; in *Epod.* 15.11–16 he threatens his adulterous mistress:

o dolitura mea multum virtute Neaera!
nam si quid in Flacco viri est,
non feret assiduas potiori te dare noctes
et quaeret iratus parem,
nec semel offensi cedet constantia formae,
si certus intrarit dolor.

Ah, Neaera, you'll have good reason to regret my manly spirit! For if there's any male self-respect in Flaccus, he will not put up with your giving night after night to his rival, and in his anger he will look for a genuine soul mate. His determination will not succumb to your beauty now that it has become odious, if an implacable bitterness enters his heart.

The poet insists on his manhood by defining his *virtus* with the etymologizing gloss *vir*.⁹⁸ By punning on his proper name *Flaccus* ('droopy')⁹⁹ he closely identifies himself with the *persona* of the speaker, and there may be a further joke in what follows. In his wrath at unfaithful Neaera and a rival lover he looks out—not for the rival to attack, but rather for a lover more suitable for the character of a Flaccus: *par* is well attested in the sense of 'well-matched opponent',¹⁰⁰ the meaning 'soul mate,' not attested before,¹⁰¹ may have acquired that sense here by punning on its ambiguity.

In *Epist.* 1.19 Horace compared his adaptation of Archilochus to those of Sappho and Alcaeus, who, in turn, are Horace's models in the *Odes*. The parallel between Horace's and Sappho's or Alcaeus's adaptations of Archilochus consists in adapting the iambic spirit to a wider range of themes. What Horace claims in *Epist.* 1.19, by his reference to Sappho and Alcaeus, is that he conceived the *animi* of Archilochus's poetry as somehow overlapping with the *animi* and the themes of Sappho's and Alcaeus's poetry. The keyword that describes the character that Sappho and Alcaeus have in common with Archilochus is *mascula*, 'man-like.' This term is paradoxically referred to Sappho,¹⁰² because it would, of course, not be associated with her as a woman. Yet, she is, along with Alcaeus, Horace's model in the *Odes*. The affinity between Archilochus and Alcaeus, both soldier-poets of warlike spirit and political invective, is obvious and, of course, Horace alludes to this

⁹⁸ Cf. also Newman 2011: 69.

⁹⁹ For the connotation of the pun, see Watson 2003: 472.

¹⁰⁰ E.g. C. 1.6.16.

¹⁰¹ Grassmann 1966: 155; Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 373.

¹⁰² Cf. Fraenkel 1957: 346.

affinity as important for his self-consciousness as a poet in the famous passage in *C.* 2.7, cited above.¹⁰³ Certainly Archilochus's invective distinguishes itself from lyrics by its aggressive harshness; *mascula* first of all conveys that Sappho, despite being a woman, did not moderate Archilochus's harsh spirit by mellowing it in a womanly, i.e., effeminate way. Yet, what precise significance *mascula* has in this context can only be fully appreciated via a small deviation.

2.1.3. *Excursus*: *Epod.* 16 (*Altera iam teritur*), 1 (*Ibis Liburnis*), 9 (*Quando repostum*), and 2 (*Beatus ille*)

Fraenkel,¹⁰⁴ in his interpretation of *Epod.* 16, put proper emphasis on Archilochus's role for Horace's aspiration to political poetry by pointing out, as others have before, how well the Ἀρχιλόχειος χαρακτήρ suited Horace's personal situation after Philippi. Klingner,¹⁰⁵ as Leo¹⁰⁶ before him, has drawn attention to the appeal archaic Greek political poetry, namely Solon's elegies, must have had for Horace. Solon could serve as a model for a poet who, as Horace in *Epod.* 16 does in a pointedly eccentric and paradoxical manner,¹⁰⁷ claimed for himself a position in which he could with proper authority instruct his fellow citizens about political matters: archaic Greek poetry was of prime importance for Horace's aspiration to find a Greek legitimization for his poetic voice as a politically engaged poet.¹⁰⁸ The aspiration to such a voice was the prime *movens* of Horace's turn to archaic Greek models in general. Archilochus, with his image as the warlike soldier-poet of blame and anger, which biographical tradition derived from his poetry,¹⁰⁹ suited Horace supremely well for expressing his political concerns in the difficult times between 42 BC and Actium. Horace, the failed soldier and man of action after Philippi, could recognize himself in the image Archilochus paints of himself when he boasted that he left behind his shield in flight from the battlefield (fr. 5 West), and in the image of Alcaeus, who repeated Archilochus's provocative self-denigration (428 [a]¹¹⁰). He could also recognize himself in the often embittered and aggressive anger expressed in Archilochean poetry

¹⁰³ See p. 29.

¹⁰⁴ Fraenkel 1957: 46 ff.

¹⁰⁵ Klingner 1961: 353 f.

¹⁰⁶ Leo 1912: 444.

¹⁰⁷ See below, pp. 208 f.

¹⁰⁸ Rightly, Schmidt 1993 and Watson 2003: 9 f.

¹⁰⁹ For the Archilochus legend, see p. 189 n. 95.

¹¹⁰ See Page 1955: 153 ff.; cf. also Anacr. 381 (b). Whether it was a literary topos for some of these poets or a selected real-life experience is unimportant in this context.

and even more so in the ruthless political attack of the exiled Alcaeus.¹¹¹ Condemned to resignation and to political inactivity Horace had an acute sense of Archilochus's and Alcaeus's rampant pride, even in seemingly disengaged self-humiliation. Something of his feeling is echoed in his statement in *Epist.* 2.2.51 f., discussed above,¹¹² that 'poverty' pushed him into writing poetry.¹¹³ This is not to say that it was just a 'biographical' affinity that made Horace turn to Archilochus, but that Archilochus and Alcaeus both represented a poetic genre that was still unexplored in Latin poetry. Archilochus, in particular, suited both Horace's inclination to satire and invective and his personal sentiments and aspirations after Philippi. When Horace presents, in *C.* 2.7,¹¹⁴ his miraculous salvation from Philippi's battleground, posing as a reincarnation of the poet who threw away his shield in flight, he is an *alter Alcaeus* in being an *alter Archilochus* in the same way as was Alcaeus.¹¹⁵ In *C.* 2.7 Horace describes his vocation as a poet as due to the experience of both humiliating defeat (*fracta virtus et minaces/ turpe solum tetigere mento*, "when valor was broken and threatening warriors ignominiously bit the dust"¹¹⁶) and his miraculous salvation by Mercury. Contemporary politics surface in the framing *Epodes* of the first part of the book (*Epod.* 1–10), but above all in the early, politically engaged poetry of *Epodes* 7 and 16. All poems remain rooted in a tradition with praise and blame as basic markers of generic character. *Epod.* 7 and even *Epod.* 16 display an overriding presence of the generic marker 'vituperation,' but the latter, in particular, explores the limits of the genre by heavily borrowing strands of argument and recurrence to religious overtones from Solon's *Eunomia* elegy (fr. 4 West),¹¹⁷ which endow his discourse with a gravity of indignation beyond the generic expectations for the *Epodes* as iambic poetry.

¹¹¹ "... die eigene Neigung wohl mehr als ein classicistischer Grammatiker hat ihn zu den echten Größen geführt, so daß er archilochische Iamben dichten konnte, als das Scheitern seiner politischen und persönlichen Hoffnungen ihm die Stimmung dazu gab," Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1903: 305.

¹¹² See p. 28.

¹¹³ Wistrand (1964: 260 ff.) saw the affinity but stressed the similarity with Archilochus too much and wrongly interprets *ut versus facerem* as an ironic ἀπροσδόκητον; Page rightly protests: "Is there really any irony at all in *paupertas impulit audax*? There is none in the immediately preceding lines; and the fact is true as stated," p. 280; "In speaking of the points of contact between Horace and Archilochus, Mr Wistrand mentioned the experience of civil war; but the model for this was really Alcaeus, not Archilochus," p. 281.

¹¹⁴ See above, pp. 29, 393.

¹¹⁵ See above, pp. 179 ff.

¹¹⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 114 f.

¹¹⁷ See below, pp. 208 f.

The same is true for *Epod.* 9¹¹⁸ in Part I of the book; though the poem is an overt invective it is not essentially different in tone from *C.* 1.37. As Fraenkel¹¹⁹ aptly put it, “the stylistic level of *Quando repostum Caecubum* is, on the whole, as high as the level of Horace’s patriotic odes. When he wrote this epode he was in fact ready for pure lyrics. He was, however careful not entirely to give up the Ἀρχιλόχειος χαρακτήρ which seemed to him essential for the stylistic uniformity of his book of *iambi*.” The latter holds true for all *Epodes* and should be the yardstick by which interpretation has to define itself. In fact, the introductory poem, *Epod.* 1, is perhaps the composition that strays furthest from the iambic genre, but still we find two generic markers: ‘self-irony’ and, the counterpart of blame, ‘praise.’ Friendship and politics are the two intertwined topics of the poem. *Epod.* 1, together with *Epod.* 9, probably the the book’s latest piece, is also its masterpiece and shows Horace at the height of his powers. As Fraenkel (l.c.¹²⁰) remarks, “[t]here exist in ancient literature very few, if any, poems in which the emotions at the height of a great historical crisis are expressed with such vigour and directness,” and few in European literature that can match the combination of the latter with artistic mastery.¹²¹ *Epod.* 1 is also a highly sophisticated and tactful blending of praise, declaration of friendship, subtle self-irony, and political propaganda.¹²² The poem’s agenda ranges from the highly official and public to the most personal: public concern clothed in an expression of touchingly affectionate care for a friend on a military mission

¹¹⁸ I shall not dwell on the hotly discussed problems of interpretation of the poem; as already said above, I entirely agree with Nisbet’s (1995: 179) view, which Watson also favors by (2003: 310 ff.) and to whose discussion I refer for further bibliography.

¹¹⁹ Fraenkel 1957: 75.

¹²⁰ Aeschylus’s *Persae*, which spring to the mind, were performed several years after the battle of Salamis.

¹²¹ For comparable works I have referred elsewhere (Günther 2010a: 162 with nn. 88 and 89) to Manzoni’s *Il cinque Maggio* or Schönberg’s *Survivor from Warsaw*; one may add George’s poem *Der Krieg* (cited above, p. 31) or Mayakovsky’s *Lenin* (cf. Magarotto [forthcoming]), the patriotic poetry of Solomos or Kalvos, Seferis’s poems Ἀνοιξη M.X. (*Spring A.D.*) and Τελευταίος Σταθμός (*Last Stop*; text and translation of both poems in Keeley and Sherrard 1982), or, perhaps, Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony. Stalin’s death was remembered in many poems, even in a cycle by one of the greatest lyric poets of the past century, Pablo Neruda (see Günther 2010a: 165 ff.), certainly no worse than many poems on the death of Napoleon; yet, the most authentic expression of the mood prevailing among his many admirers at that time, that I know of, is the respective chapter in Alki Zei’s novel *Η αρραβωνιαστικιά του Αχιλλέα*, written retrospectively in 1987. Cf. also Bowra 1966, who discusses poetry in response to the First and Second World Wars. Cf. below, pp. 383 and 406 with n. 733.

¹²² See Watson 2003: 51 ff.; for the stylistic level, at the height of Horace’s best lyrics in the *Carmina*, see Fraenkel 1957: 70.

arising from gratitude for all the favors bestowed; affection expressed by a friend who is not warlike enough to be a proper match for the patron's role in Caesar's ultimate campaign for the salvation of Rome, a friend who would rather withdraw into Epicurean privacy: all this uttered by a veteran of thirty-five who fought in the fiercest slaughter of the Roman Civil War and who had been Maecenas's companion in the Sicilian War. The voice of *Epod.* 1 is far too multifaceted to fit neatly into any description: it is something that can only be felt in the encounter of an extraordinarily rich life with immensely sophisticated poetry. In this masterpiece Horace has already fully advanced in style and tone to the highest level of the *Odes*. He has transcended the boundaries of the iambic genre by the genius of his life.

At the lowest level of description, the facet of iambic poetry that allowed this expansion of range without foregoing the generic marker of iambic 'invective' is, once again, self-deflating irony. Self-deflating irony is suitable to any modification of mockery and attack; thus it is the key to understanding the character of most of *Epod.* 11–15. However, as we have seen, the second key element of Horace's adaptation of Archilochus is an attempt to explore the limits of iambic genre where its themes overlap with those of elegy and lyrics. Kenneth Dover¹²³ has pointed out that iambus does not denote for Archilochus poems in a specific meter. Iambic poetry comprised a large variety of topics (such as love, friendship, sex, warfare, and moralizing reflection, to name some of those of particular importance for Horace)¹²⁴ and cannot be separated neatly from elegy.¹²⁵ Only later was iambic poetry closely associated with invective; ἰαμβίζειν is attested in the sense of 'satirize' as early as the fifth century BC,¹²⁶ and Aristotle (*Poet.* 1448b27) calls the satirizers (the ἰαμβίζοντες) εὐτελέστεροι, 'the rather mean or worthless' in contrast to the σεμνότεροι, 'the more honorable,' who wrote hymns and panegyrics. For Horace, of course, invective was a genus marker of Archilochean poetry, yet he also realized its wide thematic range and the numerous variations in tone in Archilochus's poetry, including political polemics and philosophical reflections on the *condicio humana*. This is also the difference from Catullus, whose *iambi* are pure personal invective; in contrast to Horace, he took over the iambicist's subject matter (Archilochus's *verba agentia Lycam-*

¹²³ Dover 1964.

¹²⁴ Cf. also Watson 2003: 11 f.

¹²⁵ West 1974: 22 ff.

¹²⁶ Brown in Gerber 1997: 15.

ben),¹²⁷ not the variety of meter. Horace could stretch the Archilochean spirit and accommodate topics that were of interest to him, topics that overlapped with those of lyric poetry. Thus, Archilochus easily lent himself to Horace, the satirist, to pave his way to the more serious spirit of lyric poetry.

In *Epod.* 1 and 9 we see Horace at the height of his powers in writing Archilochean poetry that implicitly transcends Archilochean poetry. It is enlightening to compare *Epod.* 2, a ‘*Stilübung*’ to the same effect. The poem, on its surface, illustrates the moral of *Serm.* 1; foolishly nobody is content with his lot. However, the moral is revealed only in a postponed, ironic aprosdoketon, which shows that the preceding long *laudatio* on country life was a diatribe in direct speech by the greedy banker Alfius. The affectionate description of natural innocence has seduced readers for centuries to become enchanted with Alfius’s words. Thus, just by giving a long poem an ironic twist at the very end Horace is able to incorporate into invective poetry a topic, the country life idyll, that is dear to him but very far from themes appropriate to the genre. The more affectionately he dwells on this topic the crueller the sabotage of this affection at the end.¹²⁸ Lachmann¹²⁹ had drawn attention to a passage at the end of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (1418b24–1418b33) in which Aristotle appends two postscripts on how to add character to a speech. One advises putting certain discourses in another person’s mouth. He cites Archilochus with two examples, fr. 122 West and 19 West (b27–33), stating explicitly that the poem begins

οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει,
οὐδ’ εἰλέ πά με ζήλος, οὐδ’ ἀγαίομαι
θεῶν ἔργα, μεγάλης δ’ οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος·
ἀπόπροσθεν γάρ ἐστιν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐμῶν.

Gyges and all his gold don’t interest me.
I’ve never been prey to envy, I don’t marvel
at heavenly things, or yearn for great dominion.

That’s all beyond the sights of such as me.¹³⁰ Thus, there is a certain degree of surprise if Charon, the carpenter, is introduced later as the speaker. To

¹²⁷ For Catullus and Archilochus, cf. Cavarzere 1992: 18ff.; Valerius Cato (addressee of Catullus 56, after Arch. fr. 168 West) is said to have composed *iambi* on his unfaithful bride (Plut. *Cat.* 7).

¹²⁸ All that is essential for the poem’s interpretation has been said by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1913: 305f., Sellar 1891: 127ff., esp. 130, and Fraenkel 1957: 59ff.; the oversubtle interpretations reported in Watson (2003: 75ff.) are completely unnecessary and inept.

¹²⁹ Lachmann 1876: 78.

¹³⁰ For the whole problem, see Kerkhecker 1999: 60ff. to whose analysis I am indebted.

be sure, Archilochus's 'Rollenpoesie' is different from Horace's: Archilochus simply uses the carpenter as a mouthpiece;¹³¹ Horace at the end unmasks his mouthpiece's attitude as insincere. Yet, what is important is that Horace, as Kerkhecker notes, "mocks a cliché," and that Aristotle, who regarded this technique as exceptional, singles out Archilochus among the ancient authors who used it in invective.

At the end of *Epod.* 1 (ll. 25 ff.) Horace had posed as a man content with the little country farm bestowed upon him by his patron, contrasting himself to Chremes, a comic stock character, who is not, as far as we know, associated with greed; yet, the epithet *avarus*, 'greedy,' suggests an etymology for his name from χρήματα, 'money,' in analogy to the speaking name Alfius from ἀλφαίνω, 'earn, gain.'¹³² When Horace, in the introductory poem, poses as a companion on a military excursion for *non mollis viros* ('weaklings'), to Thracia, as *imbellis ac firmus parum*, a companion 'lacking in toughness and pugnacity,' and then claims to despise wealth, a claim that he sabotages in the next poem by the Archilochean device of putting it in the mouth of a greedy banker, he signals that manly, self-ironic Archilochus is the founding spirit of his iambus—not Hipponax. Thus, in *Epod.* 6 he poses self-ironically, first, as a failed Archilochus (l. 13), second as a failed Hipponax (l. 14); he thus also alludes to his stance toward his ancient models in contrast and analogy to Callimachus.

We can see how far, in the poet's self-perception, Horace's iambic poetry is from that of Callimachus or from the *Iambi* of Catullus. Horace's consciousness of a fundamental difference of character between himself and his poetic predecessors is won by his acute perception of the mechanisms of poetic imitation in his self-analysis in *Epist.* 1.19 and in the analogous poetic self-representation in *Epod.* 6. When Horace, in *Epist.* 1.19, identifies Archilochus as the model of his iambic poetry one can read this as an anti-Callimachean choice: Archilochus, not Hipponax, was Horace's model. *Epist.* 1.19 makes explicit that the ostentatiously anti-Callimachean stance of *Epod.* 6 stands for Horace's recursion to Archilochus, with his manly vigor and the topics that suit this character. Denys Page, in the discussion following Bühler's paper on Archilochus in the Fondation Hardt volume, has pointed out that Archilochus hardly plays a role for Callimachus and that the style of Callimachus's *Iambi* is completely different from that of

¹³¹ One may note that Horace uses exactly this rhetorical technique in the second book of *Satires*, probably as a reaction to adverse criticism of his *persona* as a moralizer in *Satires* I; see Courtney, below, pp. 164 ff.

¹³² Watson 2003: 74 and 123.

Archilochus;¹³³ it is rather “eine Art ‘dichterischer Umgangssprache,’ eine bewusste Umprägung des Hipponakteischen Stils.”¹³⁴ He wondered why Callimachus preferred Hipponax to Archilochus. There can be no doubt why Horace preferred Archilochus to Hipponax: for Horace, Archilochus, with his wide thematic and stylistic range, is, in contrast to Callimachus’s Hipponax, above all his ladder to lyric poetry, and this function is abundantly in evidence in the transformation of Greek iambus in the *Epodes*. This is also the fundamental difference from Catullus, for whom *iambi* are synonymous with invective. Horace’s style differs more from that of Callimachus’s *Iambi* than Hipponax’s does from that of Archilochus. Where do we find in Callimachus’s *Iambi* the violent obscenity of the *nuda verba* or the cruel realism of *Epod.* 8 and 12, which in its condensation far outdoes Hipponax’s indulgence in petty obscene pictorialism, as in fr. 19 West?¹³⁵ Do we have the slightest reason to believe that the Callimachus who in the first *iambus* descends only twice to coarse language (fr. 191, 42 and 98 Pfeiffer)¹³⁶ and couches all sexual references in the fifth *iambus*, where he had every opportunity to be obscene,¹³⁷ in euphemistic language, was more vulgar in the lost ninth and eleventh *iambi*?¹³⁸ On the contrary, in fr. 199, 1, he uses the euphemistic νεῦρον, ‘sinew,’¹³⁹ for the male genitals. Is there anything faintly comparable to the condensed style, the extended, complex sentences of, say, *Epod.* 1 in Callimachus’s *Iambi*? He who would lump together Horace’s *Iambi* and the iambic poetry of Callimachus or Catullus, be it only by misleading expression, would earn the same contempt and vilification on Horace’s behalf as the ungrateful readers of *Epist.* 1.19: the poetry of Horace’s *Epodes* is not “archilocheismo alessandrinistico”¹⁴⁰ but “archilocheismo oraziano talvolta stilisticamente alessandrinizzante.”¹⁴¹

¹³³ For the marked difference between Callimachus’s iambics and Archilochean character, see Kerkhecker 1999: 59–62.

¹³⁴ Page on Bühler 1964: 249f.

¹³⁵ Cited by Watson 2003: 31.

¹³⁶ Bühler 1964: 246 f.

¹³⁷ Clayman 1980: 30f.

¹³⁸ Clayman 1980: 57.

¹³⁹ Adams 1982: 38.

¹⁴⁰ Castagna 1993: 51.

¹⁴¹ Much of the misunderstanding in regard to the relationship between Hellenistic and Augustan poetry is due to the confused and unhelpful context of intertextuality that pervades modern research and has obscured the merit of Pasquali’s concept of ‘arte allusiva’: the difference between what he calls ‘reminiscenze’ and ‘allusioni’ or ‘evocazioni’ (“Le reminiscenze possono essere inconsapevoli; le imitazioni, il poeta può desiderare che sfuggano al pubblico; le allusioni non producono l’effetto voluto se non su un lettore che si ricordi chiaramente del testo cui si riferiscono” [Pasquali 1951: 11]); cf. what I have written in Günther (forthcoming).

2.2. *Horatian Iambus*2.2.1. *The First Half of the Book: Epod. 10 (Mala soluta), 8 (Rogare longo), and 12 (Quid tibi vis)*

We can now turn briefly to the other poems of the first part of the book. *Epodes* 1–10 stand out precisely because, in accordance with their purely iambic meter, in most of these poems the generic marker ‘blame and vituperation’ is more evident than it is later.¹⁴² The various facets iambic blame (and its counterpart praise) can take (sexual abuse and humiliation, teasing, irony, sarcastic humor of self-humiliation), the recurring topics and stylistic means (beast fables and animal images, obscenity and coarse verbal abuse—“violation of linguistic taboos” is Watson’s apt label—dialogue either within a poem or between the poet and his audience) have long been identified and are duly listed by Watson in his introduction.¹⁴³ there is no need to discuss the matter in great detail here. Horace’s writing technique in the *Epodes* as an expression of the poet’s statement in *Epist.* 1.19 has been analyzed frequently and extensively in recent studies;¹⁴⁴ some poems have already been discussed *en passant*. Thus, I shall limit myself to a few short remarks on two poems that remain particularly close to Archilochian invective in order to put Horace’s handling of his sources in proper perspective.

The Maevius *Epode* (10) has been the prime example for comparing Horace’s technique to that of his models since R. Reitzenstein published the Strasbourg papyrus in 1899.¹⁴⁵ Leo,¹⁴⁶ and later Fraenkel,¹⁴⁷ analyzed the transformation of the original into a carefully structured rhetorical composition (2–18 [= 12–16]–4ll.): the original concentrated entirely on a vivid picture of the sufferings of the enemy after his shipwreck. Horace introduces in two lines (1f.) the target of his attack: Maevius. He defines him as *male olentem*, ‘stinking,’ but without identifying a reason for his attack he passes to the long, sharply divided middle section which develops, a) step by step the circumstances of Maevius’s drowning in a series of imprecations (3–14), and b)

¹⁴² See above, pp. 192 ff.

¹⁴³ Watson 2003: 7 ff.; he rightly points out (pp. 11 f.) that variety of subject matter is not a product of Hellenistic obsession with *variatio* but a marked feature of early Greek iambus (as it is in fact a feature of early Greek elegy, as both genres were not sharply defined by subject matter, see West 1974: 18 ff., 25 f.).

¹⁴⁴ Mainly Watson (2003), in his introduction to the single poems, who integrates previous research; cf. also again Barchiesi in Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi 2001: 107 ff., 152 ff.

¹⁴⁵ *SB* Berlin 1899: 857 ff. = Hipp. fr. 115 West; the authorship of the piece is disputed, cf. Watson 1991: 59 ff.

¹⁴⁶ Leo 1960: ii 144 ff. (original from 1900).

¹⁴⁷ Fraenkel 1957: 24 ff.; see also Watson 2003: 338 with bibliography.

ends with a prediction of his target's sufferings (15–20). Then he looks forward to celebrating the event by sacrificing to the winds in a short epilogue (21–24). Thus, the poem takes the shape of an inverted propemptikon¹⁴⁸ that formally balances *Epod.* 1. In the original, the crime of the offender was that he “trampled on the oath of friendship.” Horace, in his poem, does not speak of anything that can be regarded as a crime; if his attack is due to bad odor, this can only be regarded as pointedly ridiculous in comparison with his punishment.¹⁴⁹ In a way, this is a reversion of the self-deflation of *Epod.* 3,¹⁵⁰ to the same effect. Nobody would contend that the *Maevius Epode* is a major achievement, it is rather a prime example of a well devised ‘*Stilübung*’ that makes it particularly easy to observe how Horace puts into practice his claim to moderate the *animus* of his original by changes in *res* and *ordo*.

A short remark on one further example from *Epod.* 1–10 that leads us to *Epod.* 11–15 will suffice: an Archilochian model of *Epod.* 8 has now been identified in the *First Cologne Epode*, first published in 1974 by Reinhold Merkelbach and Martin West.¹⁵¹ In *Epod.* 8 Horace concentrates on the ἀλ-σχρολογία of Archilochus against his former bride Neobule, who had become old: he isolates the pattern of attack on the libidinous old hag (the so-called ‘*Vetula-Skoptik*’¹⁵²) and transforms it into a catalogue of defects of the aged body, inspired by epigrammatic models,¹⁵³ that reduces the obscenities of Archilochus’s figurative language to *nuda verba* and creates, in its compression of detail and devastating realism, an image of aged flesh and repulsive sexuality that in its shocking violence and realism is, to my knowledge, without peer in ancient literature and perhaps even surpasses the brutality of modern exposures of repulsive fleshliness in Gottfried Benn’s *Morgue*

¹⁴⁸ See Watson 2003: 340 f., who rightly rejects Cairns’s (1972: 55 f.) interpretation of the *Strasbourg Epode* as a propemptikon. For Horace’s technique of imposing a new, surprising, and innovative structure on invective one may compare the second framing poem, corresponding to *Epod.* 1: *Epod.* 9. Here Horace offers invective in the form of the mimetic running commentary, see above, p. 173.

¹⁴⁹ A technique already found in the Hellenistic ἀραί (Watson 1991: 133 ff.); attempts to identify a different crime are patently absurd. *Maevius* is surely to be identified with the *Maevius* of Virg. *Ecl.* 3.90 f., but this is irrelevant to the poem itself; see Watson 2003: 342 ff. (his metapoetical reading is oversubtle).

¹⁵⁰ See above, p. 186.

¹⁵¹ Merkelbach and West 1974.

¹⁵² Grassmann 1966: index 176.

¹⁵³ Normally positive (the catalogue in Arch. fr. 196a itself is a predecessor!), see Watson 2003: 291; but cf. also Meleager *AP* 5.204, adduced by Fraenkel 1957: 59 n. 1.

or Roger Bacon's paintings.¹⁵⁴ A modern reader inclined to psychoanalysis may be amused when he perceives, in a life-long bachelor's transformation of Benn's 'dumpfe Leiblichkeit' into a quasi-moralizing denouncement of female lust,¹⁵⁵ an early touch of Otto Weininger; almost, but not quite. In *Epod.* 12, Horace echoes the dialogue form of his model by a quotation in direct speech—a device often employed in the *Epodes* (cf. *Epod.* 4, 5, 11, 13, 17)—and gives his reviled female target a chance for an embarrassing counter-attack: Archilochus's αἰσχρολογία was motivated by offended pride of the male ego, which had been rejected. *Epod.* 8 and 12 deflate a male ego that compromises itself by its very attack on a repulsive woman who makes advances on her repugnant ex-lover, claiming the rights of a bygone relationship, which can now be only a major embarrassment to the latter.¹⁵⁶

2.2.2. *The Second Half of the Book*

Epod. 12 constitutes a link—between *Epod.* 1–10 and *Epod.* 11–15. *Epod.* 11–15 are all about love, except for *Epod.* 13. Except for *Epod.* 12, biting attack, even biting humor is absent from the series; only *Epod.* 14, addressed to Maecenas, recalls the jovial humor of *Epod.* 3,¹⁵⁷ which has now made room for gentle teasing and self-irony in exchange for ostentatious or even crude (*Epod.* 8 and 12) self-deflation. The change of tone and a certain restriction of thematic variety, which characterizes *Epod.* 11–15 and accompanies the enrichment of epodic meter by dactylic cola, have often been noted.

At first sight, *Epod.* 11–15 appear—except for *Epod.* 12—to stray far from the generic expectation of Archilochean invective; Fraenkel¹⁵⁸ devotes a separate chapter, “*Epodes of a Different Type*” (as different from the previous *Epodes*, “in the iambist's manner”) to *Epod.* 11, 13–15. About *Epod.* 13 he rightly says that if it “had come down to us as one of the *carmina* of Books I–III, not even the most searching critic would be able to discover in it anything incongruous with the character of that collection.” One can, of course, even

¹⁵⁴ See also below, p. 210.

¹⁵⁵ Watson 2003: 293 (with reference to *Serm.* 1.2.64–67 and *C.* 3.6.25–32) speaks of a “caricature of well-born, cultured, sexually liberated women” of the late Republic.

¹⁵⁶ Watson 2003: 384.

¹⁵⁷ See above, p. 186. The most ‘Catullan’ *Epode* and thus the most suitable example for comparison; Fraenkel (1957: 68) points out the affinities and the specific difference. Watson (2003: 130) aptly refers to *Serm.* 2.1.71–74 on Scipio and Laelius.

¹⁵⁸ Fraenkel 1957: 65 ff.

in *Epod.* 11 and 13–15, detect aspects of iambic invective: irony in *Epod.* 11 and 14, attack on the rival in love and vituperation of the unfaithful woman in *Epod.* 15. Even in *Epod.* 13 there is a hint of the latter; its tone may well be compared with Arch. fr. 13 West. Certainly, the range of Archilochus's poetry is wide enough to overlap with other lyric genres: in order to understand the character of the second half of the book we have to return to two facets of Horace's iambic poetry, which have been mentioned before and which are of crucial importance for Horace's attitude toward Archilochean invective and for its transformation in his *Epodes*.

2.2.3. *Epod.* 11 (*Petti, nihil me*) and 14 (*Mollis inertia*)

Leo's description of *Epod.* 11, "est plane elegia iambis concepta," can be extended even to *Epod.* 14 and 15, that is, to all but one of the erotic poems of the second half, but perhaps one should rather speak of mock elegy. *Epod.* 11 is, as I have already said,¹⁵⁹ programmatic not just by its position: *Epod.* 11 explicitly names love as a topic of Horace's poetry, but it does so in a paradoxical manner, it speaks of writing on love (ll. 1 f.):

*Petti, nihil me sicut antea iuvat
scribere versiculos amore percussum gravi.*

Dear Pettius, I get no pleasure from writing little verses, as I did before, because I am deeply smitten by Love.

An initial, programmatic statement by a poet, who declares that he is tired of writing verses, is strange. Of course, here it comes at the beginning of a new section of the book. Thus, "being tired of writing verse" may refer to the previous section and mark a new start. This is partially true, but it is only part of the truth. The *versiculi* are neither qualified as referring precisely to the verses of the previous section nor are they contrasted to any other form of verse. *Versiculi* refers to the verses of *Epod.* 1–10, but also to poetry in general: Horace declares that passionate love impedes his poetic production. That a depressive mood might prevent one from functioning properly, that it might prevent a poet from writing poetry, is not only natural to assume, precisely the latter is attested in Archilochus (fr. 215 West).¹⁶⁰ Archilochus even speaks of iambi:

καί μ' οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε τερπωλέων μέλει.

I feel no interest in iambi or amusements.

¹⁵⁹ See pp. 171, 173.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. also Cat. 68.1–40.

Leo¹⁶¹ was right when he suspected that “iste fortasse versiculus est quo cum Archilochi poesi carmen Horati cohaeret”;¹⁶² the wording (μ’ οὔτ’ ἰάμβων ... μέλει/ *me ... iuvat ... versiculos scribere*¹⁶³) is close enough and *amore percussum gravi* has an Archilochian model, too (fr. 193 West):

δυστήνος ἔγκειμαι, πόθῳ
ἄψυχος, χαλεπήισι θεῶν ὀδύνηισι ἔκητι
πεπαρμένος δὲ ὀστέων.

Wretched I lie, dead with desire, pierced through my bones with bitter pains because of the Gods.

‘To be smitten by love’ becomes conventional later (cf. Anacr. fr. 413 Page; Eur. *Med.* 8; in Latin, e.g., Virg. *G.* 2.467), but not only is the image attested in Archilochus first, he is the first poet to adapt the Homeric symptoms of overwhelming emotions to love.¹⁶⁴

Horace begins the poem with an Archilochian motto,¹⁶⁵ but in Archilochus (fr. 215) the reason for inactivity is grief. There are examples where love takes its place.¹⁶⁶ If Watson¹⁶⁷ objects he is right to insist that love as a cause for poetic inactivity is unconventional: on the contrary, for the Roman elegists, implicitly even for Catullus, love is the reason for writing love poetry on and for the beloved. This is one of the prime concepts of elegiac love, enshrined in the pseudonyms of the *puella* or *domina* that evoke poetic associations (Lesbia, Cynthia, Delia, and Gallus’s Lycoris). Propertius and Tibullus open their first books of elegies (published only shortly after the *Epodes*)¹⁶⁸ with the declaration, “I am in love, i.e., I am writing love poetry,”¹⁶⁹ and we can be quite certain that this was a conventional device, employed, in all probability, by Cornelius Gallus, Propertius’s close model in Book I. But this is precisely the point of Horace’s lines. Horace inverts the convention: I do not feel like writing poetry because I am so passionately in love.¹⁷⁰ This

¹⁶¹ Leo 1960: ii 146; he also suspects that Catullus in the Allius elegy models himself along these lines.

¹⁶² Aliter Fraenkel 1957: 67 n. 4.

¹⁶³ We know, of course, only one line of Archilochus’s poem, but as far as that goes the meter concurs too.

¹⁶⁴ See Page 1955: 29.

¹⁶⁵ See above, p. 201.

¹⁶⁶ Prop. 2.16.33 f. and Virg. *Ecl.* 10.62 f. are relevant; cf. Fraenkel 1957: 212 with n. 1 for further references; also Grassmann 1966: 37 f.

¹⁶⁷ Watson 2003: 359 f.

¹⁶⁸ 29/8 BC.

¹⁶⁹ See Günther 1997b: 10 ff.

¹⁷⁰ There is not the slightest need to force upon the text Watson’s (2003: 360) contorted

inversion lends itself easily, given the conventional topic of inactivity caused by depression, grief, or love. In fact, the elegiac poet himself commonly blames his *inertia*,¹⁷¹ his unwillingness to participate in public life, on his being in love.

There is another difference to the love elegy; the hallmark of elegiac love is monogamy,¹⁷² devotion to the one beloved woman on whom the pseudonym is bestowed. Promiscuity or homosexual relations are only contemplated in despair when the *domina* is unfaithful.¹⁷³ But such abortive attempts are soon abandoned; the lack of emotional engagement may frustrate the consummation of sexual union.¹⁷⁴ The Horace of *Epod.* 11, however, announces without further qualification that he is struck by a passion for utter promiscuity across the gender divide. In contrast to the elegiac lover, the Horace of *Epod.* 11 has freed himself from his passion for the woman who rejected him.¹⁷⁵ As the poem proceeds, this passion is described as that of a man who stumbled from an insane and unfulfilled love affair (*furere: furor* is a keyword denoting passionate elegiac love) with an unresponsive woman (*Inacha* in l. 6) who drove him mad and made a fool of him in public, into another hopeless weakness for a boy (*Lyciscus* in l. 24). But Lyciscus is more interested in the easy female prey of his effeminate beauty, thus only a new love of either sex may cure the desperate poet. This is obviously a caricature of elegiac love, the *grande passion* of the elegiac poet for a promiscuous woman, the despair of his inability to cure himself, his abortive attempts, the triangular relationships that evolve: the poem offers a catalogue of the topoi of the pathology of elegiac love. The caricature of the elegiac lover is the ironic self-depiction of a poet who in his poetry observes his own folly with the detachment of a bystander. And that is precisely the point of Horace's inversion of the elegiac poet-lover's attitude to writing. For the elegiac poet his poetry is inspired by his passion, which dominates him

interpretation, not only because word order dissuades the reading 'non iam me iuvat versiculos scribere, ut (me iuvit) antea, cum gravi amore percussus eram,' but also because *gravi* is pointless when taken with *antea*; it means 'now I am so passionately in love that I cannot write poetry any longer.'

¹⁷¹ E.g., Tib. 1.1.57 f.

¹⁷² Even Tibullus's book I does not promote polygamy; there are two intertwined cycles, Delia and Marathus, both monogamous.

¹⁷³ Prop. 2.4.17 ff., 2.22–24.

¹⁷⁴ Tib. 1.5.39 f.

¹⁷⁵ We do not know how Arch. fr. 215 proceeded, but, as Hans Peter Syndikus points out to me, one may expect something like fr. 11 West, i.e., that Archilochus in the end will console himself by indulging in the amusements he rejected when grief first struck him.

completely and makes him unfit for any other activity but writing about love. But how should a person possessed by insane passion be capable of observing himself and giving an articulated account in poetry of his state of mind, in particular, if this poetry must fulfil the requirements of Callimachean craftsmanship, which the elegiac poet claims for himself?

The point becomes clear in *Epod.* 14,¹⁷⁶ where Horace returns to his inability to write: he compares himself to Anacreon, who, in his love for Bathyllus,¹⁷⁷ was able to write poetry, yet only in a simple, unsophisticated meter:¹⁷⁸

*Non aliter Samio dicunt arsisse Bathyllo
Anacreonta Teium,
qui persaepe cava testudine flevit amorem
non elaboratum ad pedem.*

They say that Teian Anacreon was on fire in just the same way for the Samian Bathyllus, and with his hollow shell continually lamented his love in simple rhythm.

Poetry as outpouring of passionate feeling precludes, by implication, sophisticated craftsmanship. Horace makes an important point: poetry as an outpouring of the poet's emotions is a concept rather neglected in ancient theory, which focused on poetry's effect on the recipient's emotions, not on those of the creator who was conceived as a craftsman working according to a set of rules. Consequently, there was only a theory about the paradox of why the recipient might enjoy poetry that provoked a negative emotional response. That a poet himself might lighten himself of the burden of destructive emotions by writing about them is not the focus of this theory. It surfaces occasionally, but only at random or in oblique references. The closest explicit statement to something of the sort I know from Greek poetry is Eur. *Tr.* 608f.:

*ὥς ἡδὺ δάκρυα τοῖς κακῶς πεπραγόσιν
θρηνηῶν τ' ὄδυρμοὶ μουσά θ' ἢ λύπας ἔχει.*

¹⁷⁶ Also a parody of elegiac Neoteric style, cf. Watson 2003: 455 ff.

¹⁷⁷ Possibly an allusion to a homosexual love affair of Maecenas's, cf. Watson 2003: 449, also Hommel 1950: 56.

¹⁷⁸ There is a point in *non elaboratum*; the parallel Horace/Anacreon is not perfect: Anacreon is not a passionate and desperate lover, thus, he still writes poetry about his love; Horace is completely incapable of doing so. However, the comparison with Anacreon allows Horace to make an important point: passionate emotional involvement excludes carefully crafted poetry. In *nuce* we encounter already here a point Horace develops later in the *Letter to Augustus* and the *Ars Poetica*; see below, pp. 358, 477 ff.

How sweet are tears to those who have fared ill, the laments' moaning and music which involves sorrow.¹⁷⁹

Horace explicitly refers to the concept in *Serm.* 2.1.30–34.¹⁸⁰ He says that in his *Satires* he follows the example of Lucilius, who confided the most intimate secrets to his songs as his most faithful companions, turning to them, whether something went ill or well, so that his poetry is a mirror of his whole life. Porphyry¹⁸¹ reports that Aristoxenus used the image of books as the poet's companions in regard to Sappho and Alcaeus. Thus, Horace had a precedent for what he says about Lucilius in a statement about his Greek lyric models, above all about Sappho's love poetry.

In *Epod.* 14.11, *flevit amorem*, literally "he wept for his love (with his lyre)," assumes the meaning of "he sings songs full of tears about his love, i.e., he wrote songs that in their melancholic character resembled the feelings of the poet." Thus, *flere* becomes the antonym of *ludere*, translating Greek παίζειν (attested already in this sense of 'composing light-hearted, joyful poetry' in Pind. *O.* 1.16 f., derived from its original meaning 'playing a musical instrument'¹⁸²) as sportive writing of light verse. *Ludere*, not *flere*, is the *vox propria* of Neoteric and elegiac love poetry (cf. Prop. 2.34.85; and Hor. *C.* 4.9.9 about Anacreon as a love poet), since *ludere* and *ludus* are used for any verse form below epic or tragedy. And in Prop. 1.9.9 f. *flere* is used of the *tristes libelli* ('sad books,' l. 13) of epic poetry in pointed contrast to love poetry. Horace's play on *flere*, in implicit contrast to *ludere*; his paradoxical introduction of his self-ironic love poetry as a parody of elegiac love by a poet who derives no pleasure from writing poetry because he is too deeply involved with his passionate feelings and thus, as *Epod.* 14 makes explicit, finds it difficult to properly accomplish his poetic task; all this shows an astonishingly acute awareness of the paradox of the poet's ability to detach himself and write as a dispassionate observer about his own feelings. Horace will explore this concept further in the *Odes*: indeed it is the key to understanding his love poetry.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ To read a personal statement of the poet into Eur. *HF* 673 ff. (Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1895: 148) is not at all as absurd as Bond (1981: 237) says; however, this is less relevant: l. 676 speaks of the enjoyment and consolation 'the muses' gift' give to him who practices art.

¹⁸⁰ Transcribed above, pp. 4 f.

¹⁸¹ Cited by Kiessling and Heinze 1959: 183.

¹⁸² Gerber 1982: 38.

¹⁸³ See below, pp. 334 ff.

2.2.4. *Epod. 13 (Horrida tempestas), 15 (Nox erat), and 16 (Altera iam teritur), the Book of Epodes as a Whole*

I shall not discuss here the two *Epodes* (5 and 17) on the sorceress Canidia (also mentioned in *Serm.* 1.8 and 2.1):¹⁸⁴ they have always been recognized as brilliant, nightmarish *jeux d'artifices* that surpass their Hellenistic models by their drastic Roman color and realism.¹⁸⁵ Watson¹⁸⁶ has recently studied them in depth and highlighted the mass of detail they draw from actual magic practice, which is without literary precedent. He even substantiated Heinze's¹⁸⁷ assertion, which most modern scholars reject, that Horace—despite the humorous character of the pieces—is addressing an issue of public concern.

Apart from *Epodes* 1 and 9, already briefly discussed above,¹⁸⁸ the most impressive achievements in the collection are *Epod. 13, 15, and 16*. After the two iambic elegies, *Epod. 11 and 14*, which dwell on reflections about versification, *Epod. 15* is something like a mock elegy in iambic clothing; the poem gains its invective momentum by concentrating on two elegiac stock motifs: reproach of the unfaithful *domina* and curses on the rich rival lover. However, both the condensation of picturesque imagery in ll. 1–10 (the serene, starry sky of ll. 1f., often set in contrast to human toil, e.g., [Pseudo-]Sappho fr. *ad.* 976 LP, Aesch. *Ag.* 1ff., is a beautiful scene for Neaera's treachery in love) and the biting irony of the lover toward himself in ll. 11 ff.¹⁸⁹ and the rival in l. 21¹⁹⁰ give the poem a particularly vivid taste and charm that set it apart from everything we know from Roman elegy, for all the sharp sense of irony we find in Tibullus (much more than in Propertius)—Tibullus can be biting in Book II¹⁹¹—and Propertius's sense for picturesque scenes in his later poetry, e.g., in 3.16 or 4.9.¹⁹² But the Horatian ethos is completely

¹⁸⁴ For the pseudonym, see Fraenkel 1957: 62.

¹⁸⁵ Fraenkel 1957: 63 n. 2.

¹⁸⁶ Watson 2003: 174 ff., 534 ff.

¹⁸⁷ Kiessling and Heinze 1950: 554; see also Birt 1925a: 89 f.

¹⁸⁸ See pp. 191 ff.

¹⁸⁹ See above, p. 190.

¹⁹⁰ The point is exactly that the common view implies that obscure philosophical learning is not very effective as *ars amatoria* for either sex (Prop. 2.34.27 ff., 51 ff.; cf. also *Epod.* 8.15).

¹⁹¹ Günther 2002: 47 ff.

¹⁹² Klingner (1961: 329 f.) has described well the character of *Epod. 15* against its Neoteric background. The Horace of *Epod. 15*—in contrast to Catullus—does not waste his time in self-reproach to free himself from unfulfilled passion but rather moves on, if not to attack his rival, then to a new lover, and thus can triumph by means of his disengaged attitude over a rival who is much less perceptive about the female character.

different: in contrast to the abortive attempts of the elegist to rid himself of his passion, Horace possesses the virtue (l. 11) to do so.¹⁹³

The reasons why *Epod.* 13 ranks among the most admired of the *Epodes*¹⁹⁴ are obvious. It is the first of Horace's poems in which he displays one of the particular virtues of his poetry: to present truisms—trivialities, repeated again and again by countless predecessors and successors, trivialities that are the trivialities they are because they touch the everyday experience of man at any time and any place—in such an unobtrusively unique manner that they touch the reader as the profound truths they are, as if revealed to him for the first time. Horace sets his general reflections on the *condicio humana* in an emphatically Greek context, and yet adds, *en passant*, a personal touch by referring to his birthday in l. 6.¹⁹⁵ He expresses himself in perfect accord with his ancient Greek models, and yet he does so in his very own language and style. Thus, he speaks to us with the authority of tradition and of his very self. It is an even greater puzzle that the poem should have given rise both to inept speculations on a precise contemporary context, when the setting itself emphasizes that there is none, and to strange, over-subtle reasoning on the relationship between the situation of the addressed person and that of Achilles in Chiron's speech. In ll. 1–10 Horace puts himself in the role of one who speaks to his companions on some particular occasion, typical of the Greek iambic or lyric poet, utters reflections on the cyclical character of human fortune (Archilochus's *ῥυσμός*¹⁹⁶), and calls for *τλημοσύνη*, echoing Archilochus' fr. 128, 13 and 131 West.¹⁹⁷ Chiron's (ll. 11–18) speech adds a new aspect to the lot of the troubled human in ll. 1–10: mortality, the inescapable limitation of the human lifespan, which makes the exploitation of every occasion for merrymaking all the more imperative. Man, troubled in life, and man, destined to die, are complementary for the appeal to enjoy the moment.¹⁹⁸ Horace the Epicurean focuses the limelight on mortality and appeals to his readers to forget their troubles by

¹⁹³ As Hans Peter Syndikus points out to me, the 'elegiac' iambic poet Horace displays, so to speak, an Archilochean ethos, an Archilochean *τλημοσύνη* (fr. 13 West) on *Epod.* 11 and Arch. fr. 11 West.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. especially Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1913: 306 n. 1; Fraenkel 1957: 65 f.; Watson 2003: 417 ff.

¹⁹⁵ See above, p. 7 n. 18.

¹⁹⁶ For a comparison of *Epod.* 13 with C. 1.7, see pp. 266 ff.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1931–1932: ii 113 ff., below, p. 301.

¹⁹⁸ For such an explicit statement on mortality as an exhortation to enjoy an ancient drinking song, cf. Alc. 38 LP; also Theogn. 877 f.; 983 ff.; 1007 ff.; also below, pp. 273 ff.

merrymaking, in hopes of better times¹⁹⁹ (cf. Archil. fr. 128 West), the Epicurean twist to live always in explicit reference to one's mortality. This is, of course, the background of archaic Greek popular ethics. Archilochus need not make it explicit: the Greek language, with its words *θητὸς* (fr. 131 West) or *βροτός*, 'mortal' for 'man,' reminds him of that. By accenting a slightly different aspect of man's common lot and by unobtrusively sharpening the focus of the appeal to enjoy with the phrase *rapiamus ... occasionem de die*, 'let's seize the opportunity offered by the day,' Horace gives the Archilochean exhortation to manly *τλημοσύνη*, 'endurance,'²⁰⁰ an Epicurean twist. He can do so because Epicurean ethical philosophy is rooted in popular Greek morals and the ancient Greek view of god and man. In presenting Epicurean advice in the clothing of Archilochean iambus, Horace reveals the origins of Epicurean ethics in the common Greek worldview²⁰¹ and thus gives it a more universal appeal.

I have already hinted at the significance of *Epod.* 16 for Horace's life and career as a poet.²⁰² In his detailed interpretation Fraenkel²⁰³ has pointed out that Horace sets the scene for his utopian suggestion to escape with him to the Isles of the Blessed by alluding to concrete institutional procedures of Roman political reality that are, however, mutually exclusive. All emphasis is placed on presenting himself as a poet speaking about matters of utmost concern to the Roman commonwealth from a paradoxical position, a position that endows him with the authority of a Roman magistrate and that is, at the same time, completely removed from the realities of life. Horace holds out a poetic vision, in its very unreality, as the only hope for those of the *impia devoti sanguinis aetas*, the "unholy generation whose blood is accursed," which can, by listening to the poet's voice and being freed from the curse, become *pii*, 'holy,'²⁰⁴ again and thus find salvation. The *fuga*, the 'flight,' into the ideal realm of poetry that Horace's poem advocates is not a cheap retreat from the realities of life. Horace's poem is the most acute expression of the foundations of the aesthetics of Augustan poetry: poetry not as a mere retreat from reality but as a counterdesign to reality, art as a

¹⁹⁹ See below, pp. 266 ff.

²⁰⁰ Cf. Pfeiffer 1924: 139 f.

²⁰¹ Cf. E. Schwartz's beautiful pages on Epicurus in Schwartz 1943: 1943 ff.; also Schwartz 1951: 149 ff., 171 ff.

²⁰² See pp. 191 ff.

²⁰³ Fraenkel 1957: 42 ff.; see also Klingner 1961: 353 ff. After Fraenkel nothing of real substance has been added; I refer the reader to his text for further detail.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Cavarzere 1992: 232.

guarantee that despite the desperate contemporary reality there still exists a realm of purity, innocence, beauty, and the divine that promises salvation to the mind. It is strange that by concentrating on finding Horace's precise model for proposing that his fellow citizens escape the troubles of civil strife and war²⁰⁵ one should have overlooked that utopian flight as an expedient in utter despair is a motif at least as old as Greek tragedy.²⁰⁶ The Isles of the Blessed, the distant country where humans, irredeemably exposed to grief and despair, live a life otherwise reserved for the gods, are a cipher for man's yearning for transcendence, a hint of life as a *pellegrinatio aeterna*,²⁰⁷ as the ultimate remoteness of the promised land,²⁰⁸ a cipher for the fragility of hope, the sheer impossibility of reaching one's goal. *Epod.* 16 is an answer to the vision of Virgil's fourth *Eclogue*, but it does not simply denounce it, rather it emphasizes that the new age that Virgil proclaims is not one of this world. The only word that Horace, in *Epod.* 16, has for the function that provides him with his impossible authority, is *vates*, in the very last line (66). The word had been used at least since Virgil's *Eclogues* (9.33ff.) as a more solemn synonym for *poeta*.²⁰⁹ Here, Horace interprets it by returning to its original meaning, 'prophet'; thus, it becomes the watchword of the new aesthetics, the new concept of poetry, and the place of the poet in the world, which distinguishes Augustan poetry: the poet as the prophet of art, an art that promises salvation by raising man beyond a world of despair into a realm uncontaminated by physical reality, transcendent and divine, which only the poet can disclose.

It is difficult to appreciate the merit of a poet's early poetry when one deals with a poet who, like Horace in the best of his mature work, distinguishes himself by unsurpassed stylistic precision and perfect organization of form. The model of his later work has such an impact on the critic's perception that the inevitable defects of his poetic beginnings spring much more to the eye than the particular merits of unspoilt juvenile *élan vital* that they may possess. But at least in *Epod.* 16 many readers have felt this particular quality, a youthful ardor that betrays itself in the slight awkwardness

²⁰⁵ That Horace knew the Sertorius story attested in Plutarch's *Life of Sertorius* (8–9.1) is quite likely (cf. Watson 2003: 480f.), but, in view of what is said below, I think Fraenkel (1957: 48 n. 2) may be right to suspect a lost Archilochean source as well.

²⁰⁶ I recommend reading Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1891: 217 f.) on Eur. *Hipp.* 732–775; also Barret 1964: 297 f.; Dodds 1960: 117 f.; Kannicht 1969: ii 386 f.

²⁰⁷ See Festugière 1954: 22 ff.

²⁰⁸ Horace stresses the point in ll. 57–60; cf. Cavarzere 1992: 232.

²⁰⁹ See Newman 1967: 99 ff. and below, pp. 209, 228 f., 376 f. *passim*.

of some aspects of the composition. Conrad Ferdinand Meyer is a modern poet who in the best of his mature lyrics distinguishes himself by an almost Horatian virtue of verbal and formal polish and perfection. Nevertheless, or perhaps rather precisely because of this, his entirely different first lyric collection, *Ulrich Huttens letzte Tage*, has been a favorite of many readers. I could not find a better analogy for describing the poetic quality of *Epod.* 16 in contrast to Horace's later work.

With *Epod.* 1, 9, and 13, Horace's first lyric collection includes poems of high artistic merit; *Epod.* 16 is a unique manifesto of an aesthetics of despair and as such is one of the most modern poems of antiquity. But having said all this, and despite Watson's²¹⁰ impressive recent re-appreciation of the *Epodes*, the book as a whole is not likely to become the favorite of any of Horace's readers. The *Epodes* are of prime interest as Horace's first attempt at lyric poetry. Many of the *Epodes* are 'Stilübungen,' some of them successful as such, but in invective *stricto sensu* Horace has not much to say. However, the *Epodes* show an amazing range of poetic tone, the edges of which are much less evident in the *Odes*, where the grotesque, the eccentric, the bizarre, and the violent are much less on the surface, even though they are still an integral undercurrent of Horace's poetic voice; their presence in the *Odes* can be better appreciated if one has in the back of one's mind poems like *Epod.* 5, 8, 12, and 17. The surprising modernism of *Epod.* 8, 12, and 16 is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the work. The unprecedented, crude, and provocative display of sex and repulsive flesh in *Epodes* 8 and 12 caused offence not only to Victorian readers; it continues to shock present-day readers, those hardened by the sexual revolution. A founding spirit of enlightened urbanity who still troubles the stomachs of an age that has digested Vladimir Nabokov, Charles Bukowski, Rainer Werner Fassbinder, and many others whom the less initiated may be excused for not knowing, and who takes pride in being at long last ready for the first German translation of Aristophanes in modern red light-teenage jargon—an extraordinary madness? Hats off, gentlemen!

²¹⁰ Watson 2003: 36 ff.

THE FIRST COLLECTION OF ODES: *CARMINA* I–III

Hans-Christian Günther

Abstract: I give an overview of the genesis and chronology of the first collection of odes; then I analyze the first nine poems, the so-called 'Parade Odes,' in detail. The other poems are treated more or less extensively in thematic order: religious poems, philosophy, love poetry, and politics. Special attention is paid to matters of formal construction, arrangement, and transformation of the Greek models. Horace's religion is examined against the background of ancient religiosity in general and his philosophical convictions. The central concepts expressed in Horace's political poems are interpreted as both a mirror of Augustan propaganda and the poet's personal convictions.

Keywords: lyric poetry, political poetry, religiosity, philosophy, love poetry

1. CHRONOLOGY AND BOOK STRUCTURE¹

The first collection of *Carmina* is the most complex and, taken as the whole of three books, also the most extensive corpus of Horace's works. As an adaptation of metrical forms of ancient Greek lyrics it is, in its range and variety, without precedent and without successors in Latin poetry.² After his first publication in 35 BC, Horace took about five years to publish two further collections, a second book of *Satires* and his first attempt to adapt metrical forms of ancient Greek lyrics in his book of *Iambi*.³ Seven years passed between these publications in 30 BC and *Carmina* I–III.

The earliest poem whose date can be deduced with certainty is *C.* 1.37, written directly after the conquest of Alexandria in 30 BC,⁴ i.e., at the time Horace completed the *Epodes*. Yet, it is as good as certain that the collection

¹ For the chronology of the Odes, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxviii ff.; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 4 f.; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: ix f.; also *EO* I 220 f., 261 f., and Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 12 ff. For the book structure, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxi ff.; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 5 f.; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxviii; also *EO* I 280 ff., with ample bibliography.

² Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 4, 138. There are no Hellenistic precedents, cf. Cameron 1995: 148 f.; also Tarrant in Harrison 2007: 279. See also Knox, below, pp. 538 ff.

³ Above, pp. 169 ff.

⁴ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 409.

includes even earlier compositions:⁵ if C. 1.35 belongs to ca. 35 BC⁶ it would be the earliest datable poem of the collection. C. 2.1 presumably belongs to 34 BC,⁷ C. 2.13 may belong to 33 BC, although there is much uncertainty as to this dating,⁸ and C. 1.14 to 32 BC.⁹ As regards nonpolitical poems that may have been written early, nothing can be deduced with reasonable certainty, but C. 1.7 may belong to ca. 32 BC,¹⁰ C. 1.28, in the same meter (the only reappearance of a metrical pattern from the *Epodes*), and C. 2.18 (almost certainly a rather early poem) probably predate Actium as well.¹¹ Other odes that can be dated with great likelihood from external evidence are: C. 2.6 and 2.7 in 29 BC;¹² C. 1.2 in 29/28 BC,¹³ C. 1.31, 3.6, and 3.24 in 28 BC;¹⁴ the *Roman Odes* from 29 BC – 27 BC;¹⁵ C. 1.29¹⁶ and 2.9 in 26/25 BC; C. 1.12,¹⁷ 2.4, 3.8,¹⁸ and 3.29¹⁹ in 25 BC; and C. 1.12²⁰ and 3.14²¹ in 24 BC. C. 1.4 can be dated with certainty to 23 BC, the year of consulship of its addressee, Sestius;²² 2.10 almost certainly also belongs to the same year,²³ as does, perhaps, C. 1.24.²⁴ *Epist.* 1.13.2 refers to the publication of the *Odes* as a collection of *volumina*, and we therefore may assume that the three books were issued together in 23 BC, i.e., in the year of Sestius's consulship, before the disgrace of Murena (the recipient of C. 2.10) in 22 BC (Dio 54.3).²⁵

⁵ Thus Kappelmacher 1922–1923: 44 ff.; cf. also Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxviii, *EO* I 220.

⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxviii f.; despite Nisbet's (in Harrison 2007a: 13 n. 32 with further references) *recantatio* and Syndikus 2001: I 316, I still lean toward the early date. The pessimistic tone (*dura ... aetas* in ll. 34 f., in particular) of the conclusion does not suit a date as late as 26 BC (despite the explanations of Fraenkel 1957: 252 and Syndikus *l.c.* 315).

⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 10.

⁸ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 4, 201; *EO* I 220. C. 2.18 may belong more or less to the same period (Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 291).

⁹ Cf. Syndikus 2001: I 165.

¹⁰ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 91; also Syndikus 2001: I 104 f.

¹¹ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 291; also Syndikus 2001: I 459 ff.

¹² Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxix; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 93 f.; 107.

¹³ Below, pp. 232 ff.

¹⁴ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxx; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxi.

¹⁵ Below, pp. 373 ff.

¹⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 338.

¹⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxxiv.

¹⁸ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxii, 124; probably also C. 2.15; below, p. 351.

¹⁹ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 345.

²⁰ See below, pp. 360 ff.

²¹ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxii, 180.

²² Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxxvi; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xix.

²³ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxxvi; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 156 f.; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xx.

²⁴ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 279.

²⁵ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xix f.; however, the death of Marcellus in 23 BC, seems irrelevant

However, Nisbet and Hubbard²⁶ have pointed to convincing metrical evidence that the first book for the most part is earlier than the second, and the second earlier than the third. Thus, Hutchinson²⁷ has even argued that the three books were first issued separately. Rightly, his view did not find much favor,²⁸ not only since the first book with *C.* 1.4 contains a poem that—*pace* Hutchinson—can with certainty be assigned to 23 BC; the programmatic poems *C.* 1.1 and 3.30, the only poems in the first collection written in stichic minor Asclepiadeans and clearly balancing each other, obviously attest to the unity of the whole corpus. The metrical findings of Nisbet and Hubbard thus rather show, as they have remarked themselves, that chronological reasons played a role in the arrangement of single poems in the larger whole of the three books.²⁹ Thus, we must first look at the essential features of arrangement detectable in *Carmina* I–III.

As already stated above,³⁰ Augustan poetry books normally contain a decimal number of poems, or at least one divisible by five, as does Horace's fourth book of *Odes*. Books II and III both conform to this rule. The second book, with its twenty poems, is the most clearly organized one in the collection and most in tune with the common principles of arrangement found in Augustan poetry books, namely diptychic structure, alternation, and framing;³¹ it also shows great metrical uniformity: all but two poems (*C.* 2.12 in the Asclepiadean stanza, 2.18 epodic Hipponactean, found only here in Horace) are either in Sapphic or Alcaics. In the first eleven poems they alternate and all odd-numbered poems of the book are in Alcaic meter. The same is true for *C.* 2.14 and 2.20. Thus *C.* 2.13–15 form a series of three poems in the same meter, *C.* 2.16 is in Sapphic meter again (2.17 alternatively in Alcaics), while *C.* 2.19–20 form a pair at the end. This contrasts with the metrical *variatio* in books I and III,³² which show a large variety of five stanza types, with four epodic and three stichic meters. Only rarely are consecutive poems

to me despite the reference to Marcellus (or Marcelli; see below, p. 364) in *C.* 1.12; thus Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxvi; differently, Nisbet and Rudd 2004 l.c.

²⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxviii; also Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 4f.

²⁷ Hutchinson 2008: 131ff., 147.

²⁸ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xx; Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 13.

²⁹ Cf. also Becker 1963: 244 n. 21.

³⁰ See p. 213; for the basic principles of arrangement in the books of *Odes*, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxiiif.; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 5f.; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxviii.

³¹ For a succinct survey of the most obvious principles of the organization of Horace's first collection of *Odes*, see Kroll 1964: 226ff.; also Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxiiif.; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxviii.

³² A principle of arrangement already in the minor poems of Catullus.

composed in the same meter (apart from the *Roman Odes*,³³ in books I and III only: C. 1.16–17, 26–27, 34–35, 3.24–25) and in C. 1.1–9 the nine prevalent metrical forms are paraded in sequence.³⁴

Moreover, whereas books I and III not only aim at metrical variety but also often contrast short and long poems (on widely differing topics³⁵) in immediate sequence, Book II also shows a remarkable uniformity in poem length: except for three poems, among them the preface (2.1; also 2.16 and 2.18), of exactly forty lines, almost all the others count twenty-four or twenty-eight lines. Only one (C. 2.15) goes slightly below (20 ll.) and two (2.17 and 2.19) slightly above this mark. Thematically, the second book, with its emphasis on philosophical poems, is the most homogeneous, too. The book is framed by two programmatic poems, 2.1. and 2.20 (a kind of sphragis), addressed to Pollio and Maecenas (already honored as the recipient of C. 1.1). On the basis of the order of consecutive metrical forms the book falls into two parts, with its AB/AB/AB/AB/AB pattern³⁶ of alternating Sapphics and Alcaics, and an irregular pattern: ACBBBABDBB. This bipartite structure is emphasized by the fact that the last poem of the first half is addressed to Maecenas's brother-in-law Licinius Murena, and the Quinctius of C. 2.11 may be Pollio's brother-in-law.³⁷ The poems framed by 2.1 and 2.10 can be divided into four pairs (2/3, 4/5, 6/7, 8/9); even in line numbers a remarkably regular pattern emerges: after the prooemium of forty lines we find the sequence 24 + 28/24 + 24/24 + 28/24 + 24 ll. The second half is thematically less obviously organized, as its metrical sequence and poem length are less regular (but as regards 2.16–2.19 we find a sequence of 40 + 32/40 + 32 ll.); yet, the closing poems 2.19 and 2.20 clearly form a pair, implicitly contrasting Bacchic (2.19) and Apolline (2.20³⁸) poetry. If we divide the book into two halves of five poems each (2.1–10/ 2.11–20), they are of rather unequal length (264 vs. 308 ll.); however, one could also detect an asymmetrical concurrent division into 2.1–11/2.12–2.20: the *recusatio* in 2.12 echoes 2.1 and thus seems to mark a new beginning; moreover, one may then regard the two poetological poems 2.12 and 2.20, both addressed to Maecenas, as framing the second

³³ Below, pp. 373 ff.

³⁴ Below, pp. 216, 219 ff.

³⁵ E.g., C. 1.12 between two short poems on wine and love; the monumental C. 3.29 between a short invitation poem and the brief conclusion.

³⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 5 point to alternating dialogues and monologues in Virgil's *Eclogues* and distichs in *Priapea* 1.14.

³⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 168.

³⁸ See below, p. 284.

part of the book. With three further poems, 2.12, 2.17, and 2.20, addressed to Maecenas, he dominates the second half, in contrast to the first half, where his name does not occur.

In Book III the structure is not as clear-cut as in Book II, but it, too, contains a decimal number of poems and is framed by programmatic statements. Of course, *C.* 3.30 harks back to *C.* 1.1, but the book still has a programmatic opening: *C.* 3.1–6 are conspicuous by being the only cycle³⁹ of six particularly weighty poems with a high degree of thematic and stylistic unity. All six deal with matters of central political and moral concern and are written in a high-flown style; all are in the Alcaic stanza, which probably was closely associated with Alcaeus in Horace's time and thus may have served as a kind of hallmark for Horace's Alcaic poetry.⁴⁰ Moreover, the opening poem of the cycle, 3.1, expresses a statement on the poet's stature and role that expands on that of *C.* 1.1.⁴¹ Above all, the concept of opening a book of poetry with a cycle of more than one consecutive poem appears to have had an impact after Horace's first collection of *Odes*. Propertius's third book, which makes extensive use of Horace's first collection of *Carmina*, in obvious imitation of Horace's procedure, begins with a cycle of five elegies (3.1–5). Horace's last book of *Odes* parades again a cycle of three programmatic poems (*C.* 4.1–3) and Propertius's fourth and last elegy book begins with a sharply divided diptychic programmatic poem or, indeed, if 4.1 has to be divided into two separate compositions, as I firmly believe, with two consecutive programmatic poems complementing each other. As in the second book, the book's penultimate poem also occupies, as being the last of the main corpus, a position of some significance: thus, the long and substantial *C.* 3.29 addressed to Maecenas looks back to the traits of 'Epicureanism' of *C.* 3.1.⁴² Again, a second half is marked by an address to Maecenas in *C.* 3.16, a particularly long poem (44 ll.) between two short poems of 16 ll. each. As regards the arrangement of poems in the main body of the text, certainly, in both books III and I consecutive pairs of either very similar or sharply contrasting poems or occasional symmetries in line numbers can be detected, but an arrangement as obvious as that in the first half of Book II is not in evidence.

If we turn to Book I we are not only faced with an odd number of poems, we find an introductory programmatic poem, clearly designed to match

³⁹ Below, pp. 373 ff.

⁴⁰ Cf. Lyne 1995: 98 f.

⁴¹ For the relationship between *C.* 1.1 and 3.1, see below.

⁴² Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxviii.

3.30 at the end of the whole collection. Yet, the last poem of Book I itself shows none of the conventional markers of concluding poems. The question whether this last poem acquires an implicitly programmatic meaning by its very position is ill-chosen: the function that C. 1.38 assumes by its position is that it frustrates the expectation a reader will have for the closure of the book. The little poem on simplicity begs the question what relevance simplicity of adornment in party preparations has for Horace's poetry. As has already been pointed out above, metrical variation is sought throughout books I and III. Moreover, Book I—in contrast to the cycle of six Alcaic poems in book III—opens with a series of nine poems that parade in sequence almost all the metrical forms the poet will use in the following three books (hence they are commonly known as 'Parade Odes'⁴³); they also display almost all the topics that appear later in the book, with the sole exception of songs on gods that follows with C. 1.10. The eight poems, C. 1.2–9, each 'parade' one of four themes (A: politics, B: friendship and travel/absence, C: nature and enjoyment of life in face of death, D: love), arranged in two similar, but not exactly corresponding sequences, i.e., ABCD: A+D, B+C, DC. In analogy to the *Roman Odes* at the beginning of Book III, the first poem after the general introduction in C. 1.1 is dedicated to panegyric poetry on the princeps. The division of the eight poems, C. 1.2–9, into two sequences also finds its analogy in the *Roman Odes*. The invocation of the Muse in C. 3.4 clearly marks a new beginning, and the return to the role of the poet himself harks back to C. 3.1.⁴⁴ Thus, C. 1.1–9, as a whole, form in their way a cycle of poems opening Book I, as the six Roman Odes open Book III. If we take C. 1.1–9 as a unity, Book I contains twenty-nine poems, plus this introduction, i.e., thirty units. One may observe that if C. 3.1–6 are similarly counted as one piece, Book III contains twenty-five units, a number still divisible by five. On this count, the very strange and unequal distribution of eighty-eight poems over three books of thirty-eight, twenty, and then thirty poems falls somehow into place. We can see the three books as a sequence of either 30 : 20 : 30 or 30 : 20 : 25 units.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that the unequal distribution of the eighty-eight poems is puzzling. Port⁴⁵ thought that the first book comprises the poems that remained, after books II (the most uniform and coherent one) and III (with its round number of poems) had been put together. His suspi-

⁴³ See below, p. 221 n. 61.

⁴⁴ Below, pp. 389ff.

⁴⁵ Port 1926: 298ff.

cion is confirmed by the metrical evidence for the chronology of the poems mentioned above. We have to remind ourselves that a long time had passed since the publication of the *Epodes* and *Satires* II and if Horace was working at Lesbian lyrics as early as at least 35 BC, he took twelve years before he published anything in these meters. But then in 23 BC he had too many poems ready to accommodate them in one book. Eighty-eight poems are an exceedingly high number of poems and 2,430 lines of text amount to an immense corpus of poetry. Thus, the three books of *Odes* are an enormously big publication: Book I alone includes more poems than any other Augustan poetry book. If Propertius's second book is indeed a conflation of two originally separate books, as almost everyone now agrees,⁴⁶ Book III comes second; and with 876 ll. resp. 996 ll., books I and III are among the longest extant Augustan poetry books, almost as long as the two collections of *Satires*.⁴⁷ Horace evidently needed a long period of experimentation in order to master the new metrical form sufficiently well to go out in public with a substantial number of poems that conformed to the standards he required of himself. As we have seen,⁴⁸ far more than half of the poems in the *Epodes* are in simple, purely iambic meter; only six, all except one (*Epod.* 16) of them rather short ones, are written in dactylo-iambic couplets; the corpus of text in its entirety is rather small. This meager result testifies to the difficulty Horace encountered when trying to handle the lyric meters of archaic Greek poetry. Of course, everybody will—depending on his taste—find some arguably more and some less successful poems in Horace's *Carmina*; yet, the first collection of *Odes*, for all its enormous bulk of text and diversity of meter, style, themes, and tone stands out by an incredibly high standard of virtuosity and overall perfection. In order to achieve this astonishing result, Horace would have continuously revised over the years his earlier attempts at composition in the various metrical forms in *Carmina* I–III, while he was, of course, also writing new poems; the variance in metrical details observed by Nisbet and Hubbard reflects this process. It is also plausible that the closer Horace felt he was to the point where he might be sufficiently satisfied with what he produced to contemplate publication, he also thought of a possible arrangement of the poems in the book. Moreover, he may, at a certain time, have been particularly interested in a certain stock of similar topics and decided to handle it in a restricted number of metrical forms,

⁴⁶ See Fedeli 2005: 22 ff.

⁴⁷ See above, p. 211, below, p. 218; also Birt 1974: 291 ff.

⁴⁸ See pp. 170 ff.

i.e., Sapphics and Alcaics; this would explain the uniformity of Book II. The rather uniform length of poems and the regular series in C. 2.2–10 may be regarded as a particularly strong argument for composition with a view to the book's arrangement. Thus, part of Book II and even of Book III may have been composed with a vague intent on how to arrange them, an intent that in the course of time took a more precise shape. Thus, at the end Horace would have put together books II and III predominantly from poems from his middle or later period of composition, while the bulk of the earlier poems that could not be accommodated in books II and III and single poems that remained from his later compositions and seemed fit to complete a collection of the earlier ones were lumped together in Book I. This accounts not only for the chronological distribution of poems among the books but also for the odd and rather high number of poems in Book I.

Still, what was to become Book I displays the main features of an organized poetry book; a preface and, if not a proper epilogue, at least a significant poem in penultimate position, the *Cleopatra Ode* on Actium (C. 1.37), which balances the *Ode on Augustus* that opens the main body of text (C. 1.2). More or less in the middle of the book we find, with C. 1.20, as in Book III, a poem dedicated to Maecenas. And if the number of actual poems is an odd one, at least by counting C. 1.1–9 as a unit we arrive at a decimal number of units, and, of course, books I (876 ll.) and III (996 ll.) are more or less of equal length, framing the much shorter Book II, which, with its 572 ll., is little more than half the length of Book III. Thus, the first halves of books I and III, i.e., C. 1.1–19 (508 ll.) and C. 3.1–15 (558 ll.), equal more or less the whole of Book II, and the opening cycles of books I (256 ll.) and III (336 ll.) equal more or less the two halves of Book II (264/308 ll.). The whole complex of the three books, with its 2,430 lines, falls into various blocks of text, well balanced in their respective lengths.

The whole collection is held together by the two corresponding programmatic poems C. 1.1 and 3.30, composed in the same meter, used only here and in C. 4.8 (C. 1.11 and 18 are similar). The penultimate position in both books I and III is occupied by a composition of particular weight: C. 1.37 and 3.29, respectively. C. 3.29 balances not only C. 3.1 but also 1.1,⁴⁹ and C. 1.3 and 3.27 balance each other as well.⁵⁰ Book I, with its odd number of poems, ends with a pointedly inconspicuous poem (C. 1.38),⁵¹ whose only program-

⁴⁹ Below, pp. 224 ff., 300 ff.

⁵⁰ Below, pp. 239 ff., 242, 345 ff.

⁵¹ In contrast, Book II has a programmatic frame.

matic function is to frustrate the programmatic expectation,⁵² an expectation much more felt, since the penultimate poem of Book I, C. 1.37, with its political background, refers back to C. 1.2.⁵³ Apart from the programmatic frame, a matter of course in Augustan poetry books, in Book I as in Book III, the most transparent criterion of order is *variatio* both metrically and in content (as the ‘Parade Odes,’ announce). We may, however, quite often find pairs or even trios of poems on more or less the same topic in analogy to the pairing in Book II; sometimes we even find sequences of two or three poems of equal line numbers. But the construction of more precise patterns amounts to fancy; as we have already seen in Book II, it is clearly organized in regard to meter, poem length, and content only in the first half, i.e., C. 2.1–10, since for this book Horace selected predominantly poems composed already with the book as a whole in mind. To aim at a neat overall structure in garlands of poems composed over a large space of time and on different occasions would have demanded an amount of revision that could only have led to compromising the form of individual poems in a counterproductive manner, only in order to achieve an artificial pattern of book arrangement of secondary importance. Yet, we shall see below⁵⁴ how carefully the poems for the introductory cycle of Book I were chosen, and that Horace in arranging his poems paid much attention to numerical symmetries between pairs (or even a trio) of subsequent poems.⁵⁵

⁵² The programmatic or symbolic misinterpretations of the poem attest to this fact as well as to the irritation occasioned by such an unimpressive end of the book (see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 423). Syndikus's 2001: I 332 semi-programmatic interpretation—he speaks of “schwebender Ton des Gedichts”—is much more perceptive.

⁵³ For further semi-programmatic poems toward the end (C. 1.32, 33, 35) or in other significant positions in the book (C. 1.18), see below, pp. 224, 281f., 348.

⁵⁴ See pp. 216, 221ff.

⁵⁵ See below, pp. 222 f. Many scholars regularly deny that books of poetry or single poems are designed on purpose according to a numerical design; and the schemes some propose are denounced as pure fancy. Still, a design like the one Skutsch (1963) has demonstrated for Propertius's first book cannot have arisen by chance. I am convinced that elegy books are composed according to numerical criteria, although Propertius's second book is too badly preserved to allow for any conclusions (for III and IV, see Günther 1997a: 145 ff.). Numerical symmetries are felt much more in relatively short compositions; thus Propertius's first book of elegies, with its relatively short poems, is clearly structured, as regards both the book as a whole and the individual poems. If Horace could not arrange a garland like the first collection of *Odes* strictly according to numerical principles, he still tried, in view of the presence of mostly rather short poems, to achieve some symmetry as often as possible without recasting poems. In poetry books like the *Satires* or the *Epistles*, where most compositions were rather long, strict numerical symmetry is not sought. Only particularly long or particularly short compositions stand out among the other poems of a standard length. And thus they are placed with care so as not to disturb the symmetry.

There are, however, two further features of the arrangement of the poems in the corpus of books I and II that are a major factor in determining the reader's experience as he makes his way through the whole of the book. First of all, in the *Odes* we find the same 'associative bridging' as in the *Epodes*.⁵⁶ There we had also observed that except for one case (*Epod.* 13) pairs of complementary poems on the same topic do not stand in immediate vicinity, but are spread over a larger space. This kind of pairing is echoed in a way by the bipartite structure of *C.* 1.2–9 mentioned above. However, in the books of *Carmina*, with their much larger number of poems on a recurrent limited stock of topics, the overall arrangement aiming at *variatio* rather than, except for some pairs or trios, at longer thematically coherent blocks, as we shall see later,⁵⁷ automatically leads to a multiplicity of concurrent series of poems on similar matters. The sequence in these series is carefully chosen, and the presentation not only of meters, but also of various topics in the 'Parade Odes' at the beginning of the collection has a programmatic character: later on, various facets of the theme or its motifs presented here are developed, varied, or expanded in a meaningful way.⁵⁸ Moreover, the love poems, in particular, follow a kind of pseudo-dramatic arrangement, reminiscent of the pseudo-dramatic structure of the elegy book of Propertius (presumably already that of Gallus) or its adaptation by Tibullus, which is foreshadowed in Virgil's *Eclogues*.⁵⁹ In general, the overall arrangement of the poems is as meaningful as is possible in arranging a collection of poems conceived over a length of time, when only very few were written for a specific place in the book. The overall coherence of the sequence of poems will become apparent in the discussion of the single poems, if due attention is paid not only to each poem in isolation, but also to its position in the book. Of course, except for a few programmatic poems every poem must be considered first in isolation but even a most superficial analysis will reveal that the position of a poem in the whole of the book, its immediate vicinity in particular, is important for understanding many of Horace's odes. It seems to me that hitherto not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the Augustan poetry book has to be regarded as an organic entity, which in its progression from poem to poem continuously interprets itself.⁶⁰ Thus, in

⁵⁶ See above, p. 173.

⁵⁷ Below, pp. 222 f.

⁵⁸ The series of prominent addressees in all but two (*C.* 1.5 and 8) of the poems is significant as well; see below, p. 266.

⁵⁹ See also above, p. 173.

⁶⁰ For a particularly pointed manner of re-interpretation, see Reinhardt in De Gennaro and Günther 2009: 164.

what follows, I shall consider every poem not only as an isolated entity but also as an integral part of the whole collection.

2. THE 'PARADE ODES'⁶¹

2.1. *Themes, Meters, and Style*

When in *Epist.* 19 Horace looks back at his poetic achievement so far, he prides himself on having introduced Archilochean and Lesbian poetry to Rome; a hallmark of his creative imitation, as he perceived it himself, was close adherence to the meters of his Greek originals. It is exactly this element, where he stresses the fidelity to the model, that distinguishes his imitation across the language divide from that of Sappho and Alcaeus in respect to their 'model' Archilochus. That he mastered for the first time a large variety of meters of iambic and Aeolic poetry in Latin verse was Horace's hard-won prime achievement, which took him so long before he published his book. It is no wonder that he thus opens his collection with a cycle of poems that, above all, 'parade' the metrical diversity of his book. Thus, the first nine poems of the first book, each of which exhibits a different metrical pattern, comprise almost all the metrical forms of the collection,⁶² which features four stanza forms, five types of epodes, and three different stichic meters. All four stanza types are represented, balanced by four epodic patterns; the prologue is set apart by being in stichic Asclepiadeans. Only two stichic meters, rarely employed (ionics in 3.11 only) and as regards the major Asclepiadeus (1.11 and 18) only an expansion of the meter of 1.1, and the abnormal purely iambic epodic pattern of 2.18 do not appear. In general, in the *Odes*, Horace clearly favors the four-line stanza: the Alcaic stanza is the preferred form, with 33 poems (10 : 12 : 11), followed by the Sapphic stanza, with 22 (9 : 6 : 7); the two Asclepiadean stanzas are used seven (4 : 1 : 2), respectively six (4 : 0 : 2) times only, but the only epodic pattern that occurs quite frequently (10 = 4 : 0 : 6 times) is based on the Asclepiadeus; thus, Asclepiadean patterns, with 23 (12 : 1 : 10) occurrences in total, more or less equal the Sapphic stanza. The other two epodic meters used in the introductory cycle are very rare, that of 1.4 and 1.8 is never repeated, that of 1.7—the only metrical coincidence with the *Epodes* (*Epod.* 12)—recurs only once (1.28). The stichic meter of 1.1

⁶¹ The term goes back to Christ (1868); for the problem of where the "Parade Odes" end, see Lowrie 1995: 34.

⁶² See also Knox below, pp. 538 ff.

is only repeated at the very end of the collection in 3.30. In total, 68 (27: 19 : 22) of the 88 (38 : 20 : 30) odes are four-line stanzas, 15 are in epodic (8 : 1 : 6) and 5 (3 : 0 : 2) in stichic meter; the distribution of the various forms between books I and III is more or less equal.

C. 1.1–9 present a conspectus of both the book's metrical forms and its topics; the sequence of the metrical forms is as carefully designed as that of the themes. The stichic (A), epodic (B), and stanza (C) forms are arranged in the sequence ABCCBBCCB, with the two types of Asclepiadean stanzas in the middle (1.5 and 6), arranged so that both sections feature a stanza type aaab (1.2 and 1.6) and one type aabc (1.5 and 1.9) in perfectly parallel order; this balances the chiasmic arrangement of the two Asclepiadean stanzas in the middle. The prologue (C. 1.1), corresponding to the final poem of the whole collection (C. 3.30), is set apart as the only stichic poem. The following two sections, 1.2–5 and 1.6–9, in their metrically parallel sequence, present the major themes of Horace's poetry (apart from poetic self-presentation, already dealt with in C. 1.1) twice, but in different order: gods and politics (A: 1.2), friendship and ethics (B: 1.3), nature, life in the face of death as an invitation to enjoyment (C: 1.4), and love (D: 1.5). Poem 1.7 clearly echoes 1.3, 1.8, 1.5, and 1.9, 1.4; 1.7 and 1.9 both add to the main topic a symposiastic setting. The *recusatio* 1.6 marks the beginning of a new section, it is so to speak a programmatic postscript to 1.1, and develops the relationship between politics (from 1.2) and lighter themes, love in particular, now combined with wine and thus precluding the symposiastic aspect in 1.7 and 1.9. Poem 1.6 takes up both the programmatic statement of 1.1 and the central topic of 1.2 and, at the same time, follows aptly upon 1.5, where the range of topics from the most solemn (politics and gods) to the lowest topic (love), corresponding to a consistent decrease in poem length from 1.2 to 1.5 (52 : 40 : 20 : 16), comes full circle. If the metrical sequence in the two series 2–5 and 6–9 is symmetrical and parallel, the thematic sequence varies: ABCD vs. A' (= A^(DC))BDC. This arrangement may have suggested itself because with 3 and 4, two poems with 40 : 20 (i.e. 2 : 1) lines, and, correspondingly, with 7 and 8, two poems with 32 : 16 (i.e. 2 : 1) lines, follow each other. The attempt to achieve numerical symmetry in Book II has already been noted above.⁶³ In Book I poems either of equal length or with numbers of lines where the one is a precise multiple of the other are quite often set side by side (1.12/ 13 = 60 : 20; 13/14; 18/19; 24/25; 26/27 = 12 : 24; 32/33/34; 35/36 = 40 : 20; 37/38 = 32 : 8); there are

⁶³ See pp. 214 f.

similar examples in Book III (3.17/18; 3.29–31 = 16 : 64 : 16). We may be sure that this is not due to chance; by arranging poems in such sequences Horace could achieve at least some numerical symmetries without recasting poems. The corpus of the *Carmina* was large enough to allow such a procedure; the small corpus of the *Epodes* was not; numerical symmetry is absent there.

We have already observed that in the *Epodes* the change from pure iambics to a iambo-dactylic meter marked a change in character and subject matter. In the *Odes* we find a subtle relationship between meter and poetic register—elevated topics like politics and panegyrics (Sapphic: 1.2, 12, 3.14; Alcaic: 1.37; 2.1; 3.1–6; Asclepiadean: 1.14) and hymns to gods and religion (Sapphic: 1.10, 30; 3.11, 18; Alcaic: 1.31, 34, 35, also the quasi-hymnic 3.21; Asclepiadean: 1.21), except 1.19, which is more a love poem than a hymn⁶⁴—always go together with the stanza form. Stichic meters are reserved almost exclusively for prologue and epilogue or sententious poems like 1.11 and even more so 1.18 (the only exception is 3.11, a unique experiment in a completely different meter). These poems have a more or less prosaic tone; 1.1 and 3.30 are programmatic poems; the stylistic register may thus be seen as a kind of pointed understatement. All other poems on the poet, his vocation, the nature of his poetry, the divine protection he enjoys, are written in stanza forms (Sapphic: 1.22, 32; Alcaic: 1.17, 26, 2.19, 20; Asclepiadean: 1.6, 2.12), except 3.25. It appears that the Sapphic stanza is prevalent in panegyrics (1.2, 12; 3.14) and hymns (1.10, 30; 3.11, 18⁶⁵); poems that lean toward serious reflection on matters of politics (1.37; 2.1; 3.1–6), religion (1.31, 34, 35), or ethics (3.29) are preferably written in the Alcaic stanza. The Asclepiadean stanza is almost absent from such topics; among the hymns only 1.21 and among the political poems only 1.14, still echoing the spirit of the *Epodes*, is written in this meter. We also find it in the two *recusationes* in *Carmina* I–III, 1.6 and 2.12, two poems that evidently exhibit a pointedly light character. The Asclepiadean stanza appears to indicate a lower stylistic register than that of the Sapphic or Alcaic stanza; most of the stichic and epodic poems not by chance use Asclepiads, and all but one stichic meter are Asclepiads. Some of them, as well as the iambic 2.18 and 1.7, written in a pattern already found in the *Epodes*, still show something of the manly spirit of the *Epodes* (1.7) or even an element of invective or at least vituperation (1.3; 2.18;

⁶⁴ Below, pp. 339 ff.

⁶⁵ Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 472 point out that among the Horatian stanza forms the Sapphic stanza is the closest to the stanza form of Catullus's hymn on Diana (34), which appears to have been a metrical form common for Paeans in Hellenistic times.

3.15, 19, 24). The two unique epodic forms in the ‘Parade Odes,’ 1.4 and 8, are reserved for poems that emphasize their character as miniatures. Thus, everything except the most exalted themes, reserved for the Alcaic and the Sapphic stanza, can be cast in a large variety of stylistic levels, ranging—in an ascending line—from epodic patterns over Asclepiadean to Sapphic or Alcaic stanzas.

Thus, epodic meters lean toward parataxis, shorter sentences, and accord between verse and syntax boundaries (e.g., most of 1.4); stanza forms tend, at the extreme end of the spectrum, toward long, overarching hypotactic or participial structures that ignore metrical boundaries (1.2). As the analysis below will show, the nine introductory poems display every facet of Horace’s style, which oscillates between these two poles. In epodic meter, too, the syntax (mostly paratactic) can either ostentatiously violate verse or even distich/stanza boundaries (e.g., 1.8) or extend to larger units (1.3). In stanza forms the syntax can either be accord precisely with stanza boundaries (1.6), or, where it ostentatiously violates those boundaries, just reach a little over one stanza only (1.5). One might say the juxtaposition of 1.3 beside 1.4 and 1.7 beside 1.8 shows how the epodic mode can be adjusted to different topics and stylistic levels; 1.2 versus 1.5 demonstrates the same for the lyric stanza style, whereas 1.4 versus 1.9 show how the same topic can be treated in a different manner, by adjusting to it either the epodic or the stanza style.

2.2. C. 1.1 and 2

C. 1.1 (Maecenas atavis)

Horace frames his collection with two ‘programmatic’ poems, 1.1 and 3.30, distinguished by their meter (stichic minor Asclepiadean), which is not used elsewhere in the first collection of *Carmina*.⁶⁶ There are other poems where Horace speaks explicitly of his art, namely C. 1.6,⁶⁷ toward the end of the first book in C. 1.32,⁶⁸ and, of course, in C. 2.1 and 2.12.⁶⁹ But C. 1.1 and 3.30 are different: the other poems, such as other passages from the *Epistles* (1.19.19–34) or from the *Satires* (in 1.4, 10 and 2.1), speak of the specific character and themes of Horace’s poetry, often, as in C. 1.6, 2.1 and 12, in explicit opposition to another type of poetry. In C. 1.1 Horace does not say much about what his poetry is like, he talks, above all, about his choice of being

⁶⁶ Only later in C. 4.8, another programmatic statement; now in the middle of the book.

⁶⁷ Below, pp. 256 f.

⁶⁸ Below, pp. 281 f., 347.

⁶⁹ Below, pp. 241, 283 f.

a poet. His poetry is defined as lyric poetry on a Lesbian model, but this is rather vague. In *C.* 1.6, 2.1, and 2.12 we find a common form of programmatic statements by Augustan poets, the *recusatio*: the poet defines his poetry and its subject matter in contrast to another type of poetry from which he distances himself. In *C.* 1.1, the contrast is one between the poet and others, the poet and the world.

C. 1.1 is written in stichic meter; of course, it respects what we call Meinelke's law, but stichic meter per se does not suggest units that contain a certain number of lines. Yet, *C.* 1.1 exhibits a very clear-cut macro- and microstructure, which tends to isolate blocks of two or four lines. The poet's choice of life is presented in the topical form of a priamel series⁷⁰ that *eo ipso* implies a clear-cut bipartite structure: a normally longer part A ('others') with shorter appendix B ('I'). Thus, the emphatic *me* in l. 29 (repeated in anaphora in the middle of l. 30) divides the 36 lines of *C.* 1.1 into A: 1–28 : B: 29–36 = 28 : 8 ll. Part B is divided into one sentence of six lines, only split by the anaphora in mid verse, expanded by a long, hypotactic appendix, and a final distich that returns to Maecenas, who was addressed in the opening distich (ll. 1f.).⁷¹ This division of eight ll. into 6 : 2 ll. corresponds to the structure of A, which begins with the address to Maecenas of 2 ll.; then the long priamel series of ll. 3–28 is split into blocks of two or four lines, clearly marked by sense pause. The first *exemplum*, the athlete, occupies four lines (3–6); the next four-line unit features two professions in antithesis with two anaphoric isocola of 2 ll. (*hunc, si ... illum, si ...*) for each one (politician vs. landowner; ll. 7–10). Lines 11–14 and 15–17 continue with two four-line units reserved for one profession each. Now, the two professions, the landowner and the merchant, are diametrically opposed. Moreover, the representative of each profession is presented as engaging or not engaging in two diametrically opposed activities (staying at home vs. going to sea), in the first case in a complex hypotactical structure beginning with a participial phrase. In the second case, the contrasting paratactical structure (again beginning with a participial phrase strictly parallel to ll. 11.) is divided after the 3rd half verse (= 1½ : 2½), whereas in ll. 11–14 the subordinate clause begins after the 5th half verse (= 2½ : 1½). Lines 11–14

⁷⁰ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 3 for bibliography, to which add Dornseiff 1921: 97 ff.; Kröhling 1935; Race 1982.

⁷¹ The transmitted text in 32–36, which Shackleton Bailey doubts, is probably sound, but see Delz 1988: 500. Cf. also Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 9; Horace pays homage to his patron; what he might have thought of Maecenas's literary talent as a writer is another matter. The recent interpretation of Kovacs (2010) is plainly absurd.

feature the landowner from ll. 9f. The division of ll. 7–14 into 4 : 4 ll. is undercut by a division into 2 : 6 ll. (landowner vs. sailor). Line 19, with *est qui*, resumes the *sunt qui* of l. 3 at the head of another four-line unit (19–22): the hedonist (the anaphora after the first trochaeus in ll. 21f., *nunc ... nunc*, after *spernit ... stratus* echoes the anaphora *si ... si* in ll. 7–9). The last two *exempla* together occupy six lines (23–28), and the split between them (soldier/hunter) occurs in the first half of l. 25 (this time not at the middle caesura!) with marked enjambment; yet, there is a substructure, marked by *seu ... seu* at the beginning of the lines, which sets apart the last two lines (27f.) and suggests again a sequence 4 + 2, in strict analogy to the concluding section, ll. 29–36 (B).

The internal symmetry of the Asclepiadean line, with its subdivision into two halves by a middle caesura between two *longa*, is emphasized by the often symmetrical division of noun and adjective in the two half lines (7–10, 12, 14, 15, 19–22, 26–28). This structure almost inevitably leads to homoioteleuton (in *-is*, *-os*, *-o*, *-i*, *-ae*, *-(b)us*)⁷² between the ends of lines and half lines, and the four- or two-line units are sharply set apart by anaphora, antithesis, and parallelism in unobtrusive alternation; anaphora never occurs at line beginnings. After the series of the first four more or less different periods (ll. 3–18), *est qui* in l. 19 ostentatiously refers back to *sunt qui* (3) at the beginning of the series; thus the microscopic division of the long enumeration is balanced by a long, overarching structure: 16 (ll. 2–18) : 10 (19–28) lines. This careful rhetorical design shows Horace as a master of prose diction. In this poem Horace endows the rhetoric of charmingly simple prose with a distinctly lyrical flavor, achieved mainly by a word order that is sometimes a little artificial or by an accumulation of Greek names. The overall arrangement (A: 28: 2 : 4 : 4 = [2 + 2] : 4 : 4 : 4 : 6 = [2^{1/2} + 3^{1/2} /] 4 + 2; B: 8 = 6 + 2) with the initial sequence 2 + 4 subtly creates the impression of a syntax that carefully oscillates between divergence and coincidence of the syntactical units, with an underlying four-line pattern, in analogy to what we find in the *Odes*, composed in four-line stanzas.⁷³

⁷² A device of prose rhetoric; in verses with fixed middle caesura homoioteleuta occur inevitably from time to time (see Norden 1898: 830f.), in Asclepiadeans with the caesura between two *longa* even more so. Yet, one can observe that such assonances are carefully avoided in most poems with minor or major Asclepiadeans (e.g., C. 3.30 has only one homoioteleuton). The rare cases where homoioteleuta occurs *en masse* (e.g. C. 1.12) cannot be chance.

⁷³ More or less the same in C. 1.18 and 3.30; not C. 1.11.

The priamel, with which Horace begins, has been used from earliest times to introduce a choice of life.⁷⁴ It passed into rhetoric, where comparable topics became the subject of declamations.⁷⁵ Horace opens his priamel series with a distinct Pindaric reminiscence⁷⁶ by referring to the Olympic charioteer, even if his words do not refer to a specific Pindaric model (cf. Pi. fr. 221 SM). The loose sequence, in which a variety of occupations (athlete, politician, farmer, merchant, the hedonist, soldier, hunter) are mentioned, creates an archaic impression due to its lack of order, recalling somehow the Pindaric style. From the Pindaric charioteer the series turns to contemporary Roman life. Horace had begun the first book of the *Satires* in the dedicatory poem to Maecenas by enumerating partly the same professions as in *C.* 1.1 (merchant, soldier, farmer, *iuris consultus*); in the *Satires* he attacks people's foolish discontent with their lifestyles. There we find a merchant who, in view of the dangers of seafaring, prefers a soldier's life and a busy lawyer who yearns for a farmer's life. This is echoed in the antithetic style of the priamel in *C.* 1.1; *C.* 1.1.15–18 present—in contrast to a big landowner whose riches make it easy for him to despise a merchant's risky life—a merchant who fears the dangers at sea and longs for the leisure of country life, but is unable to moderate his greed. At first it seems as if Horace here speaks of misguided ambitions; indeed, the new beginning in ll. 19–22 turns to the hedonist (their natural counterpart), who is actually content with a simple, leisurely country life. However, this is not the contrast that marks the end of the priamel: the hedonist's country life—which is what one might expect Horace to prefer for himself—is just one in a series of lifestyles that are not those of the poet. In the following lines the soldier's and the hunter's choices of lifestyle are presented as something paradoxical: both prefer an occupation that implies hardship and disadvantage. The priamel series in ll. 3–28 unobtrusively ranges between evocations of Greece, faraway places, and contemporary Rome, the style between archaic disorder and seemingly offhand prose, while the tone conceals reminiscences of poetic solemnity under an overrunning subtle 'satiric' irony: whatever lifestyle a man may choose, it is only the expression of a sort of personal weakness, he cannot do else.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ See Dornseiff 1921: 100; Kröhling 1935: 45 ff.; Joly 1956: 12 ff.; Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 2 f.; Harbach 2010: 170 ff.

⁷⁵ See Bonner 1969: 4.

⁷⁶ For further affinities of the series of lifestyles with Pindar, cf. Harms 1936: 29 ff.

⁷⁷ Thus, the original Greek concept that the poet is just an instrument of the Muses (Maehler 1963: 17) reappears in this 'ironic' inversion of the 'Lebenswahl'-motif as Horace applies it to the poet.

Thus, even the vocation that Horace, in ll. 29–36, claims for himself, is not so much one of his own choosing: he cannot but be what he is. He is a poet because divine powers chose to separate him from the rest of the world. The priamel series of ll. 3–29 may lack a distinct order, yet a common trait runs through most of the examples. From ll. 9 onward, with the sole interruption of the soldier, the ambiente is the countryside; after the country life of the landowner and the sailor as landowner manqué and the outdoor activities of the hedonist in ll. 19 ff. we enter, with 29 ff., the idyllic space in which the poet lives by divine vocation. This space is depicted as the topical grove of the Muses, peopled by Nymphs, Satyrs, and two of the goddesses themselves, Euterpe and Polyhymnia.

In *Serm.* 1.6 Horace had prided himself on the fact that the pureness of his life and character had won Maecenas's approval;⁷⁸ in *C.* 1.1 Horace presents his choice of lifestyle to his patron and friend Maecenas to whom he had already dedicated the *Satires* and *Epodes*. In the first couplet the poet addresses him with conventional epithets, lauding his royal ancestry; then the tone falls from the height of *atauis edite regibus* "descended from royal lineage" over the prosaic *praesidium* "protection" to the intimate *dulce decus*: Maecenas is Horace's *decus*, i.e., 'he who confers distinction on him',⁷⁹ because beyond any material gain, through Maecenas's friendship he had regained a meaningful position in Roman society: his position as a poet. Maecenas's approval is thus crucial for Horace's self-esteem as a poet, just as Maecenas's approval of his character was crucial for his self-esteem as a man: it is Maecenas's judgment that will establish Horace as a lyric poet.

Old as the 'Lebenswahl'-motif is, it is by no means common that a poet presents his being a poet, purely and simply, as a choice. The aristocrat Pindar may define his role as a poet in pointed contrast and analogy to his ruler patrons; in Bacchylides (10.38 ff.) we find the poet in a priamel as one profession among others. Of course, the concept that the poet via his relationship to the Muses is part of the realm of the divine is as old as Greek poetry.⁸⁰ An aristocrat-poet like Pindar may dissociate himself from the crowd and style himself as a priest of the Muses. He thereby shaped a concept that offered itself to the Alexandrian poets when they intended to express their self-consciousness as elect artists for elect connoisseurs, in

⁷⁸ Above, pp. 23 ff.

⁷⁹ There is no proper word to translate *decus* in the sense required, cf. Günther 2010a: 14 n. 47.

⁸⁰ Cf. Maehler 1963: 16 ff.

analogy to Pindar's σύννετοι, "those who possess insight." Yet, that the poet is segregated in this pointed way from the world of ordinary men merely by being a poet goes beyond a mere claim of divine inspiration. The poet may (like Hesiod) find his inspiration by dwelling in a certain place where he is visited by divine powers. It thus became a topos that in order to become initiated the poet is transferred to a place associated with divine powers of inspiration, such as Mount Helikon or Parnassus, or to a place with certain topical attributes, like the grove of the Muses to which Horace refers. But the contrast between the poet, who lives in an ideal world, in pointed contrast to other men, who inhabit the world of ordinary, everyday life has, as far as we know, never been expressed in this pointed manner.

The closest we can come to Horace separating himself categorically from other men by his poetic profession is the old stereotype of the absentminded scholar, the unworldly intellectual, which is at least as old as Plato (*Theaet.* 174a4 ff.; cf. also Arist., *Pol.* 1259a9 ff.; DL 1.26; Cic. *Div.* 1.49.111). The motif has been exploited ironically; it can also appear in comparisons between the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplative*.⁸¹ Horace exploits the motif not only in *Epist.* 1.1.77 ff., it can be found behind the self-ironical attitude toward his poetic 'amateurishness' in *Epist.* 2.1.108 ff., where he includes himself among the dilettanti who are incurably mad with poetry, but are, in contrast to others, stricken only by a harmless madness because it induces them to despise wealth.⁸² In fact, Horace had already excused himself in *Serm.* 2.1.1 ff. by saying that unfortunately he is mad with poetry and therefore unable to stop bothering people with satiric verses. In ll. 24 ff. we even find a priamel. As we have already seen, there is a very small dose of similarly mild self-irony present even in *C.* 1.1. Yet, the context in which we have to view *C.* 1.1 is a different one.

The 'Lebenswahl'-motif was, as far as we know, introduced to programmatic statements at the beginning of poetry books by the Roman elegists.⁸³ It dominates the whole prologue to Propertius's second book of elegies: the poet presents himself as incurably struck by love and thus unable to write about anything else but his *domina*; the poet's life until his death is completely devoted to her alone. But in the *Monobiblos* Propertius had already stated his intention to write love poetry and nothing else, depicting himself as having fallen in love for the first time and without cure. Later, in the

⁸¹ Joly 1956: 100 ff.; *passim*.

⁸² See Günther 2010a: 54 f.

⁸³ Wimmel 1960: 13 ff.; Wenzel 1968: 2 ff.; Kröhling 1935: 49 ff.

recusatio in 1.7, he excuses himself for not writing epic poetry: he is busy with pleasing his beloved—as in 1.6 he refused to accompany his patron on military excursions because of his total devotion to love. Tibullus, in the proem of his first book of elegies, never speaks of his poetry, he just presents his ‘Lebenswahl’: he wishes to enjoy a simple life in the countryside beside his beloved, rejecting wealth and military service. In fact it is characteristic of Tibullus not to use literary topoi directly, but to allude to them *en passant* or to give them a slightly different turn. Here he reduces the priamel, topical in the ‘Lebenswahl’-context, to a contrast between the life of the poor farmer and the wealthy man, whose life is exposed to war and strife.

The elegiac poet presents his choice of poetic subject matter as a choice of life; this is a statement to the effect that his poetry is the expression of his life’s devotion to an ideal love that shapes itself as an ideal world, in pointed contrast to the realities of the outside world in its brutality and triviality, an ideal world filled with a great feeling that aspires to the pure and the beautiful, uncontaminated by physical reality. In C. 1.1.23 ff. Horace alludes to elegy, both with the hunter, who prefers outdoor activities to staying with his tender spouse, and with the soldier; *lituo tubae permixtus sonitus*, “the sound of horns and trumpets,” is quite similar to Tibullus’s *Martia cui somnos classica pulsa fugent*, “[him] whose sleep is put to flight by trumpet calls” (1.1.4). For the elegiac poet it is easy to present his poetic vocation as a choice of life: his poetry is dedicated exclusively to one theme, and this theme is the content of his life. Elegiac poetry is in fact the poetic expression of a certain style of life.⁸⁴ In *Serm.* 2.1.23 ff., more or less contemporary with Propertius’s and Tibullus’s Book I, Horace defends his weakness for poetry: poetry is the same to him as it was for his model Lucilius, it is a sole companion to whom he can confide his most intimate secrets.⁸⁵ However, he does not and indeed could not style his addiction to poetry as a vocation; moreover, Horace speaks of a certain type of poetry, personal poetry in the Lucilian manner. It’s his habit to write such poetry, it’s not a distinction.

In C. 1.1 Horace goes further: it is his privilege to be a poet, and the poetry he declares to be his own is not bound to any particular topic or specific character, he defines it only as Lesbian lyrics. He presents it as his choice to be a poet and nothing else. And in this quality he is different from other men, he inhabits a world different from that of other men, with their occupations, aspirations, and cares. With his characteristic understatement,

⁸⁴ See Griffin 1995: 32 ff.; Günther 2002: 24 ff.

⁸⁵ Above, pp. 4f.

Horace presents himself as a man who cannot help being a poet whether he wishes to or not. His attitude is the humility of someone who knows that the privilege he owns is not of his own choosing and powers but a grace bestowed upon him by a power beyond this world. And when he drops the word *vates*, in speaking of the lyric poets, he gives it, as he did in *Epod.* 16,⁸⁶ a precise sense; at the same time, by combining this distinctly Roman word for the poet with the Greek loanword *lyricus*,⁸⁷ he expresses the fusion of Greek and Roman poetry to which he aspires.

Lesbian poetry implies a certain form, it does not necessarily imply specific topics or a character as restricted as Archilochean poetry,⁸⁸ and Horace will, in what follows, cover a wide range of subject matter. The catalogue of lifestyles in ll. 3–28 is like a kaleidoscope of the themes that will be the subject of Horace's lyric poetry: Pindaric praise (3–6); politics (7 f.); human life with its temptations, its precarious nature, its exposure to death (9–18); withdrawal into a hedonistic life close to nature; the beauties and joys of the countryside; love; and war. All these are attitudes, activities, and cares of people who are exposed, whether they know it or not, to the impulses of their life in the real world; the poet who lives segregated from them in the ideal world of poetry remains untouched by all their aspirations, fragile and imperfect. These aspirations are all due to the fact that ordinary men live in the material world with its ambition, greed, anguish; even enjoyment and love belong there. Like Lucretius's (2.1 ff.) wise man from the *munita edita doctrina sapientum templa serena* (2.7 f.), the "calm regions, embattled on the heights by the teaching of the wise," the poet looks down on worldly passions from his place close to the stars (l. 36), living the untroubled and detached life of the 'easy-living' gods. Under his eyes the real world blends with the ideal, the geography of ll. 3–28 ranges from Pindar's Olympia to the Roman *forum*; from a big Italian landowner's business interests in Libya to Pergamon, the Aegean sea, and Greece's ancient myths; to the Italian countryside and its resonance in the idyllic landscape of Virgil and Tibullus. Seen from the divine realm; animated by the inhabitants of the Greek 'Musen-landschaft' where the poet dwells, the world of contemporary Roman reality dissolves into a timeless cosmos where the Roman is ennobled by the Greek, the present by the past, the Greek revived by the Roman, the ancient by the new. In this ideal world of poetry there is no room for the particular, as

⁸⁶ Above, pp. 191 ff., 208.

⁸⁷ Cf. Szlezák 2010: 60 ff.

⁸⁸ Above, pp. 191 ff.

such; this poetry is above life. However, it does not exclude life. On the contrary, it includes it. It does not depict life in its specific passing expressions, it encompasses life in the manifestations of their timeless significance.

C. 1.2 (*Iam satis teris*)

When in the prologue Horace had announced his aspiration to be a lyric poet in the Lesbian (*Lesboum ... barbiton*, 1.1.34) tradition, he had not said anything about the topics of his poetry. One would expect that after the book's dedication to Maecenas the princeps deserved first place, as he had already appeared at Maecenas's side in *Epod.* 1, and in the second book of *Satires* Horace pays him homage in *Serm.* 2.1. Politics is, of course, among the topics of Lesbian poetry, yet, the latter is certainly not the genre most suited to political panegyrics. In *Epod.* 1 Horace had found an elegant way to pay homage to Augustus; in *Serm.* 2.1 he recurred to the *recusatio*, the usual form of Augustan poets to praise by declining praise that would not fit the poetic genre chosen by the poet or his aesthetic credo.⁸⁹ In the book of *Odes*, however, Horace chose not to decline any longer to engage in outright panegyrics on the princeps; on the contrary, he gives second place to a poem that, together with its counterpart C. 1.12, written in the same meter, is the longest and weightiest of the book.

As the opening poem of the main corpus of text C. 1.2 occupies the most prominent place, one may even guess that Horace chose to prefix the pointedly inconspicuous prologue in order to highlight still more the weight of this long poem in the Sapphic stanza. Thus, in the *Carmina* Horace no longer, as in the *Epodes*, included the ruler in a personal statement of friendship to his patrons and thus presented matters of public concern in the frame of private affairs. If a poem on the ruler follows upon Horace's personal statement about his place as a poet and his relation to his patron, it assumes the rank of a second prologue, a public statement on the role of the poet in public matters: with C. 1.2 Horace announces that political panegyric poetry takes first place among the topics of his lyric poetry. But if this was what Horace chose to do here, he was, of course, faced with the problem of how to integrate panegyrics on the ruler into his chosen poetic genre, and it is interesting to observe how he got around the problem in C. 1.2.

It is useful to look first at the poem's structure. It falls mainly into two sharply contrasting, complementary parts of almost equal length. Six stanzas speak of unfavorable portents sent by Jupiter's wrath upon the Roman

⁸⁹ Below, pp. 256 ff.

people. From this bleak picture from l. 25 onward the poem immediately takes a new twist: after little more than one stanza of a series of vivid questions about which god to invoke to come to the aid of the falling empire, the somber mood of the beginning rises quickly to hope of a bright future in a prayer to a series of gods. The series ends with Mercury, who is suspected to be already present, incarnated in the person of the princeps. Thus, the poem shows an almost perfect symmetry of two sharply contrasting parts joined by a short link between them that prepares the change:⁹⁰ A) 1–24 = 6 stanzas: disastrous portents; B) 25–30a = 1 stanza: “Which god can help?”; A’) 30b–52 = 6 stanzas: prayer to Apollo, Venus, Mars, and Mercury.

The framing parts A and A’ each form a pair of 2 × 3 stanzas, and thus anticipate the consistent triadic structure of C. 1.12 and the *Carmen Saeculare*:⁹¹ A) falls into a) 3 stanzas (ll. 1–12), reserved for the first ill omen, bad weather sent by Jupiter. They are united by one long period, which spans the whole triad. The emphatic opening of the main clause with *iam satis*, “enough now,” which sets the poem from the very beginning in the perspective of the speaker, is reiterated by the emphatic epanalepsis (*terruit*) at the beginning of the second stanza (at the beginning of two consecutive cola, it is almost anaphoric), which strongly emphasizes the feeling of anguish, and is followed by appended subordinated clauses or participial phrases. The change to the second triad (13–24) b), referring to a further bad omen (flooding of the Tiber), is marked by a change to the first person plural *vidimus*, “we saw,” in 13, at the beginning of the line. A period (b1), similar in structure to that in stanzas 1–3, now spans two stanzas (13–18). A change of person and tempus *audiet* (sc. *iuventus* “the younger generation”) interprets the *omina* as forebodings of further civil strife (21–24; b2). Now the hypotactic syntax gives way to two main clauses—the first with an appended subordinate clause—distributed over two lines each, joined by anaphora of the verb (echoing l. 4 and 5), again placed at the opening of the phrase. The ever-decreasing period length creates a dramatic crescendo from the grandiose opening to the fear that inspires the dire forecast (both ll. 5–12 and ll. 21–24 speak of events that threaten the very existence of Rome or even the entire world).

This diminuendo in syntactic complexity prepares for parataxis in ll. 25–30a (B); nevertheless the three consecutive questions, with a short first ending in the middle of the second line and a third that spills over into the

⁹⁰ See also Syndikus 2001: I 57 f.

⁹¹ See below, pp. 364 f.

next stanza and ends abruptly after 1½ lines, mark a new beginning. The turnaround, with the desperate question “which god is suited to bring help by expiating the crime that is the reason for Jupiter’s wrath?” prepares a ‘Reihengebet’⁹² (ll. 30b–52; A’): a first triad (a), in the first stanza (truncated at the beginning) and the consecutive two, names three possible savior gods (a1: Apollo; a2: Venus; a3: Mars⁹³), unequally distributed over the block of text; the last deity, for whom 6 ll. are reserved, occupies far more space than Apollo (2½ ll.) and Venus (2 ll.). In contrast to the desperate questions in 25–28,⁹⁴ an ever more serene atmosphere arises with a gleaming, implicitly youthful Apollo breaking through the clouds (31f.—in contrast to the clouded sky of 1–4), a smiling goddess of love. The *σχετλιασμός* in the long section on Mars, which revives the fears of the beginning (37ff.⁹⁵), renders the culmination of the series of gods in the last triad (41–52; a’) in a fourth and last—at first sight surprising—alternative, again a, even more impressive god: Mercury, who is actually present in the disguise of the young Octavian,⁹⁶ the rightful avenger of Caesar’s murder, which is the crime that caused Jupiter’s wrath. The first stanza (41–44; a’1) of the triad introduces him as a possible alternative in the manner of what precedes, but the two concluding stanzas (44–48 and 49–52; a’2) assume that the hope expressed in 41–44 has come true and continue with a prayer to the princeps him-

⁹² Cf., e.g., Aesch. *ScT* 78–180; see Fraenkel 1957: 247 n. 1, with further references; as the ‘Reihengebet’ in Virg. *G.* 1.5 ff. it ends with Octavian (24 ff.). Horace adapts a regular formula of cletic hymns (see Fraenkel 1974: II 99) by which “the god is addressed by several different titles: ‘Whether you wish to be called A, or (sive) B, or (sive) C or (sive)’ [...] to four different gods”; also West 1995: 13.

⁹³ The savior gods of Octavian (and, of course, the prime addressee of a Paean), the ‘gens Iulia,’ and of Rome; cf. Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 15 f. and Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 30 f.

⁹⁴ After the staccato of the short questions in ll. 25–28, 29–52.

⁹⁵ With *ultorem* in 18 the Ilia story prepares for *Caesaris ultor* in 44; and—almost an *aprosdoketon* (cf. p. 195), yet unobtrusively prepared in 22—the motif of revenge is given a new final twist in 51 f.: the revenge of Caesar’s death was obsolete at the time the poem was written, now Octavian can turn his revenge on the enemy from outside. Commentators too easily gloss over *non* in l. 19, which does not make sense in the context of 1 ff. (only Syndikus 2001: I 47 offers a possible explanation); Shackleton Bailey’s *num* (I would punctuate it ... *labitur ripa—Ioue num probante?*—*u/xorius amnis*; thus I cannot see any syntactical difficulty; Delz [1988: 500] objects, but he acknowledges the difficulty and suggests *comprobante*) as a plausible solution.

⁹⁶ Although Horace had a starting point for the identification Augustus = Mercury in contemporary coinage and art (cf. Syndikus 2001: I 53 f.; Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 34), in the context of his poem, this identification is not an obvious one and is, above all, highly suggestive: it comprises a broad spectrum of connotations (cf. Fraenkel 1957: 248 f.). The prevalent significance of Mercury here seems to me to be his role as an intermediary between gods—Jupiter in particular—and men. He is the incarnation of a divine message.

self, who has been made divine, that he may prolong his protective presence among the Roman people in three cola of increasing length (2–2⁺–4 ll.), with marked enjambment between the stanzas.

The poem's structure could be represented by the following scheme: A) 2 × 3 stanzas = 24 (*a* 12 : *b* 12 [*b*1 8 : *b*2 4 <2 : 2>]) lines : B) 1 stanza⁺ = 6½ (1½ : 2½ : 1½) lines : A') 2 × 3 stanzas⁺ = 24 (*a* 12 [*a*1 2½ : *a*2 2 : *a*3 6] : *a*' = *a*4 12 [*a*'1 4 : *a*'2 8 <2 : 2½ : 3½>] lines. It describes a movement from ever-increasing despair, in a long bipartite first part (A), that builds up a dramatic crescendo by ever-decreasing syntax length and complexity, in accord with stanza boundaries, and then explodes in a short link passage (B) with a further increase in dramatic vividness by changing to paratactic questions with enjambment, spilling over the stanza boundary. Then the mood changes to ever-increasing hope in a finale (A'), of almost exactly the same length as A, but a little shorter because of the dovetailing between B and A'. A' also corresponds to A in its bipartite structure, and balances the decreasing length of cola in A by a crescendo of the ever-increasing length of its periods;⁹⁷ Now, however, the latter are no longer in accord with stanza boundaries and they end with an ostentatious enjambment. The movement toward ever-increasing despair in ll. 1–24 is not monotonous, nor is that toward ever-increasing joy in ll. 29–52; as the latter is interrupted by the *σχετλιασμός*, in the episode on Mars, the former is interrupted by the surreal picturesque description of the deluge and the corresponding allusion to the Roman myth of Ilia, which takes a form one could find slightly amusing. Horace had already exchanged Virgil's Po for the Tiber, now he exchanges Tiber for Ilia's traditional husband Anio,⁹⁸ so that the big river can show his wife what a good and strong husband he is, asking him to avenge her drowning in the flooding the temple of Vesta.

While in the stichic meter of *C.* 1.1 the syntactical structure marked off four-line units, in this poem the long, overarching periods, imitating Pindaric syntax with their series of subordinated clauses or participial constructions appended to the initial main clause, recreate a triadic pattern⁹⁹ by isolating blocks of text that span more than one stanza. Of course, the effect must be rather different from the Pindaric original: in Pindar the meter provides a fixed pattern consisting of long, recurrent units with an extremely complicated substructure, and the loose order of the text with its widely

⁹⁷ A common device in Pindar; for his catalogues, see Race 1990: 20 ff.

⁹⁸ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 26.

⁹⁹ See above, p. 233 with n. 91.

spanned syntax, which heaps one rather irregular period upon the other, is superimposed on it. Horace does his best to create variety in syntactic structure and to achieve monumentality by spanning the period over up to three stanzas. He thus achieves a blending of Pindaric monumentality with the discipline imposed by the much smaller form, with infinitely less metrical variation, a discipline that is entirely Horace's own.

The ill omens at the beginning of *C.* 1.2 refer to *Virg. G.* 1. 463 ff., i.e., the portents following Caesar's death,¹⁰⁰ but Horace, in contrast to Virgil's catalogue of *prodigia*—and, indeed, to the lengthy, disparate priamel series of 1.1¹⁰¹—concentrates on painting, in grand, heavy strokes, two suggestive complementary images of nature running out of control: bad weather, storm and rain (1–12; combining *G.* 1.467 f. and 487 f.), and flood (13–20; cf. *G.* 1.481 ff., replacing the Po by the Tiber). The bad weather is taken as a possible foreboding of a deluge. Horace singles out these two among the many, and mostly much graver portents in Virgil's catalogue, because the passage also refers to Pindar's 9th *Paeon* ll. 11–20.¹⁰² And this makes it abundantly clear that Syndikus¹⁰³ is entirely right in pointing out that it is futile to look for specific contemporary circumstances that would make plausible the fear of civil strife, expressed in ll. 21–24 (combining *G.* 1.474 f. and 489 f.).¹⁰⁴ In order to relate the upheavals Rome suffered until the recent past to *delicta maiorum*, Horace projects himself and his audience back into the past with its desperation and its hope in the *iuvēnis* of Virgil's *Eclogues* (1.42), the savior of *Georgics* (1.500 f.).¹⁰⁵ He asks Jupiter, the avenger of evil deeds and ultimate author of events, to send divine help in whatever form he thinks fit. We need not think of a specific moment of crisis that induced the poet to such pessimism: Horace gives voice to a sentiment of uncertainty that appears to have prevailed even after Octavian's victory at Actium.¹⁰⁶ For all

¹⁰⁰ As regards Nisbet and Hubbard's 1970: 17 objection that the portents could not refer to 44 BC because "the prodigies of 44 were much more serious than Horace's snow and hail, and on the earlier occasion nothing is said about Tiber floods," see Syndikus 2001: I 42 ff.

¹⁰¹ See above, pp. 225 f.

¹⁰² See Rutherford 2001: 189 ff.

¹⁰³ Syndikus 2001: I 38 ff.

¹⁰⁴ That the poem was composed after the victory over Antony, emperor of the East, is the only thing that is certain because of ll. 51 ff. It is strange that even Hutchinson (2008: 138) still opts for a date as late as 27 BC, when he rightly points out that "Mercury's guise is as a *iuvēnis* (41–44), since the god is famed for resembling very young men, this does not suggest a forty-year-old Princeps ..." If anything, this might point to an earlier date.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Kerkhecker in Schwindt 2002: 141.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. also recently Schauer 2007: 15 ff. on the political background of the *Aeneid*.

the official demonstration of ultimate victory, like the triumph over Antony or the closing of the temple of Janus in 29 BC,¹⁰⁷ the new regime had not yet established itself fully, the new political order had not yet found its definite shape. Thus, Octavian appears here as a tangible, yet fragile sign of hope for the future. Rather than plainly asserting Octavian's divine status the poet poses the question: could it be that this young man is the incarnation on earth of a 'message' from the supreme divine ruler that he will save Rome and lead it—at long last,¹⁰⁸ after the crimes of the past have been avenged by legitimate force—to a better future? An ephebic figure, Mercury,¹⁰⁹ in the disguise of the young Octavian is a strange and surprising image, even more extravagant¹¹⁰ than the "frivolous Alexandrian *miniatures*"¹¹¹ of the *adynata* in the description of the deluge (preparing the flooding of the Tiber in ll. 13 ff.), to which the sinister *omina* in 5–12 are compared. Yet, if we think of *Epod.* 16, we are used to extravagant, utopian suggestions of the Horatian *vates* in order to find relief from the unbearable circumstances of a present, which appear to be beyond remedy.¹¹²

With the beginning of *C.* 1.2 Horace projects his readers back to the situation of his last but one *Epode*. Thus, the Lesbian poet Horace of the *Odes* seems to place himself in the line of the 'political Archilochus' of the *Epodes*, but develops his stance as a *vates* in a quite different, surprising direction. Now, the poet's song ends not in despair, but in hope, a hope that from its first spark announces itself in the bright light of ephebic youth, with Apollo breaking through the clouds, and finally incarnates itself in the mysterious youth of Virgil's *Eclogues* (1.40–45), reappearing in *G.* 500 with explicit reference to Octavian as Caesar's avenger, who was a faint, extra-worldly, but inalienable token of divine protection.¹¹³ He also refers back—as regards poetic imagery—to the *nascens puer* of *Ecl.* 5.8: youth, infancy mark a new beginning, the hope for something fresh and innocent.¹¹⁴ With this shining image the poem 'arrives' at long last—from the depth of the sinister reasoning on past sufferings at the beginning—at the still

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Kienast 2009: 80.

¹⁰⁸ *Tandem* (l. 29), characteristic for supplications; see Syndikus 2001: I 52 n. 50.

¹⁰⁹ See above, p. 234 n. 96.

¹¹⁰ "[T]he idea [...] is due, not to the influence of some actual cult, but to a fancy of the poet," Fraenkel 1957: 248.

¹¹¹ In the words of Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 21.

¹¹² Above, pp. 191 ff., 208.

¹¹³ He is called *praesens* in Virg. *Ecl.* 1.41, on which see Claussen 1994: 47; below, p. 366.

¹¹⁴ Cf. below, pp. 376 and 382 on *C.* 3.1 and 2.

precarious present with its hope that this divine revelation could be true, a prayer that divine protection will last this time. A sudden change of mood or atmosphere in the middle of a poem is a device Horace uses elsewhere. Here, it is particularly effective because of the weather imagery that runs through the whole poem; it allows the pointed metamorphosis of the storm at the beginning into the bright, light air of the clean sky with a god being carried aloft by a passing breeze (*volat* 34, *ales* 42, *ocior aura/ tollat* 48f.).¹¹⁵

The poem hints at political slogans and concepts of the day (44ff.: *Caesaris ultor, pater, princeps*,¹¹⁶ victory in the East¹¹⁷). It does not, however, aim at presenting any political program or an interpretation of contemporary politics in poetic dress—this is what Horace does in other poems later in the collection.¹¹⁸ *C.* 1.2 embodies an aesthetic transfiguration of hope in the person of the princeps. The poem does not analyze, it transforms contemporary reality into an aesthetic vision. By taking the poet's liberty, the liberty of breaking through the clouds of the recent past, transforming it by a glance through the present, still fragile moment of relief into the light of a brighter future, Horace finds a way of integrating panegyric poetry into his poetic program without betraying it. Not by chance Horace has chosen this poem to be the *πρόσωπον τηλαυγές* of his first collection of lyric poetry; it is one of the finest poems he ever wrote.

When Horace set himself the task of writing panegyric poetry on the princeps, he had to handle the problem of how to integrate it into the genre of lyric poetry in Aeolic meter. With *C.* 1.2 he solved the problem with utter perfection: with ll. 1–24 he firmly positions his poem in the context of his previous political poetry on civil strife; from ll. 25ff. onward he converts the whole first part into the prelude of a cletic hymn, perfectly in the ambit of Lesbian lyrics and in line with Alcaeus's poetry.¹¹⁹ The introduction that, by its extraordinary length, had gained independent weight, assumes the function of describing a dangerous situation, one that motivates the prayer

¹¹⁵ To accuse Horace of an offence to moderation and rationality (Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 20) or to be shocked by Horace's "coupling of a single autocrat with the ancient Roman people" (op. cit. 254) in *C.* 1.21 shows remarkable insensitivity for the public attitude of Horace's time; *C.* 1.2 is not particularly rational, but it is a perfect expression of the public mood described by Schefold 1964: 18 (cf. also id. 1985: 37) at the highest artistic level. For the Augustan ruler cult, see below, p. 397 n. 677.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Syndikus 2001: I 55f.

¹¹⁷ See above, pp. 340, 375, 383, 397, 465.

¹¹⁸ See below, pp. 360ff., 373ff.

¹¹⁹ Lyne 2007: 299f. even thought that with Apollo and Mercury Horace alludes to the first two poems in the Alexandrian collection of Alcaeus; however, this is perhaps too far-fetched; see below, p. 278 and Knox below, p. 538.

in analogy with Pindar's 9th Paean (ll. 13–20),¹²⁰ written on the occasion of a solar eclipse.¹²¹ There, the solar eclipse provoked fear of war, bad weather, and floods. In Horace, bad weather and floods, two of Virgil's *omina* after Caesar's death, replace the solar eclipse as the natural scenario; Pindar's hint at the Deucalion story is expanded into a picturesque miniature by replacing Virgil's Po with the Tiber. Horace thus has the opportunity of inserting a second reference, now to a Roman myth that contrasts the bizarre 'Kleinmalerei' in the deluge. The sound of weapons, one of Virgil's *omina*, is used to express fear about the outcome. With Apollo taking first place in the 'Reihengebet' of ll. 30 ff., the introduction establishes itself as the scenario for an apotropaic paean motivated by a natural disaster¹²² in analogy to Pindar's 9th Paean. Hellenistic classification, where ὕμνος was used as a general term for religious song, drew no clear line between the two, and paean and hymn were often confused.¹²³ Alcaeus's hymn to Apollo (fr. 1 LP), which holds first place in the Hellenistic edition of his poems, is called either a ὕμνος, a προσίμιον, or a παιάν by our ancient sources.¹²⁴ Augustus's superhuman status allows the poet to praise him in a hymn, the religious counterpart to the secular ἐγκώμιον (Procl., *Chrest.* 319bff., pp. 40f. Severyns; Men. Rhet. 331.15 ff.¹²⁵); paeans were addressed to living rulers in Hellenistic times.¹²⁶ The poem is an extremely complex mosaic of bits and pieces taken from widely different sources melted into an organic unity where every detail has its place and function in the organization of the whole.

We have seen that the portents of ll. 1 ff. do not refer to a contemporary situation and thus they cannot be used for dating *C.* 1.2, but the extravagant exaltation of Octavian to quasi-divine status best suits a date either before or not too long after Octavian's return from the East, i.e., 29 or early 28 BC.¹²⁷

2.3. *C.* 1.3, 4, and 5

C. 1.3 (Sic te, diva, potens)

The poem is dedicated to Virgil, is third in the collection, and is one of the least attractive poems of the book, but it is interesting for Horace's manner

¹²⁰ Cf. Waszink 1966: 115.

¹²¹ See Rutherford 2001: 192 ff.

¹²² Rutherford 2001: 36 ff. with reference to Horace's poem; also Käppel 1992: 46.

¹²³ Rutherford 2001: 92.

¹²⁴ Rutherford 2001: 27 f.

¹²⁵ Cf. Harvey 1955.

¹²⁶ Rutherford 2001: 57 f.; on Horace and Pindar's paeans, see also Barchiesi in Woodman and Feeney 2002: 112 ff.

¹²⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 18; Nisbet in Harrison 2007a: 13.

of versification. The first eight lines, a farewell address to the departed ship¹²⁸ on which a friend had embarked for a journey to Attica, sets the scene for a propemptikon; but then the poem develops increasingly into a trite rhetorical topos: a moralizing attack on navigation and a diatribe on inventiveness and human hybris, provoking divine anger and revenge.¹²⁹ Everything starts with a σχετλιασμός, typical for the genre: a curse on navigation's πρῶτος εὐρετής, its first inventor. After that, the rejection of navigation develops into a general attack on inventiveness and human hybris provoking divine punishment. In the *Epodes* we have observed that Horace aspired to widening the thematic range of the genre. One reason why he appears to have shifted his attention to Lesbian lyrics was that they enabled him to accommodate almost any topic that was of concern to him more easily than in a genre mainly associated with a concept as narrow as invective. However, even in the *Odes*, Horace obviously felt obliged to integrate every general discourse as much as possible into the conventions of the lyric genre. Thus, we have seen in C. 1.2 that Horace had put panegyrics on Augustus into the form of a hymn, an acceptable subcategory of Lesbian poetry. C. 1.3 is a prime example of how Horace tries to integrate philosophical diatribe or general reflections on any given topic into the frame of what he conceived as proper for the lyric genre.¹³⁰

As we have seen, the *Epodes* explored the gnomic and paraenetic element of archaic Greek iambus and elegy. Now, versification of philosophical diatribe becomes one of the key elements of the lyric poetry of the *Odes*. Norden has rightly called attention to the fact that Horace's most original thematic input into the lyric genre is his 'philosophische Gedankenlyrik.'¹³¹ Poems simply concentrating on a gnomic truism can easily be accommodated in a symposiastic setting, as we have already seen in *Epod.* 13. In C. 1.11,¹³² Horace is particularly careful to construct a situation relevant in more than one respect to his advice of *carpe diem*: in the poem's addressee one may recognize a female companion who had consulted the stars on the couple's behalf. As in *Epod.* 13 a storm is raging outside: enjoyment that is possible even in unfavorable circumstances renders anxiety about the future unnecessary;

¹²⁸ For the problematic *sic*, see Syndikus 2001: I 59 f.

¹²⁹ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 43 f.

¹³⁰ On the whole problem, see also below, pp. 313 ff.

¹³¹ See Norden 1998: 57 f.; Norden's observation is true quite apart from his negative judgment, which one need not share. On the influence of prose, philosophical prose in particular, see also Kroll 1915.

¹³² Below, pp. 218, 277.

the advice to enjoy may suggest erotic undertones.¹³³ Often Horace tries—using a technique quite similar to one that appears later in the *Epistles*,¹³⁴ only there the addressee is, of course, conceived as absent—to construct his reflections around a concrete situation as a starting point. There are cases in which he succeeds in integrating even more extended reflections on a general topic plausibly and unobtrusively into a situation fitting personal lyric poetry as he conceived it: e.g., in *C.* 2.4 the setting is again a typical scene of symposiastic poetry,¹³⁵ and with *C.* 1.16, analyzed below,¹³⁶ moral advice is integrated in the most elegant, unobtrusive, even slightly amusing way into an erotic poem.

In the two poems of consolation on death, *C.* 1.24 and 2.9, the moralizing reflections are strictly relevant to the addressee and his specific situation. In *C.* 2.11 and 1.7 too, Horace places the addressee in a situation or mood that fits the poet's advice, with the same result: Quinctius's fears of war in 2.11, Plancus's being away on a military excursion and supposedly longing for home and retirement in 1.7.¹³⁷ Sometimes, however, as in *C.* 1.3, the setting of the poem is only a tag for a discourse that strays far from the beginning. In *C.* 1.3, the discourse on hybris is integrated by simply hooking it on the topical *σχετλιασμός*. In *C.* 1.37, the invitation to drink to Octavian's victory leads to an invective on Cleopatra, while in *C.* 1.18, the addressee (perhaps the lawyer Alfenus Varus¹³⁸) is placed in the situation of an Alcaean motto (fr. 342 LP) to make room for a dithyrambic aretology on wine that leads to an attack on excessive abuse and an exhortation to sobriety. In *C.* 2.1, the general reflections on Roman history move quite some way from Pollio's attempt to write his history on the civil wars, and, in *C.* 3.29, the invitation to Maecenas—as with Virgil's departure in *C.* 1.3—is only an excuse for a long sermon on *ἀταραξία*. Yet, in ll. 25–28, Horace is careful to relate his advice to Maecenas's conceived attitude as a statesman, similar to that of Quinctius and Plancus.

Even such moralizing sermons in Book II as *C.* 2.2, 3, and 17 relate to a concrete situation or a quality of the addressee hinted at in the poem itself;¹³⁹ only in *C.* 2.10 and 14 do we find just an individual addressee, with no

¹³³ For *C.* 1.4 and 1.9, see below.

¹³⁴ Becker 1962: 14 ff.

¹³⁵ Below, p. 342.

¹³⁶ See pp. 338 ff.

¹³⁷ Below, pp. 266 ff.; for *C.* 1.9 see below, pp. 273 ff.

¹³⁸ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 227 f.; on Alfenus Varus, see Liebs 2010; *EO* s.v.

¹³⁹ See below, pp. 319 ff.

reference to a concrete background for the advice given. In Book II we also encounter three λόγοι φιλοσοφικοί (C. 2.15, 16, and 18) without any addressee, as in Book III, with C. 3.24, and in the *Roman Odes*. There, however, C. 3.2, 3, and 5 are integrated into a cycle with its general address to the Roman people.¹⁴⁰

C. 1.3 displays the crudest method of tagging a general discourse on a situation suited to lyric poetry; thus, in C. 1.3 the thought moves ever farther from the situation and the person addressed at the beginning. This technique of tagging a discourse on a concrete situation in order to integrate it plausibly into a given poetic genre can be paralleled with Euripidean drama: in his famous prologue in *Medea*, Euripides carefully constructs a plausible situation for a sort of narrative prologue, whereas later he simply neglects to address the question why the *dramatis persona* appears on stage and why and to whom she tells her story.¹⁴¹

The technique of tagging, observed in C. 1.3, is, at first sight, the most mechanical and simple way of integrating a more extended discourse into a lyric context; if employed too often it would become stale. However, this technique should also be seen in the wider context of Horace's poetic technique: Horace sometimes composes poems that one may call a moving structure: a poem begins in one place (normally in a concrete situation or event) and ends someplace else. That Horace employs such a technique consciously is shown by the Pindaric 'Abbruchsformel' at the end of C. 2.1, where he comments himself on this manner of composition. In order to avoid boredom and predictability this method is used in very different ways.¹⁴² Tagging of precisely the same type as in C. 1.3 is used to attach not a general discourse, but a mythological narrative in C. 3.27, another propemptikon, which toward the end of the collection holds an almost precisely complementary position to C. 1.3.¹⁴³ In C. 3.11, a hymnic beginning is used as a tag for the dramatization of a myth.¹⁴⁴ In both cases, the complex and contorted structure has its particular appeal. Another example is C. 1.37: in contrast to the mannerism of C. 3.11, the poem slides very smoothly and unobtrusively from the symposiastic situation to the historical narrative.

¹⁴⁰ Below, pp. 373 ff.

¹⁴¹ If the prologue is spoken by a divinity, as in the *Hippolytos*, the absence of such a motivation is much less felt, than in the case of, e.g., Iokaste in the *Phoenician Women*. A divine apparition does not necessarily call for explanation.

¹⁴² Cf. also C. 1.4 and 1.9 (below, pp. 243 ff. and 273 ff.).

¹⁴³ Below, pp. 345 ff.

¹⁴⁴ Below, p. 352.

But, above all, a technique of associative sliding is employed in the most effective and suggestive manner in poems like *C.* 1.4, 7, and 9, analyzed below.¹⁴⁵ The origins of this technique of creating what I would call moving structures can be seen in the running commentaries on Hellenistic poetry already imitated by Virgil in the *Eclogues* and also by Horace in one of his cleverest poems on love and wine, *C.* 1.27.¹⁴⁶

Surely, the transition from tag to the main body of text in *C.* 1.3 is much less natural than it is in *C.* 1.37 and much less spectacular and curious than in *C.* 3.11 and 27. However, *C.* 1.3 is still carefully shaped and as an exercise in rhetorical versification it succeeds brilliantly. If one compares it with a rhetorical exercise such as *Epod.* 10,¹⁴⁷ the gap is enormous. In *C.* 1.3, the epodic meter is handled with complete ease and the interaction between metrical and syntactical structure shows refinement and variation: overarching syntactic structures span four or eight lines with much more frequent enjambment between a second line and the following distich (6/7; 10/11; 12/13; 22/23; 32/33; 34/35; 38/39) than in the *Epodes*. Horace thought the poem fit to occupy a prominent place in his collection for obvious reasons: apart from being an homage to Horace's poet friend, balanced later by another to Varius in *C.* 1.6, *C.* 1.3 is ideally suited to its place in the book: the bad weather, storms, and sea continue the imagery of *C.* 1.2, and when, in *C.* 1.3, the moralizing reflections on human hybris end with Jupiter's wrath and thunderbolt we are back at the beginning of *C.* 1.2.¹⁴⁸ In its place in the book, *C.* 1.3 almost seems to complement *C.* 1.2 as a reflection on an ancient inherited guilt,¹⁴⁹ which provoked the misfortunes that had befallen the Roman people after Caesar's death. And, of course, the somber reflections on death aptly prepare for *C.* 1.4 as well.

C. 1.4 (Solvitur acris hiems)

Daß nach dem Tode aller Unterschied des Standes aufhört, ist ein gemeiner Gedanke: aber er kann uns ergreifen und bewegen, dadurch daß er anschaulich wird: Der Kaliph Harun Al Raschid

¹⁴⁵ See pp. 243 ff., 266 ff., 273 ff.

¹⁴⁶ Below, p. 342. The complex structure of Tibullus's elegies, which continues to puzzle readers, must be seen in this context; see also below, pp. 382 ff. on *C.* 3.2.

¹⁴⁷ Above, pp. 198 ff.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. West 1995: 17 ff., although he goes too far in interpreting *C.* 1.3 strictly in reference to *C.* 1.2. It is unlikely that *C.* 1.3 was composed with this position in the book already in the poet's mind; in that case he could have done better. But he selected the poem, of course, with good reason to follow *C.* 1.3.

¹⁴⁹ See below, pp. 401 ff. on *C.* 3.6.

begegnete einem Einsiedler der einen Tottenkopf aufmerksam betrachtete: "Was machst Du damit." "Ich suche zu entdecken, ob dies der Schädel eines Bettlers oder eines Monarchen gewesen."

Arthur Schopenhauer¹⁵⁰

After Maecenas and Augustus have been honored in the first two poems, C. 1.4 begins a series of three poems dedicated to other particularly prominent political figures of the regime.¹⁵¹ First place is given to L. Sestius, who, after Augustus resigned his consulship in the middle of 23 BC, was appointed suffect. This was regarded as a sign of respect for Sestius's unquenched republican feelings (Dio 53.32.4): Sestius, who had been Horace's comrade-in-arms in 44 BC, was proscribed and pardoned but continued to venerate Brutus's memory (App. BC 4.51.223). Thus, placing the dedication prominently in a collection of lyrics published in the year of Sestius's consulship is, at the same time, an homage to Augustus's magnanimity and his attempts at national reconciliation.¹⁵²

The poem is also the first of a series of poems, almost all concentrated in Book I, that demonstrably draw their beginnings from an Alcaic model. The model of C. 1.4 is preserved only in scanty fragments about the change from winter to spring (fr. 286 Page). C. 1.4 introduces to the book one of the central themes of Horace's poetry, which he had dealt with in *Epod.* 13: the exhortation to enjoy life in the face of mortality. The theme then returns in close vicinity in C. 1.7, 9, and 11. In C. 1.4, one of the latest poems of the collection, the topic is treated in a unique and particularly subtle manner.

That the arrival of spring, the reawakening of nature, invites man to celebrate with wine is the theme of another fragment of Alcaeus (fr. 367 LP), which Horace used later in C. 4.12.¹⁵³ In C. 1.4, Horace does not exhort his reader explicitly either to drink or to enjoy. After the description of spring's awakening in ll. 1–8 he only alludes to a festivity by referring to garlands in ll. 9f. In ll. 11f., the festivity appears to be the sacrifice of an animal to Faunus. The lines do not even use the imperative, the exhortation is only implicit in *decet*, "it is becoming, it behooves." Accordingly, mortality cannot

¹⁵⁰ Schopenhauer 1985: 184.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Barchiesi in Harrison 2002: 157.

¹⁵² Similar motifs can be seen behind Iullus Antonius's prominent place (C. 4.2) among the addressees in the fourth book of *Odes*, see Fedeli 2008: 118. On Augustus's clemency, cf. Syndikus 2001: II 61 n. 74; West 2002: 4; Kerkhecker in Schwindt 2002: 132 ff.

¹⁵³ An explicit line between the need to drink and the quality of a season (i.e., summer) is drawn in Alc. fr. 346; see Page 1955: 303 ff. C. 4.12 exploits this; cf. Günther 2010a: 114.

be introduced in explicit reference to such an exhortation; it is only stated as a cruel fact that intrudes into the serene atmosphere of nature's beauty. Only then comes the long-postponed address to Sestius, together with the advice that man's brief life span does not allow for far-reaching hopes and that death irrevocably cuts man off from every enjoyment. Only at the very end are we transported to a symposium with wine and love for a beautiful boy. The movement of which the whole poem speaks is described from the very first word as dissolution (*soluitur*, repeated by *solutae* in l. 10): dissolution of the old into the new. This dissolution is brought about by a welcome change (*grata vice* in l. 1¹⁵⁴), a heavenly bliss that unites gods and men in its grace (*Gratiae decentes* l. 6—*deceat* ll. 9, 11). In retrospect, death distinguishes gods from men and makes it clear that the grace of change graces gods and men differently: man is not allowed to rest for long in the light of the grace bestowed on earth by the beautiful moment, he has to leave the light for an eternal exile (*domus exilis Plutonia*, l. 17¹⁵⁵) in the darkness of the underworld.

In *Epod.* 13 we observed that Horace did not develop the poem's theme by presenting reflections or images in a strictly logical relation to each other; he set side by side two complementary views: a) bad weather, as a symbol both of unfavorable external circumstances and the cyclical change of natural phenomena, is an invitation to enjoy the moment in hopes of better times, while b) the finality of immediate death makes enjoyment even more imperative. In *C.* 1.4, Horace contrasts two views that in diametrically opposite ways refer to the enjoyment of life. The awakening of nature in its beauty draws man into its celebrations, celebrations that transform it into a religious ceremony, an atmosphere of the sacred that calls man to respond to the *καίρως*, the beautiful moment, by taking part in nature celebrating itself. Death appears to constitute the utmost contrast, reminding man that *his* chance to participate in everything beautiful is brief and irrevocably limited. The only element that runs through the sacrifice to Faunus and the realm of death is the atmosphere of the sacred, the numinous, in its ambivalence of grace and shudder. This common presence of the sacred in both images

¹⁵⁴ Cf. *benigna ... vice* in *Epod.* 13.7f.

¹⁵⁵ *Exilis* (l. 17) means "meager, poor," as Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 70 rightly suggest; but neither this meaning nor the connection with a noun like *domus*, "house," is attested earlier (see *ThlL* s.v. IIAC; it can of course, easily take the "poor" in analogy to its synonym *tenuis*); they rightly suggest that it may also allude to the ghostly character of the underworld (cf. also *OLD* s.v. 4c; *ThlL* s.v. IIBb). However, in view of *C.* 2.3.27f. (see below, p. 330) I think this is a pseudo-etymological play on *exilium*, although no such etymology is attested in antiquity (the real descent of the word is unclear).

is tangible in the darkening of the bright light of spring's landscape in ll. 5 ff., first by the sacred chorus of maidens under the shining moon in contrast to the Cyclopes working beneath the earth in the glaring light of Vulcanus's fire, then by the shade of the grove where the sacrifice takes place. When suddenly death breaks in as a contrasting reality, the image of nature assumes an implicit meaning; the resurrecting life is suddenly revealed as frail in its exposure to death. In the concluding lines, death is explicitly contrasted to beauty by referring to the fleeting nature of a beautiful boy's youth, who is attractive to male lovers for only a short while. Yet, this passage is described not as one from beauty to unattractiveness, but as from being attractive to men to being—later—attractive to women. The change in human life as it moves toward death is only alluded to in an image of integral beauty:¹⁵⁶ only the nostalgic glance of the male observer, Sestius, exposes this beauty as one destined to disappear. Thus, even the beauty described in ll. 1–8, consisting in change, is never compromised; the state that gives way to the newly won beauty is never described in deprecatory terms. However, this untarnished beauty of nature assumes, by its reference to man, who observes it and who suddenly also observes his place in it as that of one who is exposed to death, both an ambiguity and an intensity that render it particularly precious by its very transitoriness: it is a transitoriness only in respect to man, who becomes aware of the brief moment granted to him to share in the divine light that graces nature in its awakening and thus for a moment graces him, too.

In ll. 9–12, the resurrection of the motionless into the movement of life, depicted in ll. 1–8, a movement that consists in dissolution, rests for a while: life appears to be released in a sacred celebration of itself. But from ll. 13 ff. onward the movement of life appears to be a movement of self-dissolution, a movement that dissolves into irrevocable annihilation.

This poem reveals in the most unobtrusive but also most poignant manner a key characteristic of Horace's poetical technique in the *Odes*: placing images, reflections, and concepts in a sequence that imbues the images with an unexpressed meaningfulness, inviting the reader to let his fantasy wander and to find every time he reads the text further implicit significances in it. We shall come back to this technique later in *C.* 1.7 and 1.9, two earlier poems, where it is employed in a slightly different manner. *C.* 1.4 betrays the lateness of its composition not only by being much more compact than

¹⁵⁶ Syndikus 2001: I 72 f. rightly points out that—parallel to this ending—the description of winter at the beginning lacks everything unpleasant.

these earlier poems,¹⁵⁷ but also by another detail. As we have seen,¹⁵⁸ Horace normally tries to connect gnomic reasoning to a poem's concrete situation. In *C.* 1.4, he takes as a starting point the natural phenomena accompanying spring's arrival; in *C.* 1.9, it will be the sight of a snow-covered mountain. Yet, in *C.* 1.4, the longest part of the poem consists only in a description of nature without relating it to an addressee, as is the case in *C.* 1.9. And even when the addressee appears, there is no exhortation to him, no conclusion is drawn explicitly,¹⁵⁹ nor is the relevance to the person of the addressee clear. Sestius is just given the epithet *beatus*, "blessed, fortunate, rich." The relevance of this epithet to the poem is very inexplicit: Sestius is 'blessed,' but he is reminded that this blessing is only temporary; thus the covert exhortation of the *decet* in ll. 9 ff. refers to him via an analogy, which the text does not make explicit.

In the completely impersonal beginning of *C.* 1.4 Horace transfers to lyrics the narrative style of Hellenistic spring epigrams, but he concentrates entirely on details relevant for the poem's¹⁶⁰ purpose. At the same time, he gives nothing away in picturesque vividness, on the contrary. If we look in detail at the structure of *C.* 1.4, the poem is in many ways a counterpart of *C.* 1.2, a reproduction of the latter's technique in miniature. We find the same concentration on a consistent imagery, relevant to the purpose of the poem, in transforming the poem's immediate models. There is the same care for shaping two contrasting sections, each of which has a distinctly different physiognomy in mood and syntax, but again with certain undercurrents that guarantee a unity in the transition from one to the other. The structure is strictly parallel; *C.* 1.4 falls into three parts: **A** (1–8), the arrival of spring; **B** (9–12), invitation to a sacrifice for Faunus; and **A'** (13–20), the inevitability of death. In analogy to the structure of *C.* 1.2, **B** can be regarded as a link between the two sharply contrasting parts **A** and **A'**. **B** is still part of the spring scenery, yet it prepares us for the sombre atmosphere of **A'**.

¹⁵⁷ For Horace's stricter concept of unity in his later poetry, see below, p. 273 n. 266, also 472 ff.

¹⁵⁸ Above, pp. 239 ff.

¹⁵⁹ As e.g. in *Epod.* 13.

¹⁶⁰ The striving for functionality in Horace's imagery is a general trait of his lyric poetry, which Latte (1968: 882 f.) beautifully described. Described by Latte 1968: 882 f. Only in this context can the technique of *C.* 1.7 and 9, described below, pp. 266 ff., 273 ff., be understood. In a way it echoes Pindar's technique of organizing his associative linkage of images (cf. Bernard 1963), or rather: Horace, by organizing his imagery from the very start according to intellectual concepts (see below, p. 363 n. 549), so to speak, inverts Pindar's "Denken in Bildern' Bildern," as described by Bernard 1963: 60 ff.

Horace takes from Alcaeus the combination of the awakening of spring from winter frost and the beginning of navigation. Descriptions of spring's awakening on land and sea had developed a stock inventory in Greek epigram, but although Horace owes the principal outlook of his description of nature to such sources, he organizes them in a characteristic way. Epigrams contain various listings of natural events on land and sea; Horace pointedly concentrates on features that contrast movement with immobility, lightness with heaviness, lulled into the mellow stop and go of the meter (dactylic tetrameter + ithyphallicus/iambic trimeter catalectic), which alternates between dactyls, slowing down and resting in the adjacent iambs. He thus paints two scenes, each with a distinctly shaped physiognomy: In ll. 1–4 he contrasts a distich on wind and sea (the dissolution of winter frost is accompanied by the Zephyr, called by its Latin name *Favonius*, and the ships are drawn into the water) with another one on land (3 f.), in three negative clauses (*neque iam*). Such an introduction is traditional (cf. *AP* 10.2.1; 10.14.3), but the three events Horace chooses are not attested in the poems of the Anthology; in contrast to the movements in ll. 1 f., ll. 3 f. speak of a rest that no longer exists. Lines 1–4 blend into a contingent whole of an Italian country scene, perhaps on the Apulian coast near Horace's birthplace: a gentle breeze, ships drawn into the sea; in the outback the meadows become green, the ploughman goes outdoors, the flocks of sheep, which will later be driven up to their summer pastures in the mountains.¹⁶¹ In ll. 5–8 the scenery changes, with again two even more sharply contrasting images: Venus joins in dance with Nymphs and Graces under the moon, whereas her ponderous husband Vulcanus visits his workshops beneath Mount Etna. A consists in two clearly marked four-line stanzas with a distinctly different syntactical pattern. Simple parataxis is found in ll. 1–4 (a): four main clauses with one motif each are joined by subtly varied polysyndeton (*-que ... ac nec ... nec; et—aut*) with exactly one clause per line and parallel distribution of noun and adjective with homoioteleuton in ll. 2 and 4 (*siccas ... carinas; canis ... pruinis*).¹⁶² The mellow gliding *v*-alliterations for the winds in l. 1 contrast with the creaking *c*-alliterations for the heavy movement of ships in 2; the *pr*-alliteration and the hypercharacterization *canis albicant* in l. 4 paint the rigidity of the hoar. In ll. 5–8 (b) one hypotactic period ranges over the whole stanza. With *iam* (l. 5) it picks up *neque iam* from l. 3 and thus varies slightly the *iam ... iam* (ἤδη ... ἤδη) common in spring poems (Cat.

¹⁶¹ See above, pp. 8 f., 13.

¹⁶² Above, p. 226.

46.1 ff.; *AP* 10.5 and 16). Now, two scenes occupy only a little more space each: the first main clause occupies one line again (with distribution of object, predicate, and subject exactly parallel with l. 3: *iam stabulis gaudet pecus/iam ... chorus ducit Venus*), but the second one spills over into the second distich, to which a subjugated clause, introducing the contrasting scene, is appended (5/6–7a). In ll. 5–8, the rural daylight scenery gives way to a moonlight scene with dancing goddesses and Vulcanus beneath the earth. With ll. 9–12 (B) we are transferred to the shade of a grove where garlands are worn and sacrifice is made to a rural deity: Faunus in l. 11 replaces Priapus who figures in Horace's epigrammatic models (*AP* 10.7). The stanza falls into two distichs marked by the emphatic anaphora *nunc* (9–11), which picks up *iam* from l. 5 and is further enhanced by the following epanalepsis *deceat*. If *deceat* is unequally distributed between ll. 9 and 11 the subordinate infinitives, with their adverbial complements of noun and adjective, are strictly parallel (*viridi ... impedire myrto*, with *nitidum caput* in between, *umbrosis ... immolare lucis* with *Fauno deceat*): in 9f. the alternative with polysyndetic *aut ... aut* is distributed over the two lines, and l. 12 appends two isocola, *seu ... seu*.

The change from the spring scenery to death knocking at the door of poor and rich alike is as spectacular and disruptive as possible: the *p*-alliteration in *pallida ... pulsat pede pauperum*, with a long echo in *tabernas* until *beate* (14) ... *brevis* (15) ... *premet* (16) over the whole stanza, is the most obtrusive so far. In l. 13, the syntax still resembles that of many of the preceding main clauses, with a third-person singular (or plural) predicate before the fourth *longum* of the dactylic tetrameter (*gaudet ... ducit ... quatunt ... pulsat*). But with the appendix *regumque turris* the clause spills over into l. 14 and stops abruptly at the caesura, where at long last we get the address to Sestius, and after it a main clause that resembles the preceding ones (third-person singular after the fourth *longum*: *deceat ... vetat*) and is an echo of ll. 9 and 11 as regards the distribution of the infinitive and its object with epithet (*spem ... inchoare longam*; *spem* not exactly in the metrical position of *viridi* and *umbrosis*). But in what follows for the first time a long, overarching period reaches from l. 16 over the stanza boundary until the end of the poem: one main clause beginning with *iam* (in analogy to ll. 3 and 5) in 16–17a, followed by two subclauses, 17b–19a and 19b–20, both beginning with *quo* (in different senses). The metrical substructure changes as well: up until l. 15 all dactylic tetrameters end with a disyllabic word of two shorts after a word break after the fourth *longum*. In the last stanza there is no word break after the fourth *longum* and the movement slides downward without this stop into the subclauses, both beginning with *quo* in metrically

identical position, recalling the epanalepseis and anaphoras of ll. 3–11. *Nec* ... *nec* (18f.) recalls the *neque* ... *nec* of ll. 3f., and in l. 20 we have, for the last time, *nunc*, the moment, but now it is followed by *mox*. With the subtly varied triplet *mearis* ... *sortiere* ... *mirabere* (three long disyllabic endings) we do not have, for the first time, third-person predicates; we have the future tense for the first time, too. The second *quo*-phrase, starting in the middle of a line, sounds like an echo of the longer first one: *calet* (19), the last present tense, and an echo: the future *tepebunt* (20)—the last word.

The poem's structure can be represented as a perfect symmetry around the central stanza: A) 2 stanzas = 8 (a 4 $\langle 1+1: 1+1 \rangle$ b 4 $\langle 2^{1/2}: 1^{1/2} \rangle$) : B) 1 stanza = 4 $\langle 2+2 \rangle$: C) 2 stanzas = 8 $\langle 1^{1/2} + 1^{1/2} + 5^{1/2} \langle 1^{1/2} + 2 + 1^{1/2} \rangle \rangle$ lines. The staccato movement of the paratactic first stanza with its bright daylight scenery gives way to the moonlight setting of the second stanza, with its wider and calmer syntax. With the monolithic bipartite third stanza, with the marked parallelism of its two periods, the movement comes to a rest in the twilight of Faunus's grove. All light vanishes when *pallida Mors*, "pale Death," in l. 13, disturbs the quietness; but the gnomic reminder to the addressee to curb far-reaching hopes, with a sentence that balances exactly, brings us to rest again. Then we are drawn ever more into the night of the *domus exilis Plutonia*, "the meager house of Pluto"; only the two very long subordinate clauses that fill the rest of the poem try to catch a glimpse of the light of the beauty of the world in recalling the joys of banquets and the all too quickly fading beauty of a charming young companion.

The change from the spring scenery to death is sudden, yet a common imagery runs through the whole poem: the air and the earth, the moon in heaven and the subterranean fires, the towers of the kings, the shade of a grove, the night of the underworld, the religious outdoor ceremony, and the memories of a banquet, still lingering in the house of Hades. There is already shadow and twilight in A, there is still a hint of light in C; C appears like a faint echo of the light of A in the pale twilight of Hades. The wide range of the vocabulary from the technical (*machinae* l. 2) and colloquial (*albicans* l. 4; *tabernas* l. 13) to the archaic (*mearis* l. 17), with Greek loanwords en masse (*machinae*, *carinas* l. 2; *choros* l. 5, *myrto* 9; and many names: *Cytharea*, *Nymphis* l. 5; *Cyclopum* l. 7; *Plutonia* l. 17; *Lycidan* l. 19) contributes to the intense complexity of the plastic and contrasting imagery.

C. 1.5 (*Quis multa gracilis*)

Aber auch zärtlich werden kann Horaz; er zählt auch zu den Erotikern. Seine Liebesverse sind es vor allem gewesen, durch die er sich die Herzen unserer Vorfahren in jenen Zeiten, als jeder gebildete Deutsche noch Latinist war, gewann. Mag unser Herz sich sträuben: in jedem Fall ist es nach so viel Politik erholsam, nach ihnen zu greifen. Man kann auch auf Lateinisch lieben.

Theodor Birt¹⁶³

The *renuntiatio amoris*, the adieu to love,¹⁶⁴ is a well-attested theme in Hellenistic epigram (*AP* 5.112, 175, 179, 184, 245; 6.1; 12.201; also Theocr. 30), Neo-teric poetry (Cat. 8, 11, 58) and Latin love elegy (Prop. 2.5; 3.24/5;¹⁶⁵ Ov. *Am.* 3.11), and it features already in Anacreon (fr. 445 LP) and later in the *Anacreontea* (7 West). Horace had alluded to the motif in *Epod.* 15¹⁶⁶ and he places a poem on the same topic, C. 3.26, toward the end of Book III.¹⁶⁷ In C. 1.5, he offers an original version of this rather overworked topic. The *renuntiatio* is normally motivated by the betrayal of a faithless woman (otherwise the reason may simply be rejection by the beloved as in Anacr. fr. 445 LP). Normally, it is announced in an address to the faithless woman herself (Anacr. fr. 445 LP and *AP* 5.179 to Eros). In C. 1.5, too, a girl, Pyrrha, is addressed, but she is not presented as the girl who had betrayed the speaker. At the beginning, she is asked who the man is with whom she is engaged in an amorous encounter, which the speaker has observed: two questions (1–5a) describe the scenery and the beauty of both the boy and girl. But then the observer turns to the boy and dedicates almost two stanzas (5b–12a) to the latter's state of mind: his present credulity, seduced by Pyrrha's rampant beauty and his future disappointment because of the girl's fickle character; a general conclusion on the misery of every potential lover of Pyrrha (12a–13a) rounds off these reflections. In the concluding stanza (13b–16), the observer contrasts his own attitude, as one who has learned from proper experience and said farewell to love, with the attitude of all those poor fellows who fall prey to Pyrrha's beauty.

Treacherous Pyrrha and her potentially disappointed lover resemble the couples typical of Hellenistic epigram; here the relationship is viewed in the

¹⁶³ Birt 1925a: 88.

¹⁶⁴ Cairns 2007: 79 ff.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Fedeli 1985: 672 ff.

¹⁶⁶ Above, pp. 190, 201, 206.

¹⁶⁷ Below, pp. 255, 345.

stage before it breaks up, by someone who can foresee the bitter outcome. With his forecast in ll. 5 ff., the observer shows the experience of someone who knows all about love affairs with girls like Pyrrha and who can only pity those who do not. He is not the man who tries, not even the man who has liberated himself from love: he is the man matured by having long ago renounced all unattainable aspirations.

With the allusion to dedicatory epigram in the last stanza,¹⁶⁸ Horace poses as one who has given up his profession by dedicating the instruments of his trade to a god.¹⁶⁹ He retires like a veteran soldier or like the elderly courtesan Lais in *AP* 6.1; i.e., he is a man, not untouched by love, presumably not even by the foolish love he observes in Pyrrha's victims. On the contrary, he is implicitly a veteran of love. The attitude of this retired lover is that of Philodemus, the Epicurean, in *AP* 5.112:

Ἡράσθην· τίς δ' οὐχί; κεκώμακα· τίς δ' ἀμύητος
κώμων; ἀλλ' ἐμάνην· ἐκ τίνος; οὐχί θεοῦ;
ἐρρίφθω· πολλὴ γὰρ ἐπείγεται ἀντὶ μελαίνης
θριξ ἥδη, συνετῆς ἄγγελος ἡλικίης.
καὶ παίζειν ὅτε καιρὸς, ἐπαίξαμεν· ἡνίκα καιρὸς
οὐκέτι, λωϊτέρης φροντίδος ἀψόμεθα.

I loved. Who has not? I reveled. Who is uninitiated
in those revels? But I was driven mad. By whom? Was it not by a god?
Good-bye to it; for already grey hair hurries to replace
the black, a signal of an age of good sense.
When it was the right time to play we played; now it is not so
any longer, we shall turn to worthier thoughts.

In the opening poem of the first book of *Epistles*¹⁷⁰ Horace explicitly takes this stance by refusing to give up lyric poetry in favor of more serious concerns because of his advanced age. *C.* 1.5 is not explicit about old age, nor about the observer's past, unhappy love affairs; the text only alludes to the speaker's amorous past in the image of shipwreck.¹⁷¹ Yet, the speaker appears as the elegiac *magister amoris*, who sees through other people's love affairs because of his own bitter experiences¹⁷²—one might even suspect that he

¹⁶⁸ In view of *C.* 3.26, and also the close parallel in *Tib.* 1.9.83, there can be no doubt that Zielinsky's *deae* for *deo* in l. 15, which Nisbet and Hubbard (1970: 79 f.) also advocate, is correct; cf. also Cairns 2007: 82; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 314; Pease 1958: 1126 f.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Rouse 1902: 70 f.; *ThesCRA* I 279.

¹⁷⁰ Günther 2010a: 9 ff.

¹⁷¹ Murgatroyd 1995: 9 ff., 19 ff.

¹⁷² On the elegiac poet as *magister amoris* see Wheeler 1910/11 and Maltby in Günther 2006: 147 ff.

had these experiences with Pyrrha, whose treacherous character he seems to know so well, but he does not speak of his own experiences directly; his own sentimental experience is only revealed in an image.

However, the disengaged stance of the Horation observer of his own love affairs and those of others does not exclude, it rather conceals emotional involvement. In the course of *C.* 1.5, Horace, in his description of Pyrrha's lover, implicitly shows much empathy with the boy, who is passionately and desperately in love. At the end he states that all that is past him, he knows it all. He refers to the fact that he does not only know love from past experience—the image of shipwreck vaguely alludes that his love was, at times, unhappy—but he does not concede, as he does elsewhere,¹⁷³ *expressis verbis*, that he once had been passionately in love himself. It is important to be sensitive toward the poet's explicit restraint in not openly confessing the power of his own emotions; Horace's love poetry shuns the grand gesture, yet it does not lack passion; it rather does not need to express it. Passion is present, in retrospect, as something in the past, something kept under control, something withheld rather than shouted aloud. As the emotional involvement of the poet is made explicit only later in the book the same holds true for another implicit facet of this renunciation by he 'who knows it all': implicitly the speaker assumes the attitude of the mature person, the person experienced in life. And, indeed, in several of the poems to follow, the poet portrays himself as the elderly lover, again, save one exception (*C.* 2.5¹⁷⁴), never explicitly, but only in implicit contrast to the beloved he woos and who is still too young.¹⁷⁵

I have anticipated this because reading the poems in sequence, as they are arranged in the book and interpret each other as the book goes on,¹⁷⁶ teaches us more than anything that to acquire the sensitivity to read the attitude, the ethos of the 'I' that speaks in Horace's poetry, is crucial to its understanding. Pointed understatement, as we encountered in *C.* 1.1, irony and self-deflation, as we encountered in the *Satires* or in the *Epodes* and find amply attested in the *Odes* as well, are masks behind which the poet hides himself. In general, in the *Odes*, where normally a seemingly

¹⁷³ Cf. pp. 201ff., 336, 340f.

¹⁷⁴ See pp. 343f.

¹⁷⁵ See pp. 339ff. In *C.* 1.16 (pp. 338f.) the speaker at least distances himself from a youthful past, but again does not speak of himself as old. This is the background against which we have to read the explicit statement of the new love poetry in Book IV, where Horace does not shy away from either stating explicitly his advanced age or his being passionately in love in *C.* 4.1 (see below, pp. 355, 446f.).

¹⁷⁶ See p. 220 n. 60.

disengaged 'I' speaks to others about himself or matters of mutual concern, this 'I' implicitly assumes a certain pose, a certain ethos, which is hardly ever made explicit, but must be deduced from the way in which this 'I' is speaking. Grasping this ethos, the perspective of the speaker of the text, is indispensable for understanding Horace's poetry.

In C. 1.5, the 'I' that has spoken in the text comments, at the end, on the perspective from which it speaks—as in C. 1.1. Both poems show a parallel structure: there is a longer first part, which deals with the actions and aspirations of the others, and a conclusion, which contrasts the speaker to the others. In both poems the speaker at the end assumes a position of detachment: he looks upon the others from a higher perspective. In C. 1.1, it was the position of the poet, removed by his status as a poet from the world of ordinary man into the realm of the divine where he transforms life into art. In C. 1.5, it is the aloofness of the man who, after a life rich with experiences, has detached himself from the world and its troubles. The two perspectives are complementary; together they represent Horace's poetic *persona*: a *persona* that by its detachment from external reality is able to present in art a mirror of reality. This mirror condenses reality to its presence in the divine realm of beauty, where it loses everything that is ephemeral and thus becomes visible in its very essence.

In C. 1.5, the passionate and unhappy love relationship is presented in a typical love scene that comprehends, in two densely packed sentences, a description of both lovers and their encounter. There is no detail in these descriptions that is not topical, yet everything is vividly presented in a few simple, evocative strokes. The trouble love entails is presented only as a forecast of the empathic observer, and, once again, as in C. 1.4, Horace presents everything, even the painful and troublesome, in a poetical image of utmost beauty. This image is as topical as that of the love scene, but it is highly evocative, dense and, at the same time, of enormous emotional appeal: a young man looking over the storm-beaten sea. The scene is a metaphor for both the storms of life and for man who in his troubles seeks comfort in solitary nature as his sole and ultimate companion. The gaze over the coastline (cf. C. 4.5.9–14) suggests a lover longing for his beloved far beyond the sea. Moreover, storm and sea remain perfectly in the ambit of imagery that prevailed in C. 1.2 and 1.3. The last stanza (ll. 13–16) picks this up once more and makes the implications of the storm-beaten sea as a symbol of troubles even more explicit: here the text entirely withdraws from concrete reality into metaphor; the shipwreck of the last stanza is nothing but the conventional metaphor for failure in love and, implicitly, also for the instability of female character (Sem. 7.27 f. West).

Syndikus¹⁷⁷ has described C.1.5 beautifully as a prime example of Horace's more developed style in the *Odes*, where the syntax stands in pointed contrast to meter: the sentences, carefully varied in construction and length, mostly run contrary to verse and even stanza boundaries. Even the overarching bipartite structure fails to accord with the stanza structure: the B-part begins mid-line (13b). C. 1.5 may very well be one of the latest odes, and is, like C. 1.4, a poem in epodic meter, whose style stands in pointed contrast to C. 1.5. It may have been composed precisely for this place among the 'programmatic odes,' where it balances C. 3.26, which Horace, for obvious reasons, placed toward the end of Book III as the last love poem, *stricto sensu*.¹⁷⁸

However, as a programmatic statement, C. 1.5 must appear, at first sight, somewhat surprising: a *renuntiatio amoris*, and for all that a successful one, is not an obvious introduction to erotic poetry. If one reads C. 1.5 in the context of Horace's poetic biography, of course, it refers back to the lover of the *Epodes*. There, Horace had first presented himself self-ironically as the elegiac lover, a lover all too deeply involved with love, but one who knows at the same time that he is a caricature of a lover.¹⁷⁹ In *Epod.* 15, Horace had modeled a poem after the topical *renuntiatio amoris* of the elegiac lover, that of Catullus in particular.¹⁸⁰ In retrospect, C. 1.5 is the ultimate confirmation and reaffirmation of the attitude of *Epod.* 15. But what kind of love poetry would a poet write, who has renounced love, given that, at least in the self-perception of the elegiac love poet, love poetry is the outpouring of a poet's life in love? We have seen that Horace, in *Epod.* 11 and 14, had shown an acute awareness of the paradox of a poet whose poetry is at the same time the outpouring and the disengaged description of his emotions. C. 1.5 seems to be poetry not about the poet's emotions, about his own love affairs, but about love as observed in others. C. 1.5 is the precise opposite of the statements of the elegists that declare love poetry to be autobiographical. And thus the world in which Horace locates the amorous affair he describes and reasons about in C. 1.5 is not tinged by any realistic Roman color, it is entirely set in an 'ideal' realm adorned by topoi of Greek love poetry, as the third-person perspective is a return to Roman love elegy's prevalent Hellenistic models.

¹⁷⁷ Syndikus 2001: I 80 f.; cf. also Knox below, pp. 539 f.

¹⁷⁸ Below, pp. 345 f.

¹⁷⁹ Above, pp. 201 ff.

¹⁸⁰ Above, pp. 190, 201, 206.

Thus, the very poetic statement Horace makes about himself as a love poet in C. 1.5 should warn us that his love poetry is not autobiographical in the sense of Latin love elegy. There is a place for the poet's real self, for his experience with love in real life; his poetic *persona* affirms itself at the end. Yet, the relationship between poetry and life is much more complex than that of the poetic transformation of lived reality into art. We shall explore this relationship in Horace's love poetry, below.¹⁸¹

2.4. C. 1.6 (Scriberis Vario) and the Augustan Recusatio

The reason for the sequence C. 1.5/1.6 is obvious: with C. 1.6 Horace returns to politics after an adieu to love. Such a sequence mirrors the structure of the elegy book. A failed attempt at political poetry marked the end of Propertius's original Book II; perhaps this was also the case with the elegies of Cornelius Gallus.¹⁸² Thus, the place after C. 1.5 (itself, as we have seen, programmatic) is ideal for Horace's postponed *recusatio*. The *recusatio* is, in a sense, the most characteristic poetic form of Augustan poetry, the form in which the Augustan poets combined, in a remarkable way, poetical self-presentation, the definition of the poet's place in society, and political poetry. In order to appreciate the proper function of C. 1.6 it is necessary to view it in the context of the development of this poem type in Horace's work and in the Augustan poet's work, in general.¹⁸³

It has been the practice, since the times of Alexander the Great, to celebrate rulers and military leaders with an epos about their deeds in war. The vast Hellenistic production of historical epos of this kind is almost completely lost to us.¹⁸⁴ When Callimachus, in his apologetic poetry, advocates his new aesthetics of the λεπτόν (literally "the slender"¹⁸⁵), i.e., sophisticated craftsmanship and subtlety in the compass of the small and highly polished form, by rejecting the grand form as something obsolete and uncreative, this kind of poetry, the post-Homeric historical epos, is the foremost target of his attack. Nevertheless, such poetry, always heavily in demand, persisted, for obvious reasons. Even after the Neoterics had transferred Callimachean aesthetic ideals to Rome the genus was still widely practiced by minor poets even in Augustan times.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, historical epos continued to be perceived

¹⁸¹ Pp. 353 ff.

¹⁸² See Günther 1997a: 11 f.

¹⁸³ See Doblhofer 1981: 22 ff.; Günther 1999 (with further literature) and Günther 2010a: 17 ff.

¹⁸⁴ Häussler 1976: 83, 211 ff.; auch id. 1978: 212 ff.

¹⁸⁵ See Asper 1997.

¹⁸⁶ Syndikus 2001: I 87 n. 2.

as the most eminent form of panegyric poetry, and the Augustan poets, as soon as they accepted political patronage, had to cope with the problem of how to integrate political panegyrics into their aesthetic credo after the historical epos had become obsolete for any poetry that would not renounce the Neoteric, i.e., Alexandrian ideals.

Thus, it is natural that Augustan poets would adapt the apologetic poetry of Callimachus, the *Aitia*-prologue in particular, to their situation and respond with this adaptation to the problem. However, this adaptation implied a characteristic difference, due to the new external circumstances and the Augustan poets' aesthetic ideals, which incorporated Callimachean aesthetics into a markedly different program.¹⁸⁷ In view of both these particular historical circumstances and the Augustan poets's new aesthetic ideals, their adaptation of Callimachean literary polemics entailed a fundamentally changed perspective.¹⁸⁸ Callimachus's apologetic poetry focuses entirely on literary issues; he highlights the merits of his particular poetic production by contrasting it to a negative counterpart that the poet rejects outright. The touchstone of poetic quality is form, subject matter is of secondary importance; it matters only as far as it corresponds to certain stylistic requirements. For the Augustan poets, the foremost problem was how to integrate a certain topic, politics, into their poetry, as political or panegyric poetry entailed grand form, epos in particular, that runs counter to the basics of Alexandrian aesthetics, which they were not ready to renounce completely. Callimachus's apologetic poetry consists merely of literary polemics; the Augustan poets were predominantly concerned with how to reject certain content, i.e., panegyric poetry about deeds of war, content they could not handle as they were expected to do. Thus the Augustan *recusatio* centers around a topic, not a formal concept; the formal concept is a matter of course. The problem consists in how to integrate a certain topic into this concept. But then this topic cannot be presented as something worthless, something to be rejected without qualification, as was Callimachus's target, the grand form. Callimachus defines his poetry against a counterpart described in purely negative terms. The Augustan poets could not simply reject the task imposed on them as unworthy, rather they had to depict it as not fitting their personal aesthetic choice. They thus presented it as something exceeding the powers of the poet, something too elevated and too sublime for his modest aspirations; this gave them, of course,

¹⁸⁷ Above, pp. 173 ff., 191 ff.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Cameron 1995: 454 ff.; Günther 1999: 145 ff.

the opportunity to highlight, at the same time, the topic they rejected as something of particular significance and value.

In fact, for every man of letters with a rhetorical education, the means for getting around, easily and elegantly, the problem that the Augustan poets had to face was ready at hand: to exalt the topic of an epideictic speech by declaring it to be beyond the faculties of the orator was a trite rhetorical device that can be traced back at least as far as Thucydides (2.35) and that Isocrates (4.13) already knew as a common rhetoric trick.¹⁸⁹ The Augustan *recusatio* is nothing but an integration of Callimachus's apologetic poetry and the aesthetic ideals that it defends into this rhetorical pattern. Thus, the Augustan poets created a very sophisticated type of panegyric poetry with integrated poetological discourse. This type of poetry endowed them with a highly flexible instrument for both political panegyrics and poetic self-presentation; the poet could choose where to place the accent, he could easily shift the focus of attention away from politics to his aesthetic concerns or hint at the object of praise en passant. Augustan *recusatio* turned panegyric poetry into poetic self-presentation that included panegyrics via a *praeteritio*.

The first example and the archetype of the Augustan *recusatio* is Virgil's sixth *Eclogue*. It is still quite close to the Callimachean model, showing just this shift of emphasis from form to content. One could give the opening of the poem the title 'a failed attempt at poetry on war': the poet shows himself keen to praise military achievements, but Apollo warns him that this is beyond his abilities, which are suited only for poetry in a lower register. Thus, the poet's refusal of compose panegyric poetry on war leaves room for an honorable mention of military achievements en passant. The next *recusationes*, in chronological order, are more or less contemporary: the prologue of Virgil's third book of the *Georgics*, the opening of Horace's *Serm.* 2.1, and Propertius 1.7 (Tibullus 1.1, only slightly later, contains an oblique *recusatio*, too¹⁹⁰) from around 30 BC. Later, we have Prop. 2.1, 2.10, 2.34, and our poem from the first collection of Horace's *Odes*: C. 1.6.

¹⁸⁹ Doblhofer 1981: 33 ff.; Günther 1999: 146, with further references.

¹⁹⁰ Tibullus, in contrast to Propertius, never explicitly speaks of his poetry; yet, as in Prop. 1.1 the announcement 'I am in love' means 'I am writing love poetry,' Tibullus in 1.1 presents country life in the company of his beloved as the overriding topic of his poetry, in contrast to his rejection of wealth, won only at the price of being endangered by war (ll. 1–4), and his refusal to join Messala's military campaign (ll. 53–56). In this context Tibullus reduces the priamel, topical for the 'Lebenswahl' to the contrast 'peaceful and frugal life vs. richness and warlike life' in ll. 1–4.

Against this background we can understand the proper function of *C.* 1.6 in the book. *C.* 1.6 is far from rejecting panegyric poetry on the princeps. Horace writes panegyric poetry in the *Odes*, and *C.* 1.2 precedes *C.* 1.6 in the order of poems in the book. In *C.* 1.6, the poet declines to write epic poetry on the military achievements of Agrippa, Augustus's most eminent military commander. Thus, 1) Horace refuses to praise military achievements, as this topic implies epos as its congenial form; he does not reject panegyric poetry, and 2) this refusal concerns poetry not on the princeps, but on a figure of secondary rank. In both these traits, Horace follows the model of Virgil's sixth *Eclogue*. The Virgil of the *Eclogues* refuses to compose panegyric poetry not on the princeps, but on the military achievements of Alfenus Varus,¹⁹¹ a rather low-ranking—and, one suspects, not particularly agreeable—figure. Virgil does not refuse to write a panegyric poem on his then patron Asinius Pollio: he has written such a poem—in more exalted style, as he professes himself—with *Ecl.* 4. Virgil softens his refusal by pointing out that there are plenty of colleagues eager to sing Varus's praises. Horace puts this motif to good use. He claims that his friend Varius Rufus is much more likely to possess the qualities required for writing an epos in Homeric style on Agrippa's deeds. Thus, he can pay tribute to his second eminent poet friend, after Virgil has been honored in *C.* 1.3.

One can compare Prop. 1.6 with 1.7, both written when Propertius was still a protégé of his first patron, Tullus.¹⁹² When Propertius, in 1.6, declines to accompany his patron on military excursions he appears to have a certain measure of independence; Tibullus did share in Messalla's military service, as did Horace under Maecenas.¹⁹³ However, even Propertius, in 1.7, does not explicitly decline the request of a patron. His *recusatio* is addressed to a colleague, Ponticus, supposed to be an epic poet. Propertius, rather than refusing a request, defines his poetry as different from that of another poet who writes epic verses on war.

This evidence suggests that the *recusatio* had established itself before Virgil or Propertius entered Maecenas's circle. Both poets could easily excuse themselves for not writing panegyric poetry on military achievements of minor figures by blaming this refusal on a lack of talent while mentioning the deeds of the respective persons as something praiseworthy, if they only had the poetic power to do so. In fact, that the Augustan *recusatio* was

¹⁹¹ See above, p. 241 n. 138.

¹⁹² See Günther (forthcoming).

¹⁹³ Above, pp. 34 f.

perceived from the very start as an expedient, established trick of panegyric rhetorics is shown by Hor. *Serm.* 2.1,¹⁹⁴ the third *recusatio*, written around 30 BC. There, a third person, the lawyer Trebatius, suggests panegyric poetry on the princeps and this gives Horace the opportunity to integrate via a *praeteritio* a little encomium in defense of his satiric poetry.

Before a poet, Virgil or Propertius, entered Maecenas's circle, no particular need was felt to write encomiastic poetry on Octavian. Octavian is alluded to in the *Eclogues*, but neither the Virgil of the *Eclogues* nor the Propertius of Book I had to deal with requests to write panegyrics on the princeps; Tibullus, who did not join Maecenas's circle, never felt obliged to do so. Virgil's *Georgics* and Propertius's second book show beyond a doubt that by entering Maecenas's circle a poet was enrolled as an official poet of the regime, and was expected, as a matter of course, to write political poetry that would contribute to the honor of the princeps and the self-representation of the regime, in general. What the regime's expectations were, how they were conveyed to the poets, and how they responded is well documented in the latter's poetry, but I am afraid that the concrete circumstances in which this poetry developed are, nevertheless, often grossly misunderstood.

If Maecenas was Augustus's minister of culture, with Virgil, Horace, and later Propertius, he won three of the foremost contemporary poets for the Augustan regime. Virgil and Propertius were, at that time, already highly acclaimed and sponsored by another patron, but, as regards Horace, Maecenas appears to have had the good sense to enlist a poet who had not yet published with much success, but was rather an 'insider tip,' and even, in his political past, an ardent ex-enemy of the system.¹⁹⁵ The Propertius of the first book seems to be anything but a poet inclined to lend himself political poetry. In 1.6 and 7, he rejects outright every political engagement both in real life and in poetry, and when he refers to contemporary politics he appears to be utterly disgusted by the political turmoil of the civil wars, which severely affected his personal fortunes. However, it should not be overlooked that in his poetry he takes side with no one. There is nothing anti-Augustan in the first book of *Elegies*; Propertius clearly appears to be an emphatically apolitical poet, precisely because of his disgust with the dire reality around him. As there can be no doubt about the great, immediate success of Propertius's *Monobiblos*, in this case Maecenas recruited a promising young poet despite his hitherto utterly personal and apolitical

¹⁹⁴ The starting point of Doblhofer's (1966) monograph.

¹⁹⁵ Above, pp. 26 ff.

poetry. If we look at the references to a poet's obligation as a member of Maecenas's circle in the first works (Horace and Propertius published after becoming members), the reason for Maecenas's (and Augustus's) enormous success becomes apparent. The obligation to render homage to the regime, the princeps, in particular, certainly existed. Implicitly, it was a matter of course; no particular request to write any particular poem needed to be made: Why should any political regime waste its effort and money to promote poets if it had no political purpose? Yet, the methods to get poets to comply with these obligations appear to have been much more subtle than contemporaries of other regimes with cruder methods often have suspected.

In his first book of *Satires*, Horace never felt the need to descend to political panegyrics. In the *Epodes*, he includes the Augustan political agenda in his homages to Maecenas, his patron and friend.¹⁹⁶ Only in the second book of *Satires* did Horace feel the need to employ, and only en passant, the topical *recusatio* of personal panegyrics on the princeps. Yet, it is conspicuous that neither here nor elsewhere did Horace depict a situation in which he rejects a request from Maecenas or the princeps himself. In *Serm.* 2.1,¹⁹⁷ panegyric poetry is introduced by a lawyer, Trebatius, consulted by the poet about a possible offence his satiric poetry might cause; only the latter suggests panegyrics on the princeps as suitable topic for the poet. Propertius, when he had to cope with his new obligations in Maecenas's circle, in the opening poem of the second book by no means presents himself writing political panegyrics by request. He begins with an address not to Maecenas but to the reader (*quaeritis* "you may ask"), who might be astonished that after the apparent adieu to love in 1.19 he returns to love poetry. He justifies this return by the complete power his beloved has upon his inspiration as a poet. Thus, Cynthia somehow takes on the role of the Apollo of Virgil's *recusatio*. Only later does Propertius turn to Maecenas and protest his utmost willingness to write about the victories of Augustus and of the share Maecenas has in them, if he only had the powers; the little catalogue of Caesar Augustus's victories that he includes in his *praeteritio* is not too short.

Nowhere either in C. 1.6 or later in Horace's or Propertius's poetry does a poet ever seriously speak of a request by Maecenas, let alone by Augustus, to write political poetry that the poet declines.¹⁹⁸ To decline such a request

¹⁹⁶ See above, pp. 191 ff.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. also Courtney above, pp. 126 ff.

¹⁹⁸ Thus in C. 2.12 Horace assumes that Maecenas is happy with him writing about love as he is happy with his young, attractive wife, see Günther 2010a: 30 ff.

would be impossible. The poet always offers himself eagerly for any such task but pretends not to possess the required qualities to fulfill it. If there is any hint of Maecenas's or Augustus's possible reaction the poet shows himself convinced that they would not want him to shoulder an impossible burden and to do disservice to their reputation. Only jokingly, Horace rejects a request by Maecenas in *Epist.* 1.1.1 ff., but a request not to write panegyrics, but to continue with poetry on love and wine (*ludum*).¹⁹⁹ When Horace mentions his promise to Maecenas in *Epod.* 14,²⁰⁰ he speaks first of his promise, not of Maecenas's request. Moreover, this was a promise to write not panegyrics, but rather the iambs he delivers in his publication. Virgil, in the prologue of the third book of his *Georgics* (l. 41), speaks of requests: Maecenas's *haud mollia iussa*, his "ungentle request," but, again, this request concerns the present work, i.e., it is a request already complied with. As regards panegyric poetry, the Virgil of the third book of the *Georgics* promises on his own initiative to write these panegyrics on the princeps in the immediate future; he kept this promise. The prologue of *Georgics* III is the archetype of the Augustan anti-*recusatio*. Horace, in *C.* 4.2, and Propertius, in 3.9 and later 4.1, develop this pattern in their own way.²⁰¹ If Virgil speaks of "requests" he presents Maecenas as a source of inspiration, as somebody who guides his inspiration toward more elevated and worthy topics, as does Propertius in 3.9.

Augustan poets obviously chose their words carefully when speaking about their obligations to Maecenas and Augustus. There cannot be the slightest doubt that their patrons appreciated their tact, and that this reflects an atmosphere of mutual respect between the poets and their patrons. Are we to believe that Maecenas and Augustus really tried to pressure Horace, Virgil, and Propertius to write certain poetry and were then content to be fooled by the poets' pretences and fictitious excuses?²⁰² Surely, the poets had to deliver what Maecenas and Augustus wanted; the largely apolitical poetry of Horace and Propertius was to their patrons' satisfaction. Maecenas and Augustus appreciated appearing in Virgil's, Horace's, and Propertius's poems as men with refined literary taste, able to savor poetry that conformed to the highest possible standards of artistry, and being lauded for their political and military achievements. The texts interpreted above paint

¹⁹⁹ Günther 2010a: 9 ff.

²⁰⁰ Above, pp. 201 ff.

²⁰¹ See below, pp. 370, 448 ff.

²⁰² Also below, p. 265.

a picture of the relationship between patron and artist in Maecenas's circle that is quite different from what is often supposed. Far from imposing on the poets a specific type of poetry, Maecenas and Augustus obviously respected the artistic autonomy and personal integrity of Virgil, Horace, and Propertius. Propertius did not write much political poetry before his fourth book. Horace, the ex-republican, was not pressed to publicly recant his republican stance and sing the praises of the regime. Even less so did Maecenas or Augustus impose on the poets a specific form of poetry or an obsolete aesthetics. They allowed each poet to find his personal way to integrate the regime's political agenda into his poetry without compromising his artistic personality. The respect that Maecenas and Augustus accorded the poets earned them the poets' respect, in return. Poets as different as Horace and Propertius could thus become sincere supporters of the new regime, and only thus could the political poetry of Augustan poets rise above the normal level of mediocre court poetry and contribute to a literary culture strictly bound to a certain political system, and to a specific person who was almost without peer in European history.

We can now return to *C.* 1.6 in some detail; the poem is a prime example of the dual function of the *recusatio* in combining praise with poetic self-presentation. On the surface, the poem is an homage not only to Agrippa, Augustus's most capable general, but also to Horace's great poet friend Varius; it thus complements the poem dedicated to Virgil, *C.* 1.3. In its position in the sequence of the 'Parade Odes,' *C.* 1.6 returns to both *C.* 1.1 and 1.2, and at the end refers to *C.* 1.5, which immediately precedes it. It picks up the political theme and redefines the character of Horace's poetry as poetry on 'Wein, Weib und Gesang.'

After the first stanza, declaring that Agrippa's deeds in war will be praised by Varius in Homeric manner, Horace, in the following two stanzas, describes the aspirations and the character of his own poetry: it is *tenuis*, "slender,"²⁰³ and *imbellis*, "unwarlike," in contrast to Homeric poetry (5–8) and to the high demands (*grandia* "grand") of a panegyrist (like Varius) suited to praise Augustus's and Agrippa's deeds (9–12). The remaining two stanzas (13–20) reiterate the contrast between Homeric and Horatian poetry. In ll. 13–16, the poet asks who could rise to the almost impossible task of writing about Homeric themes, and in the concluding stanza (17–20), Horace contrasts himself once again to Homer. In ll. 9–12, Horace had described the

²⁰³ The *vox propria* for Callimachus's λεπτόν, cf. Syndikus 2001: I 89 n. 89; also Asper 1997: 135 ff.

stylistic quality of his poetry with *tenuis*, a subject matter he had hinted at only in negative terms (*imbellis*). Now, in ll. 17–20, he names wine and love as his foremost topics. The text of the poem is not impossible as it stands.²⁰⁴ Yet, the train of thought is slightly awkward. The return to Homeric poetry in ll. 13–16 is odd, even more so because ll. 5–8 had already provided a brief general summary of both Homeric poems by alluding to the opening lines of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Lines 13–16 speak of one particular episode of the Trojan War, an episode not attested in this form elsewhere, certainly not in Homer.²⁰⁵ What one would expect is a straight contrast ‘Varius (Homer)—Horace,’ not a twisted sequence ‘Varius (Homer)—Horace—Homer—Horace.’ The text becomes all the more awkward since ll. 13–16 can only be read in this context as a hyperbolic rhetorical question: taken literally the lines suggest the answer ‘nobody (can write on Homeric topics).’ Housman²⁰⁶ tried to solve the problem by transposing ll. 13–16 after 4 and reading *qui* instead of the transmitted *quis*. This removes the offensive interruption between ll. 9–12 and 17–20, yet the isolated unattested Iliadic episode mentioned in ll. 13–16 is still odd beside the summaries in ll. 5–8, and perhaps even more if it precedes them. Yet, Housman has detected the original place of these lines. I suspect that Peerlkamp and Lehrs²⁰⁷ were right in deleting ll. 13–16. The dislocation shows that these lines at one stage were probably missing in some mss. and thus indicates that the lines are spurious.²⁰⁸

If the lines are removed, everything falls into place. The poem has a bipartite structure (A: 1–4; B: 5–12, 17–20) in analogy to C. 1.1 or, indeed, 1.5. All these compositions neatly contrast ‘others—I,’ and if, in C. 1.1 and 1.5, a long first part precedes a much shorter one, in C. 1.6 the asymmetry works the other way round. In fact, if the deletion of ll. 13–16 is accepted, C. 1.5 and 1.6 can be regarded as two consecutive poems of exactly equal length, as we find them often in the *Odes*,²⁰⁹ and the structure of C. 1.6 (4 : 12 ll.) would be almost a precise mirror of C. 1.5 (12½ : 3½ ll.). In any case, as regards style, C. 1.6 is the precise opposite of C. 1.5, with its incongruency between syntax and meter: in C. 1.6 only the second and third stanzas are joined by enjambment, while

²⁰⁴ My analysis follows that of Syndikus (2001: I 90 ff.), who tries to explain the structure of the transmitted text.

²⁰⁵ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 88.

²⁰⁶ Housman 1972: I 93 f.

²⁰⁷ Peerlkamp deleted ll. 13–20, Meineke and Lehrs (who rewrites ll. 19 f.) ll. 13–16 only.

²⁰⁸ For this phenomenon, see Günther 1997a: 78, 115 ff.

²⁰⁹ See above, pp. 214, 219.

the other stanzas form a neat syntactic unit. Another typical example of this style is C. 1.10, following immediately upon the ‘Parade Odes.’

With C. 1.2, Horace had put panegyric poetry on the princeps at the forefront of his lyric poetry. With C. 1.5, he had introduced himself as a strange kind of non-, almost anti-elegiac love poet; a reader may well wonder what to expect from him. With the postponed *recusatio* in C. 1.6, Horace redefines both his political and his erotic poetry. In C. 1.2, Horace had written panegyric poetry; in C. 1.6, he renounces poetry not of the type of C. 1.2, but on military topics. The *recusatio* refers to Augustus’s general, Agrippa. Augustus only receives an honorable mention *en passant* (ll. 11 f.). Thus, the rejection of C. 1.6 is a qualified one: Horace refuses to write on achievements in war and must thus renounce writing poetry in honor of a military man. He does not write on the military achievements of the princeps either. C. 1.2 did not celebrate Augustus’s victories, but expressed the hope that he would be a tangible seal of the divine will to bring salvation, and internal and external peace to the Roman people. Horace’s panegyric poetry on Augustus mentions, but never dwells unduly, on the emperor’s military achievements. His praise of the princeps’s achievements, indeed his civic poetry, emphasizes quite different concerns.

Horace had honored the princeps by giving first place to a long and elaborate poem in his honor. Panegyrics and politics are the most elevated topics in the *Odes*. They are, however, the subject matter of only a minority of the poems. Thus C. 1.6 redresses the balance by shifting the accent firmly from politics to poetry on love and wine. After the *renuntiatio amoris* in C. 1.5, Horace now, in C. 1.6, poses as the elegiac poet who has failed to liberate himself from his love and turns to political poetry. Horace, in C. 2.9,²¹⁰ explicitly refers to the elegiac concept of political poetry as a cure for ill-fated love, as we find it in Cornelius Gallus and in Prop. 2.10. After C. 1.5, the *recusatio* in C. 1.6 corresponds to Propertius’s failed anti-*recusatio* in 2.10. With C. 1.6.17 ff., Horace even takes back, at least in part, the disinvolved stance of the mere bystander of C. 1.5: he will write on love, either *vacuus*, “carefree,” or *sive quid urimur*, “burning (with desire)”; his love poetry is poetry about the stormy relationships of others (*nos proelia virginum/ strictis*²¹¹ *in iuvenes unguibus acrium/ cantamus*, “we sing of the battles waged by fierce girls who have drawn their nails against young men”), but with *sive quid urimur* Horace leaves a door open: perhaps, just on occasion, he may even be emotionally involved himself.

²¹⁰ Below, p. 361.

²¹¹ *Strictis Bentley: sectis codd.*; see Günther 2010a: 26 n. 17.

2.5. C. 1.7–9

C. 1.7 (Laudabunt alii)

C. 1.7 stands at the end of a series of three poems dedicated to eminent persons of Roman public life (C. 1.4, 6, 7). After Agrippa in C. 1.6, the Plancus²¹² of C. 1.7 is another high-ranking military commander of the time. In spite of the opportunism of which he has been accused by contemporaries like Cicero²¹³ and posterity alike,²¹⁴ and despite the fact that he joined Octavian's camp only late, he held a position of high esteem, presumably because of his experience and efficiency as a military man, and it was Plancus who in the famous meeting of the Roman senate in January of 27 BC proposed the name Augustus for Octavian.

Appreciation of C. 1.7 has suffered from unfavorable comparison with the much-admired *Epod.* 13.²¹⁵ Yet, C. 1.7 is not only a particularly revealing example of Horace's poetic technique, it aspires to something much more complex than *Epod.* 13, and if Horace's poetic intentions are properly understood, the poem is of high artistic merit. If C. 1.7 has often been thought to fall into two incongruent halves, ll. 1–14 and ll. 15–32, the problem is reminiscent of some misguided interpretations of *Epod.* 13, where the slight difference in perspective between Chiron's speech and the initial setting of the poem has caused completely unnecessary problems.²¹⁶ In C. 1.7 there is, at first sight, a real incongruence: ll. 1–14 are dedicated to the praise of a certain place, Tibur, preferable to many other named locations; in l. 21 Tibur turns out to be Plancus, the addressee's, native place, but the whole section ll. 15–32 argues that one can enjoy life in whatever circumstances one may find oneself and that the place where one finds oneself, whether it is home or exile, does not matter. Thus, one may wonder how the particular qualities of Tibur relate to this message.

But let us closely follow the train of thought: there is a first part (1–14: A) that consists of an extensive priamel series contrasting Tibur favorably with a long series of twelve attractive Greek locations (Rhodos, Mytilene, Ephesus, Corinth, Thebes, Delphi, Tempe, Athens, Argos, Mycene, Sparta, Larisa). This priamel, however, is not a straight one of the type: 'others prefer ABC, etc., but I prefer X.' First there is an elaborate series 'others prefer

²¹² See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 90 f.; *EO* I 858.

²¹³ Cic. *epist.* 10.3.3.

²¹⁴ Sen. *NQ* IV praef. 15; Vell. 2.83.1.

²¹⁵ Above, pp. 206 ff.

²¹⁶ Above, pp. 207 f.

ABC, etc.,’ artfully crafted with distinctly varied syntax: a series of three paratactic sentences of decreasing length (4–3–2 ll.): 1–4: *alii laudabunt*; the carefully varied irregular polysyndeton *aut ... aut ... vel ... vel ... vel ... aut* gives two examples in each of the first three lines and then, after enjambment, almost all of line 4 is dedicated to a seventh place. With ll. 5–8 (*sunt quibus ...*) the syntactical pattern changes and an eighth alternative extends over three lines; in 9f. the syntax slightly changes again with the rather *recherché* phrase²¹⁷ *plurimus dicet*, with two further alternatives distributed over two lines. With the antithetical first person *me* the poet indicates his own preference for Tibur directly. Before he does so, however, he rejects in two lines two further alternatives, Sparta and Larisa, as less attractive (ll. 10f.: polysyndeton with anaphora *nec tam ... nec tam*) before devoting three lines (12–14) to a vivid description of the scenery of his favorite Tibur that appeals both to the eye (the cascades of the Anio fall into a dark gulf, the grove above, the orchards in the valley below, with the movement of the water of the irrigation channels the imagery returns to the beginning that suggested sea travel: islands Rhodos and Mytilene, *bimaris* as an epithet of Corinth) and to the ear (*resonantis*, “echoing” in l. 12) in a polysyndetic (*et ... ac ... et*) tetracolon.

After the speaker’s declaration of his personal preference for Tibur, l. 15 abruptly opens a second part (15–21a: B), which turns to Plancus and appeals to him to console himself with wine whatever the circumstances. Initially, one does not understand how this advice relates to the priamel series and the speaker’s expressed preference. Only the weather imagery for good and bad days continues the motif of natural phenomena found in the description of the beauty of Tibur, with its emphasis on water. Only at the end of the phrase (ll. 19–21a), with the very last word *tui*, “your” (l. 21), does the train of thought fall into place. Horace and Plancus share a preference for Tibur, and Plancus even has a special reason for this: it appears to be his native place. However, we have also heard in the meantime that Plancus is away on military service and exposed to hardship. In stating that enjoyment is imperative not only in all circumstances, on good and bad days, but that this advice also applies explicitly in whatever place one may find oneself, abroad or at home, the multiple relevance of location for the poem’s theme becomes apparent, but it becomes apparent only at the very moment where the preference expressed in ll. 1–18 runs counter to the irrelevance of location expressed in ll. 19–21a. The first alternative, mentioned in ll. 19–21a, implicitly reveals

²¹⁷ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 98f.

that Plancus at that moment is distressed by being on military duty far from home. In the second, contrasting alternative it becomes clear by *tui* at the end that Tibur is Plancus's native place. After that the exhortation to console himself with wine, whatever the circumstances, is elaborated in a third section (ll. 21b–32: C): the mythic example (similar to *Epod.* 13) of exiled Teucer is adduced, who addresses his travel companions on their common journey toward a new home. In the concluding line (32) the text returns explicitly to the sea travel with which the poem began, with its imaginary journey to Greek islands (Rhodes and Mytilene) and Corinth, explicitly called *bimaris*, “with two seas” (ll. 1f.).

As in C. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, in C. 1.7, too, the text strays quite far from its beginnings or, more precisely, from the expectations aroused by the beginning. But there is, as in C. 1.2, an overall coherence of imagery that runs through these sections, with their quite different content. As do C. 1.2 and C. 1.4, the poem falls into two contrasting outer sections, A and C, of almost, but not quite equal, length, around a shorter link passage B: A = 14ll. = 3½ stanzas; B = 6½ ll. = 1½ stanzas; C = 11½ ll. = 3 stanzas. As in C. 1.2, sections B and C are dovetailed by enjambment; the syntactic structure of C reflects that of A: the introduction of Teucer's speech occupies the rest of the sixth stanza (ll. 21b–24)—the first stanza of the poem (ll. 1–4) forms a neat syntactic unit. The last two stanzas (ll. 25–32) are dovetailed (5 : 3) and thus resemble the even more extensive dovetailing in ll. 10–14 (3 : 2 : 5).

Similar to what we find in *Epod.* 13, in C. 1.7 the seemingly incongruent parts A and BC are complementary. In C. 1.7, however, the unity of the poem is much more elusive than in *Epod.* 13. What holds the poem together is the situation and the character of the addressee, as depicted in the address to Plancus in B (ll. 15–21a). This link passage reveals that C. 1.7 is intended as a poem of consolation for Plancus, who is distressed by military service abroad. Plancus emerges as the important man of military action, stressed by his official duties, above all his duties in exotic, faraway places, and longing to retire to his native place. With his praise of Plancus's birthplace Horace begins with a common topic of rhetoric panegyrics²¹⁸ that has its roots in ancient panegyric poetry, namely in Pindar.²¹⁹

Horace begins the poem in a distinctly Pindaric manner, precisely by the way in which he uses the priamel. The contorted way by which Horace finally arrives at his point ‘I prefer Tibur’ via a new start in l. 11 (others prefer

²¹⁸ See Menander Rhet. 3.344 ff.; Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 92.

²¹⁹ Cf. Dornseiff 1921: 115 ff.

ABC, I prefer not DE but F) resembles Pindar's even more contorted priamel technique as exemplified in the first *Olympian* ll. 1 ff.,²²⁰ which runs: 'among A's B is best, among C's D.' Then instead of continuing 'thus among E's there is nothing better than F,' he says, 'thus do not look among E's for anything better than H among G's and than F.' This is an illogical manner of expressing in parataxis what ought to be 'thus do not look among E's—as you would not look for anything better than H among G's—for anything better than F.' Only after this contorted expression in Pindar's first *Olympian*, and after a further detour, praise of the addressee's (Hieron) kingly virtues, does it become clear why the preference expressed in the priamel series, Olympic games, is relevant for the poet: it is relevant because Hieron's racehorse Pherenikos has won an Olympic victory.

C. 1.7 resembles, in a smaller and much more focused compass, this characteristic Pindaric technique of approaching a theme via a series of detours, where each new step is introduced by a new start, and only at the end of the new twist of thought does the relevance to what preceded become clear: 1) many people praise this or that place; 2) I do not prefer any place to Tibur; 3) whatever the circumstances, Plancus, console yourself with wine; 4) irrespective of whether you are (as you are now) far away on military excursions or in your native (beautiful) Tibur; 5) for even in the worst circumstances and far from home one may console oneself with drink; 6) and anyhow, there is good hope even in the worst circumstances that someday things will turn out right.

Horace begins A) with a praise of Plancus's native place, topical in encomiastic speech; later it becomes instrumental for a consolation that confronts the addressee with two possible consolations: B) one can always forget one's sorrows by drinking, thus he can enjoy wine now on duty as he will be able to enjoy it when he comes home again, C) sorrows are temporary, thus they can be set aside even more easily by having a glass of wine in the certain hope of a good end and happy outcome. A, B, and C complement each other in reference to the addressee and his situation, revealed in B: Plancus may be assumed to be homesick and tired of his commitments. Thus, the reminder of the beauty of his native place will both please and flatter him; he may console himself even when he is far away by enjoying a drink, and even more so if he thinks that he will enjoy it even more once he has returned to his beautiful birthplace. And in fact, he may really be quite confident that he will see his home again: men in even worse situations than

²²⁰ Cf. Race 1990: 9 ff. for *O.* 1.1 ff. and other Pindaric priamels.

that of Teucer could drown their passing sorrows in wine in the confidence that they would overcome their troubles.

The unity of the poem consists in the personal situation of the addressee. Various, on the surface not exactly congruent motifs, fall into place if related properly to the situation, as it is constructed in the text. The fact that they are juxtaposed in a manner that does not make explicit their coherence, but rather presents various aspects in isolation and alludes to the overriding interconnection only at the very end of every episode creates the impression that several layers of text are superimposed upon each other.

C. 1.8 (Lydia, dic per omnis)

With C. 1.8, a second love poem follows, meeting perfectly the expectations raised by C. 1.5. Again, love is described from a third-person perspective and there is not even a 'personal' appendix. Like C. 1.5, the poem is addressed to a girl, Lydia, who is asked why she is luring a beautiful young boy into her traps. In C. 1.5, the perspective later shifted to that of the male companion. Here, everything that follows on the initial question focuses completely on the boy; there is no reference to the girl's attractiveness or amatory skills. And, in contrast to C. 1.5, in the description of the boy in love no mention is made of the latter's mental state. The poem dwells on a purely external description, not even a description of the external symptoms of love or of activities associated with a person who has fallen in love. We get a catalogue not of the lover's activities but his non-activities. In a series of four indignant, negative questions (only ll. 5–7 are introduced by *neque ... nec*; the other questions employ a verb that indicates avoidance of action, *deserit ... timet ... vitat*) to the girl the poet speaks of the activities proper for a young man, which the young victim of Lydia's love no longer performs. The address to a girl, in an amatory context, appears to serve only as a pretext to describe in ll. 3–12 the normal activities of a young man.

Only the last stanza (13–16) features a positive question to describe the boy's actual situation: that as a result of being in love he avoids doing what he should do is described as hiding (*latet*) and illustrated by a mythological example: Achilles hiding (among girls) on Syros so that he may not be recruited for the Trojan War. Thus, the example implicitly hints at Sybaris being debared from normal behavior because he is in the company of a girl and at the same time describes his present state as a kind of unmanly neglect of proper behavior (*virilis cultus* l. 15 f.).²²¹ Finally, *sub lacrimosa Troiae funera*

²²¹ Achilles's mother is given the epithet *marina*, "of the sea" (l. 13), which is perfectly suited

“before the heartbreaking deaths at Troy,” hints at the turn Achilles’s life took soon afterward. Jokingly and unobtrusively, this comparison with a precedent from mythology brings home the moral of the little speech about a boy named Sybaris,²²² whose manhood is spoiled by passionate love: he should follow Achilles’s example. On the surface the poem offers a beautiful and highly evocative description of a young man’s athletic activities set in an ambiance concrete enough to evoke contemporary Roman images but sliding more and more into the world of a Greek gymnasium. Uttered in a series of emphatic indignant questions as a rebuke of a girl engaged in an erotic relationship with the male, the description of the latter assumes both a pointed sensuous quality and a strong, yet unobtrusive moralizing undertone.

It is revealing to compare C. 1.8 to C. 3.12. In the latter, too, a young girl, Neobule, is addressed.²²³ Here, however, the poet comments on the girl’s incurable love for a beautiful boy and then in the second half describes the boy’s beauty as it becomes apparent in his athletic activities, similar to those of Sybaris in C. 1.8. Thus, C. 1.8 appears to be a kind of inversion of the situation of C. 3.12: the poet poses a series of indignant questions to the girl, who has seduced a boy, noting the manly activities that made him an attractive partner and that he no longer performs. C. 3.12 is the only poem in the third book that uses an Alcaic motto (imitations of Alcaeus are concentrated in book I²²⁴); thus, C. 3.12 may well fall into the same period as C. 1.9, 1.14, 1.18, 1.37 (i.e., perhaps around 30 BC), and C. 1.8 may well be later than 3.12.

C. 1.8, in epodic meter, shows the same subtle interaction between metrical and syntactical structure as C. 1.5. Lines 1–12 present a series of five parallel, purely paratactic questions of varied length, all introduced with *cur*, “why,” in anaphora: the first stanza has two questions, with enjambment between ll. 2 and 3. The third question occupies three lines (5–7) and is abruptly followed by a very short one, which stops just one cretic before line end (8a). Then the fifth question extends over the stanza boundary and occupies the whole following stanza (8b–12). The last stanza hosts the only positive question: the main clause consists of only two words, *quid* (instead of *cur*) *latet*, but is expanded with two long, hypotactic appendices with

to her, but elsewhere it is an epithet of Venus (C. 3.26.5 and 1.5.16; cf. above, p. 252 n. 168; also Artem. 2.37).

²²² For the associations of the name, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 111.

²²³ For the problem of the speaker, see Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 164.

²²⁴ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxix.

enjambment in the same metrical position in ll. 13 and 15. The syntax is as varied as it can be in a text that consists of a series of parallel paratactical questions. This syntactic variety, accompanied by frequent enjambment, contrasts with an extreme metrical uniformity (of the almost symmetrical meter!): the Aristophanean is always divided into da + tro, the first half of the Sapphicus maior always into - - - - | - - -, the second half in five consecutive cases (4, 6, 8, 10, 12; i.e., all but the first and the two last instances) into da + tro, i.e., an Aristophanean.

Whereas in C. 1.5 we were transported into a purely ideal world of literary topicality, in C. 1.8 we are faced with a mixture of Greek and Roman elements similar to that in C. 1.1.²²⁵ The Greek names Lydia and Sybaris (ll. 1 f.) and the Achilles myth sets the athletic activities, located explicitly in Rome (*Campum* 4, *Tiberim* 8; also *Gallica* 6), into a Greek frame. The description focuses wholly on movement (riding, swimming, fighting: *gestat* l. 10!, throwing), fitting with the stop-and-go of the metrical pattern between iambic, dactylic, and choriambic elements. The actions are made vivid by being given a concrete location and being highlighted by a few pointed references to color: *apricum* (3) ... *solis* (4) ... *flavum* (8; all three "yellowish") and *livida* (10). The sound play (beside the anaphora *cur*) in this poem is particularly subtle: *p(b/r)*-alliteration in ll. 1–4 (*per* ... *Sybarin* ... *properes* ... *perdere apricum Campum patiens pulveris*; note also *per* ... *properes perdere deserit patiens pulveris*), with a change from predominant *i/y*-vocalization in l. 1 to *o* in l. 2; in ll. 7 f. *a* becomes prevalent; from ll. 4–7 there is a remarkable series of different endings in *-is* (*pulveris* ... *solis*, l. 4: gen. sing.; *militaris* ... *aequalis*, ll. 5 f.: acc. pl.; *lupatis* ... *frenis*, ll. 6 f.: abl. pl.) prepared by *omnis* ... *Sybarin* and echoed in *Tiberim*. The *p(b/r)*-alliteration in ll. 1–4 is followed by *qu/c* and *l* (*neque militaris* ... *aequalis equitat Gallica nec lupatis*) in ll. 5 f. giving way to *t* (*temperat* ... *timet tangere*; note also the frequent *r* in three consecutive words in l. 7: *temperat ora frenis*) in ll. 7 f. and then *vi* (*olivum viperino* ... *vitat* ... *livida*) in ll. 8–10. The anaphora *saepe* ... *saepe* (11 f.) is accompanied by homoioteleuton in *-o* (*viperino* ... *disco* ... *iaculo* ... *expedito*) at line end or caesura. The last stanza (13–16) begins with 'chiastic' *f/t*-alliteration in ll. 14 f. (*filium* ... *Thetidis* ... *Troiae* ... *funera*) and homoioteleuton at line ends (*marinae* ... *Troiae* ll. 12 f.) and ends with frequent *c*-alliteration and accumulation of *r* toward the end of l. 16 (*cultus* ... *caedem* ... *Lycias* ... *proriperet catervas*). From *apricum* ... *Campum* in ll. 3 f. onward we find homoioteleuton at almost every end of line and often also at caesuras. All this is achieved

²²⁵ Above, pp. 224 ff.

without wasting one single word that does not have a point. This economy, the combination of the utmost outward simplicity in style and content with the highest, yet completely unobtrusive sophistication endows C. 1.8 with an inimitable charm; it is one of the best poems Horace ever wrote.

C. 1.9 (*Vides ut alta*)

C. 1.9 is both a much admired and much criticized poem.²²⁶ Its merits can best be recognized in response to the criticism that has been directed against it. With the analysis of C. 1.4 and of C. 1.7, in particular, we are well prepared for the apparent incongruence between the scene painted at the beginning of the poem and that depicted at the end: a winter landscape encouraging indoor activities in ll. 1–8 vs. outdoor activities suggesting spring or summer in ll. 18–24. In fact, there are even more inconsistencies, and they are constitutive for the poem as a multilayered whole that resembles C. 1.4 and 1.7. The first stanza (ll. 1–4) evokes a winter landscape with a snow-covered mountain peak in the distance, an image of rigidity in winter frost (reminiscent of the *acris hiems* of C. 1.4.1): woods immobile, suffering under the burden of snow, rigid, frozen rivers. The rigidity of a life paralyzed in wintry death is made explicit again by the exhortation to dissolve (l. 5) the cold by kindling the fire indoors (cf. *solvitur* in C. 1.4.1). The exhortation is addressed to a man with a Greek name with sympotic connotations, Thaliarchus.²²⁷ Thaliarchus is also asked to pour wine from a Sabinian jar. The whole setting is an ostentatiously ideal blending of the Greek and the Latin: a speaking Greek name in an explicitly Roman location (Mount Soracte), the vessel of the wine called with the Greek word *diota*, nowhere else attested in Latin literature. It is not clear who Thaliarchus is nor does the text reveal the occasion on which Horace enjoys his glass of wine. One might

²²⁶ E.g., by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1913: 311 (who calls it a 'pasticcio'; his description is still worth reading) and Fraenkel 1957: 177. The contrasting imagery, which was one of the causes of criticism, is beautifully explained by Syndikus 2001: 117. The seeming inconsistency of the imagery or situations in poems like C. 1.9 and C. 1.7 has aptly been compared to stylistic tendencies of Roman painting (Schefold's second style, see pp. 81 ff., 158 f.) slightly predating Horace's *Odes* by Schefold 1952: 87 f. Schefold points out that Horace's request for unity in *AP* 21 is more strictly observed in what he labels the third style (op. cit. 166 ff.). C. 1.7 and 9 are probably rather early (e.g., C. 2.15 shows the same impressionistic tendencies, below, p. 317); later, Horace appears to apply a stricter concept of unity, but surely the technique of C. 1.9 is not immature, but consciously and carefully devised; moreover, Horace's criticism in *AP* 1 ff. is directed against grotesque conflations and unskillful incongruity (see Heath 1989: 63); the combination of motifs and images in poems like C. 1.7 and 9 does not qualify as such. Cf. Haffter 1972 also on this poem.

²²⁷ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 121.

be tempted to identify Thaliarchus as a servant called to provide warmth and a glass of wine to a poet, resolved to enjoy a warm and cosy room on a frosty clear winter day. But this does not fit with the turn the poem takes from the third stanza onward.

With ll. 9 ff. the address to Thaliarchus passes to advice to leave the future to the gods. This advice is illustrated by another image of nature, distinctly reminiscent of the first, speaking of wind, trees, and water. But this resemblance also emphasizes the difference: ll. 1–4 presented an image of immobility, ll. 9–12 one of movement brought to rest. As in the image in ll. 1–4, there are immobile trees, but now they are trees no longer bent by storm; ll. 9–12 speak of the calm of the winds over the sea, ll. 3 f. of frozen rivers. The immediate combination of woods, once beaten by storm, with winds that have come to rest over the sea is reminiscent of what Horace elsewhere says about Mount Garganus: in *C.* 2.9.7, he mentions Mount Garganus in an image strictly reminiscent of *C.* 1.9.9–12 (but cf. also *laborant* 2.9.7/ *laborantes* 1.9.3) combined with an alternative that speaks of motionless, wintry ice (ll. 5 f.). In *Epist.* 2.1.202, Mount Garganus is mentioned in combination with the sound of the roaring sea (again presented as an alternative). The imagery of ll. 1–4 and ll. 9–12 recalls the landscape of Horace's native region, with the towering Mount Vulture; the woodlands around his hometown that, in his imagination, mingle with the woods of Mount Garganus; and the coastline in the distance. The sight of Mount Soracte, seen on clear days from Rome and thus a familiar sight for the poet, might have reminded the poet of the towering mountains of his youth, of which he speaks in *Serm.* 1.5.77 f. and *C.* 3.4.9.²²⁸

More important, up to l. 8 it seemed to be the poet who was resolved to enjoy the moment, in ll. 9 ff. Thaliarchus becomes the addressee of advice to enjoy life irrespective of fears for the future. And now the image of immobile nature is no longer associated with wintry death, it suggests calm and rest from the turmoil of life.

The complete second half of the poem, three further stanzas (ll. 13–24), elaborate on the advice of ll. 9–12. Only with ll. 13 ff. it is made explicit that the exhortation not to be troubled about the future implies enjoying gratefully every moment of life as long as it is possible, as long as one is young. Enjoyment is presented as enjoying love. Thaliarchus is addressed as *puer* "boy" (l. 16), fitting for the servant the reader might have seen

²²⁸ Above, pp. 8 ff.

Thaliarchus as up to that point. Now, of course, *puer* refers to Thaliarchus's still-lasting youth: he should exploit it before it is too late (ll. 17 f.). As in *C.* 1.4,²²⁹ the anaphora *nunc* in ll. 18 and 21 (at the stanza's beginning) insists on the moment, and the last two stanzas paint a scene of the boy enjoying amorous encounters on the *Campus Martius*. The last stanza (ll. 21–24) is a prime example of Horace's inimitable facility for concentrating in a single sentence such an enormous amount of descriptive detail that he tells a whole story by making literally every word the carrier of constitutive narrative content (a further example of this technique is the immediately following poem, *C.* 1.10). Now outdoor activities are implicitly referred to in contrast to ll. 1–11, but only implicitly do they suggest spring or summer in contrast to the winter scene of the beginning. Again, we have strayed a long way from the beginning and, as in *C.* 1.4, we are suddenly transferred into a completely different atmosphere and world; now the change is from wintry frost, immobility, death, and rest from turmoil to a lively scene about the spring of life. The reference to the enjoyment of life in youth has carried a ray of warm sunshine into the closed chamber that defended its inhabitants from the troubles of the outside world; it has released them into the open air of a bright summer night.

Again, the poem provides a particularly dense and multifaceted combination of layers of suggestive images and thoughts. They refer to each other in an ostentatiously vague and rather associative manner, a manner that associates them by identical elements (immobility/rest, enjoyment) but also by implicit contrast or even mutually exclusive aspects. Thus, every image and every aspect of thought assumes a certain independence and this encourages the mind to wander freely in associations that are only suggested by the text itself as a suggestion to go beyond what is said literally. Even more than in *C.* 1.4 the natural images purposefully concentrate on a certain set of significant traits. This is also the major difference between Horace and his Alcaic model: up to l. 8 Horace follows Alcaeus (fr. 338 LP) rather closely.²³⁰ But, in a manner comparable to what he does in his adaptation of Virgil's catalogue of *prodigia* in *C.* 1.2,²³¹ Horace focuses wholly on details that contribute to the symbolic significance of the image of nature. Even the activities in ll. 5–8 are described by words that contribute to this significance: *dissolve frigus* (5) vs. *gelu ... constiterint* (3 f.), *large ... benignius* (6) vs.

²²⁹ Above, pp. 249 f.

²³⁰ See Pasquali 1920: 714 ff. (who grasps the character of the poem well) for a perceptive interpretation of Horace's technique between Alcaeus and Hellenistic epigram.

²³¹ Above, p. 236.

trouble (*onus ... laborantes* 2 f.), restriction, and discomfort (*acuto* 4). At the same time, Horace sets his scenes in a concrete Roman location by *Soracte* (2) and later *Campus* (18). Here we can—by way of comparison with a Greek model—observe particularly well how Horace conveys a vague and implicit purposefulness to his imagery. His images are both plastic and concrete, particular and with a vivid appeal to the senses, but also shaped by a focus on certain conceptual elements, which elude, however, any attempt to fit them into a neatly consistent corset. Thus, these images in their ostentatiously frustrated meaningfulness express in words what seems to be inexpressible.

The scenery at the beginning suggests first the immobility of nature in winter, the inconvenience of frost and cold, the burden of snow as a metaphor for the inconveniences of life, against which man can guard himself by making the best of the situation and enjoying life from the position of relative security he can create for himself. In ll. 9–12 man is exhorted to renounce control over his circumstances, leaving it to the gods, who—in contrast to him—are in absolute control with perfect ease. The stillness of nature signifies rest from the turmoil of life, graced upon men only by the gods. Ll. 13–15 admonish man to gratefully respond to the gifts of chance instead of looking further ahead. Now the focus has changed from the speaker to the addressee. With him we are transported into the world of youth, as opposed explicitly to old age. It is the young who can properly respond to the call to renounce thinking of the future and to enjoy the moment presented to him, who is graced by the ‘*Gunst des Augenblicks*.’ What does it matter to him, who lives in the grace of the moment, that only the gods can bring to rest the storm of life? Here somebody appears to speak who takes a quite different perspective. Is it one who is no longer young and therefore knows of life’s turmoil: turmoil that is beyond human, but under divine control? Does he know, better than anybody else, how precious the gifts of youth are because they are past him? Is the image of the snowy mountain and woods, the icy river, also an image of death, of old age, the snow perhaps a mirror of the white hair referred to in l. 17? Does the image of rest from turmoil perhaps refer to the image of death?

We are not told by the text, nothing is made explicit. And why does the speaker exhort his young companion to enjoy love? Is the speaker—for a moment—in the young fellow’s company, one who longs to be himself a ‘*Günstling des Geschicks*’? Is he capable only of warming himself in a dim reflection of the sun that falls upon his young companion? Horace’s poem draws its unique artistic merit and its profoundness from the very fact that it poses, if only implicitly, these and countless other questions but does not attempt to answer them.

We have seen that Horace chose the first nine poems of his collection with great care, not only as regards thematic variety and order. To be sure, C. 1.3 and 1.6 were chosen for thematic reasons:²³² both C. 1.6 and even more so C. 1.3 are not among Horace's greatest achievements, yet even the latter is an agreeable example of versification. All other poems of the series (including C. 1.1 and 1.7, in my opinion) show Horace at his best, as do C. 1.10 and 1.11. C. 1.10 (after an Alcaean motto and thus perhaps contemporary with C. 1.9²³³), the first hymn to a god in the book, is arguably the best poem of this type,²³⁴ and C. 1.11²³⁵ is close in style, charm and perfection to C. 1.8 and C. 1.1; the latter also resembles by its stichic Asclepiadean meter. In any case, Horace chose for his parade of meters some of his best earlier poems, written between 30 and 28 BC (C. 1.2, 1.7, 1.9; C. 1.3 and 1.6 cannot be dated), and completed the cycle with the introductory poem (C. 1.1) and a poem to the consul of the year of publication (C. 1.4). C. 1.5 and 1.8 are probably later works; it is possible and, in regard to the quasi-programmatic function of C. 1.5, even likely that both C. 1.5 and 1.8 were written for their place in the opening cycle in 23 BC.

3. THE POET AND THE DIVINE

3.1. *Poems on Gods and Goddesses*

C. 1.10 (Mercuri, facunde nepos), 18 (Nullam, Vare, sacra), 21 (Dianam tenerae), 30 (O Venus, regina), 35 (O diva, gratum); 2.19 (Bacchum in remotis); 3.18 (Faune, Nympharum), 22 (Montium custos), 25 (Quo me, Bacche)

With C. 1.10, Horace returns to the Sapphic stanza, the meter of C. 1.2, the one he preferred for songs to the gods.²³⁶ Except for C. 3.25 on Bacchus, an extraordinary poem in every respect, all hymnic poems (even similar poems on objects like C. 1.32²³⁷ on the lyre or C. 3.21 on the wine jar) exhibit the stanza form. If we include the latter and the hymnic C. 1.2²³⁸ and C. 3.11²³⁹ we

²³² Above, pp. 239 ff., 256 ff.

²³³ Above, pp. 273 ff.

²³⁴ Below, pp. 278 ff.

²³⁵ Below, pp. 218, 240.

²³⁶ See pp. 221, 223.

²³⁷ See below, pp. 281 f., 347 f.

²³⁸ Above, pp. 232 ff.

²³⁹ Below, pp. 242 f., 317 f., 346, 352 ff.

find the Sapphic stanza in seven out of eleven poems (C. 1.2, 10, 30, 32; 3.11, 18, 22); three are Alcaic (C. 1.35; 2.19; 3.21), one is in the Asclepiadean stanza (C. 21).

The reason why Horace chose C. 1.10 to occupy the prominent position of the first hymn *stricto sensu* in the book is obvious. In this position the hymn to Mercury harks back to C. 1.2, the quasi-hymnic encomium on the princeps, which tentatively identified him with this god (viewed in isolation, of course, C. 1.10 does not relate to Augustus at all). With C. 1.10, the introduction of themes and meters comes full circle; with this poem Horace returns to the form and meter of the first poem of the corpus of lyric poetry after the prooemium. Now, in contrast to the complex and artificial adaptation of the hymnic genre to political panegyrics in C. 1.2, we get a conventional hymn, in fact the most conventional of all such poems in Horace's *Odes*.

A further reason for the poem's position may be seen in Horace's well-known personal attachment to Mercury. In fact, his choice of Mercury in C. 1.2 as the divine power incarnated in Octavian, may have been influenced by this personal predilection as well. However, the significance Mercury has for Horace is not made explicit in the poem.²⁴⁰ On the surface, C. 1.10 is among the most impersonal and conventional compositions in *Carmina* I–III. As other odes in close proximity (namely C. 1.4, 9, 14) it has an Alcean model; in fact, C. 1.10 and C. 1.30, i.e., the first and last hymns to an Olympian god (Venus), go back to an Alcean, respectively, Sapphic model: C. 1.10 to Alcaeus's hymn on Hermes,²⁴¹ which was the second poem (after a hymn to Apollo) in the Alexandrian edition of the poet.²⁴² Its first stanza is preserved in a quotation by Hephaestion (fr. 308 LP). C. 1.10 avoids any personal touch, even any reference to Roman or contemporary items. It pretends to be nothing but a literary imitation that aspires to capture in Roman cloth the spirit of archaic Greek hymn, as C. 1.23 aspires to a recreation of the character of Anacreontic poetry.²⁴³ Yet, Horace indiscernably shapes and transforms his Greek material into a remarkably distinct and purposeful whole that resem-

²⁴⁰ For Mercury's significance for Horace, cf. Newman (2011: 77 f.), who even attempts to find relevant traits in C. 1.10.

²⁴¹ Page 1955: 252 ff.

²⁴² The position of the hymn in the edition of Alcaeus may have influenced Horace's choice to place the poem here; but Lyne's (2007: 293 ff.) speculations on the influence of the Alexandrian edition of Alcaeus on the structure of Horace's book are oversubtle; above, p. 238 n. 119.

²⁴³ Below, pp. 341, 343 f.

bles his personal vision of the god he styled as his personal patron: only the first narrative episode on the theft of Apollo's cattle follows Horace's Alcean source (as Paus. 7.20.4 and Porph. ad loc. attest). The following story from the Trojan War (ll. 13–16) and Hermes as ψυχοπόμπος (ll. 17–20) did not feature in Alcaeus. In both its macro- and microstructure the poem exhibits the tremendous sense of purpose and economy that is characteristic of Horace's poetry. The catalogue of Mercury's powers and achievements in the opening stanzas (ll. 1–8), though conventional,²⁴⁴ emphasizes the god's mental and inventive powers, his achievements for civilization. After highlighting the god's musical achievement (6: invention of the lyre) the catalogue comes straight to the final characterization of Mercury's mental capacities as 'cunning,' which is further defined as achieving whatever one wants with gracious, even exhilarating ease (7 f.: *callidum quidquid placuit iocoso/condere furto*, "cunning at concealing anything your fancy has taken with jesting theft").

The three concluding stanzas list activities that testify to the god's facilities, activities in the world of the gods (9–12), of men (13–16), and of the dead (17–20). In the ease with which he makes Priamus pass through all obstacles the god, who as a child added a smile to the serene and happy life of Homer's 'easy living gods,' by his 'cunning' transports into the world of men something of this supreme absence of toil. From l. 9 onward every stanza is a self-contained unit that condenses into a single phrase a whole story. In ll. 1–8, the action, which attests to Mercury's particular divine power, or—in the last stanza—the ultimate summary of his role in the upper and lower worlds, is always revealed only in the very last words of the respective passage (12: *risit Apollo*, "Apollo laughed"; 16: *fefellit*, "passed unnoticed"; 19 f.: *superis deorum/gratus et imis*, "a favorite with the gods above and with those below"). The anaphoric *te* at the beginning of ll. 5 and 9 links the introduction to the narrative stanzas; after the interruption in the fourth stanza beginning (13) with the emphatic particle *quin*, with *te* later in the line, a polyptoton *tu* returns at the beginning of the concluding stanza (17). The ever-simplified syntax (9–12: hypotaxis—13–16: participles—17–20: parataxis) dissolves into a peaceful descent into the realm of the dead. Syndikus, who best describes the poem's supreme poetic qualities, distills the very essence of Horace's achievement in his ultimate comment on the construction of the Priamus episode with the words: "In unserem Gedicht

²⁴⁴ Cf. Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 126 f.

ist also viel von Horazens Wesensart in die mythische Hermesgestalt hineinprojiziert, oder vielmehr, Horaz gibt hier dem griechischen Gott zurück, was er an lösender Wirkung des Geistigen von den Griechen gelernt hat."²⁴⁵

Mercury's prominence is reaffirmed in the cletic hymn to Venus toward the end of Book I (C. 1.30), where he replaces Peitho among the goddess's attendants.²⁴⁶ Both this poem and C. 1.21 (to Diana, Apollo, and Leto), although adhering to a traditional design like C. 1.10, go some way to give the Greek models a different color: C. 1.30 blends various archaic Greek models—Sappho, Anacreon, and Alcman—with an epigram of Posidippus, *AP* 12.131;²⁴⁷ as in the latter, the goddess is asked to visit the home of a woman. She bears the name of one of Horace's fictitious loves, the Glycera of C. 1.19 (also later in C. 1.33),²⁴⁸ but, characteristically, Horace does not go as far as Posidippus in secularizing the hymnic prayer by making it explicit that his wish is motivated by sexual favors. In C. 1.21, Horace appends a special prayer to Apollo for Caesar's well-being to the praise of Diana, Apollo, and Leto, which is sung by a chorus of girls and boys.²⁴⁹ In the hymn to *Fortuna*, C. 1.35, the invocation of the divinity, leading to a more elaborate prayer for the emperor on his military excursions, is interrupted by a quasi-Pindaric, abrupt change²⁵⁰ to a series of indignant questions on the moral decay of Rome, troubled by civil strife, quite similar to *Epod.* 7, before it suddenly returns to good wishes for Caesar's war plans in the last 2 1/2 ll. C. 1.35 is an elaborate poem, which Horace chose to occupy a prominent, quasi-programmatic place toward the end of the book,²⁵¹ yet, here the result of blending a hymnic beginning with philosophical and moralizing discourse and references to contemporary politics can appear rather clumsy if compared with other Horatian compositions and is likely an early composition.²⁵²

If the hymns in Book I, except for C. 1.35, adhere rather closely to conventional models and draw their charm from transforming those models, the songs on gods in the third book move further from the hymnic form. Both

²⁴⁵ Syndikus 2001: I 123 ff.

²⁴⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 347.

²⁴⁷ See Syndikus 2001: I 270 ff., who rightly connects the poem with C. 1.19; see below, pp. 339 ff.

²⁴⁸ Below, pp. 347 ff.

²⁴⁹ Cf. Nisbet and Hubbard's (1970: 254) fine interpretation; but I do not understand why it should be "shocking" that Horace "couples a single autocrat with the ancient Roman people."

²⁵⁰ Cf. the overtly Pindaric end of C. 2.1 (29 ff.) with its 'Abbruchsformel' in the last stanza (ll. 37–40).

²⁵¹ For a further interpretation of C. 1.35 in respect to 1.34, see below, pp. 377 ff.

²⁵² See above, p. 212.

C. 3.18 and C. 3.22²⁵³ are addressed to gods connected with the countryside. C. 3.22, addressed to Diana, as is C. 1.21, resembles the fabric of 1.30; in C. 3.22 Horace blends hymn with dedicatory epigram (dedication of a tree to the goddess). In accord with the catalogues of epithets of the gods in hymnic tradition, Diana is not merely depicted as a goddess of hills and woods. Much more space (3 ll.) is allotted to Diana's identification with Ilithya, and the goddess's infernal aspect as Hecate is highlighted. The emphasis on these aspects, which are not relevant for the dedication and contrast with the atmosphere of the country idyll in the second stanza, and the address by the vague and ambiguous *Virgo* (1),²⁵⁴ are highly suggestive; they open up a wide space in which the idyllic character of the countryside can shine in an even brighter light. In C. 3.18, the quasi-hymnic address to Faunus is only a tag for the description of a religious ceremony on Horace's country estate.

C. 1.35 was an example of a long, elaborate poem in which a hymnic beginning develops into something else, and in its own way C. 1.2 (probably ca. 29/30 BC)²⁵⁵ is a very sophisticated example of this kind as well. C. 3.11, discussed below,²⁵⁶ is another poem addressed to Mercury, besides C. 10 in the first collection of *Odes*: here the hymnic beginning is only a tag for a completely different 'secular poem.' One may differ in opinion about its artistic quality, one may find fault with it being rather too ingenious, contorted, and bizarre, but that is what Horace wanted it to be. That the *vir Mercurialis* should show a predilection for his patron with three poems (C. 1.2, 10, and 3.11) is no surprise, nor does Horace's choice of the rural deities (Diana, twice, and Faunus) or Venus—in view of its Sapphic models—call for explanation. The poems not considered so far are the three odes concerned with Bacchus, C. 1.18, 2.19, and 3.25, but only C. 2.19 is a hymn.

"Von den zwei Seiten des griechischen Wesens, die Nietzsche charakterisiert hat, hatte unser Dichter entschieden mehr Sinn für das Apollinische—sogar in dem Augenblick, in dem er ein Gedicht auf Dionysos schrieb," is Syndikus's comment on C. 2.19.²⁵⁷ Yet, the first collection of *Odes* contains three poems on Bacchus, and there is only one (C. 1.32) on Apollo, whereas

²⁵³ The address to the goddess in ll. 1–4 pointedly puts the accent not on her attributes as a goddess of nature but on her other functions as those of being called upon by women in labor, of the moon, and Trivia. This forms a beautiful contrast to the idyllic picture of the second stanza.

²⁵⁴ See Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 257.

²⁵⁵ Above, p. 212.

²⁵⁶ See pp. 352 ff.

²⁵⁷ Syndikus 2001: I 466.

in the hymnic C. 1.21 he figures beside his sister and his mother. Indeed, Bacchus is mentioned more often than Apollo in the *Odes*.

Of course, Horace's hymns on gods are literary exercises, not cult songs, nor outpourings of personal piety, however, as I shall argue in the following section, it is too simplistic an approach to reduce the gods in Horace's poetry to mere literary metaphors; this is only part of the truth. In fact, as regards Bacchus, it is true; Bacchus owes most of the references to him to his association with wine. How Horace reduces a god to a literary metaphor we can observe best in the curious C. 1.18, where, as we have noted above, he uses an Alcaean motto adapted to the addressee as a tag for a strange dithyrambic diatribe on the dangers of the excessive consumption of alcohol.

C. 1.6 spoke of wine and love as the foremost topics of Horace's lyric poetry, and C. 1.32, toward the end of the book, reaffirms this statement with explicit reference to the prime model of Horace's poetry.²⁵⁸ C. 1.18 also has a semi-programmatic function; as C. 1.11, which in the sequence of poems precedes it, it returns to the stichic meter of C. 1.1: this time the major Asclepiadean. If we count the 'Parade Odes' (1–9) as one unit, it occupies the tenth place in a book of thirty units,²⁵⁹ i.e., it concludes the first decade. As we shall see,²⁶⁰ C. 1.13 and 16 explicitly propose the Horatian aspiration to a peaceful, quiet love in contrast to the violent and unstable emotions of the love affairs of Hellenistic epigram and Roman love elegy.²⁶¹ In C. 1.17, this ideal of peaceful love is presented in a symposiastic scene in the company of a girl, set in the ideal landscape of the poet's home, protected by divine powers.²⁶² This prepares the reader for, C. 1.18,²⁶³ which immediately follows it. It constitutes Horace's programmatic poem on wine. As in C. 1.13, 16, and 17 the poet spoke of his aversion toward passionate, violent emotions in love, in C. 1.18 he advocates the preservation of moderation and *decorum* in the consumption of alcohol. This concern is reiterated in the context of a symposiastic scene at the beginning of C. 1.27.²⁶⁴ However, C. 1.18 is not merely a diatribe on the right use of wine; on the contrary, the poem makes its point in a rather oblique manner. As with several poems analyzed above, C. 1.18 constitutes what I have called a moving structure that proceeds from

²⁵⁸ Above, pp. 29 f. and 281 f., 347.

²⁵⁹ See above, p. 216.

²⁶⁰ Below, pp. 334 ff.

²⁶¹ See pp. 347 ff.

²⁶² See p. 339.

²⁶³ Above, p. 281 and below.

²⁶⁴ On this poem, cf. Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 309 f.

a tag and then arrives via a link passage in the middle somewhere else. The poem begins (A: ll. 1–6) with a quasi-dithyrambic aretology of the consoling powers of wine (or Bacchus) and its companion, love (Venus, l. 6). Only then, with the mythological *exemplum* of the Centaurs and Lapiths does Horace allude to violence and hubris as a result of drunkenness (B: ll. 7–11a). In the link passage he makes his central point, preservation of the Golden Mean, by pointing to the fine line (*exiguo fine*, l. 10) between right and wrong. The enjambment between ll. 10 and 11 leaves the coda (C: 11b–16) only a little shorter than A: in this wider context, opened up by B, the final shift toward Bacchus as the god of eastern orgiastic cults and mysteries is intelligible; the poet can warn against Bacchus as the god of eastern orgiastic cults and implicitly distance himself from the patron god of Antony.²⁶⁵

C. 1.18 makes plain why Bacchus's role in Horace's poetry is quite different from that of gods of the Roman pantheon like Apollo or Diana: he is not an official deity; on the contrary, his worship was suspect, and as the god Antony identified himself with Bacchus could even serve as a negative tag. This is the general context in which the poems on Bacchus have to be viewed, and this is, in a wider sense, the programmatic function of C. 1.18.

This guarded attitude toward the orgiastic side of the god does not, however, exclude another function Bacchus holds in Horace's poetry: in both C. 2.19 and 3.25 Dionysiac ecstasy stands for poetic inspiration.²⁶⁶ Panegyric or national poetry that, inevitably, draws its inspiration from a Pindaric model and thus is above the level of private Lesbian poetry in the vein of Alcaeus and Sappho is described as beyond the capacities of the poet in the *recusatio*. If the poet is keen to offer himself to this task despite his limited abilities he may call himself back by a Pindaric 'Abbruchsformel,' as in C. 2.1,²⁶⁷ or describe it as a passing attack of Dionysiac frenzy, as in C. 3.25.²⁶⁸ Thus, Bacchus may serve as a cipher for poetic inspiration, the highest, but at the same time a passing and precarious inspiration, a *dulce periculum* ("sweet danger," l. 18) that is marked—as wine—by a subtle line between right and wrong, a borderline not to be crossed too often.²⁶⁹

At the end of Book II Horace placed two 'programmatic' poems (C. 2.19 and 20) on the poet's inspiration, which balance C. 2.1 (with its Pindaric

²⁶⁵ See Pasquali 1920: 1 ff.; Syndikus 2001: I 201 f.

²⁶⁶ See also Reinhardt below, p. 501.

²⁶⁷ See pp. 283 f., 367 n. 562.

²⁶⁸ Cf. below, pp. 372 f., 391, and also Newman 2011: 95 ff.

²⁶⁹ Syndikus 2001: II 209 ff.

end). Even more than in C. 1.18 or 3.25 in C. 2.19, the only piece on Bacchus that can be classified as a hymn, Bacchus's powers are described as threatening and fearful.²⁷⁰ C. 3.25 describes the poet under the spell of a divine epiphany, which inspires his poetry;²⁷¹ untypically for a hymn, C. 2.19 begins with a description of the overwhelming power of the god in his immediate presence, highlighting the fear with which this unusual and hardly credible event inspires the poet. The Dionysiac frenzy of C. 2.19 extends even to the bizarre and slightly self-ironic extravagance of the poet's immortalization in C. 2.20 and excuses the pointedly hyperbolic self-assurance and grotesque imagery of the beginning.²⁷² After C. 2.19 one can read the poem as a failed attempt to contain the overpowering impact of the divine presence, which, for the moment, inspires Horace's poetry.

3.2. *Personal Religion in the Odes*

3.2.1. *Preliminaries*

"Other people's religions are often hard to understand." Hardly anyone would disagree with Nisbet and Rudd's²⁷³ laconic statement as it relates not only to Horace's personal religion—if he had one—but to that of the ancients in general. It seems to me that this is the best summary of the scholarly discussion on ancient religion in the recent past, a discussion that has brought about a marked change in our appreciation of ancient religion, both Greek and Roman. This discussion has questioned, in particular, the all too simplistic dichotomy between religion or religious beliefs and rationality. Feeney's 1998 monograph is a concise, yet very thoughtful and circumspect reappraisal of Roman religion and its representation in Latin literature, Augustan poetry in particular. Yet, in the most authoritative recent study on Horace's *Odes*, the volumes of H.P. Syndikus,²⁷⁴ surely one of Horace's most perceptive interpreters, the image of Horace as the enlightened rationalist, for whom the emblems of traditional religion are mere poetic or literary symbols, prevails. Few scholars today will be prepared to take at face value Horace's confession in the notorious C. 1.34, the crucial text in regard to the

²⁷⁰ Syndikus 2001: I 467 ff. rightly points out that Horace aims at presenting the full range of Dionysus's powers.

²⁷¹ Cf. also C. 3.4, below, pp. 389 ff.

²⁷² Horace alludes to it in C. 4.2 (see Fantham below, pp. 448 ff.) in order to stress that it is quasi impossible to stand up to the elevated level of Pindar's poetic inspiration. For a challenging new interpretation that stresses the fanciful and grotesque aspects, see Newman 2011: 81 ff.

²⁷³ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxiii.

²⁷⁴ Syndikus 2001.

poet's personal religion, that he has renounced the Epicurean dogma on the gods in favor of traditional religious belief.²⁷⁵

I shall not pretend here to be able to give convincing answers to problems that are far too complex to be defined with the necessary precision in the context of a study on Horace's religious poetry, yet, I raise some fundamental questions about the wider context in which the problem of Horace's personal religion has to be addressed. I apologize in advance if I dwell unduly on what may seem to be commonly known trivialities, but I am afraid that it is crucial to redefine some fundamental notions, and I prefer to appear pedantic in at least touching on far-reaching problems that are much too complex to be addressed here with the necessary precision, but of which we must be aware if we interpret Horace's poems with a view to the attitude of the poet himself toward traditional religiosity. Thus, I thought fit to begin with a very sketchy and superficial outline of the general context in which we can explore at *C.* 1.34 and some other key passages on religion in Horace's *Odes* in more detail.

The change in our apprehension of ancient poets' and intellectuals' attitude toward traditional religion is due to a more acute appreciation of the fallacies provoked by our inclination to inevitably impose on ancient religion modern concepts of what terms like religion or the divine mean, concepts suggesting themselves subconsciously to a culture that has been indelibly shaped by the Christian faith. Feeney rightly draws attention to the fact that our word 'religion' is not synonymous with *religio* in Latin nor does it correspond precisely to any ancient Greek or Latin word. He thus warns us against speaking of the religious beliefs of the ancients as if belief were identical with what the word means in a Christian context.²⁷⁶ Naturally, we have become aware of facts that reveal the ancient Greeks and Romans as much less rational, enlightened, and secular than they would have appeared to someone who looks at the relationship between religion and intellect from a Victorian or pietist point of view. However, it seems to me that for all its obvious merits the modern discussion about fundamental differences in various religious concepts has not been carried far enough. Of course, it is significant that there is no one term in either Greek or Latin that covers what religion meant in the sense established in the course of time from

²⁷⁵ Apart from Syndikus 2001: I 293 ff., the most authoritative modern discussions of *C.* 1.34 are still Fraenkel 1957: 253 ff. and Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 376 ff.; on Horace, and religion in general, cf. Griffin in Harrison 2002: 181 ff.; Oksala 1973; see also below, pp. 296 ff.

²⁷⁶ Feeney 1998: 1 ff.; on belief 12 ff.; cf. also Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1931–1932: 9, 12.

Lactantius until the Middle Ages: 'religion,' with all the changes and applications the word has been subjected to in modern times, is a rather empty and, at the same time, an extremely flexible term that does not grasp precisely the quality of any particular experience of the divine and thus may sensibly be used as a general term for various sorts of attitudes toward a higher sphere, which, with due caution, one may call the divine.²⁷⁷ *Religio* originally had a very precise and restricted meaning, it was a word that denoted a particular attitude toward the higher powers;²⁷⁸ it meant 'due respect for the requests of the higher powers,' and in fact this attitude represents the very essence of what religion originally meant for both the Greeks and the Romans.

We become aware most poignantly of the difference between the attitudes of a culture shaped by Christianity and those of pagan antiquity if we

²⁷⁷ "Obwohl es seit langem üblich ist, (R.) als Sammelbegriff für jede Verehrung transzendenter Mächte, jede Lehre vom Göttlichen und alle Glaubensbekenntnisse der Menschen zu verwenden, ist es fast unmöglich genaue Äquivalenzbegriffe für (R.) in jenen Sprachen zu finden, die nicht das lat. (religio) aufgenommen haben, nicht zuletzt wegen des Bedeutungswandels von (religio) selbst," Dierse in *HWP* VIII 631. But there is a real problem with whether religion should be applied to Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. If one precludes any preconceived definition of 'religion,' especially one colored by Christianity, one can eventually use religion in a very broad sense. That there is indeed a problem, not only from a Christian perspective, is indicated by the fact that the Constitution of the People's Republic of China recognizes freedom to believe in a religion in § 36. Officially, China recognizes five religions (*jiao*): Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism, defined officially by four elements: 1) belief (*xinyang*), feelings (*ganqing*), ceremonies (*yishi*), and organization (*zuzhi*), cf. von Senger 2008: 119 f.; for minor cults, folk religions, superstitions, cf. *ibid.* 121 ff. In his introduction von Senger discusses briefly what 'religion' means with special reference to Confucianism, not officially classified as a religion today. This poses the question of whether religion (in the modern sense) implies any concept of what one may call god or gods (religion surely does not imply any metaphysics). In Buddhism, overt atheism and theism coexist, precisely because neither the presence nor the absence of something called god is relevant at all to the Buddhist doctrine per se. But rather than ask whether religion implies the notion of god one should ask what god or something like god means. Then it becomes clear that the former question does not make sense because a word like god can only be a cipher for something that cannot even be defined as unknowable, but rather as neither knowable nor unknowable. Thus, even a division into personal and impersonal concepts of god, as advocated by Tugendhat (2006: 121 f.), who is conscious of the fallacies in drawing a clear line, is more than questionable. However, Tugendhat's (op. cit. 111 ff.) definition of religion (vs. mysticism) rests upon a penetrating recent analysis of the anthropological roots of religiosity, although one may be inclined to define mysticism in Tugendhat's sense as a higher state of religion than to regard it as contrasting attitudes toward the whole and the self. Of course, the problems of the Chinese constitution in defining whether certain groups can claim the status of religion corresponds exactly to the problem in western societies whether or to what extent communities such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Scientology, Free Churches, or esoteric 'religiosities' fall under the guarantee of freedom of religion or what status they can hold in respect to established churches.

²⁷⁸ Latte 1960: 39.

ask ourselves what our word ‘belief’ means today in a religious context and to what word or what facet of ancient religiosity it refers. When we ask what precisely belief meant to the ancients or in the Christian religion, we note immediately that in English ‘belief’ is not the *vox propria*, but a rather pale term for the Christian attitude toward god. The English language, as also the Italian, French, or other Romance languages, is fortunate to have a more precise term for the attitude of a Christian believer: ‘faith,’ (in Italian ‘fede,’ in French ‘foi,’), the very word Christians used in Latin to describe their attitude towards their god: *fides*, whereas in German there is only one word: ‘Glaube.’²⁷⁹ ‘Glaube’ overlaps with ‘Überzeugung,’ or conviction.²⁸⁰ This variety of expressions in modern languages attests to the difficulties in expressing adequately in any language the basic quality of a certain, in this case the Christian attitude, toward god. Before we note the differences between Christian attitudes and ancient ones, or ask questions like ‘did the ancients believe in their gods,’²⁸¹ we should define at least provisionally what it means for a Christian to believe in god, although I can adumbrate this complex problem in only an extremely elementary manner, which, as I fully know, must be an extremely simplistic one.

At any rate, ‘faith’ (or ‘fede,’ ‘foi’) corresponds exactly to the Latin *fides*, i.e., the Latin translation of Greek πίστις, the word by which Christians chose to define their attitude toward their god in contrast and analogy to pagan Greek religion. Thus πίστις, or *fides*, mirrors ancient ‘terminology’; here we

²⁷⁹ ‘Credenza’ would hardly be the proper word in Italian for Christian beliefs, nor ‘croyance’ in French. For English ‘belief,’ see Lloyd (2004) 64 ff., where he briefly touches also on the question of what religious belief is the utter ambiguity of the modern word.

²⁸⁰ For the origins of German ‘Glauben’ and the Hebrew basis of Greek πίστις and Latin *fides*, cf. *LAC* s.v. ‘Glauben,’ also s.v. ‘Fides.’

²⁸¹ Therein lies the fallacy of such statements as “Glaubte Horaz an die von ihm dargestellten Götter? Diese Frage ist vielleicht nicht richtig gestellt. Auf welcher Ebene der geistigen Tätigkeit glaubte Horaz an die Götter? Die Antwort: auf der Ebene des ästhetischen Erlebens und in der Welt der Phantasie” (Oksala 1973: 24). The scholarly discussion about Horace’s religion still does not question radically the validity of any such expression as ‘to believe in,’ inevitably tinged by Christian notions (or rather pseudo-Christian notions), and therefore fails to do justice to Horace’s religious attitudes. Somehow, even today, the discussion on the personal religion of the ancients subconsciously implies that the question is whether an educated person in antiquity could really ‘believe’ that something or somebody somehow resembling the Zeus of Greek statues or myth did ‘exist,’ as a Christian believer somehow appears to ‘believe’ that somewhere something ‘exists,’ which bears some resemblance to someone who once uttered the Ten Commandments and then after some time somehow decided to send his son down to earth. How difficult it is to rid oneself of attitudes and concepts not necessarily implied in ancient religiosity and worship can be easily appreciated by reading Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931–1932: 9, 12) or Heinze (1960a: 168 f.; on Augustus’s religiosity); cf. also Drachmann 1922: 1 ff.

are at the linguistic roots of the difference between Christian and pagan religious attitudes: Christians had to find a proper Greek expression for their attitude toward their god in the ambit of the vocabulary of Greek pagan religiosity. In fact, there cannot be any better illustration of the difference between the pagan attitude toward the divine and the Christian one than the semantic difference between πιστεύω and νομίζω, the commonly used word in Greek antiquity for the relationship between man and god. In pagan Greek religion men νομίζουν θεούς, i.e., 'they use, they handle gods (like a language or a currency), treat gods as it is usual to treat them.'²⁸² Nothing could be more alien to the incalculable nature, the very notorious unreliability of the Greek gods as the κρείττονες, the "stronger," the unscrutable power of the uncontrollable,²⁸³ than the concept expressed by πιστεύειν, "to trust," πίστις, "faith," in the sense of full confidence, trust, and reliance as the fundamental relationship of man with god.²⁸⁴ Could there be any better proof of the fact that the divine in ordinary Greek religion was felt predominantly as something threatening, something profoundly disturbing than Epicurean philosophy, a philosophy that aimed at freeing man from the anxiety caused by the threatening presence of higher powers interfering with human affairs capriciously and completely beyond human control?

Thus belief, or conviction, is not at all the proper term for the attitude expressed by πίστις in the Christian sense.²⁸⁵ The fundamental attitude of the Christian religious believer consists of total dedication to the divine. In an ancient context, such total devotion to (a) god is not only discouraged by the incalculable nature of the gods, it is, generally speaking, not even in accord with the requests for proper behavior toward the divine sphere.²⁸⁶ The most eminent example of a human being's total dedication to a god in ancient Greek literature is Hippolytus in Euripides's play. However, Hippolytus's attitude is something completely extraordinary, something that must

²⁸² See Fahr 1969.

²⁸³ See Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1931–1932: I 17 ff.

²⁸⁴ Cf. E. *Hec.* 956 ff. A good example of proper religious conduct for a man, favored by a god, is Odysseus in Sophocles's *Aiāx*; even where he is encouraged by his protectress Athena to revel in his closeness to the goddess, he does not 'trust' in the permanence of the divine favor bestowed. Athena confirms this disbelief, which is the basis of human σωφροσύνη, "good sense" as an attitude dear to the gods; cf. S. *Ai.* 121 ff., 127 ff. In the traditional religion of the ancients the fear of the Lord is not only the beginning of wisdom, it is also the end.

²⁸⁵ πίστις in pagan Greek philosophical terminology is something like or between 'conviction' and 'belief.' It is enlightening to read Arnou 1967: 27 f. on πίστις, in order to understand the fundamental difference between Christian faith and pagan philosophical 'certainties,' based not on πίστις, a much too feeble concept, but on spontaneous intellection.

²⁸⁶ Aphrodite in Eur. *Hipp.* 20 explicitly renounces any pretention of exclusivity.

appear to the pious as a lack of respect for the ultimate barrier between mortals and gods.²⁸⁷ Belief, in the common sense of firm conviction, is not even an appropriate term for an attitude of ordinary ancient religiosity. As νομίζειν, “to treat as is common use,” in religious contexts attests, the relationship between god and man was primarily one of worship and cult as an expression of respect for a superior and uncontrollable power: an attitude most eminently expressed by σέβομαι, “to revere” (a god is σεμνός, “one to be revered”; piety is εὐσέβεια, i.e., fundamentally the same as Latin *pietas*, “respect”²⁸⁸). Belief, in the sense of the firm conviction that a certain divine power exists, entails first of all a certain concept of the divine, and a concept is something that basically runs counter to the divine’s *per definitionem* inscrutable essence. A concept of the divine as something intellectually meaningful shapes itself only in concepts that run counter to traditional religion. The external appearance of the divine in traditional religion is only the expression of the fact that the divine, even if it is only the incarnation of the undefinable *per se*, must be something definite in order to receive external expressions of respect, of the sense of the inscrutable as something beyond one’s control. The traditional ‘concept’ of god is meaningful only in respect to the actions of a cult as an expression of respect. This relationship between man and god as one based simply on mutual interaction is most sharply developed in Roman religion with its impersonal gods, but it forms the essence of Greek religion as well. Thus what Latte says about Roman religiosity is the most pointed description of the essence of ancient pagan religiosity, in general: “Religiosität bedeutet eben für den Römer nicht eine Gesinnung, die die ganze Persönlichkeit prägt, sondern die ständige Bereitschaft, auf jedes Anzeichen einer Störung der gewohnten Verhältnisse zu den Göttern mit einer begütigenden Handlung zu antworten.”²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ For the servant in the dialogue, see E. *Hipp.* 88ff.; Hippolytus’s radical devotion to (a) god leads to his ruin. Surely, Hippolytus’s radical devotion to Artemis has a trait of greatness and inspires a kind of suspicious, uncomfortable admiration; not the kind of admiration anyone of us today might feel for a Christian Desert Father. Of course, someone devoted completely to a god may fail in the world; in our conception, a radical religious ideal may be incompatible with real life. In Euripides’s *Hippolytus* however, it is not the ‘world,’ that causes Hippolytus’s destruction. It is not simply a ‘dirty’ world, in which the chaste and radically devoted believer cannot live. On the contrary, it is a divine power who takes offence and kills him. At the end, Hippolytus enjoys the admiration of the world and dies an hero. He is not only rejected by Aphrodite, he is left by Artemis as well. His deathbed companion is his desolate father Theseus, not—as with a Christian martyr, who fails in the world—his god.

²⁸⁸ Latte 1960: 39 f.

²⁸⁹ Latte 1960: 39. Of course, Roman religiosity struck Greek observers of a developed age of Greek religiosity such as Polybius (6–56.6–14) or Dionysius of Harlicarnass (*ant.* 2.18–20) as

Intellectually meaningful concepts of god form themselves in contrast to traditional religion, either in esoteric religion or in philosophy or philosophizing contexts. Belief in the existence of divine powers depends on a concept to be believed in, i.e., philosophical interpretations of religion may challenge the traditional concept as something that contrasts with the concept that the philosophical critique proposes and thus implicitly defines the former as well. Belief or disbelief in the existence of the divine is always found in an esoteric or more or less philosophical context; it is primarily the belief or disbelief in a certain concept of god.²⁹⁰

Thus, belief is a notion of incomparably less importance in pagan religion than in Jewish, Christian, or Islamic monotheism. The notion of trust in and reliance on god implies a positive concept of god; he is someone who, in his very essence, is worthy of trust in the most eminent sense. Faith, of course, implies firm belief in the 'existence' of that, on which I rely entirely. And, in fact, man must have some token, some external sign, in which to place his complete trust in this otherworldly, and as such absent, god. The god in whom I can put my trust must have revealed himself to me as the one in whom I can trust and who can show me the path upon which I can enact my trust in him. Thus, the token of this trust is in itself a kind of intellectual concept, the concept of the trustworthy god who reveals himself to his devotee in the form of the path that leads toward him: a Holy Scripture.²⁹¹

something particular; this does not, however, mean that the basic concept that characterizes the origins of Greek religion was so different. W.F. Otto (1947: 9ff.) describes the difference between the Greek and Christian religious attitudes beautifully.

²⁹⁰ This is confirmed by all passages for νομίζειν θεόν/ θεούς in Fahr 1969; Greek atheism arose at a time when the nature of the traditional gods was a hotly discussed question (for the question of the existence of gods in the 5th century BC and its reflex in Herodotus, see Roettig 2010); when the existence of gods is contested, at least implicitly, a particular concept of god is normally implied. Moreover, even where νομίζειν (or ἡγεῖσθαι) θεούς slides into the meaning "to assume that there are gods" this is still far from belief in a Christian sense. It just means that somebody assumes that there is a good chance that some kind of god, who may be able to interfere with his affairs, exists. Proper religious attitude consists in the cautious notion that one does not deny the possibility that there is a certain god rather than in the firm conviction that such or such a god exists. It is significant that the most ardent and explicit attack on various forms of atheism is that of Plato in *leg.* 884Aff.

²⁹¹ Of course, this holds true for pagan esoteric religiosity as well, which is in this respect rather the same as Christianity. Even there the reliability of the divine powers is not nearly as strong as it is in the Christian religion, due to the fact that esoteric pagan religion still remains to some extent in the realm of traditional religion, i.e., it is directed toward divine powers borrowed from traditional religions, if not Greek then foreign ones, but in any case, divinities seen in the major context of a religious attitude, which views the divine as the untrustworthy *per se*.

This concept of the divine as the trustworthy god who reveals himself in sacred scriptures as a token of his reliability, a concept prone to intellectual redefinition and refinement,²⁹² met an ancient world already endowed with a religiosity profoundly influenced by philosophy. The Christian faith had to defend its concept against the intellectual challenge of Greek philosophized religion.²⁹³ Philosophy was prone to have the strong influence Greek philosophy actually had on ancient religion by the very fact that traditional religion did not provide any certainties to the agent of the performance of cult. This surely was a major factor that favored the sharp distinction between public and private religiosity in the ancient world.²⁹⁴ The desire to cope personally and individually with the overpowering effects of the divine required at least some degree of certainty, i.e., a concept of these divine agents that brought them closer to man, made them more calculable. In the uncertainty and pointed vagueness of traditional religion, which governed public religious life, the individual was alone in his desire for some degree of certainty. He had to take refuge in an expression of the divine that was closer and thus more easily intelligible to himself and his individual needs. In popular religion this desire expressed itself in the cult of minor local divinities, close to the particular needs of particular people in particular situations.²⁹⁵ Or it manifested itself in esoteric religions, with their promises of salvation in the broadest sense, or in philosophical religion.²⁹⁶ It is in the context of private and esoteric religion that the concept of trust in a god surfaces in pagan Greek religion. Private religiosity had a desire for reliability, esoteric religiosity tried to satisfy it, philosophy tried to provide intellectual reassurance for something the intellectually inclined could rely on. Thus, with the firm establishment of philosophy as a major intellectual trend, it took the place of what we would call religion, in the sense of a 'Heilslehre'.²⁹⁷ Ancient philosophies such as Platonism, Stoicism, or Epicureanism provided the certainties that traditional religion failed to; philosophy was the private religion of

²⁹² August. *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 5 (*PL* 44, 962f.) is a key passage from the work of one of the foremost and most influential ancient intellectual defenders of Christianity.

²⁹³ For pagan Greek 'monotheism' vs. Christianity, cf. West and Frede in Athanassiadi and Frede 1999: 21 ff. and 41 ff.

²⁹⁴ See Festugière 1954: 2 ff.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Festugière 1954: 85 ff.; van Straten's informative article (in Versnel 1981: 65 ff.) on votive offerings allows a fair insight into the sphere of private religiosity in the 6th–4th century BC.

²⁹⁶ In this wider sense, intellectual religious concepts, even those expressed in Hesiod or Pindar, Aeschylus, or other poets, may be called philosophical; cf. Szlezák 2010: 129.

²⁹⁷ Cf. Hadot 1995: 106 f., 161–163 *passim*; Festugière 1954: 37 ff.

educated men.²⁹⁸ With some overstatement one might almost say that school philosophy in antiquity filled the role that Marxism-Leninism occupied in the 19th and 20th centuries in the life of a part of the European intellectual elite.

Thus, the Christian (and earlier, Jewish) religion entered the Greek world when traditional Greek religion was already profoundly shaped by philosophical discourse in the minds of educated men. Given the natural inclination of a revealed religion like Judaism and Christianity to intellectual refinement and the dialectically opposed, yet convergent, concepts of the divine in pagan and Christian religion, it was inevitable that these three religions should have interacted strongly upon each other.²⁹⁹ This intellectualization of Christian religion led to the extremely intellectualized concept of Christianity of the Middle Ages, which left its indelible stamp on European thought, paradoxically, as it might seem at first sight. The extreme desire for certainty in regard to the existence of a certain concept of god, required for a religion based on absolute devotion, led to Christian dogma as a strange intellectual system to account meticulously for a detailed intellectual justification of a concept, based on a *per definitionem* irrational intellectual basis: the divine, i.e., *per definitionem* superhuman revelation. In order to guarantee the intellectually unchallengeable validity of what, from the outside, must appear as an utter absurdity, i.e., a justification by the human mind for something, which, as a divine revelation, is *per definitionem* beyond human powers, the Christian dogma had to be created. It is, in fact, a curious form of applying legal force to rules of thought: the believer has to think in a certain way in order to be able to believe in the existence of what he must rely on entirely.

In the context of ancient religiosity to challenge traditional religion intellectually was not impious *per se*; in principle, there is no essential difference between the critique or correction of commonly held views on the gods by Xenophanes, Pindar, the Sophists or Plato.³⁰⁰ Given the utter uncertainty

²⁹⁸ What Schefold (1952: 43) says about Lucretius is paradigmatic for this phenomenon: "Mit einer solchen Verachtung hergebrachter Mythen kann sich aber sehr wohl der Eifer neuer religiöser Stimmungen verbinden. Derselbe Lukrez, der den alten Glauben und Aberglauben leidenschaftlich bekämpft, verkündet mit frommem Eifer die Lehre Epikurs und beginnt sein Gedicht mit dem Anruf der Venus."

²⁹⁹ See Hadot 1995: 355 ff.

³⁰⁰ To become alert to this fundamental ambivalence one need only compare the precisely parallel statements in Aesch. *Ag.* 160 ff. and Eur. fr. 480 N, already adduced by Drachmann 1922: 55. Dornseiff (1921: 126 ff.) offers a brief, yet enlightening characterization of Pindar's corrections of myth with an outlook on Christian parallels. Cf. also Lloyd 1966: 67 f.

about the nature of the divine even Protagoras's radical statement that nothing about the gods was certain, not even whether they exist or not, is not inherently a statement against religion. An intellectual challenge could only be perceived as impious (ἄσεβής) in the Greek sense if it was perceived as subversive to cult, i.e., if scepticism was carried so far that it called into question the very need to worship the gods.³⁰¹ Cult was the answer to divine interference affecting human life; thus defenders of traditional religion, such as Herodotus,³⁰² focused on trying to prove that the realities of human life could not be explained sufficiently without assuming divine agents, whatever the precise nature of these forces was.

As regards ancient Greek and Roman religion, we must refute the concept that the attitude of a religious worshipper had anything to do with certainties. Pagan religiosity may—with slight overstatement—be described as pious scepticism. Νομίζειν θεούς, “to use the gods—like a currency,” implies unquestioned acceptance of the gods as something that is ‘there,’ felt in its threatening presence.³⁰³ The attention is not on the quality of the entity *per se*, since it is perceived as being beyond one's control, but on its effect, i.e., it is directed toward heading off eventually damaging effects by practice. Given that the nature of the gods was obscure, the acts to be performed in respect to them were not meaningful in themselves, but only in regard to the desired goal. The very lack of knowledge about their meaning corresponded precisely to the lack of knowledge about the divinity they were directed at. The effect of actions of cult was viewed as highly uncertain. Actions were performed as a precaution; rather than hoping too much for the desired effect of action, the omission of proper behavior was conceived dangerous. Where the concept of resignation in the divine will is lacking, prayers

³⁰¹ Legal provisions in both Greece and Rome were aimed at banishing actions that disturbed the practice of cult; theoretical statements could legally qualify as ‘impiety’ only if they were perceived as depriving worship of the gods of its traditional basis.

³⁰² See Roettig 2010.

³⁰³ Latte, in particular, stressed the threatening nature of the divine as the key experience at the basis of Roman religion and contrasted it with the Greek concept of god. In his paper in Latte 1968: 36–59, however, he views Greek religion as already shaped by ‘philosophical’ religion in the broadest sense. As regards basic religious sentiment, what Latte says about Roman religion (cf. also above, p. 286 n. 278), its emotional coldness, as he puts it, is equally true for Greece, only that in Rome this gap between the desire for certainty and closeness to the divine was only filled in the wake of importing Greek elements into Roman religion. The, as he says “conchetto ... utilitario” (p. 608) of Roman religion is admirably described by Pasquali 1920: 607ff., who points out that the character of Greek religion as that of what he calls “tutti i popoli primitivi” (p. 609) was basically identical.

measured alone in the context of a *do-ut-des* cannot be held to be very efficient.³⁰⁴ Again, the desire for closeness and trust in divine protection had its place in private and philosophical religion, not in public cult. In private philosophical religion, the concept of practice of cult as a path toward the divine, of philosophical prayer as contemplation of the absolute, leading to union with the divine evolved. Philosophical prayer was strongly promoted by the influence of Epicurean religiosity with its disbelief in divine interference of the gods.³⁰⁵

Thus, ancient religion consisted in the proper respect and caution toward that which was conceived as beyond human capacities both of the body and of the mind. Ancient religion never demanded nor even encouraged complete dedication, the ancient gods did not request, so to speak, the whole person, and even esoteric or philosophical religion did so only to some degree and in various measures. The devotion or the reliance, the 'faith' of the believer in an esoteric religious or philosophical conviction was much more fragile than that of the believer in revealed religion. Plato's philosophy requested total devotion of the whole person to this philosophy as the way to an ultimate truth, which was understood as an absolutely commanding goal; yet, Aristotle's god, much closer to that of common religion, did not. Everything—not only *everyone*—in the world is directed toward him in the measure proper to the place in the world assigned to it, the world, conceived as *kosmos*, the order, which receives its superhuman beauty from being directed toward the divine, the most eminently beautiful, as the center of this order. As this god is the desirable in itself, everyone is drawn to him, he need not and cannot come closer than he already and always is by his own nature.

³⁰⁴ As with religion, there is no complete correspondence between our word 'prayer' and any single Greek or Roman word (more than one word may be used for what we might call prayer), nor is it easy to neatly define a concept of prayer that covers all the different expressions of what one may call by this term in various religions; Jakov and Voutiras, in *ThesCRA* III 105ff., give a good overview of the problem; for Rome, see *ibid.* 151ff. Versnel (1981: 1ff.) is much less aware of the fundamental methodological problems and therefore rather stresses, as he admits himself (p. 3), the common elements between antiquity and what he calls the present-day mentality; yet, even his survey (pp. 37ff.) fairly documents a mentality of prayer that rests upon the *do-ut-des* principle, which, of course, persists in Christianity (Catholicism, in particular) as in other religions; but as his article is not aimed at a comparative study it does not take account of the fundamentally different concept of resignation to the divine will, nor does his study, or the later—rather unsatisfactory—one on philosophers' and intellectuals' religiosity and prayer by Meijer (in Versnel 216ff.) take proper account of the affinities between philosophical attitudes and the latter concept.

³⁰⁵ See below, pp. 298, 312; for philosophical prayer, see Beierwaltes 1979: 391ff.; cf. also *ThesCRA* III 131f.

If we consider only this extremely vague sketch of the differences between ancient pagan and Christian attitudes toward the divine, it becomes immediately apparent that the relationship between religion and reason is a fundamentally different one in the context of ancient pagan religiosity from what it is in a Christian, Jewish, or Islamic context.³⁰⁶ Thus, we need not explore further the even more complex question of what reason meant in antiquity in contrast to what it meant in the Middle Ages or in modern times. It is sufficient to say that in the context of a religion that was not directed toward certainties and did not entail any aspiration to an 'intellectual' truth, but basically consisted of religious practice, animated by a certain attitude of reverence toward a power transcending all human facilities, something one may call in Rudolf Otto's terminology the *numinosum*,³⁰⁷ reason and religion coexist as something complementary, but not necessarily, not even predominantly antagonistic. In such a context philosophical thought can reason on a definition of this power and also pose the question of being, i.e., whether there is any power of this or that sort, whether this or that concept of the divine is true. But the question of existence, as that of existence only, is a subordinate one.³⁰⁸ Above all, when there is neither a definite preconception of a divine nature nor any request for total devotion on the part of the worshipper, there is no natural conflict between thought and religion. Reason can challenge traditional beliefs, of course, and thus conflict

³⁰⁶ The 'secular' reason of the Enlightenment in the 18th century is only possible in the context of a religion like Christianity; in fact, the arguments of the thinkers of the French Enlightenment very much resemble those of ancient attackers of the Christian doctrines like Celsus. Szlezák (2010: 158f.) rightly stresses the importance of the Christian church as an opponent of modern enlightenment in contrast to what one has called the 'Fifth-Century Enlightenment'; in view of the fact that 'enlightenment' is probably the most misused slogan of today, it is imperative to stress the difference rather than the similarity, which is emphasized in simplistic approaches like that of Schmidt 1989 (with disastrous consequences in the editor's own papers), who also misuses a perceptive chapter of Dodds' (1973: 92 ff.), with a new, invented title.

³⁰⁷ See Otto 1923: 5 ff.; for religion and reason, cf. *ibid.* 1 ff.

³⁰⁸ Cf. Gilson 2002: 38 ff.; cf. also Berti (in Bruchmüller 2011), who shows that even Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is basically a 'Prinzipienlehre,' not an ontology. However, by putting the emphasis on the 'substantiality' of the 'principles,' Aristotle paves the way for Thomas, who legitimately used Aristotle's thought in his concept of god, which one could call—rather than Aristotle's *Metaphysics*—an ontotheology. For the relationship between being (or the highest 'reality') and god in Greek philosophy, Gilson (op. cit. 1 ff.) is still enlightening, although to his pages on Plato one should add that Plotinus calls the One (ἓν) god; the relationship between the One and the Good in Plato's philosophy is, of course, a notorious problem, but cf. Halfwassen in Bruchmüller 2010; differently, Lavecchia (in Bruchmüller). Meijer (in Verbeke 1981: 216 ff.) rightly stresses the relative unimportance of atheism.

with public religion, but the relationship between thought, reason, and religious observance is never that of *fides* vs. *ratio*, where reason must either confirm concepts basic to religious devotion, such as faith, or inevitably come in conflict with a religion defined as faith. Secular rationality is only possible in the context of a revealed religion of faith; it is secular rationality as opposed to a religion that either defines itself as beyond reason (i.e., partly rational or sometimes even as totally irrational) or defines reason as that which confirms (or must confirm) its preconceptions, or rather—as in fact, Christian mainstream religion did and continues to do—applies both concepts in tandem, despite the fact that they are mutually exclusive.³⁰⁹

3.2.2. C. 1.34 (Parcus deorum), 35 (O diva, gratum); 3.1 (Odi profanum), 29 (Tyrrhena regum)

The poem that always has been at the center of the discussion about Horace's personal attitude toward religion is C. 1.34.³¹⁰ Here, Horace makes an explicit statement about his personal stance toward both traditional religion and philosophical concepts about the gods. In the opening stanza he claims to have given up his neglect of reverence to the gods, caused by his philosophical convictions, because he experienced a flash of lightning in a clear sky (C. 1.34.1–5a):

*Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens
insanientis dum sapientiae
consultus erro, nunc retrorsum
vela dare atque iterare cursus
cogor relectos.*³¹¹

I was a stingy and infrequent worshipper of the gods all the time that I went astray, expert that I was in a mad philosophy. Now I am forced to sail back and repeat my course

in an opposite direction.

Having experienced lightning in a bright sky Horace constructs his *recantatio* of Epicurean doctrine in strict analogy to the profession of his adherence

³⁰⁹ Cf. Gilson 1950a; idem 1950b: 3–121. If there is a text that most sharply highlights the antinomy it is Hobbes's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.

³¹⁰ See above, n. 275; since Porphyry, the poem was understood as the sincere confession that the poet had abandoned Epicureanism in favor of adherence to traditional piety, until Dacier challenged this view with an ironic interpretation; cf. Fraenkel 1957: 254 f. n. 4 for the further history in the 18th century.

³¹¹ For Heinsius's *relectos* (*relictos codd.*), see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 380.

to it in *Serm.* 1.5.101 ff. (*namque ego didici securum agere aevum/ nec si quid miri faciat natura, deos id/ tristis ex alto caeli demittere tecti*, “because I have learned that they lead a life free of care/and that, if nature does something of which we are amazed, it is not the gods, who in their anger send it down from an overcast sky”).³¹² Horace renounces his belief in the Epicurean mechanistic explanation of the world, which left little room to chance and none to divine interference.³¹³ In consequence, in what follows, Horace emphasizes the uncontrollable and reckless power of *Fortuna*, which turns life upside down and is utterly beyond human control. It may seem a well-known triviality, but one must take note of the fact that what Horace says is nothing like a conversion from atheism to piety. The text is not about the existence of god (or gods), it is simply about the vexed question, discussed by ancient philosophers and intellectuals since the 5th century BC, of whether the gods interfere in human affairs or not. Many intellectuals of standing—from Herodotus³¹⁴ onward—have defended the traditional view against a modern challenge. To exchange one view about the gods with another does not mean one is a repentant sinner who sheds tears about having left or hitherto ignored the right path but who is suddenly struck by the truth of a divine revelation. If Horace says *iterare cursus cogor relectos*, “I am forced to repeat my course in the reverse direction,” he does not promise from now on to go to church more frequently; that is not how the poem ends.

Horace does not give up sceptical rationality in favor of religious certainties: on the contrary, philosophy, Epicureanism, provided a sense of certainty and was, as I noted above,³¹⁵ in a certain sense a religion. Horace exchanges the certainty of Epicurean belief in a human life untroubled by divine interference for a more sceptical view.³¹⁶ The *cursus*, the “path,” of which Horace speaks is not, as Nisbet and Hubbard (*ad loc.*) say, “the path

³¹² See Courtney above, p. 102.

³¹³ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 378.

³¹⁴ See Roettig 2010.

³¹⁵ See pp. 291 f.

³¹⁶ That he still confesses to be an Epicurean in *Epist.* 1.4.15 f. does not stand in the way of taking the *recantatio* of *C.* 1.34 seriously (cf. Fraenkel 1957: 255); Horace does not reject Epicurean philosophy as a whole, he rejects a certain doctrine. Horace never cared about systematic philosophy, he never totally embraced Epicureanism nor did he ever totally reject it. The doctrine he rejects is the doctrine that man can rise completely above being affected by external ills; he can and should strive for an attitude that minimizes the affect of external factors on his peace of mind, but he can never attain completely untroubled happiness. Horace was a man supremely experienced in real life, not an armchair philosopher; he knew that, and, as we shall see below, in the ‘Epicurean’ passages of his poems, where he speaks of human autarky, he never fools himself into believing that man can ever attain it completely.

between piety and doubt,” but one between ‘belief’ in Epicurean dogma and the cautious commonsense attitude of the ordinary man who practices traditional religion, the ordinary man who feels threatened by the precarious nature of human life and who takes proper precautions by attending to his religious duties. The emphasis is not on diligent worship, but on uncontrollable divine interference, on the rejection of the Epicurean dogma of the gods not interfering with human affairs.³¹⁷ It would be absurd to stage such a *recantatio* pompously like a death-bed conversion. Thus, the light and, one may well say, “mock-heroic”³¹⁸ tone of the opening is not at all subversive to the message of the text, as there is nothing to subvert. Horace is ironic about himself as a believer in Epicureanism. One may doubt that being a “stingy and infrequent worshipper of the gods,” because he thinks the gods do not interfere with human affairs, is the hallmark of the good Epicurean, who should worship the gods for quite different reasons. At any rate, in ll. 1 ff. Horace presents himself as a naive believer in a dogmatic philosophy in the face of an utterly unexpected and, according to scientific doctrine, in which he pretends to have believed, impossible event.³¹⁹ This event is, of course, an easily explicable fiction, one that both offered itself to Horace by an Archilochean fragment (Arch. fr. 122) and is pointedly chosen to ridicule Epicurean dogmatism. Tagging a philosophical poem on a particular event, is, of course, a Horatian device to fit philosophical discourse into the frame of his self-imposed generic concept.³²⁰ How else but ironically could he, given these preconditions, stage a *recantatio* of philosophical dogmatism? Thus, the argument of irony, often used against taking Horace’s words at face value, is to no avail. To take his words at face value means that we should accept that Horace’s experience of the important role unexpected and inexplicable contingency plays in human life has led him to renounce the certainties of Epicurean doctrine, a doctrine he once approved of.

However, the text is much more specific than that. In l. 5 the lightning is explicitly ascribed to the doings of *Diespiter*. Much has been made of the shift from *Diespiter* to *Fortuna* as the agent behind the cruel upheavals in human life, unduly, as Fraenkel shows by pointing to the fact that the identification of Ζεύς and Τύχη was a common one.³²¹ However, the shift of

³¹⁷ Hardie, in Gillespie and Hardie 2007: 111 ff., stresses the antithetic reference to Lucretius; he very aptly speaks of Lucretius preaching an “Epicurean gospel” (112).

³¹⁸ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 377.

³¹⁹ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 376 f.

³²⁰ See below, pp. 313 ff.

³²¹ Fraenkel 1957: 253; Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 377 f.

focus from Jupiter to *Fortuna* is significant, and the position that Horace chose for the poem in the book, before the long hymn on *Fortuna* in *C.* 1.35, emphasizes *Fortuna*'s role in *C.* 1.34. There is even a verbal echo of *C.* 1.34 at the beginning of *C.* 1.35, an echo that identifies both powers in referring to the famous description of Zeus's powers in Hes. *OD* 5 ff. (*C.* 1.34.12b–13a/1.35.2). Rather than using the shift from Jupiter to *Fortuna* to subvert Horace's statement, one should try to explain what this shift of focus means.

Not enough attention has been paid to the fact that this shift occurs at the very end of the poem (l. 15; the last line but one). Lines 12b–14a, echoed in *C.* 1.35, describe the power that causes the upheavals in human life, in general, not simply the lightning strike, ascribed to *Diespiter*. But their subject is not yet *Fortuna*, it is the general *deus* "god" (13), an unspecific intermediary between *Diespiter* (5) and *Fortuna* (15). Thus, the power responsible is a *divine* power. This is not without significance. According to the poem's beginning Horace's adherence to Epicurean doctrine results in neglect of cult. The text makes the explicit point that experience has led the poet to reject philosophical certainties and to recognize the rightful place reverence for divine powers holds in human life.

Even Nisbet and Hubbard, who advocate an iroic interpretation of the beginning, rightly stress the fact that divine power for the ancients was often viewed as not only unscrutable, but irresponsible and capricious as well. This is true even for Horace's Jupiter, who is prominent in his civic poetry and who is far from being always the just and supreme ruler who only directs his wrath against sinners. In fact, it is interesting to have a look at the beginning of the *Roman Odes*, where Jupiter, after the opening address in ll. 1–4, precedes a sort of priamel series that presents various types of men with high ambitions not shared by the poet:³²²

*regum timendorum in proprios greges,
reges in ipsos imperium est Iovis,
clari Giganteo triumpho
cuncta supercilio moventis.*

Dreaded monarchs have power over their own flocks; monarchs themselves are under the power of Jove, who in the glory of his triumph over the Giants moves the whole universe with the nod of his brow.

One may first think that the *vates*, who in ll. 1–4 had addressed the Roman youth, is speaking here of the just supreme ruler of the universe to whom

³²² On the priamel, see below, p. 380.

kings, as his representatives on earth, are subordinated,³²³ but as soon as the priamel series on various ambitions has begun it becomes clear that Jupiter's supreme power in this context is the irresistible power of destiny, represented by *Necessitas* "Necessity,"³²⁴ named as *Fortuna's* attendant in *C.* 3.25.17f. In *C.* 3.1.14–16 the power placed at the head of the priamel is mainly intended as that which crushes even the proudest aspirations of men:³²⁵

... *aequa lege Necessitas*
sortitur insignis et imos;
omne capax movet urna nomen.

... Fate recognizes no distinction, choosing by lot the highest and the lowest alike; everyone's name is shaken in its capacious urn.

The ultimate power that man cannot resist is death. It is significant that Horace so abruptly shifts from Jupiter's supreme might to that of death, and surely, death is a power far from being one that punishes evildoers (*C.* 4.7.23f.). If any superior force is no respecter of merit or rank it is death, which is meted out to all men, *aequa lege* "with no distinction," as the text says.

In the book's towering penultimate poem (*C.* 3.29), which by its very position balances the *Roman Odes*, *C.* 3.1 in particular, Horace returns to his personal choice of a frugal and simple life, to being content with his lot, the choice he had presented in *C.* 3.1 in contrast to other men's aspirations to power and wealth. In *C.* 3.29 Horace describes his lifestyle as that of the Epicurean, intent on living what the moment has to offer, careless of the upheavals and changes of time,³²⁶ depicted in the image of a swollen river (ll. 32–41a). It is the life of the man who lives in the moment and is immune from anxiety about the unforeseeable vicissitudes of the future (ll. 41b–45a):

... *ille potens sui*
laetusque deget, cui licet in diem
dixisse 'vixi': cras vel atra
nube polum Pater occupato
vel sole puro ...

³²³ See below, pp. 366, 377f.

³²⁴ Below, p. 378, 380. See also Reinhardt in De Gennaro and Günther 2007: 164ff.

³²⁵ Syndikus 2001: II 16f., below, pp. 378ff.

³²⁶ See also below, pp. 326ff.

... That man will be master of himself and live a happy life who as each day
ends cover the sky in dark cloud

or bright sunshine ...

Jupiter, the god of the changing weather, easily represents the changes of time from night to day, as elsewhere he stands for the changes of season (e.g., *C.* 2.9³²⁷), changes to which human life is exposed without being able to defend itself. But in the next stanza (ll. 49–52) the power that upsets the external life of humans is *Fortuna*, depicted in very similar colors as in *C.* 1.34 and 35:

*Fortuna saevo laeta negotio et
ludum insolentem ludere pertinax
transmutat incertos honores,
nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.*

*laudo manentem; si celeris quatit
pennas, resigno quae dedit et mea
virtute me involvo probamque
Pauperiem sine dote quaero.*

Fortune, revelling in her cruel business, and determined to play her high-handed game, switches her fickle favors, kind now to me, now to someone else.

I praise her while she stays, but if she shakes her swift wings, I return her presents, wrap myself in my virtue, and go in search of honest Poverty, though she brings no dowry.

This power, once called Jupiter, once *Fortuna*, this something, which affects, dominates, and determines human life in all its aspects, with irresistible force can be both benign and dreadful; it is a power that brings change, whether abruptly and unforeseeable as a winter torrent or in the quiet and inevitable succession of seasons and times of day. This power is the same as the Zeus of Archilochus, who determines the ῥυσμός, the rhythm of human life, the Zeus whom we met already in the drinking song in the Epodes (13).³²⁸ He can inspire fear, by his unpredictable and irresistible force, or relief, calmness, and resignation in the afflicted, Archilochus's τλημοσύνη, his “endurance” in the man who perceives this force as a change before which all are equal, king and slave, rich and poor, the blessed and the wretched. The τλημοσύνη of Archilochus is replaced in Horace’s account by

³²⁷ Below, p. 329.

³²⁸ Above, pp. 206 ff.

the ἀταραξία, “calmness,” of the Epicurean, who is wise enough to be a good steward of the resources the fugitive moments of time have to offer him (ll. 32 f.):

... *quod adest memento
componere aequus ...*

... Make sure to settle immediate problems calmly.

He who does so is immune from unreasonable fears of the future, which god in wise providence has hidden from men (ll. 29–32a):

*prudens futuri temporis exitum
caliginosa nocte premit deus
ridetque si mortalis ultra
fas trepidat.*

God in his providence hides future events in murky darkness, and laughs if a mere mortal frets about what is beyond his control.

The god, the divine power that hides the future, is wise but not necessarily benign: god laughs at the fool who tries his human wits on things that are beyond the limits of the human mind. This providence is benign only toward the man who knows the limits of his mind, who renounces calculating what the future will bring and is content to live the moment. This man is immune from unnecessary fears, he can live peacefully at least the happy moments of life without undue worry; yet, he is not exempt from the external vicissitudes of life. He is *potens sui*, “master of himself,” but not the master of his lot (τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὄραν, τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, see below). What can he do, when he is affected by the inevitable changes of his fortunes for the worse? Horace’s *vixi*, “I have lived,” of l. 43 provides only an answer to the question of how to achieve a maximum of happiness in untroubled hours; it relieves one from being troubled by unnecessary anxiety about the future. This ever-recurring maxim (C. 1.9.13–15; *Epist.* 1.4.13 f.; *Epist.* 1.11.22–25) is Epicurean, but Horace is far from pretending to be the completely untroubled Epicurean sage of Lucretius (2.1 ff.). When the cruel god who laughs at human fools turns his back on him, what can Horace’s wise man do? Of course, the Epicurean who strives for an absence of physical pain knows that ultimately no man is exempt from troubles: *nil est ex omni parte beatum*, “nothing is happy in every respect,” as Horace says in C. 2.16.27 f.³²⁹ In C. 2.16, the wise man can only “dilute bitter things with a

³²⁹ See below, pp. 323 ff.

mild smile" (*amara lento temperet risu*, ll. 26 f.). In C. 3.29, Horace is a little more precise: the wise man can return fortune's gifts and retire into his self, his *virtus*. When the Stoic sage is befallen by external ills and turns back into his true self, he turns back into a self that cannot be affected by external ills; his true self is the god within him, as Marcus Aurelius says.³³⁰ The Epicurean, too, when troubled by external ills turns back to his virtue, but this virtue is a merely human, not divine, one that unites the mortal spirit with god and ignores the human body. It is much more difficult for the Epicurean, who is dependent on the absence of physical pain, to achieve autarky by retiring into his merely human self. Yet, even the Epicurean knows that virtue is inseparable from his ultimate goal of an untroubled life of pleasure (Epic. *Men.* 132.11 ff.³³¹):

συμπεφύκασι γάρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον. Ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρείττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος καὶ περὶ θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας ὡς ἔστιν εὐσυμπλήρωτόν τε καὶ εὐπόριστον διαλαμβάνοντος, τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ὡς ἢ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τινων δεσπότην εἰσαγουμένην πάντων ἐγγελώντες (εἰμαρμένην ... ὣν ἃ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται) ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς διὰ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὄραν, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτόν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν (ἐπεὶ κρείττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένη δουλεύειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς, ἢ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην)· τὴν δὲ τύχην οὐτε θεόν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, ὑπολαμβάνων (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτάκτως θεῷ πράττεται) οὔτε (πάντων) ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν ((οὐκ) οἴεται μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐκ ταύτης πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν ἀνθρώποις δίδοσθαι, ἀρχὰς μέντοι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ὑπὸ ταύτης χορηγεῖσθαι), κρείττον εἶναι νομίζει εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν.

For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfil and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain: he laughs at "destiny," whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things "... some of which happen by necessity" and some by chance, and some within our control; for while necessity cannot be called on account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame. For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to destiny of the

³³⁰ See Festugière 1954: 113 ff.; also Hadot 1996: 164 ff.

³³¹ Text and translation after Bailey 1989.

natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god's acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause "of all things": for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and evil are afforded by it. He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason.

Horace says something that is quite close to this text; there are, however, significant differences. The virtue of the Epicurean does not guarantee complete autarky, as does that of the Stoic. The wise man cannot avoid external ills; if the goal of life consists in the absence of physical pain, virtue is unable to avoid the latter completely. Virtue can only limit the damage to a great degree by avoiding unnecessary greed for the unattainable and by reflecting properly on the favorable proportion of good and bad for the man who knows the proper limits of his desires. Accordingly, the virtue that Horace claims to possess, is his *paupertas*, his being content with little. This corresponds, of course, exactly to what Epicurus requested, in 130f., as the prerequisite for understanding "that the limit of good things is easy to fulfil and easy to attain." If Horace calls his *paupertas* "honest" (*proba*), this corresponds with what immediately precedes the text printed above: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, "it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly."

Given the close similarity in the general outline the differences are all the more significant. Epicurus does everything to limit the role of chance; Horace, on the contrary, requests virtue as the wise man's sole weapon precisely because of the reckless, destructive, and utterly irresistible doings of *Fortuna*. If, in Horace's text, chance is personified, from C. 1.34 we know that this is not merely poetic garb. The identification of *Fortuna* with Jupiter in the latter via the pointed *deus* ("god") in l. 13, makes it clear that Horace explicitly contradicts Epicurus; this is one key element of his *recantatio* in C. 1.34. The ample role assigned to chance in C. 3.29 has further consequences: Horace's virtue is much frailer than that of Epicurus. Epicurus seeks first to more or less eliminate the impact of chance by minimizing her influence. Then, at the end, he actually eliminates it by claiming that for happiness only good and bad, as determined by free will, are relevant, and that it is better (*κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζει*) *εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν*, "to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason." The sophistic distinction implied between *εὐτυχία* and *εὐδαιμονία* badly cov-

ers the fact that to make good and bad, as judged by φρόνησις, “prudence,” in the terminology of the text, the ultimate measure of the life of the wise man runs counter to Epicurus’s basic assumption that physical well-being is the ultimate touchstone of happiness. Equally, the insistence on the small impact of inevitable external ills because “they are short in time or slight in pain” is an extremely cheap subterfuge. One need not be Horace, every realist with due experience in real life can see this, even today, let alone in the precarious conditions of antiquity.

In both C. 1.34 and 3.29 Horace protests against this cheap minimalization of the impact of unforeseeable physical ills. In C. 3.29, he does so in ll. 29–32; there he plainly denies that men can foresee the future. Of course, nobody would contest this, yet Epicurus tries to minimize even the impact of our ignorance of the future by saying: Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε ἡμέτερον οὔτε πάντως οὐκ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον, “We must bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may altogether expect it as sure to come, not abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come” (*Men.* 27.5–8). As far as this is an appeal for positive thinking this is not as cheap as the reasoning on pain above. Yet, apart from the fact that one may doubt that just hoping for the best is an attitude very befitting a wise man who, in accord to what Epicurus says below on desire, should avoid indulging too much in hope. As an Epicurean, of course, he would rather concentrate on the present. To deduce from the fact that no ill is certain, no good utterly impossible, that “the future is not wholly not ours,” is either, in this context, an oblique way of saying “the future is not completely out of control,” which is a truism but has nothing to do with the fact that we can always hope for the best, or this sentence means precisely nothing. We may safely assume that Horace regarded this advice as foolish as he regards disproportionate fear of the future.

Epicurus desperately tries to minimize the impact that physical ills must have upon the happiness of him whose happiness consists in physical pleasure; Horace is not ready to accept such cheap sophistry. He simply admits that, as soon as pleasure is decisive for attaining true happiness, man must cope with the fact that unhappiness occupies a large part of human life. Man has to cope with it without being able to avoid the fact that it severely affects his life. In order to be prepared for this cruel reality, man has to look it in the eye and not talk it away. Thus, Horace’s virtue is not only much frailer than that of the Stoics, it is even frailer than that of Epicurus: it is the virtue of a human being who cannot but be affected by external ills, one who can only endure them by wise self-restraint and insight into his human

frailty.³³² The virtue of C. 3.29 is only a philosopher's cloak,³³³ a cloak that may protect against many ills, but is not the *murus aeneus*, "the iron wall," of the Stoic philosopher king whom Horace admires, yet confesses not to be able to live up to, in *Epist.* 1.1.³³⁴

But what can teach man this virtue of self-restraint and resignation to his lot? What should warn man against extravagant hopes is called *fās*, "that which is permitted by divine law."³³⁵ Horace's virtue is content with "honest" poverty. Horace's virtue consists in his righteousness, in his moral integrity, which he protests for himself in C. 3.1.41–48, the integrity that need not fear the sword that hangs over the unholy neck of the sinner (*destrictus ensis cui super impia/ cervice pendet*, "for the man who has a naked sword hanging over his unholy neck," ll. 17 f.). This virtue can exempt man from the unnecessary fears of the greedy, from self-debasing lament in the face of the inevitable troubles of life; all this is in perfect accord with Epicurean teaching. However, if Epicurus then explains away the fact that physical ills severely affect man's happiness by calling him who fares ill by the impact of chance, ἀτυχής, this implies that a man who is not εὐτυχής, "lucky," can still be εὐδαίμων, "happy." Thus, he stops just short of Horace, who concedes that the wise man may not be happy, great as his wisdom may be, that he has to resign himself to the fact that incurable ills may befall him. Yet, his virtue, the self-respect he can maintain even then, can endow him with the satisfaction of one who knows that he need not "grow pale because of his bad conscience" (*nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa*, *Epist.* 1.60), with the almost Kantian satisfaction of knowing that he had deserved happiness.³³⁶

When Horace speaks of *fās*, "divine law,"³³⁷ warning man against improper behavior, he is again principally in accord with Epicurus. Epicurus's wise man is, first of all, "he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods."³³⁸ These are the blessed gods in whose "acts there is no disorder," as Epicurus says at the end. A god who does not interfere with human life does nothing that is "alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness" (μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον, *Men.* 123.4 f.). The

³³² Newman (2011: 57) very aptly speaks of virtue as self-worth in this context.

³³³ See Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 361, who rightly call the image "self-deprecating."

³³⁴ See Günther 2010a: 80.

³³⁵ Latte 1960: 38 f.

³³⁶ See Günther 2010a: 108.

³³⁷ Cf. *nefas* in precisely the same context in C. 1.11.1.

³³⁸ For Epicurean religiosity, see Erler 1994: 167 ff., with references to earlier studies; also Attridge 1978: 46 ff., 51 ff.

pious Epicurean does not pray to the gods to receive their favors, he reveres the gods, participates in public sacrifices, but if he turns to the divine, he contemplates the perfect and eternal happiness of the divine life. This contemplation of the divine model of life, which incites man to emulate it more closely in his own life, is the Epicureans' path to the *ὁμοίωσις θεῶ*, "the union with god." This man may, as the letter to Menoeceus (135.7 f.) says, "live like a god among men," but he must achieve this ambitious goal through his human capacities alone, he can never hope to receive any assistance from god such as the Christian Platonic Synesios (*hymn.* 9.122 ff.).³³⁹

Horace's wise man is a pious, too, but that his gods are different from those of Epicurus. Horace's gods do interfere with human affairs. *Fortuna* is a divine power, the same divine power, in fact, as the god who governs the sky in its eternal change from dark clouds to bright sunshine. For Horace, divine power is ambivalent, it can be orderly and benign or disastrous and capricious. It is ambivalent, precisely because man experiences once one way, once the other way. Horace is a realist and an empiricist. He trusts his everyday experience—and whether it is lightning from the clear sky—he has no interest in distinguishing between *προλήψεις*, "sensations," and *ὑπολήψεις*, "suppositions," of Epicurean school doctrine (cf. *Epic. Men.* 124.1). Thus, the same god who can bring utter catastrophe to man can also bring comfort and relief. If the attainment of perfect happiness is closed to human virtue, not even a man's pure conscience can endow man with ultimate happiness and serenity. Yet man may be graced with it by the blessing of the gods, and to receive this blessing is the privilege of the pure of heart. There is a chance, if no certainty, that righteousness and integrity will confer on mortals the blessing of the gods, a blessing only to be hoped for in prayer, as Horace prays for himself in the final lines (62–64) of *C.* 3.29:

*tunc me biremis praesidio scaphae
tutum per Aegaeos tumultus
aura ferat geminusque Pollux.*

In that situation, the breeze, along with Pollux and his twin, will carry me serenely through the Aegean's storms in my two-oared dinghy.

³³⁹ This corresponds somehow to the dichotomy *ji-riki* vs. *ta-riki* "enlightenment by the power of one's own self" vs. "enlightenment by the other power." The excursion (Strohm) in Gruber and Strohm (1991: 246 f.) lists the relevant passages for divine aid in man's ascent to the divine, yet, the interpretation given is absurd; to speak of "die althellenische Überzeugung von der wesenhaften Güte der Gottheit" is nonsense. All passages cited are from esoteric or Platonic religiosity; *Sen. epist.* 73.15 goes back to platonizing Stoicism as well.

The righteousness of which Horace speaks is a virtue gained by insight into human nature, a nature that defines itself not simply as helpless against a cruel, cynical, and reckless destiny, but as different from the divine. This divine is a cipher for the ultimately hidden and inscrutable, of something that may appear cruel and reckless, or benign, granting relief, deservedly or undeservedly, justly or unjustly, but that is always unpredictable. Serenity, which results from human self-restriction in the face of life's various vicissitudes, consists in not applying the limited standards of the human mind to things that are beyond its scrutiny. But Horace goes further than just to acknowledge that "there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in [his] philosophy." Horace, the sceptic of *C.* 1.34, recognizes his human powers as being not just limited, but limited in respect to the divine, and this insight entails a moral lesson, too: *insignem attenuat deus, obscura promens*, "he makes the illustrious dim and brings the obscure to light" (*C.* 1.34.13 f.). It is the old lesson of archaic Greek religion, the lesson of the Delphic oracle, the request for an attitude Horace encountered in his archaic Greek models, different as they were, in Archilochus and, above all, in Pindar. The religious attitude Horace advocates is the humility of man before the divine, and as this humility is the immediate expression of the basic attitude of ancient pagan religiosity described above, it is common to Greek and Roman religion.

If it expresses itself in cult and worship, this has nothing to do with superstition.³⁴⁰ The cautious attitude of the worshipper is prevalent among men with a highly precarious life and few certainties, both technically and intellectually. This life lacked not only the physical and the intellectual certainties that go with the technical supremacy of the modern age, but also those certainties that a metaphysical religion pretends to need. In such conditions one had no need to impose an intellectual corset on the divine, nor upon any actions or attitudes of worship. Neither did any particular action of worship possess any significance beyond the action itself. The problem of whether the god to whom the worshipper paid his respect was personal, imper-

³⁴⁰ Superstition is a rather questionable term anyhow; to speak of superstition makes sense only if certain actions or beliefs are measured against a specific intellectual concept, as, e.g., that of Christianity, modern rationality, or—in antiquity—a certain philosophical doctrine. One need not look far to find 'superstition' in this sense among educated men in antiquity; it is amusing that Heinze (1960a: 167 f.), who doubts whether Augustus, educated in Greek philosophy as he was, could have 'believed' in anthropomorphic gods, deplores that he was "abergläubisch, wie ein kleiner Mann aus dem Volke" (for Augustus's religiosity, cf. also Radke 1972). For the role of what we may call superstition in classical Athens, cf. Parker 2005: 101 ff., who fittingly speaks of "the paradoxes of Athenian rationalism."

sonal, Greek, Roman, or whether he had a definite shape or not was also not as pressing as it may seem to us. In the context of ancient religiosity this was a philosophical, an academic question. In every act of worship a god was worshipped as the actual form in which the divine manifested itself in the moment. If Horace renounces a stance of carelessness toward the higher powers he is not an enlightened intellectual, who at the end superstitiously takes his bow in front of the bones of a Catholic saint. Behind ancient religious observance there was no dogma that could offend reason; ancient cult was just the outward expression of an attitude of reverence without any further significance. Horace had no reason to qualify his acceptance of traditional religious behavior as Goethe had qualified his stance toward Christianity by asserting that he was ready to accept the divine nature of Christ as the highest revelation of morality, as he accepted the divine nature of the sun as the most immediate revelation of the divine source of life, but if asked to bow before a thumb bone of St. Peter or St. Paul, he could only reject this as an absurdity.³⁴¹ There was nothing absurd in Horace sacrificing a ram or a lamb to Faunus on his Sabine farm. And Horace had no need to declare himself to be a high-church atheist; he might well declare himself to be a high-church sceptic, as he does in *C.* 1.34.

At the beginning Horace professed to have neglected the worship of the gods; he does not return to worship at the end and says nothing about being a regular churchgoer now. He shows himself as shocked by the destructive interference of uncontrollable powers, explicitly defined as divine, in human affairs. *C.* 1.35, whenever it is composed,³⁴² is a supplement to *C.* 1.34. Lines 1–4 repeat the experiences of life's utter unpredictability, hammered into the poet's mind at the end of *C.* 1.34; now they are the attributes of *Fortuna*, and in ll. 14–16 *Fortuna's* power is described as provoking civil strife, the most dreadful form in which Horace's generation experienced the helplessness of man in the face of the utter destruction of every basis of his material and moral life. Lines 5–17 refer to the reactions of people of every social rank, from Rome to the most remote regions of the known world, to *Fortuna's* destructive force, which affects every human *aequa lege*, "without distinction." This shock inspires the reaction of common ancient religiosity, the expression of awe in the face of the unpredictable, irresistible power of the divine: prayer motivated by anxiety and fear (*sollicita prece*, "anxious prayer," of the poor and helpless; fear of mighty tyrants: *purpurei*

³⁴¹ Cf. Goethe 1999: 748.

³⁴² See above, p. 212.

metuunt tyranni, l. 12), a prayer helpless against *Fortuna's* torchbearer, *Necessitas*, necessity in the sense of Greek ἀνάγκη, “that against which resistance is impossible.”³⁴³ At the end (ll. 28–40), Horace joins in prayer; yet, it is not the prayer of the common man, motivated by panical fear for his unpredictable lot. Horace at the end prays for the salvation of the princeps on military duty.

The prayers addressed to *Fortuna* in C. 1.35.6 ff. correspond to the prayers of the fools in C. 3.29.57–60, motivated by blind greed, of which Horace says (l. 57): *non est meum*, “it is not my way.” His way is to pray for the well-being of the ruler, the well-being of the Roman people, or for a blessing on his pure and self-content life. The prayers at the end of C. 1.35 and 3.29 supplement the missing reference to Horace's new attitude toward religious worship, omitted on purpose at the abrupt ending of C. 1.34.

The ‘philosophy’ behind this simple religiosity seems to be, if measured against the doctrines of philosophical schools, a curious mixture of Epicurean and Stoic elements, integrated into a new and rather different whole. But Horace's religion is not a philosophy; nor is it simply the personal religion of a convert to traditional cult. Horace pointedly presents his religion as a renunciation of philosophical certainties about the divine in a stance that is depicted as that of the ordinary religious believer. And Horace's attitude is a simple and genuine one, which is rooted in the experience of his life. It is simplicity regained by a man who did not simply ignore the philosophical concepts with which he had grown up and which he had absorbed in trying to cope with his life in a manner he could answer for intellectually. But at the end the ‘religion’ he adopted, the religion that corresponded to his experience of life and satisfied his need for—if not trust—at least a hope of closeness to the divine, was the religion the poet found in his ancient Greek models. The ‘religion’ that surfaces in C. 3.34, 35, and 3.29 is rooted in the basic sentiment of ancient Greek religion, revived by clothing it in concepts of philosophical thought, which the latter in turn owed to the general traits of the Greek ‘Weltanschauung.’ Horace's philosophy, if one wants to use the word, or his religion, if one likes to call it so, is not one that he learned in Athens or in his library, it is a philosophy that he learned in his life as a man and, above all, as a poet.

³⁴³ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 393 f.; *Necessitas* is not, as Syndikus (2001: I 310 f.) says, μοίρα. Greek ἀνάγκη is not what ‘necessity’ means to us; originally, it is not logical necessity, natural law. It means compulsion by outside forces (opposed to ἐκὼν “voluntarily”); cf. *LSJ* s.v.

The basis of common religiosity of ancient Greece is a feeling for the inseparable distance between god and man. Man, who defines himself in opposition to the divine finds himself alone in his troubles, in the frailness of his life, cut off from a life that must appear to him, who labors and toils, as the blessed life of the easy-living gods. The basic quality of the experience of the divine in ancient Greek religion is of its remoteness or absence. The explicit experience of the divine throws man back into a life where the divine—save for a few passing moments of grace³⁴⁴—lingers only as that which is absent and leaves man destitute and alone. When Hippolytus is dying because of his complete devotion to Artemis, he is left alone by that very goddess. He remains devoted to her even in death, without consolation and without her compassion (χαίρουσα καὶ σὺ στεῖχε, παρθέν' ὀλβία· / μακρὰν δὲ λείπεις ῥαϊδίως ὁμιλίαν, “farewell to you and go, blessed maiden; yet, easily you leave our long company”; E. *Hipp.* 1440 f.). He can only find compassion and a sense of community with his father, another mortal (ll. 1445 ff.). At the end of Sophocles's *Oedipus Coloneus* Oedipus's daughters and even Theseus, who attended Oedipus's disappearance, are all radically cut off from the hero, who has been made divine: they must not even mourn the deceased (S. *OC* 1751 ff.). They are thrown back into their daily life, as if nothing had happened, a life naked, stripped of every token that could make it more than an everyday life, a life that has lost everything that points beyond itself.³⁴⁵ The ultimate experience of the divine as the radically absent is the experience of loneliness or naked life as two faces of the same coin.

Nowhere else was this Greek experience of god more alive in Horace's time than in the Epicurean doctrine of a divine sphere, not interfering with human affairs and completely cut off from troubled human life in a life of infinite pleasure.³⁴⁶ No man could feel more poignantly and bitterly the helplessness, the solitude, the desparation of never being able to fully attain what he deemed to be the ultimate goal of life, than the man who perceived himself as ultimately dependent for his happiness on the pleasures of the body. There cannot be, it seems, any community with gods disinterested in human affairs. None of these gods can reside in man's inner self; the virtue of the Epicurean and failed Stoic Horace in *C.* 3.29 and *Epist.* 1.1 is a purely human one. Therefore it is not armor, but only a cloak, which leaves even

³⁴⁴ See above, pp. 245 ff., 276, 307 f.

³⁴⁵ See Günther 2007: 215 f.

³⁴⁶ See Günther 2010a: 104 ff., with reference to Schwartz 1943: 152 and to idem 1951: 189 in 105 n. 156; Morel 2009: 88 ff.

him who possesses the highest degree of self-sufficiency man can attain helplessly exposed to all the ills of human life that he so ardently seeks to avoid. In the context of this ‘philosophy’ the powers that govern human life can only be experienced as the capricious and destructive nature of *Fortuna*. Yet, there is another aspect of Epicurean ‘theology’ as well: far from rejecting a reverent attitude toward the gods, Epicurus in his letter to Menoeceus mentions as the first of his principles of a good life (στοιχεῖα τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν; *Men.* 123.2) the correct concept of god. He states that there is a clear vision of the gods (ἐναργῆς ... αὐτῶν ... γνῶσις; *Men.* 123.8), beyond any doubt, but he rejects the opinions of the crowd and insists that only the concept of the completely self-sufficient, eternally blessed god, who is not contaminated by any interference with human life, accords with god’s blessedness and immortality. Reverence to the gods consists in not compromising those holy opinions on the gods (περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος; *Men.* 133.2). Indeed, Epicurus’s non-interfering, self-sufficient god is in a way the most radical consequence of the archaic Greek ‘Weltbild,’ with its fundamental division between humans and mortals. Epicurean theology enshrines in the most radical way the experience of the divine as the absent and of man’s solitude in the face of god. Thus, Epicurus’s concept of god contributed much to a new spiritual attitude: worship as pure contemplation of the divine as such, which by shaping human life in accordance with its unattainable model enacts the presence of the divine in its absence.

Horace’s vision of the gods is profoundly influenced by this attitude; he rediscovered the spirit of Epicurean theology in the image of the divine in archaic Greek poetry. His hymn on Mercury (*C.* 1.10³⁴⁷) is the epitome of his—both very personal and yet completely objective—recreation of the *charis* of the gods of ancient Greece as reflected in the poet’s spirit. And it was his poetry, which opened up to Horace an experience of the forces that he felt were interfering with his life. It was in his art that he could express that these irresistible forces, which normally appear so awe-inspiring and destructive to human beings, can also be experienced as a blessing of the spirit. The ‘Dichterfriede,’ which hovers over the poetic landscapes of *C.* 1.17³⁴⁸ and 3.18,³⁴⁹ which protects the pure of heart in *C.* 1.22, is the reflection of Horace’s contemplation of the divine in his life and in his art. The “unblemished life, unstained by crime” is the life of the poet (cf. *Epist.* 2.1.117 ff.³⁵⁰) who, when

³⁴⁷ Above, pp. 278 ff.

³⁴⁸ Below, p. 339.

³⁴⁹ Above, p. 281.

³⁵⁰ Below, pp. 488 f.

he retires into his art, can abandon all gloom and fear in the company of the muse who transports him into the divine realm of his poetry (C. 1.26), a sacred space the poet occupies even in this world.³⁵¹

Horace's religion is a religion of art, yet, it is not an empty aestheticism, cut off from real life and concretely lived experience.³⁵² It was his poetry that endowed Horace with the ultimate insight into the nature of human life. But his art was also one he wrested from an enormously rich and intensely lived life, and thus his art did not make him a stranger to the external world, but on the contrary gave him a prominent position in society, his rightful place in the external world, which had first seemed to be denied to the aspirations of the youth.³⁵³ His art transferred Horace not only into an ideal place segregated from the paths of ordinary men, it also secured him an eminent place amid his fellow citizens, a place, he had the wisdom and strength to manage well and to maintain.

4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL POEMS

4.1. *Philosophical Discourse and the Character of the Horatian Ode*

Richard Heinze, in his groundbreaking paper "Die Horazische Ode,"³⁵⁴ has laid the foundations for a proper understanding of the poetic intentions of Horace's lyric poetry in its historical context.³⁵⁵ Heinze may have overstated

³⁵¹ Above, pp. 224 ff.; below, pp. 389 ff.

³⁵² There is no better description of the religiosity of Horace and his age than that of Schefold (1952: 22 f.), which deserves to be quoted *in extenso*: "Wenn die Kunst auch ein Hinzutretendes ist, so ist das Verlangen danach aus dem römischen Leben nicht wegzudenken, es ist religiös begründet. Es ist falsch, den römischen Klassizismus rein ästhetisierend zu nennen, wie es üblich ist. Der Künstler der Römerzeit kopiert klassische Vorbilder als Träger bestimmter Ideen. Religion durchdringt im Altertum das ganze Leben; unendlich vieles ist noch religiös, was heute als profan gilt. Der modernen Barbarei blieb es vorbehalten, der Religion die Sprache der Kunst zu rauben. Gelockert ist der Bund der beiden höchsten Lebenskräfte schon in der Römerzeit. Die Kunst ist nicht mehr die selbstverständlichste Sprache der Religion, wie sie es bis zur Klassik war. Aber gerade die Zeit des Augustus wendet sich vom Ironischen der alten Sagen ab; Horaz und Virgil gelingt es noch besser als Ovid, die alten Stoffe mit neuer Frömmigkeit zu durchdringen. Die Malerei zeigt, daß eine religiöse Stimmung verbreitet war, die der Haltung des Kaisers und seiner Dichter entspricht." If art was not any longer "die selbstverständlichste Sprache der Religion," for Horace it surely was the most eminent language of religion in the most pointed and reflected sense.

³⁵³ Above, pp. 26 ff.

³⁵⁴ Heinze 1960: 172–189.

³⁵⁵ For a recent reappraisal, see Barchiesi's perceptive remarks in Harrison 2002: 155 ff.; cf. also Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxivf.

the differences between Horace, the Greeks, and modern European lyric poetry,³⁵⁶ yet, in general outline, he correctly describes what Horace surely conceived to be the essential generic characteristics of his Greek models, which he tried to preserve in converting into Latin the poetic genre practiced by Sappho and Alcaeus.³⁵⁷ Mutatis mutandis one can lay down the

³⁵⁶ If Heinze—rightly to a large degree—thought fit to distinguish the character of Horace's lyric poetry as address to an 'ideal' vis-à-vis archaic Greek and modern lyric poetry, one should point out that there are analogies in modern poetry, too, that may help to understand Horace's choice to write poems addressed to a vis-à-vis, which is ideally conceived as a living individual. The poems of Stefan George's "Das Jahr der Seele" consistently speak of 'I,' 'you,' and 'we.' The poems were written during George's relationship with Ida Coblenz; what George later said in the preface of the second edition (George 1928: 7) can be applied very well to Horace's poetry in general: "Auch einige die sich dem sinn des verfassers genähert haben meinten es helfe zum tieferen verständnis wenn sie im Jahr der Seele bestimmte personen und örter ausfindig machten möge man doch (wie ohne widerrede bei darstellenden werken) auch bei einer dichtung vermeiden sich unweise an das menschliche oder landschaftliche urbild zu kehren: es hat durch die kunst solche umformung erfahren dass es dem schöpfer selber unbedeutend wurde und ein wissen-darum für jeden andren eher verwirrt als löst. Namen gelten nur da wo sie als huldigung oder gabe verewigen sollen und selten sind sosehr wie in diesem buch ich und du die selbe seele." He could do so because his dialogue with the 'real' you was always one of his 'ideal' self with the ideal self of his vis-à-vis, and thus much of his poetry, above all in "Der Stern des Bundes," is a dialogue of an 'ideal' self with his own ideal you. It is a poetry to be read by reenacting this dialogue, by realizing that in reading this poetry the ideal 'I' that we encounter may be we or we may be the 'you' and 'I' of the poem. This is due to the fact that, similar to Horace, George was almost obsessed with himself but always with that within himself that represented a general trait of the human soul.

³⁵⁷ If Horace chooses to construct his odes predominantly as addresses, this is, of course, not a kind of 'Systemzwang,' which prevented him from expressing what he otherwise could have expressed, and Syndikus (2001: I 13 ff.) is right to point out that Horace's poetry in the *Satires* and *Epistles*, too, is always directed at a vis-à-vis. However, this takes nothing from the correctness of Heinze's observation as a formal approach to Horace's poetical technique in the *Odes*. There is no doubt that Horace regarded the address to an individual as the ideal form of his lyric poetry and the basis for this in the form of his Greek models is obvious. We only have to free ourselves from the concept that a poet could have had any intention to express something he does not express. No poet fails to express anything he wants to express if not because he is not a true poet. If Horace chose to place a formal restriction upon his poetry he did so because this form was congenial to his poetry. Moreover, the exceptions to the rule show that he had no problem ignoring his self-imposed rules occasionally. In this respect, Heinze surely is too keen on fitting everything into the pattern whenever possible; there is no need to force the presence of the addressed when the context does not suggest it. Of course, there is a difference between addresses to persons, gods, and the rare addresses to objects, yet, that Horace chooses to stage allegory as an address to the ship in C. 1.14 shows that he has a distinct preference for the form. The fact that Horace's poetry, in general, i.e., in the *Satires* and *Epistles*, too, is staged as an address only attests to this preference. Thus, Syndikus's description of Horace's poetic intentions is entirely correct. Yet, it does not contradict Heinze's formalistic concept, if it is taken only as the formalistic technical concept

following code of essential stock characteristics in Horace's lyrics: 1) As a rule Horace's odes are first-person statements (as in Roman love elegy); the lyric voice is to be perceived as that of the poet himself, who carefully styles his poetic persona as compatible with his real persona; 2) almost always these statements are addressed to a second person, in most cases an individual;³⁵⁸ 3) ideally, the poems project the reader into a concrete situation, to which the text refers;³⁵⁹ thus, they create the fiction of being spoken directly to the addressee.³⁶⁰ It is a triviality to say that with these standards Horace aimed at recreating the specific taste of a poetry, which had its origins in a certain real performance context, in a purely literary context.³⁶¹ The precise relationship between literary fiction and real life in Horace's Greek models is irrelevant to our understanding of Horace's poetic technique, apart from the fact that such a neat dichotomy is a fallacy in itself.³⁶² And Horace knew this very, seeing his adaptation of ancient Greek lyric poetry as not fundamentally different from what happened in the Greek poetic tradition itself in the vexed passage *Epist.* 1.1.23 ff., already discussed above.³⁶³ What

it essentially is. Heinze's only fault is that he presents it as a kind of external 'Systemzwang' that prevented the poet from writing another type of poetry; Horace chose to model himself on archaic Greek lyric poetry and adopted this formal concept, derived from what he thought to be essential to the latter, precisely because he felt that this type of poetry was congenial to his artistic ideal. Cf. also Citroni 271 ff., Barchiesi in Harrison 2002: 155 ff., and Klingner in *Entretiens* 1953: 125.

³⁵⁸ Apart from the second-person plural addresses and the generic singular *Romane* in *C.* 3.6 or *plebs* in *C.* 3.14 (see below, pp. 370 ff.) and those directed toward drinking companions in *C.* 1.27 and 37 (in *C.* 36, the participants in the celebration are referred to implicitly by *iuvat* in l. 1), there are some experiments, the most trivial one consisting of the two hymnic addresses to the lyre in *C.* 1.32 and to the wine jar in *C.* 3.21. More recherché is the address to the ship in *C.* 1.14 (see p. 341): the allegory is presented as if the words were referring to a specific event observed by the speaker, who, overwhelmed by his feelings, lightens himself in an address to the ship in danger. In *C.* 2.13 such an indignant address to the tree that almost killed Horace is natural; as a tag for an allegorical poem it is not very convincing. That Horace thought fit to adopt such a device clearly shows that he aimed at address and concrete situation as a tag for the ideal formal frame. If, with *C.* 1.22, Horace en passant inserts a perfectly superfluous address to Fuscus into a purely narrative poem, just to present the text as a conversation in which he tells his friend a story about himself, this shows the same concern. Horace's only monologue, *C.* 2.5, is at least presented as a soliloquy (see pp. 319, 343 ff.; for *C.* 3.12, see p. 352).

³⁵⁹ *C.* 1.34 has no address, but at least refers to a particular situation.

³⁶⁰ That Horace regarded the presence of the addressee as a distinctive generic feature is confirmed by the fact that in the *Satires* he consistently pretends to speak to an addressee who is present, whereas in the *Epistles* he is, of course, absent, cf. Rudd 1989: 11 f.

³⁶¹ Cf. Fraenkel 1957: 36 ff.; also above, p. 189.

³⁶² Cf. Günther 2002: 34 f.; idem 2010a: 3 ff.

³⁶³ Above, pp. 175 ff.

is important is that Horace regarded first-person address to an audience, conceived as present, and motivated by a certain concrete occasion, as a fundamental characteristic of the genre he intended to recreate. One must liberate oneself from the conception of a rigid generic rule imposed upon the poet from without and preventing him from expressing what he could have expressed perhaps better in another form. To compose poetry in the tradition of Sappho and Alcaeus as he perceived it was Horace's choice; he chose to place his poetry in this tradition because he perceived it as a model congenial to his poetic intentions. The rules Horace follows were rules of his own choosing, not rules dictated from without; they were also flexible and Horace had no problem suspending them to some degree on a few occasions.

Of course, the performative context, which prevails in the formation of the Greek poetic genres, determined not only the tone, but to some, although much lesser, extent also the content of the texts. The origin in a certain performative occasion did not entail a definition of a genre by subject matter and thus left a more or less wide margin for possible topics to appear in each genre, yet the subject matter was conditioned by the concrete living context of the environment in which it was practiced. A modern poet, intending to creatively adapt a model rooted in the quite different conditions of bygone times, must have felt the need to open up the range of topics available in the Greek generic conditions to further themes of his personal concern. Horace states this himself in *Epist.* 1.1.23 ff., where he emphasizes the novelty of the subject matter as the mark of creativity in his adaptation of Archilochus's, Sappho's, and Alcaeus's poetry, and claims the same for the relationship between the latter two and Archilochus. As regards Aeolian lyrics, their thematic range was much broader than that of an iambic poetry that was conceived primarily as invective. Still, Horace thought certain discourses unfit to be integrated plainly and simply into his lyric poetry without crossing the boundaries of the generic ideal of Alcaean lyrics, adumbrated above. First of all, there was the challenge of writing encomiastic and political poetry with a broader appeal than was possible in an ambit, restricted to off-hand comments on a particular situation; moreover, Horace aimed at developing moralizing remarks and observations on human life into more discursive philosophical sermons. To a lesser degree, he was interested in recasting mythological narrative in a more elaborate form than was fit for Lesbian poetry *stricto sensu*.

These concerns, then, affected how a theme was presented, along with its style and tone. In fact, Horace stresses this as the second major element of creative imitation in *Epist.* 1.1.23 ff.: *ordo*, "disposition." Philosophical dis-

course features most prominently in Book II, which, to some extent, was conceived as a unity from the start. We might suppose that, whenever the poems in Book II were written, at some very early stage Horace decided to write poems of a certain type, meter, and length in order to arrange them later in a book of rather uniform shape and content. In Book II, we find the highest concentration of λόγοι φιλοσοφικοί, which occupy half of the book (*C.* 2.2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18), two of which, *C.* 2.15 and 18, lack an address. It may be significant that the latter poem by far exceeds the length of 20–28 ll., most commonly found in Book II, at 40 ll., a number of lines found also in the *recusatio*, *C.* 2.1, and *C.* 2.13, a poem on a personal accident. Both poems, as well as *C.* 2.18, the only purely iambic poem in the *Odes*, may have been written before Actium.³⁶⁴ The only other poem of 40ll., *C.* 2.16, is of uncertain date.

Horace likely began to write both philosophical diatribes and encomiastic poetry more and more systematically after Augustus's return from the East in 29BC, the period to which *C.* 2.15 and 3.24 (in epodic meter),³⁶⁵ which are akin to *C.* 2.18 but rather more impersonal and discursive, and also the earliest of the *Roman Odes*, *C.* 3.6,³⁶⁶ probably belong.³⁶⁷ The princeps's return from the East and the hope for a peaceful future obviously gave Horace the impulse to enter into a new phase of his political and, as *C.* 1.2 attests,³⁶⁸ strictly encomiastic poetry on the ruler. If this is true, it becomes obvious that Horace, when he began to embark on a more discursive and, indeed, rhetorical type of poetry, first tried his hand at moralizing λόγοι, which still resemble Horace's iambic and satiric poetry, echoed even more in *C.* 2.18. *C.* 2.15 and 3.6 may well be Horace's earliest compositions of this type in an aeolic stanza form (both in the Alcaic stanza). It is quite obvious that Horace, as soon as his interest in writing more discursive poetry increased, looked for a way to integrate this type of poetry into his self-imposed generic frame. The simplest, yet least organic way to do this is the tagging observed in *C.* 1.3,³⁶⁹ a method Horace also used for integrating historical (*C.* 1.37) or mythological narrative (*C.* 3.11 and

³⁶⁴ Above, p. 212.

³⁶⁵ See above, pp. 401 f.; *C.* 2.15 should be more or less contemporary with 3.24; see Syndikus 2001: I 434.

³⁶⁶ Below, p. 374.

³⁶⁷ For the date of *C.* 2.2, see Syndikus 2001: I 350; among the discursive poems of Book II only *C.* 2.1 is decidedly earlier (see above, p. 212) and *C.* 2.10 is very late (above, l.c.).

³⁶⁸ Above, pp. 323 ff.

³⁶⁹ Above, pp. 239 ff.

27).³⁷⁰ However, there were other ways open to him to achieve a less artificial result.³⁷¹ For political discourse he could go back to his adaptation of archaic Greek political poetry, addressed to an assembly of the people, as he did in *Epod.* 16. This line Horace took up in the generic address *Romane*, “Roman,” in *C.* 3.6.2,³⁷² and even more pointedly in the address in the opening poem of the cycle of the *Roman Odes* (*C.* 3.1–4), which served to introduce a series of three λόγοι φιλοσοφικοί.³⁷³ As regarded nonpolitical topics, reflections on human life were, of course, at home in archaic Greek poetry. The carpe-diem motif, so dear to Horace, had its place in symposiastic poetry, as we have seen.³⁷⁴ Thus, it was quite easy to extend the gnomic statements in line with archaic Greek poetry into a more coherent paraenetic discourse. Another and concurrent method was to tag paraenetic sermons on an encomiastic address. This was, of course, a particularly attractive possibility for a poet who was in strong demand for encomiastic compositions on his patrons and other dignitaries, because paraenetic discourse was a stock element of encomiastic poetry since Pindar and had long been firmly embedded in the rhetoric tradition of the paraenetical speech, the *suasoria*, which Cicero in his Caesarian speeches had employed in the historical context preceding the principate of Augustus. Thus, the focus of Horace’s philosophical poetry shifted increasingly from the ψόγοι of *C.* 2.18 and 3.24 to λόγοι παραινετικοί, which could exploit a genuinely lyric tradition and, at the same time, shape it in accord to rhetorical devices, ready at hand and flexible enough to fit any generic requirements Horace chose to impose on his poetry. This, then, is the type of philosophical poetry we mainly find in Book II and we can thus turn to a brief analysis of some particularly significant poems.

³⁷⁰ Above, pp. 242 ff. and below, pp. 318 f., 346 ff. In view of what we have observed for the philosophical poems, it is an easy guess that *C.* 1.15, which renounces any situational tag and surely is not one of Horace’s greatest achievements, was perhaps his earliest attempt, preserved in the *Odes*, to write mythological narrative.

³⁷¹ ‘Artificial’ need not imply necessarily artistic imperfection. As could be seen in the analysis of *C.* 1.3 above (see also on *C.* 3.11 and 27 below, pp. 318 f., 346 ff.), the very artificiality of the device can be appreciated as artistically effective, if seen in the context of Horace’s technique of composing poems as moving structures.

³⁷² Below, p. 374.

³⁷³ Below, pp. 373 ff.

³⁷⁴ Above, pp. 240 and 327, 468 n. 9.

4.2. *Topics, Addresses, Situation,
and Philosophical Discourse in Book II:*

C. 2.2 (Nullus argento), 7, 9, 10 (Rectius vives), 11 (Quid bellicosus),
16 (Otium divos), 17 (Cur me querelis)

The second book of *Odes* has one particularly prominent topic, death, that runs throughout it and is present in more or less prominent position in fifteen of the twenty poems (absent only in C. 2.4, 10–12, and 15; in most of the other poems it occupies center stage). But there is a further common characteristic of the poems in Book II: in books I and III the individuals addressed are often, and in the love poems always,³⁷⁵ characters who bear a Greek name, as are the other persons referred to in such poems. Thus, whatever the relationship between the persons named in the poems and any living persons in Horace's life, on a purely text-immanent level these persons are presented not as real but as 'ideal' characters. There are, of course, several poems addressed to gods, but also some to objects, even some with rather more experimental addressees, such as C. 1.14.³⁷⁶ The number of poems in books I and III addressed to living individuals is limited. They are concentrate toward the beginning of the collection, with a series of men of particularly prominent standing.³⁷⁷ Then we have several poems addressed to Maecenas (C. 1.20; 3.8, 16), including the last but one (C. 3.29³⁷⁸), and a few other friends (toward the end of Book I: C. 1.18, 22, 24, 29, 33; only one in Book III: 3.17), dispersed over the corpus (without the poems on Augustus: ten of the thirty-eight poems in Book I and three of the thirty in Book III). In Book II, however, fourteen of the twenty poems are addressed to named living individuals. Only two 'personal' poems, C. 2.5 (a soliloquy³⁷⁹) and 2.13 (the tree that almost killed Horace), exhibit an 'irregular addressee.' The erotic poems C. 2.4 and 2.8 are addressed to fictitious Greek characters; one poem, C. 2.19, to a god; and two others, C. 2.15 and 18, lack any addressee. Thus, Book II presents a characteristically close sequence of poems addressed to real

³⁷⁵ See pp. 272, 349.

³⁷⁶ See pp. 314 n. 357, 315 n. 358, 360 ff.

³⁷⁷ Below, p. 244; see Barchiesi in Harrison 2002: 157. Apart from the opening series, we find the following living individuals as addressees in books I and III: Varus (C. 1.18), Maecenas (20), Fuscus (22), Virgil (24), Iccius (29), Tibullus (33), Maecenas (C. 3.8, 16, 29), and Aelius (17). Thus, in Book I only 13 out of 38 poems are addressed to named real individuals, in Book III only four out of 30, three of them to Maecenas. For the difference in the choice of addressees between the *Odes* and the *Epistles*, see Ferri in Harrison 2007: 125 f.

³⁷⁸ See above, pp. 300 ff.

³⁷⁹ See pp. 243 ff.

persons, all but Asinius Pollio, the dedicatee of the prologue (C. 2.1), and Maecenas, figuring in a complementary quasi-programmatic poem (C. 2.12) and two poems at the end of the book (C. 2.17 and 20), persons of less importance than the distinguished series of men at the beginning of Book I (Maecenas, Augustus, Virgil, Sestius, Agrippa, Plancus). Book II is also a kind of 'book of friends,' and parades in sequence Asinius Pollio (C. 2.1), Sallustius (C. 2.2.), Dellius (C. 2.3), Septimius (C. 2.6), Valgius (C. 2.9), Licinius (C. 2.10), Quinctius (C. 2.11), Maecenas (C. 2.12), Postumus (C. 2.14), Grosphus (C. 2.16), and again Maecenas in C. 2.17 and 20. Much of Book II presents itself as utterances from the poet's private conversation with a circle of friends about matters of common interest; many poems are more or less encomiastic (C. 2.1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 17), some are downright λόγοι προτρεπτικοί (C. 2.2, 16),³⁸⁰ often consolatory (C. 2.3, 9, 10, 11)³⁸¹ or diatribes (C. 2.14, 15, 18).

As one can observe in the naked address to Fuscus in C. 1.22, Horace may introduce an addressee just for the sake of endowing a poem with a conversational cloth. But normally the poem projects the reader into a more or less concrete situation relevant to the addressee, if only in the extremely 'mechanistic' manner of C. 1.18.³⁸² If we look, for example, at C. 2.10, ll. 17f. suggest that the addressee, Licinius Murena, is in trouble, and, in fact, the moral lesson, directed toward Licinius, refers to the actual biographical circumstances of the addressee,³⁸³ although the latter are only hinted. We must therefore admit that the relationship between the poems and the living background may be closer than a reader not familiar with the historical facts can appreciate. However, if Horace aimed at creating poetry that would live forever, he clearly must have felt that his poems would speak to those readers as well who were not familiar with the real-life context. Of course, Horace, who tried so carefully to remain true to biographical reality in styling his poetic voice in accord with what was plausible for his real persona, did address poems to living people that that reflected the circumstances of their lives. In some, perhaps even in most cases they may well have been designed to have an additional significance for the addressee that would have no meaning for an uninitiated reader.

We have already seen that moral advice in the widest sense had a certain place in symposiastic poetry.³⁸⁴ Horace often stages his invitations to enjoy

³⁸⁰ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 3f.

³⁸¹ Another consolation poem is C. 1.24.

³⁸² See p. 241.

³⁸³ See below, p. 320.

³⁸⁴ *Epod.* 13 (see pp. 206 ff.), C. 1.9 (pp. 273 ff.), 11 (p. 240).

life in a symposiastic context. He may even, as in *C.* 3.29, which is basically an invitational poem, carefully construct a situation in which he could plausibly integrate his advice to Maecenas, and then develop this advice into a longer discourse on the right lifestyle in general and on the poet's own personality and life: Maecenas, the important man of state, troubled by his official duties and his involvement with politics in the city is invited to relax by joining Horace at his farm and enjoying a little banquet. In a less elaborate and explicit way a similar frame, i.e., the addressee portrayed as the stressed politician who longs for retirement, is created in *C.* 1.7.³⁸⁵

In Book II, *C.* 2.11 is of the same sort; the circumstantial frame is made clear from the start (ll. 1–3) much more explicitly than in *C.* 1.7; of course, to portray someone as an important man, troubled with affairs of state, implies an encomiastic element. In *C.* 2.1, 9, and 17, the external circumstances of the address are clear from the outset (Pollio, engaged in writing a history of the civil wars in *C.* 2.1; Valgius, in distress because of his boy lover's death in *C.* 2.9; and Maecenas, pestering Horace with his fear of death in *C.* 2.17). In *C.* 2.7, Horace exploits an invitational poem for his personal story, contrasting his own lot in the civil wars to that of an old comrade in arms.³⁸⁶ In *C.* 2.20, for once it is not Horace who invites his high-ranking patron Maecenas to his humble villa, but Maecenas who calls on his socially inferior client (ll. 7 f.); thus, Horace, in *C.* 2.20.6 f., jokingly makes his extravagant claim on eternal fame as a reminder to his patron of the important guest he is to receive.

There are also three poems, where no particular situation is mentioned but the addressee is characterized by an epithet in a manner that refers to the 'message' of the poem: *C.* 2.2, 3, and 6. In *C.* 2.6, the addressee, Septimius, is presented as a particularly affectionate friend, ready to accompany the poet on any trip (l. 1–4); similarly, in *C.* 2.2, the wealthy and liberal Salustius's wise use of his fortune (ll. 2–4) is the tag for Horace's sermon on virtue vs. material wealth. To praise someone by commending to him—and thus to the text's audience in general—the virtues he is more or less explicitly assumed to possess, is, of course, a common device of panegyric poetry or indeed of a *suasoria*:³⁸⁷ one need only think of Cicero's Caesarian

³⁸⁵ See pp. 266 ff.

³⁸⁶ Above, p. 29.

³⁸⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 33 f., 37 f. There is nothing strange in recommending to someone a virtue he is supposed to possess (Pindar's famous γένοιτο οἷός ἐστι μαθῶν in *P.* 2.72 makes precisely this point); on the contrary, to recommend to someone something that he is assumed to have done, is first of all a clever kind of eulogy by understatement (West 2002: 38, 64); moreover, the convention of praising by paraenesis provides an ideal background

speeches or, as regards Greek poetry, Pindar's poems on Hieron, in particular (cf. especially *P.* 1.86 ff.).

In *C.* 2.9 and the poems addressed to Maecenas (*C.* 2.12, 17, 19), praise is replaced by ironic teasing: the all too dedicated lover and all too sentimental poet Valgius (*C.* 2.9); Maecenas, the happy husband of an attractive wife whose behavior is at the limits of decency for a Roman lady (*C.* 2.12); the mortal, all too afraid of death, who does, however possess in the poet a dedicated friend (*C.* 2.17); the high-ranking patron, who can be proud to count a poet as exalted and ambitious as Horace among his clients. The address to Pompeius Grosphus in *C.* 2.16, identified toward the end of the poem as a wealthy Sicilian landowner³⁸⁸ and failed fellow Epicurean—such a fitting addressee for a lesson on Epicurean ethics—is teasing as well. In this poem the interaction of framing address and content is particularly subtle. The renewed address to Grosphus in ll. 31 ff. allows for a personal ending of the until now rather sententious poem, with its rather dense sequence of gnomic statements: Horace's *paupertas* and Grosphus's, the wealthy businessman's, luxurious lifestyle vis-à-vis the preceding philosophical discourse on the Epicurean sage's tranquillity of mind.³⁸⁹ The humorous change from the grand exempla for the poetic justice, effected by the changing times (Achilleus's short vs. Tithonus's long life; ll. 29 f.), to the contrast between poor Horace and wealthy Grosphus³⁹⁰ provides for a serene smile at the end of the rather somber reflections, in line with the precept to "dilute bitter things with a gentle smile" (ll. 26 f.³⁹¹). Moreover, the end 'explains' in retrospect the reference to material wealth in ll. 7 f., where Grosphus is introduced: he, the rich

for manipulating the powerful by inducing them to think that by enacting what they are exhorted to do they do exactly what they want to do anyway. Cicero's Caesarian speeches are an example of this ambiguity: *Pro Marcello* is an epideictic speech in the form a *suasoria*; cf. Kerkhecker in Schwindt 2002: 101 ff. Seneca's *De clementia* is the counterpart: the treatise is wholly based on an approach (cf. *De clem.* 1.1.6, a precise application of *Pi. P.* 2.72) that tries to sell moral values by presenting them as desirable status symbols of the ruler. It is no surprise that Cicero's (and Seneca's) success was a literary rather than a political one; see Kerkhecker *ibid.* 132 ff.

³⁸⁸ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 252 f.

³⁸⁹ For an interpretation of the poem, see Latte 1968: 876 ff., cf. in particular Latte's concluding remarks 882 ff. (cf. also above, p. 247 n. 160); for the structure of the ode, see Barwick 1950: 149–258 (on the same structure in *C.* 3.1, pp. 259–264).

³⁹⁰ The change of time levels out the incalculable interference of chance in human life; this is an Epicurean concept. It is quite funny that Horace, who, content with his lot favorably compares his modest lifestyle with Grosphus's riches (ll. 33 ff.), should remark that time may perhaps at least give him an advantage over wealthy Grosphus in terms of age (ll. 31 f.).

³⁹¹ Above, pp. 302 f.

man, cannot buy peace, as true peace is peace of mind. With these lines, i.e., with the address to Grosphus, the discourse on *otium* reaches its point: the intentionally vague beginning plays on the different shadings of *otium*.³⁹² First, (ll. 1–4) *otium* is contrasted with bad weather at sea, a very unusual context for the word (motivated by the Lucretian model, *Lucr.* 2.1 f.). In the second stanza (ll. 5–8), with *otium* as relief from the toils of war, the term is set into the context from which the new, positive concepts of *otium* of the Augustan period emerged:³⁹³ *otium* had already assumed a new positive dimension in the time of intellectual crisis of the late republic, which questioned traditional Roman values and social standards. But only the complete dissolution of the external conditions of Roman society in the civil wars allowed for a comprehensive positive concept of *otium* that comprised relief from the physical dangers of war and bloodshed, retirement into a civilian life free of external threats, in a stable patriarchal political order, into an ideal world of beauty, away from the brutal realities of daily life, a quest for inner security, spiritual serenity, inspired by a quietist philosophy, i.e., *otium* in an all-embracing sense, which found its congenial poetic expression in *Virg. Ecl.* 1.6 (*deus nobis haec otia fecit*, “a god has bestowed on us this freedom of care and strife”). The allusion to war then allows for the introduction of Grosphus’s name via a play on words (Greek “spear”). Moreover, the desire for freedom from the toil and strife of war serves as an entirely plausible, yet surprising context in which to illustrate that *otium*, “peace,” is not to be bought by material goods: of course, in a war against Thracians and Parthians, peace is not for sale for gems or purple. And here we have arrived at the theme of this φιλοσοφικὸς λόγος: true peace as freedom from external troubles is not an external good, it resides in man’s mind.

C. 2.16 is a splendid example of how to fit a discursive text, in this case a sequence of gnomic reasonings, into a personal frame, which gives color and allows for a variety of tone and register. Here, the poem’s topic is not presented simply as a heading (as in C. 2.2, 3, 10), but is approached via two different, yet complementary images, which are accommodated by a common semantic element from the wide range of the term *otium*: freedom from toil. This technique of presenting reflections in a string of different images, metaphors, examples, and gnomic reasonings, which complement each other by overlapping and thus creating a train of thought as a string

³⁹² See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 253 f. and, in particular, West 1998: 112 ff.; in general, André 1966.

³⁹³ André 1966: 387 ff., 500 ff.

of common denominators is a standard device found in other Horatian discourses; C. 2.16 is a particularly sophisticated example of this technique, a very plain one is C. 2.2.³⁹⁴ It is the counterpart to the even more complex manner of sliding images observed in C. 1.7 and 9.³⁹⁵ If anything, C. 2.16 shows that what I called the 'deformation' of a topic by its integration into the generic frame of Horace's lyric poetry is not to be understood in a negative sense; on the contrary, it endows philosophical discourse with the qualities to become a fit subject of lyrics. The conceptualized imagery of Horace's poetry places the train of thought before our inner eye as a movement of plastic and vivid objects. By this conceptualized imagery Horace is capable of adding a specific coloring, freshness, and the appearance of novelty to trivial and commonplace notions in his philosophical 'Gedankenlyrik' and also in his panegyric poetry. Paradoxical as it seems to apply romantic aesthetics to Horace, no poet lives up better to what Schopenhauer³⁹⁶ requires of poetry:

Also liegt dem Dichter ob, durch solche mittelbare, nämlich durch Begriffe vermittelte Einwirkung auf die Phantasie, diese dennoch in Bewegung zu setzen, so daß sie selbst im Hörer die Bilder schafft in denen er die Ideen erkennt, deren Mitteilung der Dichter beabsichtigt.

And when Schopenhauer lists the means by which a poet achieves this, one could not find a more telling example than in Horace's poetry (not cited by Schopenhauer³⁹⁷), but from the "Begriff," yet he, with the perceptive listener, succeeds in the "Wagstück in Anderen lebhaftere Anschauung erregen zu wollen, während man selbst bloße Begriffe hat: Wärme mitteilen zu wollen, während man selbst kalt ist." And thus Horace achieves the effect that Latte³⁹⁸ so admirably describes in his interpretation of C. 2.16:

Das Verhältnis des Ausdrucks zu dem Gedanken ist bezeichnend für den Odenstil überhaupt. Er ist nicht diskursiv entwickelt, sondern birgt sich hinter Bildern, die nirgends Selbstzweck sind. Der Weg des Dichters geht nicht vom Bild zum Gedanken, sondern in umgekehrter Richtung; daher wirken die Bilder so oft zufällig, konventionell und könnten beliebig vertauscht werden. Daraus entspringt ein Mangel an Kraft und Unmittelbarkeit des Anschaulichen, der im schärfsten Gegensatz zu Goethes Lyrik steht und ihn veranlaßt hat, Horaz nur 'Realität ohne alle eigentliche Poesie' zuzuerkennen. Aber aus

³⁹⁴ Cf. Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 33 f.; Syndikus 2001: I 349 f.

³⁹⁵ See pp. 266 ff., 273 ff.

³⁹⁶ Schopenhauer 1985: 181.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 181–189.

³⁹⁸ Latte 1968: 882.

derselben Wurzel kommt der verhaltene Klang dieser Verse, die immer auf etwas Dahinterstehendes deuten, kommt jenes Schweben zwischen Bild und Gedanken, in dem ein besonderer lyrischer Reiz liegt; es läßt dem Gedicht soviel Unbestimmtheit, wie sich mit den festen Linien des Gesamtaufbaues irgendwie verträgt.

C. 2.16, in contrast to poems like *Epod.* 13,³⁹⁹ C. 1.7,⁴⁰⁰ 9,⁴⁰¹ and 11, presents reflections on human life in a whole string of gnomic utterances that are attached to a heading that proclaims a maxim to be proved in the following discourse (even if in C. 2.16 this heading is only approached by a deviation via two complementary images), in this case ‘freedom from troubles, i.e., ἡσυχία or ἀταραξία, cannot be achieved by external goods,’ whereas even in a moralizing discourse as extensive as C. 3.29⁴⁰² the text starts from a specific remark adapted to the staged situation of the poem and then unfolds into more general reflections. Other prime examples of philosophical discourses that unfold a topic, stated as a heading,⁴⁰³ plain and simple, are C. 2.2 and 2.10. In C. 2.10, Horace explicitly refers to the fact that the addressee of the poem, Licinius (Murena, the brother of Maecenas’s wife Terentia⁴⁰⁴), is in trouble; as I have already said above, the poem refers to an extremely precarious moment in Licinius’s career, close to his final downfall and assassination.⁴⁰⁵ It is more than understandable that Horace preferred to allude to Licinius’s situation only by the vague *si male nunc*, “if things are bad now,” in l. 17 than to be more explicit. In C. 2.2, the addressee, Crispus Sallustius, receives an epithet (*inimice lamnae*, “you, who despise strips of metal”; l. 2), which is later developed in an appended clause (*nisi temperato splendeat usu*, “unless they shine in moderate use”; ll. 3f.). The following sermon recommends and thus elevates the virtue that Sallustius is implied to possess:⁴⁰⁶ wisely calculated munificence.⁴⁰⁷ However, the philosophical discourse is not limited strictly to the virtue in question but praises virtue as a self-sufficient

³⁹⁹ Above, pp. 206 ff.

⁴⁰⁰ See pp. 266 ff.

⁴⁰¹ See pp. 273 ff.

⁴⁰² Above, pp. 300 ff.

⁴⁰³ A similar technique can be observed in some poems of Propertius’s third book (3.13, 14, 19, cf. also 11); the technique is anticipated by a poem like Prop. 2.1; see Fedeli 2005: 43 f.

⁴⁰⁴ See Syme 1986: 387 ff. and Nisbet and Hubbard (following n.).

⁴⁰⁵ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 151 ff.; in particular 156 ff.

⁴⁰⁶ For the topical praise of patrons for their munificence, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 33: Their statement that “Horace carries his delicacy so far that he presents the encomium of a rich benefactor as a denunciation of materialism” (op. cit., 34) best sums up the merits of the poem.

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Cic. *De off.* 1.42–44.

value independent of external goods, which is, in fact, a central concern of Horace's philosophical poetry, particularly evident in C. 2.16 and also in the following C. 2.3 (equanimity, which guarantees a certain degree of independence from external ills, cf. also C. 3.29⁴⁰⁸).

C. 2.2 exhibits the same structure as C. 2.16, and this structure is indeed characteristic of several of Horace's λόγοι φιλοσοφικοί: a series of blocks (normally of two stanzas), filled either with metaphorical imagery, *exempla*, or *sententiae*, one set beside the other; thus the train of thought develops via a chain of more or less self-contained statements, where every link of the chain adds a new dimension to the theme in question.⁴⁰⁹

4.3. *Life in the Face of Death: Living Mortality:*

C. 2.3 (Aequamemento) and 14 (Eheu fugaces)

We can observe the same technique in C. 2.3 as in C. 2.2, i.e., tagging a discourse on an epithet attached to the addressee. Here, the interaction between the epithet and the lesson directed at Dellius is a particularly subtle one. As in C. 2.2 and 2.10 the poem begins with recommending a certain behavior to the addressee,⁴¹⁰ and, again, the addressee is assumed to already possess that quality.⁴¹¹ To treat catastrophe and triumph with equal indifference, the *aequanimitas*, "equanimity," recommended to Dellius, is the prerequisite for the peace of mind praised in C. 2.16. However, this attitude is

⁴⁰⁸ See pp. 300 ff. If one does not tie Horace down to the dogmatism of school philosophy, there is no contrast at all between C. 2.2 and 3 (thus Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 34). Stoicism and Epicureanism, in essence, are much closer than they appear from the outside; the 'unorthodox Epicurean' Horace reveals these affinities, cf. Günther 2010a: 70 ff. with n. 51.

⁴⁰⁹ See above, p. 322 n. 389 with reference to C. 3.1; excellent brief description of style and structure of C. 2.2 in Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 35. C. 2.3 and 2.14 are similar, yet the blocks are slightly irregular in length (2 : 2 : 3 for C. 2.3, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 53, and 3 : 3 : 1 in C. 2.14, see op. cit., 225). The slightly awkward structure of C. 2.18 (see Syndikus 2001: I 459 ff.) and 3.24 (Syndikus 2001: II 198 ff.) contains the germs of the regular and carefully constructed chains of thought in these poems. The late C. 2.10, on the other hand, is a masterpiece of micro-construction combined with pointedly concise and clipped expression (see Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 158): two exactly symmetrical sections of three stanzas each (1–12 vs. 13–24), each containing a paraenesis, show an internal substructure of three self-contained blocks in the manner of C. 2.2, 16, or 3.1 each. In the first half they exactly match the metrical structure (one stanza per block); in the second half the 'dovetailing' between stanzas 4 and 5 (13–15a : 15b–20) is accompanied by even more clipped paratactic syntax.

⁴¹⁰ It befits a man with Dellius's career (see Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 52). Of course, Horace had to be as cautious to match the staged situation or the precepts recommended in a poem with the addressees' actual situation, as he styled his poetic voice in accord with what was plausible in view of the actual circumstances of his life.

⁴¹¹ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 52.

not so much a philosophical concept, common to different philosophical schools: the topic features prominently in Archilochus (fr. 128 West). In fact, that it became commonplace in philosophy results from the fact that this concept is nothing more than an application of the basic maxim of archaic Greek popular moral: for mortals it is wise not to dwell on excessive aspirations and hopes, but to keep a low profile and resign oneself to the inevitable misery of the human lot. At first sight, the mood of Horace's poem oscillates strangely between an invitation to *carpe diem*, with lush descriptions of a *locus amoenus* fit to host Dellius, by enjoying exquisite wine, and the melancholy of the final three stanzas, which dwell on death. But, above all, it is not immediately clear how the invitation to enjoyment is related to the heading of the poem: to avoid excessive emotional involvement in both directions.

The train of thought becomes clear only if we understand the thrust of Horace's words by imagining ourselves in Dellius's situation. As is *C.* 2.10, *C.* 2.3 is intended as a consolation for the addressee, who in the first line is portrayed as being in trouble: the euphemistic *rebus in arduis*, "in situations difficult to master, requiring labor and endurance" (l. 1), implicitly flatters Dellius. Of course, being portrayed as the model of a wise Epicurean, he does not really have a bad time: he is the important man of high public standing who, from time to time, has to cope with stressing and difficult tasks. The opening stanza distinctly alludes to the famous passage in Archilochus (fr. 128 West) already mentioned above:

θυμέ, θύμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε,
[.....]
.....] μήτε νικέων ἀμφάδην ἀγάλλεο,
μηδὲ νικηθεὶς ἐν οἴκῳ καταπεσών ὁδύρεο,
ἀλλὰ χαρτοῖσιν τε χαίρε καὶ κακοῖσιν ἀσχάλα,
μὴ λήην, γίνωσκε δ' ὅλος ῥυσμός ἀνθρώπους ἔχει.⁴¹²

Heart, my heart, with helpless, sightless troubles now confounded,
[.....]
not overproud in victory, not in defeat oppressed.
In your rejoicing let your joy, in hardship your despairs
be tempered: understand the pattern shaping men's affairs.

Lucilius (fr. 689, 699 Marx) explicitly referred to Archilochus's verses and Horace here uses them as a sort of Archilochean motto.⁴¹³ Archilochus, involved in quarrels with his enemies, exhorts himself (his θυμός) to endurance (τλημοσύνη) in difficult situations; with the Archilochean motto Dellius

⁴¹² 2^{1/2} heavily corrupt lines are omitted here.

⁴¹³ See above, p. 202.

is put into an analogous situation, just as in *C.* 1.18 Varus is put in the situation of an addressee of Alcaeus.⁴¹⁴ Of course, the situation envisaged by *rebus in arduis*, “in steep, i.e., difficult circumstances,” is general enough to be fit anybody, thus it need not necessarily refer to any concrete situation in Dellius’s life (as surely is the case in *C.* 2.10); thus, *C.* 2.3 pretends to provide a precept that should console Dellius, imagined to be in such a difficult situation. Archilochus appends to his self-exhortation a general reflection that goes beyond his present mood; he also supplies the counterpart to self-restraint in distress: equal restraint in triumph. This predilection for antithesis, even where one alternative is completely irrelevant for the actual context, is typical for archaic Greek poetry.⁴¹⁵ However, when Horace imitates Archilochus, the second alternative has a point as important as the first: the implication of Horace’s words in the poem’s situational context is that Dellius must maintain his self-control in difficult circumstances as he is a man who, hedonist as he is, knows the proper limits in enjoying life. This, above all, is the compliment paid to him; thus, ll. 2b–4a implicitly supply the desired laudatory epithet for Dellius: Dellius is a good Epicurean hedonist, who knows his limits.

The epithet, however, with which he is provided in the address, following immediately on the precept of ll. 1–4a, comes as a surprise: nothing could be stranger at first sight than *moriture Delli* (4), “Dellius, sure to die.” It is less strange if one understands it as a pointed translation of Greek θνητός, “mortal”; *moriture Delli* is almost a kind of γνῶθι σαυτόν, reminding Dellius of his mortality, and, βεῖνγ the good Epicurean he is, of course, he knows it. The conscience of one’s οὖν mortality, which prevents Dellius from indulging in excessive enjoyment, can equally calm him down in times of distress: in the face of inevitable death, which levels everything, everything in human life is of only slight importance, be it good or ill. In strict parallel with *C.* 2.2, the epithet is qualified by a subordinate phrase; here it is again an alternative balancing the initial one: (Dellius is sure to die) whether he lives always in distress or whether he takes from time to time a day off from his troubles and treats himself to an exquisite cup of wine in his beautiful garden. As *moriture* was, at first sight, a surprise, so is here *seu maestus omni tempore vixeris*, “whether you live in perpetual gloom.” What we expect is ‘in good or in bad days,’ but why live in gloom *omni tempore*, “all the time”?

⁴¹⁴ Above, p. 241.

⁴¹⁵ Cf., e.g., the common formulaic combinations of ἐργον and ἔπος in the Homeric epics, where regularly one of the two alternatives is completely irrelevant for the context; cf. also Lloyd 1966: 15–171; on ἐργον and ἔπος *ibid.*, 92.

Of course, “all the time” refers to a common topic of consolations, used by Horace also in *C.* 2.10⁴¹⁶ and even more explicitly in *C.* 2.9:⁴¹⁷ one need not be too depressed by present ills; the utter unpredictability of human life gives hope of a change for the better. Yet, in *C.* 2.3, the immediate context is different; Horace does not speak of changes in time, he speaks of the inevitability of death. Moreover, if the second alternative takes the form, ‘if you have your happy hours from time to time,’ the first alternative should be, ‘if you have to endure distress from time to time.’ Yet, this would make no sense, qualifying *moriture*, “sure to die.” In fact, the alternative is one between the ordinary fool, who by his fears lives unnecessarily in constant distress and anxiety, and the wise man, who knows to enjoy the beautiful moments of life, whenever they offer themselves, for that is something all men can hope for. Life is full of toil, the most man can achieve is to resign himself to fully enjoying the few passing moments where he can rest from that toil, an attitude recommended by Pindar, in particular.⁴¹⁸

Moriture is the link that joins the first two stanzas on equanimity with the following invitation to enjoy life; it is the hinge of a door that closes behind what preceded and opens up to what follows. In the face of man’s exposure to total annihilation whatever can happen in human life is a matter of slight importance, yet, vis-à-vis death, the few moments of happiness granted to mortals appear all the more precious. Thus, by dwelling on the second alternative the feeling changes imperceptibly from mellow resignation to serene melancholy, which awakens the desire to enjoy to the full whatever this precarious life has to offer. This mood facilitates the new start in ll. 9 ff.: ll. 6–8 had reminded Delliis that he has some days off to spend in his garden; now the poet points to the trees and water. The question he asks (“for what purpose, why are they there?”) incites the addressee to recognize that the present moment offers him the chance to enjoy nature in its benign appearance and grace invites him to join her as long as his short life span allows him to do so.⁴¹⁹ Yet, the shadow of death lingers in the mind and cannot be brushed away; on the contrary, it is precisely the acute feeling of the immediate threat of death that man feels in his very desire to enjoy. The thought of the second stanza comes back again, and it is even more explicit: death is the same for all, and it takes away everything, thus it is, if anything,

⁴¹⁶ Above, pp. 320, 325 f.

⁴¹⁷ See pp. 256, 361.

⁴¹⁸ Cf. *Pi. P.* 8; called “the Ecclesiastes of the odes” by Gildersleeve 1965: xxx.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. above, pp. 206 ff. (on *Epod.* 13) and pp. 243 ff. (on *C.* 1.4).

even more painful for the happy and wealthy—like Delliis—than for him, who is poor. Now the same concept, which, in ll. 1–8, inspired with mild resignation the man who was distressed, is cruel and without mercy for the man who can revel in his wealth: death, which was sweet for the distressed, is bitter to him who enjoys good days (cf. *Sirach* (*Eccl.*) 41.1–3). This is no longer the painless death with which the Epicurean consoles himself, the death he does not fear, for total annihilation does not know pain. Of course, as elsewhere, the immediacy of death serves as a reminder that it is imperative to enjoy life. However, here death is explicitly described as cruel (*nil miserantis*, “pitiless,” l. 24) and undesirable (*exsilium*, l. 28). Death is frightening because it takes away everything, is felt as eternal deprivation, and leads to eternal exile.⁴²⁰

Exile is an extremely poignant expression for death and, although it easily lends itself to the context, is not common at all in the latter, and is, so far as I know, not attested elsewhere before Christian writers of late antiquity.⁴²¹ The common notion is that life is only a guesthouse, man is not perfectly at home in a fleeting world.⁴²² The world is *only* a guesthouse for a man who feels that he is at home somewhere else, where he may join the divine. For a man who does not have this hope, earth is *at least* a guesthouse, a place that at least offers some hospitality to someone who is at home nowhere, who leaves this world as a stranger. Horace suggests, in this Epicurean invitation to enjoy the moment, that the notion of death is worlds apart from that of Epicurean philosophy, which instills serenity into the mind of the sage. Once again, as in his rejection of Epicurus’s explaining away the heavy impact of incurable troubles even on the life of the man who is not a fool,⁴²³ Horace implicitly subverts the complacency of Epicurean school doctrine, which pretends that it is easy for a man who conceives physical pleasure as the ultimate goal of life to cope with life’s inevitable uncertainties. Yet, despite the fact that the poem dwells on death in four of its seven stanzas, there is no bitterness, no despair. On the contrary: the serenity inspired by the thought of death at the beginning, as almost a relief for the distressed, lingers throughout the

⁴²⁰ That Horace is far from Epicurean complacency in regard to death was duly noted by Syndikus 2001: I 428 (on C. 2.14; see below,). *Serm.* 1.1.117 ff., modeled after Lucr. 3.935–939 (cf. also below, pp. 480 ff.), contain an implicit reproach of the man, who dies feeling that he had not had enough of life, not so in C. 2.3. C. 2.3 evokes precisely that feeling, censured in *Serm.* 1.1.117 ff., simply stating it and leaving the reader with a bitter taste.

⁴²¹ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 65f.

⁴²² Cf. Cic. *De senect.* 84.

⁴²³ Above, pp. 300 ff.

poem and endows it with an undercurrent of serene melancholy that only heightens the mellow joy incited by the things around him that remind him that his life on earth has much beauty in store. In its movement, suspended between distress and happiness, the beauty of life and the cruelty of death, the poem inspires both calm resignation in the face of grief and painful and gentle delight in life's beautiful gifts: *C.* 2.3 is the perfect expression of the bittersweet smile of the wise man, of which Horace speaks in *C.* 2.16.26 f.

There were two facets of the *tristesse*, the bittersweet smile, of *C.* 2.3: it mellowed the grief in the sad hours of life and it intensified the appreciation of life's beautiful moments, as did the *tristesse* of *C.* 1.4.⁴²⁴ The contemplation of death, of man's ultimate renunciation contributes to both consolation and joy. The counterpiece to *C.* 2.3 is *C.* 2.14, which centers almost completely on death and mortality. The addressee, Postumus, not qualified by any epithet, cannot be identified.⁴²⁵ The circumstances mentioned toward the end of the poem imply that he is a married man, possessing a house with a beautiful garden (ll. 20–24). In fact, the qualification *harum*, “these here,” of the trees in l. 22, suggests a concrete scenery as the background of the poem: ll. 21 ff. transfer us to the garden around Postumus's villa.⁴²⁶ In *C.* 1.4, the beauty of nature's reawakening in spring suddenly reminds man of death, as soon as he realizes that this beauty is a transitory one.⁴²⁷ Here, the gentle joy of the first half of the poem turns into gloom and—at the end with the nostalgic ll. 18–20—into *tristesse*. In *C.* 2.14, the poem seems to start in utter gloom; it dwells as long as five stanzas on utterly desperate thoughts on the brevity of human life and the irrevocability of death. What *C.* 2.3 says in one word, the epithet *moriture*, in *C.* 2.14 is spread over five stanzas, which repeat again and again the inevitability of death, the futility of every attempt of man to escape his lot.⁴²⁸ Only the last two stanzas (ll. 21–28) turn to life, to Postumus's belongings, the belongings that make life dear to him. Horace points to these belongings, to the trees in Postumus's garden, and adds that nothing will belong to him forever, that these trees will outlive him, their “short-lived master” (*brevem dominum*; l. 24), and the cypresses will mark his grave. The beautiful sight of Postumus's house and garden have evidently inspired the poet with the somber reflection that man cannot hold on to

⁴²⁴ Above, pp. 243 ff.

⁴²⁵ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 223 f.; their tentative identification with the Postumus of Prop. 3.12 is attractive.

⁴²⁶ Heinze 1960a: 174.

⁴²⁷ Above, p. 246.

⁴²⁸ Syndikus 2001: I 424 f.

what is dear to him. He speaks not only to his friend, he speaks to himself as well. He changes from the second-person singular in ll. 1–9a to the first-person plural in ll. 9b–16 and ends with a general statement with the gerund in ll. 17–21. The precise application of this impersonal statement in ll. 21 ff. to Postumus renders the fact that he cannot escape the common lot all the crueler.

Lines 21 f. have a Lucretian model: Lucr. 3.894 ff.⁴²⁹ In Lucretius, the words are part of a funeral speech. The lament that the deceased will never return to his house or see his wife and children seems to have been topical on such occasions. Lucretius derides these laments, adding that the deceased is not participating in these feelings: they are feelings merely of the living (ll. 902 ff.). Horace refers to Lucretius, and explicitly contradicts the Epicurean stance on death. Not that he contests that there is no afterlife. On the contrary: he does not contest that death takes away all feeling, all pain. For the dead, death is neither painful nor a tragedy. For the living, however, it may well be. Horace does not project himself into the position of the dead, as Lucretius does. For him who is alive, lives well, and loves and enjoys life's gifts, the thought of death is painful. Epicurus's consolations may console a man who has largely become independent of pleasure by submitting himself to Epicurus's ascetic discipline, yet, Horace, with all his *paupertas*, is not an ascetic. He is a hedonist who knows, without indulging in excess, how to enjoy life to its full; he can cope with deprivation with a gentle smile, but he cannot, he need not deny that he feels the pain of being deprived of what can be enjoyed, and he refuses to take refuge in reasonings that contradict the archprinciple of every philosophy that makes bodily pleasure the ultimate touchstone of human happiness.

In C. 1.4, the shift from delight to the horrors of death was a sudden one; it was motivated, however, by the appreciation of the transience and fragility of seasonal beauty. In C. 2.14, the somber reflections, with all their vigorous and lively emphasis, seem unmotivated; there is no hint at a particular situation that inspires these feelings. However, if the addressee lacks an epithet, the address is an emphatic anadiplosis in the very first line. Postumus is surely the name of a living individual, even though we may not be able to identify him, yet, Postumus is a speaking name itself: "late born, born after the father's death." The twice-repeated name itself prepares for a somber atmosphere from the very start. At the end, when the friends look at the trees in the beautiful garden their eyes rest on the cypresses: if one wants to

⁴²⁹ See above, p. 330 with n. 420.

reconstruct the suggested scene, we are led to imagine the poet beside his friend, admiring his estate and spotting between the trees the tree of death. Thus he remembers his friend's ominous name and is reminded, too, that if these trees may stand there for a long time to come, once only the cypress will recall his short-lived friend, and others will be deemed worthier than him to enjoy what remains of his earthly belongings.

There is another poem that, after describing a beautiful place to live in the countryside, in fact Horace's own villa at Tibur, turns to a funeral: *C.* 2.6. Of course, if the thought wanders at the end of the poem to the end of life, this is motivated both by the fact that Horace chooses Tibur as a place to retire from active life and eventually to die, and by the fact that he speaks of his friend's tears in a poem concerned with friendship. When, at the end, the focus rests on the poet's death in a beautiful place, as contrasted to the happy, fulfilled life there that now awaits the two friends, there is a gentle touch of melancholy, of the *tristesse* of *C.* 1.4 and *C.* 2.3. To be sure, *C.* 2.6 begins with gentle irony, an irony that in ll. 13–21 changes into serene affection for a country idyll. Yet, one need not be surprised that such a poem ends with death, and if one tries to explain it away by suspecting humor at the end, one fundamentally misunderstands Horace. The concluding lines need no humor to not be gloomy; they are not gloomy anyway. In the light of what precedes death, death itself is transformed and integrated into the bright light that lingers when even winter is mild and gentle. Whoever thinks that Horace must always be ironic and 'positive,' whoever is afraid that by taking anything in his poetry seriously he may be too metaphysical or sentimental for Horace's urban wit, misses the very essence of this poetry. Horace's supreme virtue is that he is serious without being solemn, profound without being metaphysical, and that his poetry is capable of expressing the whole range of human feeling, is capable of expressing the deepest sentiment without ever being sentimental.

Thus, to detect subversive irony even in *C.* 2.14 can only be the apex of perversion. The poem remains fixed on death throughout, even the spark of light in the penultimate stanza is subsumed in the shadow of death. The whole poem dwells on the inventory of poems that invite the reader to enjoy life in the face of death. Yet, *C.* 2.14 lacks this invitation. In the penultimate stanza the focus remains on the acute sense of how precious life's amenable side is, how attached man is to what makes his life bright, how difficult it is to depart from what is dear to him. Yet, again, even *C.* 2.14 exhibits not the slightest touch of morbidity, let alone sentimentality. There is a perfect balance between the pain felt at having to leave behind life with all its and the happiness inspired by this beauty, which only becomes

apparent in its fullness by the very fact that it is so short-lived, that it is something man cannot hold on to. In *C.* 2.3, death mellowed the pain and inspired the true enjoyment of the good. *C.* 1.4 discovered death in life, but death that makes life all the more worth living. In *C.* 2.6, even death is transfigured into the light of life. In *C.* 2.14 the beauty of life shines all the brighter through the shadow of death.

In all these poems Horace uses standard topics of ancient poetry and philosophy, yet, the attitude, the mood he purports in his poems is completely unique. That the contemplation of death, of life's misery and brevity, implies an invitation to enjoy life, that life's misery exhorts man to brave endurance; to oppose himself to the ills or to resign himself to his lot; to restrain his aspirations, wishes, and hopes; to try to avoid excessive anxiety by wise self-restraint, all this is commonplace. In Horace we find, beyond all that, something completely different: life is only worth living precisely because it is exposed to death. Only someone who is conscious of the fact that he is destined to die, to be reduced to nothing, can truly feel and experience beauty and joy; only he who can die can live. If he feels the pain of deprivation, and even more acutely that of the ultimate deprivation, the pain of dying, he also feels that only in this pain can he feel the joy of life. And thus the very reminder of death need not even serve as an implicit invitation to enjoy life, it needs nothing that points beyond death: the contemplation of death itself, as the contemplation of life in its absence, can be a form of enjoyment. Horace thus arrives by quite a different road at the ultimate conclusion of Epicurean philosophy: that for a man who knows that life is nothing to death, and death nothing to life, mortality itself is a pleasure (*Ep. Men.* 124.8 ff.; a passage one might almost call Epicurus' 'Ecclesiastes'):

ὅθεν γνώσις ὀρθή τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον.

And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality.

5. 'WEIN, WEIB UND GESANG'

5.1. *Horatian Love Poems:*

C. 1.13 (Cum tu, Lydia), 16 (O matre pulchra),
and 17 (Velox amoenum)

With *C.* 1.5, Horace had programmatically introduced his love poetry as that of the dispassionate bystander who observes the passionate and unhappy

love of others. C. 1.8, the apex of Horace's 'descriptive' love poetry, essentially presented a mere narrative about a young man in love, couched in a question to a girl addressed by the poet. In C. 1.13, the observer of a love scene, quite similar to that of C. 1.5, returns, but now, in contrast to the latter, he appears to have lost his detached position; he is in love himself with the girl he addresses and whom he observes in the arms of another man. In fact, in C. 1.13, the speaker is exactly in the situation one would expect him to be after an opening like C. 1.5 or 1.13, an expectation that is frustrated in C. 1.5, but not in C. 1.13. The pair, C. 1.5 and C. 1.13, which mirror each other precisely, represent the two types of love poetry C. 1.6 refers to, with *vacui sive quid urimur*, "whether carefree or burning with desire" (19), and then in all (C. 1.16, 19, 23, 25, 33) but two (C. 1.25 and 27) of the love poems in Book I that follow C. 1.13 the poet, despite and in frustration of the programmatic opening, portrays himself as being in love.

Hitherto, Horace had alluded to only one of his two Lesbian models, Alcaeus, in C. 1.4 and 1.9. In C. 1.13, he opens his series of 'subjective' love poems with an imitation of a poem of Sappho (fr. 31 LP). Not by chance he chooses the very poem that Catullus (51) had translated into Latin, one of the very few attempts to transfer Aeolic meter to Latin poetry before Horace's *Odes*. Since in this case we know more about the Greek model than in any other case of imitation of Sappho or Alcaeus, C. 1.13 offers particularly precise insights into Horace's technique in transforming his models. Horace takes over the situation from Sappho's poem. As does Sappho, Horace is observing a girl, Lydia, who is engaged in an erotic encounter with a man, Telephus, an encounter that provokes the speaker's jealousy. But Horace takes Sappho's four stanzas about the girl's behavior and the speaker's reaction only as the starting point for a further development of the situation, which leads far away from Sappho's poem; he thus compresses Sappho's four stanzas into two. Moreover, the couple's activities are overtly erotic in Horace; in Sappho they are not. In Sappho's poem the narrative occupies 4 1/2 ll.; Horace, initially, sketches, as in C. 1.5, the amorous encounter of a typical couple of Hellenistic epigram with a few brushstrokes in only 2 1/2 ll. In what follows, he selects from Sappho's catalogue of seven physical symptoms of jealousy (speechlessness, fever, lack of vision, tinnitus, sweat, tremor, paleness) just three; he leaves out the most drastic ones and dwells instead on two correlated symptoms, sweat and fever (after change in color⁴³⁰). After

⁴³⁰ *Mens* beside *color* is new in Horace; it may echo Sappho's τό μ' ἦ μάν/ καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν "that, I vow, has set my heart within my breast a-flutter" (fr. 31.5 f. LP) blended with

that, he returns to the love scene, but now he focuses on the man: in ll. 9–12 he speaks of the boy's violent activities, activities strictly consistent with the situation depicted in ll. 1–3: he advises the girl in ll. 14–16 to put no trust in the fidelity of such a barbaric lover. In place of Sappho's self-appeal to restrain her feelings,⁴³¹ echoed by Catullus, Horace ends with a praise of faithful love until death, which stands in sharp contrast to the violent and unstable affair between Lydia and Telephus.

Horace's casting transports Sappho's scene into the world of Greek epigram, the world of C. 1.5, with its conventions and topoi; yet Horace's offhand style, with its crude colloquialisms (cf. ll. 4, 8⁴³²), is as different from that of Hellenistic epigram as it is from Sappho's pictorial realism. As in *Epod.* 11, 14, and 15, both the style, with its careful disposition of nouns and epithets over consecutive lines and half-lines,⁴³³ and the topoi of the unfaithful lover, the rival, and the ideal of eternal union transport us into the Neoteric world of Roman elegy. Horace projects himself once again into the role of the elegiac lover, whose situation and state of mind he had depicted as an outside observer in C. 1.5. In C. 1.13, he observes not only the two lovers, but also himself as an observer of an amorous couple; now he is not the dispassionate bystander of C. 1.5, he is emotionally involved himself. Horace, in contrast to Sappho's objective realism, states, even before he begins to enumerate the symptoms of his jealousy, his emotional state in l. 3 f. (*meum/fervens difficili bile tumet iecur*, "my liver swells boiling with choking bile") and sums it up in l. 9 (*uror*, "I am burning"), and he describes the symptoms of jealousy explicitly as external indications that reveal (*arguens*, "betraying" in l. 7) his inner state to an observer. He places himself as a lover explicitly under the scrutiny of himself as an observer.

In fact, *arguens*, "betraying" is not without precedent in Sappho; she says (fr. 31, 15 f. LP), *τεθνάκην δ' ὀλίγω 'πιδεύης/φαίνομ' ἔμ' αὐτᾶ*,⁴³⁴ "It seems to me that I am not far short of death." Denys Page has drawn attention to "the uncommon objectivity" of Sappho's "demeanour toward her own extremity of passion," that "there is certainly no lack of control in the expression,

Arch. fr. 191 West: κλέψας (sc. ἔρω) ἐκ στηθέων ἀπαλάς φρένας "steeling the gentle wits from my heart."

⁴³¹ This is the likely, yet not certain interpretation of the corrupt end of the Sapphic fragment.

⁴³² Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 170.

⁴³³ See pp. 201 ff. C. 1.13 is a prime example of epodic meter organized in a series of neat syntactic units of four lines each.

⁴³⁴ For the text, see Hutchinson 2001: 29.

whatever there may have been in the experience.”⁴³⁵ This particular quality of Sappho’s art is the ultimate model for Horace’s own attitude of self-detachment in speaking of his own self in his poetry. In *Epod.* 11,⁴³⁶ he had alluded to the paradox of the poet’s self-detachment in regard to violent passion, the passion of love, in particular. In *C.* 1.13, he presents this paradox as the essence of the personal ethos of his love poetry. The poet’s detachment from his personal experience enables him to write love poetry about his own emotionally involved self as if he were the disengaged observer of others, as in *C.* 1.5. In Sappho’s poem, the poet-speaker’s detachment from her personal experience remains inexplicit, the experience depicted as her own presents itself as passionate. Sappho was, in the perception of antiquity, the poet of passionate love par excellence, and as such she is the explicit model for Horace’s self-presentation as a passionate lover in *C.* 1.13 (as Meleager is the hallmark of Propertius’s serious elegiac love in *Prop.* 1.1.1f.⁴³⁷). Yet, the implicit self-consciousness of his split persona as a poet and as a living object of his own poetry, which Horace puts on display, transforms the very emotionality that his poetry represents.

Sappho speaks as someone who presents his experience, pure and simple. The description of symptoms, however, is both vivid and conventional (her catalogue has literary precedents⁴³⁸); this and her dispassionate manner of speaking achieve an objectivity in which every reader can recognize himself. Horace could not possibly recreate this simplicity, which, as such, is unrepeatable *per definitionem*. Horace reconstructs his own experience by transporting it to an unreal world created by a blend of various literary allusions. In this ostentatiously fictitious world, real-life experience gains new life as lived again by the poet in its conscious transformation into poetic autobiography. The emotional demeanor that emerges in the poetry is—from a reader’s perspective—automatically broken through the mirror of the poet’s detached attitude and can no longer appear to be the outpouring of intense passion. Horace’s detachment is analogous to Sappho’s, yet also different, since Sappho’s description is implicitly, Horace’s explicitly conventional. Sappho’s passion asks to be taken literally, Horace’s does not. Thus, the emotional self, which we grasp behind Horace’s love poetry, has an attitude of self-ironic self-detachment, an attitude that is emotionally

⁴³⁵ Page 1955: 27; also Theuissen 2000: 272 ff.

⁴³⁶ Above, pp. 201 ff.

⁴³⁷ Fedeli 1980: 60.

⁴³⁸ Page 1955: 29 f.

involved and disengaged at the same time.⁴³⁹ C. 1.13 is explicitly descriptive, like C. 1.5 and 1.8; with C. 1.13, however, the descriptive character of Horace's love poetry has gained a new dimension: the speaker is himself the object of his description.

Only a little further below we read what are perhaps Horace's two best love poems in Book I besides C. 1.8. Both, C. 1.16 and 17, are written in the same meter (the rather elevated Alcaic stanza⁴⁴⁰) and both are exactly the same length. This is not by chance, although the poems are not strictly linked as closely as some have thought: they need not refer to the same girl.⁴⁴¹ However, it is significant that the two poems have so much in common that such a suspicion is aroused in the reader who reads them consecutively. Both deal explicitly, in a diametrically contrasting manner, with love and poetry, serenity and violent emotion. In C. 1.16, Horace incorporates a little diatribe *de ira* into a palinode à la Stesichorus, addressed to a beautiful lady he had angered by writing invective iambics (that Horace knew Stesichorus's poem is shown by *Epod.* 17.42–44⁴⁴²). Thus, C. 1.16 is a successful example of integrating a moral sermon into a situation perfectly suited to a lyric poem.⁴⁴³ Moreover, via this diatribe Horace gives his poem an entirely new twist, in contrast to its Stesichorean model. Rather than offering a *recantatio* of his previous invective, Horace tries to placate the offended lady by lecturing her on the terrible consequences of anger. When, at the end, he invites her to give up her wrath, he cites, as the last example of bad consequences of anger, himself in his misguided attack on her in his *Iambi*, an anger that the poet explains as the result of immature, juvenile passion (*fervor*, "hot temper," l. 24) and that he now repents. Thus, as in C. 1.13, there is a correspondence between the emotional state of the poet and that of another person: in C. 1.13, the speaker is as involved in passionate love as is the couple before his eyes, in C. 1.16, the poet explicitly *was* once in the same state as the person addressed. At the end, Horace reveals that his advice to the other person about their shared emotions is due to the fact that he once experienced these feelings himself, but now, with age, he has become wiser and thus much less prone to disturbances of his inner balance. Here, the detached attitude of the observer of passions explicitly is the result of lived experience.

⁴³⁹ Cf. also Brink 1982: 459 f.

⁴⁴⁰ Above, pp. 215, 222 f.

⁴⁴¹ Thus, after Porphyry still Heinze in Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 81; see Fraenkel 1957: 207 ff.

⁴⁴² Cf. Kiessling and Heinze (1955) ad loc.

⁴⁴³ Above, p. 241.

In *C.* 1.17, three major themes of Horatian lyrics are combined with love: the invitational poem; the divine protection of the poet; the description of natural beauty, of the poet's Sabine farm, in particular.⁴⁴⁴ Horace invites a girl into the poetic landscape of his Sabinum, a landscape that, from the very start, is depicted as one that enjoys the presence and protection of the gods. The poet invites the girl to find, in these peaceful surroundings, a happy, peaceful union with a lover different from the violent young man Horace depicted in *C.* 1.13, and who returns in the description of a rival to the poet for the girl's attention (ll. 24–28). The quarrels, the troubles of the passionate love affairs, like those observed in *C.* 1.5 and 1.13, the jealousy, the sufferings, their violence will be forgotten here in the shade of the secluded Sabine valley, between the cups filled with Lesbian wine; there will be only an echo of these feelings, the feelings of suffering for a shared love, transformed into a song of old tales on Penelope's and Circe's love for the same man.⁴⁴⁵

In *C.* 1.16, it was the wisdom of the man who has been through the turmoils of life, which granted emotional detachment and thus held out the possibility for reconciliation and peace. In *C.* 1.17, the poet, in the serene atmosphere of his art, guarantees the happy union of the couple, which, in *C.* 1.13, was an ideal denied to those involved in their lives filled with uncontrollable passions. In real life, harmony and happiness can be achieved, as much as is possible on earth, by the detachment from oneself that is a result of lived experience; but perfect bliss is a grace reserved exclusively for the ideal world of art.

5.2. *The Elderly Lover:*

C. 1.19 (*Mater saeva*), 23 (*Vitas inuleo*),
 25 (*Parcius iunctas*); 2. 4 (*Ne sit ancillae*),
 5 (*Nondum subacta*); 3.14 (*Herculis ritu*), 15 (*Uxor pauperis*),
 26 (*Vixi puellis*), 27 (*Impios parrae*), 28 (*Festo quid potius*)

C. 1.16 reveals that maturity gained through experience is the prerequisite for Horace's detached position as a bystander and, of course, the advanced age of the observer of *C.* 1.5 already shone through in the metaphor of the veteran of love at the end of the poem. But if we look at *C.* 23 and 25 in Book I and *C.* 4 and 5 in Book II, the elderly lover holds a prominent place in Horace's love poetry. After *C.* 1.17, which gave prominence to the poet under divine protection, Horace places two poems on gods: Bacchus and

⁴⁴⁴ See Fraenkel 1957: 204 ff.

⁴⁴⁵ Transformed, the motif will return in *C.* 4.11; see below, p. 356.

Venus. In C. 1.18.6f., both gods are mentioned side by side as a consolation for the ills of life.⁴⁴⁶ As we have seen, the closely connected C. 1.16 and 1.17 both rejected violent passion in favor of peace and harmony. The whole sequence, C. 1.16–19, shares this central credo of Horace's ethical outlook: the advocacy of measure and restraint, the avoidance of excess. C. 1.18 is a sermon on moderation in drinking, the other three, C. 1.19 included, apply the maxim to the passion of love. A very peculiar cletic hymn to Venus, C. 19, concludes the series.

If we read it in sequence, C. 1.19 refers back to C. 1.5: the first stanza (ll. 1–4) explains how the lover who had said adieu to love came to be involved with love again: he is at the mercy of the divine powers of love, who by their reckless doings have forced him back into love even against his adamant will. Against the full force of this power the poet is helpless. Lines 10 ff. (*nec patitur Scythas/et versis animosum equis/Parthum dicere nec quae nihil attinent*, “she refuses to let me sing of the Scythians, and the Parthian who is courageous when galloping away, and other irrelevant topics”), in the sequence C. 1.5/6, refer again to the typical movement of elegiac poems, attested in Prop. 2.10 and already briefly commented on above.⁴⁴⁷ Yet here the motif appears in its conventional form: the poet cannot write on war because he is too occupied with love (cf. *Anacreontea* 23, 1–4 West).⁴⁴⁸ At the end, however, the poem takes a surprising twist. Before the last stanza there was no address: the poet simply described his mental state by referring to the goddess of love as its cause. In l. 15, the poet calls on *pueri*, “boys, servants,” to provide what is needed for a sacrifice (turfs, garlands, and wine), a sacrifice that might induce Venus to be less cruel to the poet.

The first three stanzas depict the poet hopelessly in love, a context in which one might expect the speaker, if he resorts to prayer, to call the goddess of love to help him achieve the fulfillment of his desires. This Sappho does in her famous cletic hymn to Aphrodite (fr. 1 LP), which took first place in the ancient editions of her work. Or, when the goddess is described as cruel and as weighing too heavily on him by her very presence, perhaps the poet may pray to be relieved, as Horace does later in the apopemptic hymn on Venus at the beginning of the fourth book of *Odes*, 4.1, in pointed reference to C. 1.19.⁴⁴⁹ However, C. 1.19 is not addressed to the goddess, and the

⁴⁴⁶ Above, pp. 241, 281 ff.

⁴⁴⁷ See p. 256.

⁴⁴⁸ See also above, pp. 201 ff., on *Epod.* 11.

⁴⁴⁹ Günther 2010a: 124 ff.; below, pp. 446 f.

end frustrates any expectations the reader may have regarding the speaker's wish. The sacrifice the servant boys are called to prepare, should neither cure the poet of his love nor help him to achieve the fulfillment of desire, it should induce the goddess to moderate her influence on him and to endow him with less violent, more pleasant emotions. *C.* 1.19 is written in the same meter as *C.* 1.16, the style, with its plain language and simple syntactic structure in full accord with a four-line stanza pattern, reminds one of *C.* 1.13,⁴⁵⁰ and the two odes may well be more or less contemporary.⁴⁵¹ Even though *C.* 1.19 nowhere explicitly refers to Sappho's hymn to Aphrodite, the beginning resembles Sappho, fr. 130 LP, and the poem could be read as Horace's response to Sappho's hymn. One could read it as the modification of Sappho's prayer by the Horace who, in *C.* 1.13, adapted Sappho's ode on jealousy to his own situation. In any case, in the context of the book, *C.* 1.19 complements *C.* 1.13 (one may note that in the cycle of erotic poems 1.13, 16, 17, and 19 two epodic odes in the fourth Asclepiad surround two odes in the Alcaic stanza!); it prays for the mild and gentle love that the jealous observer in *C.* 1.13 praised in the concluding stanza.

C. 1.25 returns to the 'Vetula-Skoptik' of *Epod.* 8 and 12.⁴⁵² Although the poet uses drastic language for the ardent desire of the libidinous hag, in contrast to the *Epodes*, obscenities and *nuda verba* are strictly avoided; only the erotic desires of the old woman are described drastically in ll. 13–16. But the poem's overall character is determined rather by the picturesque Hellenistic 'Kleinmalerei' of ll. 1–12, tinged with some realistic Roman touches;⁴⁵³ it transports us into the romantic world of moonlight serenades and excluded lovers of Hellenistic and Neoteric poetry. The excessive lust of the elderly woman stands in obvious contrast to the mellow stance of the elderly male lover of *C.* 1.23. The same contrast reappears even more poignantly in the juxtaposition of *C.* 3.14 and 15. *C.* 3.15, which focuses entirely on every lack of restraint in the amorous fury of the elderly woman, comes directly after the statement at the end of *C.* 3.14, in which, reminiscent of the end of *C.* 1.17,⁴⁵⁴ the poet protests explicitly that old age had mellowed his own erotic passion (*C.* 3.14.25 f.):

⁴⁵⁰ Above, pp. 335 ff.

⁴⁵¹ And perhaps contemporary with the demonstrable imitations of Alcaeus in Book I; see above, p. 271.

⁴⁵² Above, pp. 198 ff.

⁴⁵³ Syndikus 2001: I 243.

⁴⁵⁴ Above, pp. 282, 312, 339.

*lenit albescens animos capillus
litium et rixae cupidos protervae.*

My greying hair is mellowing my temper, which used to be eager for wrangling and impulsive brawls.

In *C.* 3.15, the absence of vulgarities, *nuda verba*, even of a drastic description of desire, is all the more conspicuous in comparison to what one might commonly expect in this context. Both the lust and the ugliness of the elderly woman are referred to *e contrario* by a description of beauty lost and of young girls' behavior, unsuited to the addressee. But above all, in *C.* 3.15 the moralizing undertone, present in much of Horace's love poetry comes to the surface:⁴⁵⁵ rather than being an invective, *C.* 3.15 is a lesson on proper behavior, which, by being set in the context of derisive erotic poetry, avoids anything sententious.

In Book II again two poems on old age and love are placed, this time directly side by side, and both of exactly equal length: *C.* 2.4 and 5. In *C.* 2.4, the situation is similar to that of *C.* 1.27: the poet teases a young friend in a symposium about his love, a conventional topic of Hellenistic epigram and Neoteric and Latin love poetry.⁴⁵⁶ However, in *C.* 2.4, this situation only provides the frame for a little sermon that justifies the young man's love for a slave girl, a topic both treated in erotic poetry and controversially discussed in philosophical and rhetorical discourse. Thus, *C.* 2.4 is, above all, an example of integrating moralizing reflections⁴⁵⁷ unobtrusively into a lyric context. Yet, in a kind of diversion, Horace at the end adds a personal touch to his little sermon: for all his praise of the slave girl's physical beauties, which fully justify a free man's love, his drinking companion need not fear that Horace's appreciation of his beloved's body betrays a personal interest on the poet's part, as he is already forty years old. Thus, at the end the old man, vainly hunting a young object of desire, appears *en passant* and sets the scene for the following poem. As a joking, self-ironic allusion to oneself, put into the shoes of the elderly lover, the theme is stripped of all the self-pity by which it is so often accompanied, and any sentimentality. Already the voyeuristic gaze over the girl's body from top to bottom in ll. 21 f. reveals that the disclaimer of erotic interest is not to be taken seriously. In fact,

⁴⁵⁵ Syndikus's (2001: II 147 ff.) sensitive interpretation admirably captures the ethos of the poem.

⁴⁵⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 66 f.

⁴⁵⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard, who (1978: 68) aptly describe the poem's character, rightly point out that Horace's style of argument smells of declamation.

somebody who so emphatically claims that he has retired, though his eyes have not, would arouse the suspicion he disclaims.

After this, *C.* 2.5 takes up precisely the theme of *C.* 1.23. Yet, now the poem is not addressed to the speaker's young object of desire, but takes the form of a soliloquy à la Catullus (there are close parallels with *Cat.* 8⁴⁵⁸), an extraordinary and unique form for a Horatian ode.⁴⁵⁹ But this is not a Catullan *renuntiatio amoris*: Horace declares that he renounces, for the moment, the sexual favors of a girl who is still too young, and shows himself resigned to wait until the girl comes of age. But the passing of time reminds the poet of the distance between the girl's youth and his own age; the relation of both to the passing of time is a diametrically opposite one: if she still has a lot of time to wait, the poet has not (9–15):

... *tolle cupidinem*
immitis uvae. iam tibi lividos
distinguet autumnus racemos
purpureo varius colore,
iam te sequetur; currit enim ferox
aetas et illi, quos tibi dempserit
apponet annos.

... Get rid of your desire for an unripe grape! In due course you will find that autumn with its many tints will set off the darkening clusters with purple hue;

in due course she will follow you; time runs implacably on, and will give her the years it takes from you.

At the end the poet, with slight nostalgia, dwells for just 1½ ll. on bygone loves in order to favorably compare young Lalage's beauty with them.

The poem's starts first stanza is ostentatiously crude: the poet's desire is described with an animal simile, which compares him to a bull in heat (*A:* 1–4). With his interest in consistency of imagery, already observed above,⁴⁶⁰ Horace passes in l. 5 to a description of the girl as a heifer playing in the meadow beside a river (*B:* 5–10a), a tenderly idyllic scene that stands in pointed contrast to the poet's violent desire. In all of Horace's love poems we

⁴⁵⁸ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 77.

⁴⁵⁹ There have been doubts about who is addressed since the pseudo-Acronian scholia (see Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 77), but pace Syndikus 2001: I 361 f. there cannot be the slightest doubt that the poem is a soliloquy; cf. also below, pp. 473, 483 f.

⁴⁶⁰ See p. 247.

have read so far the poet was keen to contrast his mellow and mature love with the violent love of the young. In C. 1.23, he had protested the tenderness of his feelings toward the young girl in using, as in C. 2.5, conventional animal metaphors both for the girl and for the lover he claims not to be. In C. 2.5, he portrays the power of his own passion as far too crude for the girl in a way that could not highlight more effectively the unsuitability of the poet's love for the girl than by juxtaposing an idyllic scene, which remains in the same ambit of imagery. This contrast is already an indication of the poet's resignation; it is a stance quite different from that of C. 1.23, a poem that intentionally concentrates on recreating the ethos of Anacreon. In fact, the young animal playing in the meadow in C. 2.5 is as reminiscent of Anacreon as that of C. 1.23: C. 2.5.5–9a is modeled on Anacr. fr. 417 LP, where the girl appears as a filly. In Anacreon the desire of the male is, as in C. 2.5, depicted in pointed reference to the animal, which represents the girl: the poet jokingly boasts to be an experienced rider suited to the untamed filly's needs. In contrast, in C. 2.5, the male is pointedly depicted as completely unsuited for the girl. In C. 2.5, we hear, from the very start, the voice of the poet himself, who is resigned to renouncing the fulfillment of his unsuitable desires. That the poignant beauty of the beginning is still completely ignored by modern interpreters, who continue to be shocked by what they regard as the sexist brutality of the beginning, ironically shows that our enlightened age is no less prudish and philistine than that of the Victorians—on the contrary. In fact, it is hard for me to understand how anybody, even today, can be so insensitive as to regard the opening of the poem as brutally sexist, when—if the term 'sexist' has any meaning at all—it is precisely the opposite.

From the tender description of the girl in l. 10b the poem moves on to reflections about the age gap between the two partners (B: 10b–16). Then, in an appendix, it returns to the girl, comparing her beauty to that of Gyges in almost two stanzas. Before that, Horace inserted, just in passing, a nostalgic look back at the elderly poet's past and his elusive (*fugax* l. 17) loves (C: 17–24). In this poem, Horace is as sentimental as he can get: he is most explicit in the brief allusion to his past loves in 1½ ll. only, and only by way of negation. To his unsuitability as a lover he refers only by the slightly self-ironic depiction at the beginning. His old age is never mentioned explicitly, but it shines through in the comparison of his relationship with time to that of the young girl and in the description of her eventual maturity by an autumnal metaphor. This is a very personal touch; in order to appreciate it properly one must remind oneself that autumn in ancient Greek poetry does not and cannot have the role that it plays in poems on the seasons

in modern European literature.⁴⁶¹ Of course, dying and falling leaves are a common metaphor for human transiency from the *Iliad* onward; but autumn in a southern climate such as that of Greece is quite different from autumn in a more northern climate.⁴⁶² Thus, the Greek words for autumn, ὁπώρα, originally, “the later part of summer,” and φθινόπωρον, “the waning of ὁπώρα,” simply denote the time after summer, either the time directly after the peak⁴⁶³ or a little later.

There are passing references to *autumnus* in combination with leaves as a symbol of transiency in Roman literature (cf. Virg. *Aen.* 6.309; but at a similar place in V. G. 4.474 Virgil characteristically speaks of *hiberni imbres*, “winter storms,” in an analogous context), but there are no autumn poems such as we are used to reading from countless modern poets. In fact, Horace, in C. 4.7.11, describes autumn strictly in keeping with what the word ὁπώρα, often referred to fruits, indicates. In C. 2.5.10–12, too, autumn is primarily a metaphor for maturity, not transience. When the girl’s advancing age is described by an autumn picture that precedes a slightly melancholic reflection on the passing of time this is as far as an ancient author can get to the sentiment of modern autumnal poetry. And, in C. 2.5, Horace comes as close as he wants to the lover who has to resign himself to acknowledging that the ‘Gunst des Augenblicks,’ bestowed on the young, is denied to him.

That the love of the elderly man, as much as Horace’s subtle self-irony, is the overriding characteristic of Horace’s love poetry is reaffirmed by the fact that in the last love poem proper of the whole collection, C. 3.26, Horace even more explicitly reiterates the stance of the veteran of love of C. 1.5. This time, however, there is an oblique, yet all the more conspicuous hint that the *renuntiatio* of the old man is not to be taken too seriously, when the man who dedicated all his armor to Venus prays at the very end that Venus may strike, at least once, a girl reluctant to grant him her favors. Thus, even though C. 3.26 pretends to put an end to erotic poetry, there is a postscript, or rather two: C. 3.28 and the curious C. 3.27 that follows 3.26. If, in C. 3.26, the poet pretended to have bidden farewell to his own desires, he continues with a propemptikon to a girl, C. 3.27, which—in analogy to C. 1.3⁴⁶⁴—only

⁴⁶¹ “The word is less autumnal than some uses of ‘autumn,’ but as in Keats’s ode suggests the seasons when fruit ripen and are picked,” Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 85, who cited parallels for a similar usage in erotic context.

⁴⁶² For how a Roman like Horace experienced the seasonal change between summer and winter, cf. *Epist.* 1.7.1ff.

⁴⁶³ For the etymology, ὁπώρα, see *DELG* s.v.

⁴⁶⁴ Above, pp. 239 ff.

serves as a tag for something different: in this case a mythological narrative about Europa. The poem has provoked even more negative reactions than *C.* 3.11⁴⁶⁵ with its dramatized myth appended to a curious hymn to Mercury, and, indeed, *C.* 3.27 continues to puzzle readers. Yet, David West⁴⁶⁶ is surely right in pointing out that the prominent place Horace has assigned to the poem attests to the fact that the poet himself held it in high regard. As with *C.* 3.11, reactions to this poem may vary; even more so in this case, because there is an obvious incompatibility of the myth with the tag to which it is attached. Yet, Horace's intentions are clear, and as there is incompatibility, we should take it for what it is.

When the poem is put between two love poems, there cannot be the slightest doubt that Galatea, addressed in l. 14, is to be understood as the poet's ex-mistress, who leaves him for another man. The fact that she is a woman who once had been loved by the speaker, is alluded to only vaguely in ll. 7 and 13 ff. In full accord with this vagueness, the name Galatea, equally that of a sea-goddess, is pointedly elusive in the context of a propemptikon,⁴⁶⁷ and the same is true as regards the correlation between Europa's and Galatea's journey. West is right: this is a burlesque, yet, it is unnecessary to relate the character of Galatea to that of Europa. Heinze,⁴⁶⁸ in the introduction to the poem in his commentary, has said everything that is essential for understanding the poem and Horace's intentions, though he did not explicitly note the humorous aspects of the whole procedure. *C.* 3.27 is a kind of inversion of the elegiac propemptikon. In contrast to the elegiac lover, Horace bids his love farewell jokingly and amicably. The mature lover of *C.* 1.16,⁴⁶⁹ who is no longer inclined to quarrels, is capable of renouncing generously,⁴⁷⁰ wishing his beloved happiness with another man, as he is capable of a happy reunion like that enacted in *C.* 3.9.⁴⁷¹

This is the context in which Horace's poems on the elderly woman, the old libidinous hag—a topic he appears to be obsessed with since the

⁴⁶⁵ Below, pp. 352 f.

⁴⁶⁶ West 2002: 223.

⁴⁶⁷ "Den auch im Leben nicht ungebräuchlichen, den Lesern aber vor allem aus der Dichtung geläufigen Namen der Nereide Galatea hat H. gewählt, weil die Meerfahrt des Mädchens Anlaß des Gedichts ist, die Meerfahrt der Europa im Mittelpunkt des Mythos steht," Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 365.

⁴⁶⁸ Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 363 ff.

⁴⁶⁹ Above, pp. 338 f.

⁴⁷⁰ Horace anticipates the generous stance of the Propertian Cynthia in Prop. 4.7; see Günther 2002: 31; idem in Günther 2006: 381 f. and 2010b: 224 ff.

⁴⁷¹ Below, pp. 351 f.

*Epodes*⁴⁷²—must be read. ‘Vetula-Skoptik’ was an established literary topos and already in *Epod.* 8 and 12 Horace gives the topos a characteristically self-ironic twist. ‘Vetula-Skoptik’ easily lent itself to a poet obsessed with the decay of old age, who also assumed a somewhat oblique and self-ironic stance in speaking of things that really concerned his intimate self. When, in the fourth book of *Odes*, Horace makes explicit his advanced age—and there he could do so with much more plausibility than in *Odes* I–III—the decay of old age is transferred to the male as well in *C.* 4. 10, and the cruel mockery of the elderly woman in the *Epodes* and *Carmina* I–III⁴⁷³ in *C.* 4.13 makes room for pity and horror on the faded beauty of a once-beloved woman.⁴⁷⁴

5.3. *Horace and Latin Love Elegy:*

C. 1.31 (Quid dedicatum), 32 (Pocimur. Si quid),
33 (Albi, ne doleas); 3. 7 (Quid fles, Asterie), 8 (Martii caelebs),
9 (Donec gratus eram), 10 (Extremum Tanain), 11 (Mercuri, nam te),
12 (Miserarum est), 20 (Non vides quanto)

In *C.* 1.13, Horace had put himself again, as in *Epod.* 11, 14, and 15, in the position of the elegiac lover; in *C.* 1.5, he posed, implicitly, as the anti-elegiac observer. *C.* 1.33, the last poem on love in Book I is addressed to the elegiac poet Tibullus.⁴⁷⁵ *C.* 1.5 was followed by a *recusatio* (*C.* 1.6)—if the deletion of *C.* 1.6.13–16 is accepted⁴⁷⁶—of precisely the same length, in which Horace affirms that love, not politics is the prevalent concern of his Muse.⁴⁷⁷ *C.* 1.33, like *C.* 1.5, comprises 16 ll. and is preceded by another, explicitly programmatic poem, again of exactly the same length, *C.* 1.32.⁴⁷⁸ It is in this poem that Horace for the first—and, except for *C.* 2.13, the only—time in *Odes* I–III explicitly refers to Alcaeus (*Lesbio ... civi*, “citizen of Lesbos,” l. 5), his foremost Greek model, although he does not call him by name. As in *C.* 1.6 love and politics are named side by side, now in regard to

⁴⁷² Above, p. 169, *passim*.

⁴⁷³ Beside the already mentioned *C.* 1.25, 3.10, and 15 Book II features a similar poem, *C.* 2.8.

⁴⁷⁴ For Horace’s late love poetry, see Günther 2010a: 123 ff.; also Fantham below, pp. 446 ff.; also Günther 2011.

⁴⁷⁵ About the identity of the Albius of *C.* 1.33 and *Epist.* 1.4 there cannot be any doubt, cf., e.g., Nisbet and Hubbard 1978: 368; Fantham below, p. 416.

⁴⁷⁶ Above, p. 264.

⁴⁷⁷ Above, p. 265.

⁴⁷⁸ Cf. Günther 2010a: 24 ff. Both *C.* 1.32 and 33 also exhibit the same structure as *C.* 1.5: a long part A of three stanzas vs. a short part B of one stanza (but there is dovetailing in *C.* 1.5; above, p. 251).

Alcaeus's poetry:⁴⁷⁹ in ll. 5–12 Alcaeus is described as a poet who despite his involvement in political and martial troubles never ceased to sing of love. Horace plays on the commonplace of the poet who is too deeply in love to write about anything else,⁴⁸⁰ precisely the topos exploited by the elegists and in Augustan *recusatio* poems in general: there the poet's involvement with love debars him from writing on war.⁴⁸¹ In C. 1.32, Horace inverts this topos. Lines 6–8 unmistakably refer to Alcaeus's civic poetry; in fact, Horace has adapted one of Alcaeus's political poems (fr. 326 LP) to his personal stance toward the fortunes of the Roman state in C. 1.14, a poem preceeding C. 1.32 (almost certainly also as regards the date of composition).⁴⁸² In contrast, sympoisiastic poetry on love and wine delivers relief from the troubles of a dire reality; not by chance does the third stanza start with *Liberum*, 'the releaser,' for Bacchus (l. 9). Thus, Horace, via his insistence on sympoisiastic love poetry—in this context, private versus public poetry—vindicates the autonomy of art as supreme relief from the troubles of life.

In fact, this little hymn on the lyre follows upon the poet's prayer, addressed to Apollo on the occasion of the dedication of the new temple of Apollo on the Palatine on 9 October 28 BC. Posing as a *vates* in the opening lines (1f.) the poem deflates any pompous or solemn expectations the reader may have by descending to a prayer suited to the poet's common private persona as a man of modest means with no higher aspirations than *frui paratis et valido mihi*, 'that I may enjoy what I possess in good health' (l. 17). But he concludes with the topical wish that his Muse may not desert him even in old age (ll. 18–20).⁴⁸³ Thus, the prayer of the poet in C. 1.31 points forward to the pair C. 1.32/33: it prepares us for the concept of art in C. 1.32 as relief from troubles, and the explicit reference to old age in C. 1.31 prepares us for the implicitly elderly, mature lover of C. 1.33.

Thus C. 1.33 can be read as the last poem of a programmatic cycle of three poems toward the end of the book. Already in the *Epodes* and later in C. 1.5 Horace had defined his attitude to love in implicit contrast to the concept of love in Latin love elegy (or the Hellenistic epigrams on which it was modeled): C. 2.8⁴⁸⁴ can be read as a mock poem on elegiac love. In C. 1.33, Horace

⁴⁷⁹ Cf. also above, p. 282.

⁴⁸⁰ See pp. 202 ff.

⁴⁸¹ Above, p. 261.

⁴⁸² Above, p. 212, below, pp. 360 ff.

⁴⁸³ Cf. Günther 2010a: 42 f.

⁴⁸⁴ See Syndikus 2001: I 381 ff.

contrasts his attitude toward love explicitly to that of contemporary elegy.⁴⁸⁵ In the first stanza Horace describes the ‘melancholic’ concept of elegiac love. Speaking of *miserabilis ... elegos*, “pitiful elegies,” he mentions the elegiac lover indulging in excessive Wertherian nostalgia and grief (*doleas plus nimio ...* “do not grieve overmuch,” l. 1),⁴⁸⁶ the intractable and cruel elegiac *domina* (*immitis Glycera*, “cruel Gylcera”), and her infidelity (*laesa ... fide*, “broken promises,” l. 4). Yet, what Horace depicts as the kind of love characteristic of the addressee, the elegiac poet Tibullus, corresponds neither to the typology of elegiac love nor to that of Tibullus, in particular.

A hint that the first three stanzas (ll. 1–12) will not present an exact depiction of Tibullus’s love poetry can be found in the very name of the woman presented here as the addressee’s beloved: Glycera. Obviously, the name is chosen to create the oxymoron *immitis Glycerae* (‘the bittersweet,’ l. 2); yet, it is also conspicuous that Glycera features in two preceding love poems, C. 1.19 and, in the immediate vicinity of C. 1.33, in C. 1.30. In C. 1.19, Glycera is the object of Horace’s ardent desire (ll. 5 ff.), with which the cruel goddess of love has struck the poet, and Syndikus⁴⁸⁷ has correctly interpreted the relationship between C. 1.19 and the prayer to Venus to transfer herself to Glycera’s house in C. 1.30. The two poems symbolize contrasting concepts of love: dull, violent passion vs. cheerful play. The reference to Glycera in C. 1.33 is a first hint that Horace via Tibullus speaks of his own pseudo-elegiac love poetry as well. In what follows other persons are mentioned, who all bear Greek names, as one would expect. A Pholoe occurs in Tibullus’s poems in a context similar to that of C. 1.33.5–7, where she rejects Cyrus: in Tib. 1.8 she is cruel with Marathus, the beloved boy of Tibullus. The Lycoris of l. 5 cannot but allude to Gallus’s mistress. Obviously, the whole passage is to be read as a characterization of elegiac love, not of the elegy of Tibullus in particular, hence the medley of names. If ll. 5–8 refer to multiangular, unsatisfactory relationships Horace hits upon a motif, characteristic not so much of Latin love elegy, but of Hellenistic poetry, the unstable and unhappy love of Greek epigram, which Horace depicts in poems like C. 1.5 and 1.13. Horace refers in ll. 5–12 to elegiac love as transformed back into its Greek models in his own poetry. This kind of self-reference is even more obvious in ll. 3 f., when the reason for Glycera preferring a rival is the superior beauty of a younger man.

⁴⁸⁵ Excellent brief remarks on Horace’s love poetry and elegy by Barchiesi in Harrison 2002: 158 f.

⁴⁸⁶ Cf. Tib. 2.5.110; Günther 2002: 26.

⁴⁸⁷ Syndikus 2001: I 272 f.

This obviously fits the elderly lover of Horace's love poetry; certainly, it does not fit the rival of the elegiac poet. This rival is himself rather an elderly, but rich man, and surely the topical motif of the elegiac *domina's* infidelity is greed, not the sex appeal of younger men.

As in the initial, programmatic love poem of the book, C. 1.5, one stanza at the end contrasts the attitude of the speaker toward love to three preceding stanzas about the unhappy and unfulfilled love of others.⁴⁸⁸ Yet, the end of C. 1.33 (ll. 13–16) comes as a double surprise: quite unexpectedly, Horace does not pose as a disengaged bystander or judge. First of all, Horace does not speak of his present attitude, he speaks of his past; and this past is not so different from that of the elegiac lover. Horace presents himself as a man who had once been involved in one of the unfitting relationships of the chain of love presented in ll. 5–12: although a better choice was open to him, he was once a slave of an intractable freedwoman Myrtale, i.e., of another 'elegiac' *domina* like the Glycera of the beginning. In C. 1.33, the poet makes absolutely plain what had been alluded to only in a metaphor in C. 1.5: the reason for his superior stance is based on proper experience with the same kind of love from which he now has freed himself.

Perhaps not by chance Myrtale, though found as a courtesan's name in Greek literature, is, in contrast to Glycera, Cyrus, and Pholoe, a name that belongs to real life and was often borne by freedwomen.⁴⁸⁹ It appears that the poet, unable to resist love entirely, as he had pretended in C. 1.5, at least contented himself with a *Venus parabilis* in accord with his own precepts in *Serm.* 1.2.105 ff. (in this context *melior ... Venus* in l. 13 might suggest a witty ambiguity). Yet, *parabilis* as she may have been, the poet's low-class courtesan is not as *tractabilis* as a true disciple of Philodemus might wish. Horace is poking equal fun at his elegiac poet friend and at himself, and this poignant self-awareness and self-irony distinguishes Horatian love poetry from love elegy as he depicts it. Self-ironic detachment is, of course, not alien to Propertius and even less alien to Tibullus,⁴⁹⁰ yet, it is not, as with Horace, the overriding characteristic of Latin love elegy. Still, an almost Horatian sense of humor becomes apparent in Tibullus's second book. Perhaps Horace's advice to his younger friend did not go unheeded.⁴⁹¹

C. 3.20 is, in a certain sense, a counterpiece both to C. 1.33 and to the programmatic poem, C. 1.5. In C. 3.20, Horace is the disengaged observer of

⁴⁸⁸ Above, pp. 251 ff.

⁴⁸⁹ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 375.

⁴⁹⁰ See Günther 2002: 35 ff., 41.

⁴⁹¹ Günther 2002: 45 ff.

a triangular relationship involving two men and a woman, similar to that of Tib. 1.8. But whereas Tibullus, himself in love with the boy, addresses the girl his sweetheart is in love with to cede to Marathus's wishes, Horace dissuades the man to compete too ferociously with the girl. The triangular relationship of this poem allows Horace to contrast, even within the love relationship observed by the speaker, passionate love (the two rivals, Pyrrhus and the girl) and a completely uninvolved lover (the beautiful boy Nearchus who decides the contest among the rivals). This elegant, brilliant *jeu d'esprit* is one of Horace's most original poems,⁴⁹² yet is not among the most well known—undeservedly.

Consistent with his predilection for placing love and politics side by side, Horace follows the cycle of the *Roman Odes* (C. 3.1–6) at the beginning of Book III with a sharply contrasting cycle of six erotic poems: C. 3.7–12. In this cycle, C. 3.8, a poem on the poet's paradoxical celebration of the matrona's day as a bachelor, appears to be a funny intruder. C. 7, 9–12, in spite of all differences between them, have one element in common: they focus more or less on the woman. The paraclausithyron, C. 3.10, is the least original of the cycle, although it, too, has a distinct character of its own (the pointed absence of any sentimentality and complete focus on the cruelty of the woman) and may, as Lyce returns in C. 4.13 in pointed reference to C. 3.10 and in company of Cinara, the darling of Horace's youth (cf. *Epist.* 1.7.28; 14.33, cf. also C. 4.1.4), resemble Horace's personal experience with a particular woman more closely than all other love poems in books I–III (although nothing in the poem itself points to real-life experience). Two pieces, C. 3.9 and 11, may be called experimental, as is C. 3.12, at least in regard to meter.⁴⁹³ The adaptation of the *amoebaion* in C. 3.9, among Horace's best love poems, derives much of its charm from the unique mixture of utmost simplicity, which recalls the form's origin in folk song, and charming play with a pretended intensity of emotions, changing from couplet to couplet over an almost entirely static surface of utmost regularity in syntax and meter.⁴⁹⁴ The dialogue of the two lovers teasing each other enacts in dramatic form the passing from strife and quarrels to the happy union of mature, sincerely felt, yet gentle love envisaged and longed for in C. 1.16.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹² Cf. Syndikus 2001: II 177 f.

⁴⁹³ Above, p. 271.

⁴⁹⁴ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 134.

⁴⁹⁵ "Il carne oraziano è sentimentale e, chi ben guardi, grave: i due personaggi sentono sinceramente, ancorchè il loro sentimento sia tutt'altro che una grande passione," Pasquali 1920: 413, in the context of his perceptive comparison of the poem with an epigram of Philodemus (*AP* 5.46).

C. 3.11 is both a most original and a highly problematic composition. It is among those of Horace's poems that move furthest away from the expectations of the beginning. We have observed Horace's technique of the tag in poems where he integrated some sort of more extensive discourse or tale into a lyric frame.⁴⁹⁶ In this case he aimed at presenting the *prosopoiia* of a woman in love within the compass of a lyric poem. C. 3.11 begins with a cletic hymn to Mercury and the lyre to help, by their persuasive capacities, overcome the resistance of a girl, still innocent and unwilling to cede to any man's advances. The prayer develops into a wish to threaten Lyde, the girl, with a song on a mythological example for the punishment that is in store for women who are resistant to love. The Hypermnestra story, which stands at the end, is approached obliquely via an excursus on the powers of Orpheus's lyre to move even the guardian of the underworld and punish prisoners like Ixion, Tityos, and the Danaids. By thus anticipating the Danaids' punishment, i.e., the link between the myth and the hymnic frame, the narrative, and thus the poem, can end with a dramatic speech by Hypermnestra. Reactions on the poem may oscillate between disconcertment and astonished admiration for the poem's ingenuity to produce this peculiarly contorted train of thought.⁴⁹⁷

Already in other poems, in those on the attitudes of the libidinous old hag in particular, the focus of the poet as the observing bystander was on the female.⁴⁹⁸ Now, in C. 3.11, as partly already in the dramatic dialogue of C. 3.9, the poet puts himself completely in the perspective of the woman in love. The same is true for the *paraclausithyron* C. 3.10 and C. 3.7, addressed to a girl bemoaning the absence of her beloved: both poems focus almost entirely on the perspective of the woman. In C. 3.12, the empathy is carried even further; although still a narrative of a male observer, the narrator at the beginning (ll. 1–3 in Shackleton Bailey's numeration) identifies himself with the girl to such a degree that the following narrative appears to be spoken from the girl's perspective. Indeed, in the Alcaean model (fr. 10 LP) the poet assumed the role of the woman.⁴⁹⁹ Horace just changes from the Greek ἐμὲ, "me," to a generic third-person *miserarum*, "(girls) deserving pity" (1), and in

⁴⁹⁶ Above, pp. 239 ff.

⁴⁹⁷ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff says about C. 1.15, 3.11, and 27: "Da mußte er wieder Gedichte machen, die nur den Wert von Studien hatten, Umsetzungen chorischer Poesie in das aeolische Lied"; C. 3.27 he regards as less satisfactory than C. 3.11; more favorably Fraenkel 1957: 196 f.; cf. West 2002: 104 ff. for a survey of various interpretations.

⁴⁹⁸ Also in C. 2.8; see above, p. 347 n. 473.

⁴⁹⁹ For the Alcaean model and Horace's adaptation, cf. Page 1955: 293 f.

l. 4 addresses the girl with *tibi*, “you.” With these poems Horace preludes the exchange of roles between male and female in Propertius’s fourth book of elegies.⁵⁰⁰

7.4. *The Character of Horatian Love Poetry*

Von den gründen weshalb Shakespeares Sonnette bei uns noch wenig gewürdigt wurden · ist abgesehen von der anforderung sehr hohen verse-verständnisses der wichtigste innere: dass unsre gewohnheit alle dichtung durchaus “romantisch” sieht · diese vierzeiler aber · obwohl oberste dichtung—durchaus “unromantisch” sind. Der äussere betrifft den gegenstand. Hier wurde jahrhundertlang von herausgebern und auslegern unfruchtbar gestritten · was spiel und was gefühl sei · wer der blonde jüngling und wer die schwarze dame der letzten abteilung: hier haben sie geraten · gerenkt und geirrt bis zum völligen verhören des seelen-tones. Nicht nur in der fortpflanzungsreihe (I–XVII) wo freilich der geist mehr verborgen liegt—nein durchgängig entdeckten die mehr stumpfen geirne in auftrag gearbeitete stilübungen · die mehr niedrigen ihren ganzen eignen ekel: kaum eines aber erkannte den gehalt ...

Stefan George

In *Odes* I–III Horace casts his love poetry in an ideal Greek setting; all personal names are Greek ones, contemporary Roman reality at best surfaces in a Greek frame (e.g., in C. 1.8⁵⁰¹). This predominantly Greek and literary ambience sharply contrasts to the love poetry of Roman elegy; it erects a barrier between the poetry and the real life of the poet who speaks. Horace’s love poetry emphasizes the distance from real life, it ostentatiously asks not to be taken as the real-life experience of the poet. Like Roman elegy Horace’s love poetry is subjective in the sense of being fictitious autobiography.⁵⁰² Of course, not even Latin love elegy is a realistic depiction of the author’s love life, but it purports to be a genuine expression of his sentimental experience in real life. In Horace’s love poetry the ideal setting hints at the distance between the speaker of the poems and the lived experience behind the speaker’s words. This distance corresponds to and is further enhanced by

⁵⁰⁰ Günther in Günther 2006: 367 ff.; Günther 2010b: 221 ff., also Reinhardt in Günther 2006: 206.

⁵⁰¹ See pp. 270 ff.

⁵⁰² Above, p. 3 with n. 8.

the speaker's stance as a disengaged bystander, which is emphasized more than once. Being the poetry of an observer, this poetry is descriptive; C. 1.8 is the most extreme example. This speaker speaks not of himself, of his own experience in love, but of the love of others.

Horace's love poetry is, as is his lyric poetry in general, a dialogue with a person addressed as if he or she were present; the address is motivated by a concrete event, fact, or situation.⁵⁰³ In his role as the speaker who is motivated by a certain event to address another person the poet is himself part of the scenario. The poet defines himself in relation to the person addressed and to the events or situations he describes (cf., e.g., C. 1.5,⁵⁰⁴ 16, 17,⁵⁰⁵ or 2.4⁵⁰⁶). Thus, implicitly, the poet speaks of himself; he speaks of himself explicitly as well: he relates the events, situations, and attitudes of the persons addressed or described to events in his life or to his own attitudes. He even goes so far as to make himself explicitly the object of his description (C. 1.13⁵⁰⁷). There are also experiments at the outer end of the spectrum: description may pass into empathy (C. 1.5; but also C. 1.25,⁵⁰⁸ 3.6, 10⁵⁰⁹), to the degree that the description almost slides into a monologue of the person described (C. 3.12⁵¹⁰). In a mythological narrative the poet even stages a *prosopopoiia* of a woman in love (C. 3.11⁵¹¹). At the other end, we find a soliloquy, C. 2.5;⁵¹² here speaker and addressee coincide: the speaker wholly becomes the object of his own description. He describes himself to himself. In fact, that Horace went as far as that is less surprising if one calls to mind that an address like that to the *pueri* in C. 1.19 or that in C. 3.26 serves no other purpose than to give the speaker the opportunity to talk about his own state of mind.

As we have seen, Horace shows a keen awareness of the paradox of poetry as a dispassionate expression of passionate emotion,⁵¹³ and, of course, he builds upon this awareness in his later poetological texts, *Epistles* II and *Ars Poetica*.⁵¹⁴ Horace's eminently self-conscious love poetry is anything but

⁵⁰³ Above, pp. 313 ff.

⁵⁰⁴ See p. 251.

⁵⁰⁵ See p. 339.

⁵⁰⁶ See p. 342.

⁵⁰⁷ See pp. 334 ff.

⁵⁰⁸ See p. 341.

⁵⁰⁹ See pp. 351 ff.

⁵¹⁰ See pp. 271, 352 f.

⁵¹¹ See p. 352; cf. also the dialogue in C. 3.9, p. 351.

⁵¹² See pp. 343 ff.

⁵¹³ See pp. 201 ff., 336 f.

⁵¹⁴ See pp. 447 ff., 501, 506.

impersonal; it surely reflects the poet's own sentimental experience. Self-conscious as this poetry is, it reflects personal experience in the most eminent sense, yet, not purely and simply, but subtly broken in the mirror of the interrelationship between the poet's experience and the experiences of others to whom he relates his own self. It is perhaps in Horace's love poetry that this trait so distinctive of Horace's poetry and personality, his 'obsession' with observing himself from the outside,⁵¹⁵ is most apparent. If this poignantly 'broken I' of Horace's love poetry reflects the paradox of emotional involvement and disengagement in the process of recreating emotional experience, we are warned that the disengaged, even sometimes ostentatiously self-ironic stance the speaker assumes in Horace's love poems is only half of the truth. Horace's love poetry seems, or rather pretends to lack passion; it does not, however, lack deeply felt sentimental experience. Only if we are sensitive to the dialectical relationship between appearance and essence in Horace's love poetry are we able to appreciate its particular quality. In order to grasp the 'ethos' of the speaker, as I have called it above, we often have to read between the lines. There is, however, on occasion, a direct hint—*en passant*—of the sentimental state of the seemingly disengaged speaker, as, for example, the epithet *dulcis*, "sweet,"—not motivated in any way by the context—of *iuventas*, "youth" in *C.* 1.16.23. And not by chance the soliloquy in *C.* 2.5 is the poem where Horace gets as 'sentimental' as he wishes to be when he compares the effect of time's passing on him and on his young beloved.

It is characteristic of the new style of the fourth book of *Odes* that Horace becomes much more, sometimes even ostentatiously, personal.⁵¹⁶ Thus, in contrast to *Odes* I–III, *C.* 4.1 and 13 refer to Cinara, mentioned nostalgically as the darling of his youth in the *Epistles* where a concrete background in real life is beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the absence of such an important erotic experience in the first collection of *Odes* shows the pointed remoteness of his lyric poetry from anything bluntly realistic. *C.* 4.1 and 4.13 indicate that the Lyce of *C.* 3.10 probably refers to a particular woman in the poet's life as well; yet nothing could better highlight the difference between Horace's love poetry in *Odes* I–III and *Odes* IV than the fact that nothing in the topical situation (a *paraclausithyron*) depicted in *C.* 3.10 would indicate anything of that sort.

⁵¹⁵ See p. 6. In view of this, perhaps the notorious story of the mirrors (see above, p. 51) in the *Vita* is almost too well invented to be true.

⁵¹⁶ See Günther 2010a: 123 ff.

Since the times when ‘every educated German was a Latinist’⁵¹⁷ are definitely over, Horace’s seemingly lukewarm love poetry has left more than one reader cold.⁵¹⁸ In Fraenkel’s book the love poems are notoriously underrepresented, and a monograph that would do justice to their unique quality is still hard to find or even to expect today. Better than any positive descriptions of the character of Horace’s love poems, I still find expressions of frustrated romantic expectations the most revealing statements about this poetry. A scholar like Helm,⁵¹⁹ who openly confesses disliking Horace’s last book of *Odes* as a whole, and who thinks that the most favorable verdict a modern reader might pass on Horace’s love poetry is to excuse him for his faults of taste by noting that he became a love poet too late in life and could therefore not compete with the juvenile fire of Catullus, nonetheless admired *C. 4.11*.⁵²⁰ If Helm is prone to take Horace too seriously and overlooks the subdued smile that shines through the poem, many readers today, in fear of indulging in romantic sentimentalism, overstate the element of irony and distance, if they don’t refuse to see in Horace’s love poetry more than a literary exercise. But no poet is more suited than Horace—and Horace, the love poet above all—to render us sensitive to the fact that the mask of distance and irony, worn both so lightly and ostentatiously, may be a veil spread over matters of the most intimate concern as an expression of the most acute emotional involvement.

The irony of Horace and his own emotional detachment is diametrically opposite to that of the elegiac poet; as I have said above. Irony is amply in evidence in Latin love elegy as well, though not as the latter’s overriding characteristic.⁵²¹ The irony of the elegiac poet balances and complements the poet’s overt sentimentality and may, in modern poetry, be compared to that of Heinrich Heine.⁵²² The occasional irony of the elegist is often ostentatious. Horace’s use of irony in the *Odes*, by contrast, is mostly implicit. Horace is perhaps the least romantic among the great poets of European literature, yet, with his acute awareness of the paradox of the coexistence of

⁵¹⁷ Cf. the quotation from Theodor Birt’s *Horace*, above, p. 251.

⁵¹⁸ Pasquali 1920: 392 ff. is remarkably perceptive.

⁵¹⁹ Helm 1921: 4, 7, 17 f., 26; Günther 2010a: 138 f.

⁵²⁰ It is amusing to compare Helm’s (*1872) disdain for Horace’s lack of passion in the rest of his poetry with the concluding words of the almost contemporary chapter on love poetry in the monograph (1925a) of Birt (*1852), who speaks of the “klassische Ruhe” of Horace’s Muse, “die den wilderen Herzschlag unserer Jugend wohl unbefriedigt läßt, den Älteren unter uns dagegen immer noch ein dankbares Lächeln der Sympathie entlockt.”

⁵²¹ See p. 350.

⁵²² See Günther 2002: 35 ff.

emotional detachment and involvement in poetry as an expression of the human self, he comes closer to Schlegel's philosophical concept of romantic irony than any other poet ever did. Caught in the 'romantic' prejudices of his time (still echoed in Helm's judgment),⁵²³ Schlegel was not able to appreciate this. But which age ever did justice to Horace's erotic poetry, which, at best, has been appreciated as a kind of moralizing Anacreon?⁵²⁴ One of the most revealing expressions of frustration with Horace's love poems are Wilamowitz-Moellendorf's remarks on Sappho and Horace, which sound quite amusing today but are helpful precisely where they are at fault because they attest not only to his, but also to our difficulties in understanding Horace's love poetry. Surely, an age, in which a scholarly commentary feels the need to offer 'anthropological' explanations for why the libidinous old hag was rather unpopular with previous generations—and, I am afraid, continues to be—is infinitely worse prepared for understanding anything of the Horatian lover's ethos than that of Wilamowitz-Moellendorf:

Horaz hatte auch schwerlich für die Innerlichkeit und Weiblichkeit der sapphischen Poesie Verständnis. Die Frauen die er nach Ausweis seiner Werke gekannt hat, hatten keine reine Seele, wenn sie überhaupt eine Seele hatten. In ihrem Verhältnis zum Weibe liegt die einzige, negative, Ähnlichkeit zwischen Horaz und Pindar. Bemerkenswert ist nur, daß er auch keine der vornehmen Damen, Livia, Octavia, Iulia, Antonia mit einem Compliment bedacht hat; und die Terentia des Maecenas gleitet als Likymnia bedenklich in die Sphaere der Glycera und Phyllis.⁵²⁵

⁵²³ Still, what he says (in Schlegel 1979: 348f.) on Horace and Virgil is—for all its misapprehensions—quite perceptive, and at least he was conscious of the fact that "Die Römer sind uns näher und begreiflicher als die Griechen; und doch ist echter Sinn für die Römer noch ungleich seltner als der für die Griechen, weil es weniger synthetische als analytische Naturen gibt" (Schlegel 1975: 153). And perhaps there is no better guide to a proper understanding of the character of Horace's poetry than Schlegel's aperçu: "Nichts ist pikanter, als wenn ein genialischer Mann Manieren hat; nämlich wenn er sie hat: aber gar nicht, wenn sie ihn haben; das führt zur geistigen Versteinerung" (Schlegel 1975: 157): Horace had manners, but mostly he is interpreted as if the latter had him.

⁵²⁴ Cf., e.g., the pointed statement of the Russian literary critic and translator (he translated, i.a., the Grammar of Port-Royale), Nikolaj Jazvickij (around 1810), cited by Busch 1964: 137 on Anacreon, Pindar, and Horace; Jazvickij chose C. 4.1 as the example of an Horatian erotic ode. I do not know any work that really does justice to Horace's love poetry; Birt's (1925a: 88 ff.) chapter, 'Horaz als Liebesdichter,' even though his Horace is far too much the petty love poet of the 17th century, is more to the point than most modern interpretations; at least, to read Birt, this highly amusing popularizer, is revealing even where he errs or where he amuses unintentionally. If one knows how to read Birt's exceedingly funny book one will find that in general he succeeds well in combining *prodesse* and *delectare*.

⁵²⁵ Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1913: 309 n. 1.

'Innerlichkeit und Weiblichkeit' is a very apt description of the particular taste of Sappho's poetry, which is so different from everything else we have of Greek erotic poetry. Horace is quite perceptive about female psychology in the poems in which he puts himself into the perspective of the woman,⁵²⁶ yet, surely 'Innerlichkeit' is the last thing we find in Horace's basically 'descriptive' love poetry.

Since the Middle Ages almost every European writer or poet, even, or perhaps especially, those who deplore the fact that 'das ewig Weibliche' pulls the male down rather than lifting him up, in some way implies that women have or should have a soul. The Roman elegist, too, desperately seeks traces of purity of heart in his heartless sweetheart. Horace certainly does not seek a soul in the women in his poetry. He does not even pose the question whether a woman has one or not; how could he look for purity of soul? But perhaps he need not do so, since for the pure of heart (C. 1.22), everything is pure. I wonder whether Horace—especially the love poet of *Odes* IV—does not resemble more than it appears at first sight the elderly lover of Goethe's *West-östlicher Divan*, if we just strip this poetry of everything metaphysical.

Just as Goethe in this work strayed as far as he thought he should from what he conceived as the classic ideal of the Greek 'Gestalt' and abandoned himself to the floating river of emotions, Horace in the love poetry of Book IV reached with a pure hand into regions of his heart hitherto unrevealed in his poetry. Measured against the standards of the uninvolved love poetry of *Odes* I–III, Horace could well have said about the erotic poems of Book IV:

*Wie nimmt ein leidenschaftlich Stammeln
Geschrieben sich so seltsam aus!*

And one can read Horace's remarks on poetic madness and the sheer impossibility of conforming in his poetry to the highest standards of craftsmanship in *Epistles* II and the *Ars Poetica*⁵²⁷ as a commentary on the love poems of *Odes* IV. The love poetry of Book IV, so different from that of books I–III can imbue us with a sensitivity for the dimensions intentionally withheld in the latter. The elusive voice of Horace, the love poet, in books I–III is that of a Pushkinesque narrator who comments not on Onegin's, but on his own story, a story in which he was never tempted to succumb to a passionate love that was never revealed to him. Flaubert said about one of his characters, "Madame Bovary, c'est moi." Horace says even of his own poetic self,

⁵²⁶ See pp. 352 ff.

⁵²⁷ See pp. 477 ff. below.

“moi ... mais je ne suis pas moi” or, in other words, Horace when speaking of himself just says, “je parle ...,” whereas the elegiac poet says always, “moi, je parle ...” Thus, the only tangible indications by which this Onegin manqué may sometimes betray himself are those little words like *dulci* in *C.* 1.16.23. There is a lot of poetry and a lot of literature, great literature for that matter, whose *movens* somehow consists in the feeling that language is “a cracked kettle on which we tap crude rhythms for bears to dance to, while we long to make music that will melt the stars.” Horace limits himself to saying what can be said plainly and without forcing anything, and therefore he always says much more than he appears to.⁵²⁸

When Barchiesi,⁵²⁹ in another context, pointed out that Horace, as no other poet of antiquity, invites psychological biographism, he hit upon a fundamental trait of Horace’s poetry and its deeply personal character.⁵³⁰ It is legitimate, within limits, to reconstruct Horace’s emotional attitudes in his dealings with persons and situations in his life. It is legitimate, where his poetry invites us to do so. I am fully conscious of the fact that many may regard the picture drawn of Horace, the man, in my opening chapter as unduly redolent of modern biographism, yet, as regards his family background, his friendships, the external vicissitudes of his life, Horace ostentatiously paints a very distinct image of himself by conscious self-stylization. As regards the poet’s sentimental life lines have been drawn more or less tentatively between Horace’s love poetry and his bachelorhood, his being debarred from a marriage of proper standing, and his involvement with the contemporary party scene, the fugitive relationships in the demimonde of venal love. And, of course, Horace’s love poetry is neither that of a married family man, not even of one who takes his marital vows a bit lightly, nor that of the passionate young artist suited to satisfy the romantic instincts of an unhappily married lady. But when it comes to the poet’s sentimental life Horace’s poetry does everything to discourage specific psychologizing speculation. And should we not regard ourselves as fortunate not to possess the evidence that would allow us to satisfy our biographical curiosity about what kind of lover Horace was been? In an age when even St. Ignatius is placed on Freud’s couch by a fellow Jesuit biographer or Simone Weil’s supposed sexual abstinence is deduced from her particularly strong sense

⁵²⁸ Cf. Birt 1925a: 114.

⁵²⁹ Barchiesi in Harrison 2007a: 145.

⁵³⁰ See above, pp. 2 ff. Newman’s (2011) monograph is the most original and perceptive interpretation of this kind that I know.

of hygiene as a child, one may be tempted to say “yes.” The lack of evidence should make it easier for us to resist the temptation of thinking that the trivialities of the real life of a poet or trite psychological speculation could teach us more about his inner self than that particular poetic—and human—sensitivity we can develop by respecting and not desecrating the intimate life the poet chose to hide under the ambiguous veil of his poetry.

6. POLITICAL AND PANEGYRIC POETRY

6.1. C. 1.14 (O navis, referent) *and the Political Agenda:*
C. 1.12 (Quem virum aut heroa); 3.14 (Herculis ritu),
and 25 (Quo me, Bacche)

In the political poetry of the *Epodes* the princeps figured in only two poems addressed to Maecenas (*Epod.* 1 and 9).⁵³¹ In his first collection of *Odes*, however, Horace chose to place a poem in praise of Augustus directly after the inconspicuous prologue, with which he dedicated the work to Maecenas, a poem which is among the longest and most ambitious of the book.⁵³² C. 1.2 was probably written not long after the Actium *Epodes* (31 BC) and the ode on the capture of Alexandria, C. 1.37 (30 BC), in 29/28 BC.⁵³³ With its beginning, which conjures up an atmosphere of civil strife, C. 1.2 still reflects the mood of Horace’s earliest extant political poems, *Epod.* 7 and 16.⁵³⁴ Almost directly after the ‘Parade-Odes’—divided by only two poems—we read two further political poems: C. 1.12, another great panegyric poem on Augustus, and, after the interjection of an erotic poem (C. 1.13), C. 1.14.

The sequence C. 1.13/14 is carefully chosen: C. 1.13, closely modeled on a poem by Sappho,⁵³⁵ is followed by what is perhaps the closest imitation of Alcaeus in the *Odes*. The sequence love/politics mirrors the juxtaposition C. 1.5/6, a juxtaposition that plays on the elegiac movement ‘(failed) *renuntiatio amoris*/failed attempt on political poetry’⁵³⁶ and turns it into the sequence ‘successful *renuntiatio amoris*/refusal to write poetry on war and reaffirmation to write on love nonetheless.’ As we have seen, C. 1.13 looked back explicitly to the programmatic C. 1.5/6: in C. 1.13 the poet projects him-

⁵³¹ Above, pp. 191 ff.

⁵³² Above, pp. 323 ff.

⁵³³ Above, p. 211.

⁵³⁴ Above, p. 169.

⁵³⁵ Above, pp. 334 ff.

⁵³⁶ Above, p. 256.

self back into the role of the elegiac lover as he did, self-ironically, in the erotic *Epodes*. Thus, in *C.* 1.13, Horace yields to the pressure of love by writing, in spite of his announcement at the end of *C.* 1.5, subjective love poetry, but he longs to free himself from his entanglement in an unhappy love affair. In *C.* 1.14, he confesses renouncing a hitherto disengaged stance toward politics and being ready to engage in politics, i.e., to write engaged political poetry. The sequence *C.* 1.13/14 echoes the poet's advice to lovesick Valgius in *C.* 2.9 to restrain his feelings about the death of his beloved and to sing about Caesar's victories instead of indulging in excessive lament.⁵³⁷

The political poems in the *Epodes* and in the first book of *Odes* (i.e., *Epod.* 7, and 16 and *C.* 1.2, 12, 14, and 37) permit us to trace the development of Horace's political poetry and its concerns from his beginnings as a poet in ca. 40 BC until the zenith of his poetical career with the publication of *Odes* I–III in 23 BC. As we have seen,⁵³⁸ it took some time after he had entered Maecenas's circle until Horace thought fit to publish political poems *stricto sensu* and to side with the regime. The first book of *Satires* (published 35 BC) omitted grand politics even where the poet could easily have referred to it if he had wished by dwelling on the private character of his relationship with Maecenas.⁵³⁹ Only with the *Epodes* five years later (35 BC) did Horace choose to pay homage to the princeps, but he inserted two older political poems as well, written in utter despair about the disbandment of the Roman state, *Epod.* 7 and 16.⁵⁴⁰ Whenever it was written, *C.* 1.14 marks a turn from the despair of *Epod.* 7 and 16 to a more positive stance toward the political development expressed in *C.* 1.2, where the princeps appears as a distinct hope for a better future in a line with the *iuvēnis* in Virgil's *Eclogues*—if not yet as a definitive guarantor of that hope. *C.* 1.14 begins as a rather close imitation of two poems by Alcaeus,⁵⁴¹ which alluded to political troubles as a ship, a common metaphor for the state, tossed by a storm. But Horace addresses the ship itself;⁵⁴² thus, even in this use of allegory he keeps to the fiction that the poem refers to a specific situation event happening directly before the speaker's eyes. The speaker pretends to observe from the shore a

⁵³⁷ Above, p. 265.

⁵³⁸ Above, pp. 34 ff.

⁵³⁹ Above, p. 35; Courtney above, pp. 97 ff.

⁵⁴⁰ Written probably 39/38 BC; see above, p. 169.

⁵⁴¹ See Page 1955: 179 ff.; Syndikus 2001: I 160 ff. As in its Alcaic models, the ship in *C.* 1.14 is clearly to be understood as a metaphor for the ship of state; other interpretations, proposed in recent times, are too obviously absurd to merit detailed refutation.

⁵⁴² Cf. West 1995: 66.

storm-tossed ship, whose troubles induce him to warn the ship of danger. At the end Horace appends a personal last stanza (ll. 17–20):⁵⁴³

*nuper sollicitum quae mihi taedium,
nunc desiderium curaue non levis,
interfusa nitentis
vites aequora Cycladas.*

Until lately you caused me worry and disgust; now you inspire my devotion and fond concern. Make sure to avoid the waters that flow between the shining Cyclades!

With *sollicitum taedium*, literally “anxious disgust,” Horace pointedly describes his feelings after the catastrophe of Philippi, the period in which falls the poet’s retirement into private life, his ‘conversion’ to Epicurean philosophy, his renunciation of any meaningful role in the political life of the Roman state.⁵⁴⁴ *Taedium*, “disgust,” is the word Horace chooses for his feelings in view of the *paupertas*, the “poverty,”⁵⁴⁵ forced on him by being caught on the wrong side of history in 44 BC. Yet, for all his ‘disgust’ at politics, his resignation at no longer being a man of action, but one who must find a new direction in life, reduced, as it was, to a purely private one, Horace—or rather the poet that Horace discovered in himself as *Epod.* 7 and 16 attest—still cared deeply (*sollicitum*, “anxiety, worry”) about the doom of the Roman people: *Epod.* 7 and 16 express the bitterness and despair the poet felt at having to renounce a meaningful political role in the desolate circumstances. Lines 18 ff. speak of a renewal of interest in the political fortunes of the Roman state: there is no definite hope expressed yet, but in contrast to the utter despair of *Epod.* 16, where any salvation in the real world appeared to be cut off, at least a desire surfaces, a deep concern (*desiderium curaue non levis*, “devotion and fond concern”⁵⁴⁶) that the Roman state may, in the future, at least avoid the worst troubles.

The mood of *C.* 1.14 stands between the despair of *Epodes* 7 and 16 and the extravagant, yet distinctive hope of *C.* 1.2. As the Actium *Epodes* (1 and 9)

⁵⁴³ For the personal significance of these lines, see Reckford 1969: 23, 71; Günther 2010a: 63.

⁵⁴⁴ See above, pp. 26 ff.

⁵⁴⁵ Above, p. 28; Günther 2010a: 95 f.

⁵⁴⁶ Already *taedium* is ‘a lover’s word,’ and the ‘erotic’ language in *desiderium curaue non levis* (see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 187; Rudd’s translation, printed above, renders well the connotations of the whole phrase in English) indicates passionate emotional involvement. One may note that in modern Italian, the word *amore*, which has distinctively erotic connotations and can hardly be used in the context of mere friendship (only in erotic or, at best, paternal, relationships), is common in respect to the fatherland.

and C. 1.37 attest, Actium marked the point where Horace was ready to fully endorse Augustus's regime. C. 1.14 likely dates somewhere between 38 BC and 31 BC, perhaps after the defeat of Sextus Pompeius in 36 BC.⁵⁴⁷ C. 1.14 is a stiff, wooden, and much less subtle adaptation of Alcaeus than the others we can trace. Alcaeus's vivid descriptions, which renounce metaphoric functionality in favor of painting an exciting scenario,⁵⁴⁸ convey a sense of immediacy. Horace reduces the drama of the original to a well-organized allegory⁵⁴⁹ with a personal appendix; only the extravagant address to the ship marks a high level of personal engagement on the part of the speaker. If quality is an indication—which it need not be—C. 1.14 may well be among the earliest of the extant poems demonstrably modeled on Alcaeus (C. 1.9, 10, 37; 3.12) or closely following compositions by other Greek lyric poets.⁵⁵⁰

C. 1.12, probably to be dated to 25 BC,⁵⁵¹ is very likely the latest of the political poems discussed so far. Like C. 1.2, it is written in Sapphic stanzas, and with its sixty lines exceeds the latter in length, whereas all the poems between the two are decidedly shorter. This second panegyric poem on Augustus clearly refers, not only by its meter but also by the position it holds in the book, back to the expectations aroused in C. 1.2 and thus appears to confirm and crown the praise of the ruler, now presented as the definite guarantor of peace and stability. C. 1.12 is both much more overtly panegyric and Pindaric⁵⁵² than C. 1.2. The opening plainly states that praise is the topic on which the poet now embarks, in lines that distinctly echo the beginning of Pindar's *Second Olympian*. But Horace (ll. 1–3) inverts the Pindaric order, which descends in two steps from god via hero to human (O. 2.1.f.: ἀναξίφορμιγγες ὕμνοι, τίνα θεόν, τίν' ἥρωα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα κελαδῆσομεν; "Hymns that rule the lyre, what god, what hero, and what man shall we celebrate"). In Horace's poem the series becomes a climax:

⁵⁴⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard (1970: 180 f.) acknowledge the plausibility of such a date; if *Epod.* 7 is dated as early as 39/38 BC (see above, p. 169), and not to 36 BC, as Nisbet and Hubbard suggest, the fact that C. 1.14 exhibits a more optimistic mood does not stand in the way of dating the poem to 36 BC.

⁵⁴⁸ See Page 1955: 188 f.

⁵⁴⁹ Horace's art in reducing the pictorialism of his models to a consistent imagery, which gives the train of thought a pointed sense of purpose without renouncing descriptive vividness, has been described above (p. 247). In C. 1.14, Horace strips his model of all detail that would sabotage the metaphorical scope, yet does not arrive at a consistent and poignant picture.

⁵⁵⁰ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxix.

⁵⁵¹ Above, p. 212.

⁵⁵² For the Pindaric echoes, see the still-useful Harms 1936: 20 ff.

*Quem virum aut heroa lyra vel acri
tibia sumis celebrare, Clio?
quem deum?*

What man or hero do you choose to celebrate with lyre or shrill pipe, Clio?
What god?

Whereas in Pindar the opening lines serve merely as a lively introduction, in Horace's poem the announcement of ll. 1–3 determines the whole content of the poem: a catalogue of gods, heroes, and men. It starts with Jupiter, the king of the gods; continues with further gods; later enumerates various demigods, heroes, and eminent men of Roman history; and finally culminates in Augustus, who is presented as the highest god's vicegerent on earth. The fact that Horace's poem exhibits exactly the same number of stanzas (15) as its Pindaric model cannot be coincidental.⁵⁵³ Moreover, the first (A: ll. 1–24) and the last (C: ll. 37–60) six stanzas on gods (A), respectively, men (C), are in turn clearly divided into two triads each: A₁ (ll. 1–12) forms an introduction, which only elaborates on the opening lines quoted above. A₂ (ll. 13–24) names five gods (a: Jupiter, b: Pallas, c: Liber, d: Diana, e: Phoebus) in a descending order of units the first three of which sharply decrease in length: 6 (ll. 13–18) : 2½ (ll. 19–21a) : 1 (21b–22a) : 1 (22b–23a) : 1½ (23b–24). The concluding section on men is constructed as A's mirror image. A falls into two parts: the opening (A₁) and the catalogue of various gods (A₂). C₁ (ll. 37–48) is dedicated to a series of seven persons or families of Roman nobles (a: Regulus, b: the Scauri, c: L. Aemilius Paullus, d: C. Fabricius Luscinus, e: Curius, f: Camillus, g: Marcellus or the Marcelli⁵⁵⁴); they are distributed over three stanzas in units of increasing weight (4 items for ll. 36–40: a/b/c/d; 2 items for ll. 41–44: e/f; 1 item for ll. 45–48: g). C₂ (ll. 49–60) is

⁵⁵³ Since Christ 1879: 654 (cf. also Orelli 1850: 84) rightly a commonplace; cf. especially Fraenkel 1957: 291. It is a puzzle to me how even the slightest doubt could ever arise that this correspondence cannot be by chance. It is correct that ll. 25–36 are not as neat a unit as the other triads (cf. Syndikus 2001: I 136). As Hans Peter Syndikus (*per litteras*) points out to me, ll. 29–32 seem to be a conclusion and *dubito* (l. 35) marks a new beginning. He suggests taking 33–36 as a link passage before Horace begins in l. 37 ff. with unqualified praise (*insigni ... Camena*, l. 39); for the objection that not all Pindaric poems of Horace show a triadic structure, see above, p. 233.

⁵⁵⁴ There is much to be said for Peerlkamp's *Marcellis*, printed by Shackleton-Bailey (*Marcelli codd.*) in l. 46. If *Marcelli* is kept, the reference is unmistakably to the younger, not the older Marcellus (see Fraenkel 1957: 296; Syndikus 2001: I 146; wrong, Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 66). Nisbet and Hubbard (1970: 162) rightly point out the merits of Peerlkamp's conjecture (accepted also by Delz), but, as *Marcelli* must plainly refer to the younger Marcellus, the transmitted reading cannot, as they claim, do the same job.

reserved entirely for Augustus. Thus, to the initial series, divided into 12 : 6 : 2½ : 1 : 1 : 1½ ll., corresponds an ascending sequence that, in contrast to the enjambments over stanza boundaries in A (most ostentatiously between ll. 4/5 and 20/21), matches syntactical and metrical units: first, three neatly set-off stanzas, ever less densely packed; as regards the number of items covered by one stanza an ascending sequence of (ll. 36–40 =) 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : (ll. 41–44 =) 2 : 2 : (ll. 45–48 =) 4 can be observed. The last triad gives twelve entire lines to Augustus.

This carefully conceived structure makes it abundantly clear that Horace tries to imitate the triadic metrical structure of the Pindaric original by replacing the metrical triads with a corresponding scheme based on syntax and content, as we observed in a less obtrusive and mechanistic manner in C. 1.2. Only the shorter middle section (one triad only; B: ll. 25–36), which first seems to be dedicated to the heroes/demigods, ostentatiously frustrates the expectation of congruence between strophic triad and content. Hercules and the Dioscuri occupy two stanzas (ll. 25–32); then ll. 33–36 suddenly turn from Greece to Rome. But if Romulus still is a plausible Roman match for the Greek heroes in the previous lines, and Numa Pompilius and Tarquinius Superbus remain in the primordial epoch of the ancient Roman kings, the mention of Cato Uticensis⁵⁵⁵ in ll. 35f. abruptly transports the reader to the immediate past and violates the chronological order; ll. 37–44 return to older Roman history.⁵⁵⁶

Quite obviously the single triad (ll. 25–36) serves as a link passage, which slides both from Greece to Rome and from the divine realm to that of men, mixing up Greek heroes, Roman kings, and a disturbingly eminent person of the recent past. Yet, the ‘disorder’ displayed at this point is inevitable or even poignant: the beginning of the poem suggests a clear-cut ranking: ‘gods—heroes—men.’ However, Horace’s poem is about Augustus’s special status between the human and the divine, and the category ‘heroes’ marks this same precarious, overlapping zone. It has been pointed out that by ranking

⁵⁵⁵ Pace Bentley, Housman (1972: I 94ff.), and Shackleton Bailey the transmitted *Cato* in l. 35 is surely correct; however it should be pointed out that Bentley objected mainly to the order of the series, not that Cato would be unfitting here. Defenses of the transmitted reading (most emphatically Fraenkel 1957: 295 n. 3) aim purely at refuting the charge of impropriety. Thus, the significance of Cato’s prominent position in the catalogue of Roman heroes has not been fully appreciated. Fraenkel (1957: 295) at least saw that *dubito memorem* highlights the disturbance of the natural sequence at a crucial point.

⁵⁵⁶ This ostentatious, gross inconsistency is something completely different from the deliberately non-chronological order of the following series.

Liber, who belongs in the second category with Hercules, among the gods Horace sabotages the clear-cut division between gods and demigods suggested at the beginning.⁵⁵⁷ At the end of the section on eminent Roman men of the past, immediately preceding the closure on Augustus, the *Iulium sidus* (47f.), or Caesar raised to divine status, appears. The intermediary status between god and man, attributed to Augustus, does not fit precisely in the tripartite traditional system 'gods—heroes—men': Augustus is presented as the highest god's deputy on earth. This definition elegantly avoids a too explicit and precise commitment to whether Augustus is a god or not: he is not even explicitly called a demigod, nor a future god as Caesar: the question of where he belongs in the traditional tripartite scheme disappears in view of his status as the highest god's vicegerent. This status endows the princeps with a singular importance and dignity, which raise Augustus above the merely heroic rank without involving necessarily a clear pronouncement on his divine status. It is significant that here, in contrast to C. 3.5 (probably more or less contemporary with C. 1.12⁵⁵⁸), where Augustus as Jupiter's representative on earth returns, Horace avoids an explicit statement like the *praesens divus*, the "present god, the god on earth" in C. 3.5,⁵⁵⁹ nor does he raise him to equal rank with demigods like Hercules and Romulus as he does in C. 3.3.9ff.⁵⁶⁰ He stops just short of such equations, which were a common element of Hellenistic panegyrics of kings (Theocr. 17, 16, 33),⁵⁶¹ C. 1.12 does not even go as far as Call. *hym.* J. 85–90 in stressing superhuman, godlike qualities in the ruler. On the contrary, Horace carefully chooses a phrase that exalts the ruler by stressing his subordination to the highest god (*te minor*, "subordinate to you," l. 57).

⁵⁵⁷ See Feeney 1998: 112 f., with further references; already Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 152 f. In C. 3.3.9ff., where Augustus is named as a future god among the heroes, the latter include Pollux, Hercules, and Romulus. The sliding transition from Greek heroes via Romulus to the ancient Roman kings is prepared by a sliding change between A and B: the last but one god mentioned in A is Bacchus (Liber), who elsewhere appears in Hercules's company as a deified demigod. Thus, without ostentatiously frustrating the order announced in ll. 1ff., the sequence of names from Jupiter to Tarquinius unperceivably slides, as the text goes on, faster and faster away and with Numa Pompilius we suddenly find ourselves in a completely different world from the Greek, 'Olympian' beginning. Tarquinius, with his negative connotations, is the first surprise, but only Cato, belonging to a completely different period of time, is explicitly marked as a person extraneous to the program announced originally at the beginning; cf. also below, pp. 367 ff.

⁵⁵⁸ See below, pp. 374, 396 ff.

⁵⁵⁹ Below, p. 397.

⁵⁶⁰ See below, p. 386.

⁵⁶¹ Cf. also Syndikus 2001: II 69 f.

One may ask why Horace here avoids more explicit references to divine status if he unashamedly ascribes the latter to Augustus in the more or less contemporary *C.* 3.3 and 3.5. Of course, had Horace done so in this catalogue poem on gods, heroes, and men this would have been counterproductive: Augustus would fall into the intermediate category and it would be hard to present him as the ultimate climax, as *C.* 1.12 does. But one may still ask why Horace chose this particular catalogue form if he is going to bypass the tripartite division of the beginning. A passing reference to the divine or semidivine rank of the ruler in a larger context is different from what such an assertion would mean as the epitome of a whole poem devoted to one man. Horace had taste enough not to indulge in what could only lead to empty bombast and a depiction of the arrogant presumptuousness of power, which was surely not in accord with the princeps's intentions. Horace's strategy to solve the problem of heaping the most eminent praise on the ruler via an ingenious frustration of the traditional scheme of the ladder from the human to the divine and by maintainng a proper sense of *decorum* deserves respect. And in this context, the link triad (B), which appears messy on the surface, provides a sliding transition from gods to men, entirely in line with the clever strategy of raising Augustus to a special position outside the proposed scheme.

The sudden change to the immediate past with Cato in l. 35 f., however, requires further explanation. The intrusion of the latter goes far beyond what would be necessary or even functional or helpful in providing for a smooth transition. On the contrary, Cato constitutes a brutal disruption of the order, a disruption that is, moreover, marked explicitly by *dubito*, "I hesitate": the explicit *dubitatio* functions as a kind of Pindaric 'Abbruchsformel'.⁵⁶² Romulus and the Roman kings had led the poet to Tarquinius Superbus, the king who achieved a hitherto unknown expansion of the Roman empire, but whose arrogance also provoked the end of the ancien regime. Fraenkel⁵⁶³ has drawn attention to the fact that the object of *memorem*, "shall I mention" (l. 34), is *fascis*, "rods," and *fascis*, not *Tarquini*, "of Tarquinius," carry the epithet *superbos*, "arrogant." *Superbos ... fascis*, "arrogant rods," contrast *quietum ... regnum*, "the quiet reign" in ll. 33 f. This marks a change from the untroubled kingship of earlier times to the turmoil that led to a new order, a turmoil caused by the arrogance of power that had reached

⁵⁶² Similar to the end of *C.* 2.1 and in *C.* 3.3.69–72. Good observations on *dubito* and the perikope on Cato are offered by Race in Davis 2010: 159 f.

⁵⁶³ Fraenkel 1957: 295 n. 2.

its zenith. The *fascēs* were among the royal *insignia* displayed too arrogantly by Tarquinius, but whereas others were abolished with the republican order, the *fascēs* were among those that survived and marked a continuity in the passage from kingship to consulship. Thus, they incarnate the ambivalence of power, and this ambivalence is indicated by the epithet *superbus*, with its various shadings of “grand, proud, arrogant.” With Tarquinius, the excursion into Roman history has reached a critical point; the poet is uncertain how to continue. He is carried away by this impulse to another prominent political figure of the recent past who also stands for another fundamental change in the constitution of the Roman state: Cato’s ‘noble death’ (*nobile letum*), which in l. 36 concludes the link passage, the ‘noble death’ of the Roman republic. Beside Tarquinius’s *fascēs*, symbol of arrogance and decay, or rather of the ambivalence that accompanies greatness of political power, the sudden change to *Catonis nobile letum* expresses, as perhaps no other passage in Horace’s poetry, the poet’s feelings in the period of transition from Philippi to the establishment of the new order.

The hesitant *dubito* in l. 35 indicates that the strange series of the link stanza is an excursus: Cato and Tarquinius Superbus are both referred to by way of a *praeteritio*, after which Horace can make a new start with a catalogue of some of the traditional national heroes of Rome. But with Cato’s death, he imperceptibly introduced a heading for the first persons named in what follows: *Nobile letum*, magnanimity in defeat, sets the scene for the choice of Roman heroes of the past that follow: the unchronological series Regulus, Aemilius Paullus, the Scauri, Curius, and Camillus does not dwell on military achievements. On the contrary, the first two men are notorious examples of noble endurance in defeat. Only the last hero, the conqueror of Veii, was a successful man of military action, but just as Fabricius and Curius are examples of pristine frugality, rather than military success, Camillus is united with them by emphasizing frugality and a simple lifestyle as a prerequisite for warlike strength (41 ff.). Lines 33–44 offer, in a brief and packed catalogue of different men from Romulus until almost Horace’s own age, a kaleidoscope of Roman history in all its facets, its greatness and ambivalence; the catalogue presents *μνημεῖα κακῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀίδια*, ‘eternal monuments of Rome’s greatness in good and bad, in victory and defeat.’ Augustus, in the last triad (ll. 49–60), is presented as Jupiter’s vicegerent; he appears in a prayer addressed to the god, a prayer to grant that Augustus may exercise his power ‘subordinate to Jupiter’ (*te minor*; l. 57). The princeps who “rules because he holds himself inferior to the gods” (*dis te minorem quod geris, imperas*; C. 3.6.5) serves as a model that reconciles power and restraint and thus is suited to guarantee stability and lead Rome to the apex of its

greatness and destiny. In retrospect, the limelight on Cato at the very center of the poem is an eminently efficient trick to add emphasis and depth to the poem's content.

C. 1.12 aims at a meaningful interpretation of contemporary politics against the background of Roman history and is anything but an empty catalogue poem; yet, despite the high degree of craftsmanship on display, judged by Horace's standards artistically the poem is a failure, and it is a riddle to me how it could ever have been favorably compared to C. 1.2. Certainly, the role attributed to Augustus in C. 1.12 has much greater political significance and appears to be a much more tactful way to get around the problem of outright deification than the fanciful suggestion of C. 1.2 that he may—perhaps—be Mercury in disguise. Yet, the latter, however fanciful and extravagant an idea, is, precisely for that reason, highly suggestive and poetically effective. C. 1.2 alludes to watchwords of Augustan self-stylization and propaganda but does not aim at any politically relevant statement. It simply expresses a common attitude, and expectation of its time, in a highly effective and poetic manner, and is, as such, a great poem. C. 1.12 aspires at presenting in poetic dress a politically meaningful eulogy of the princeps, yet, despite its careful design the poem lacks, not so much unity, but rather a clear sense of direction, a virtue otherwise so eminently displayed in Horace's poetry. All attempts at variation at every level cannot diminish the unbearable monotony of the enumeration of a long series of items, which is introduced by some kind of *verbum dicendi* in the first-person singular future for forty lines. If the series of Roman heroes in ll. 33–44 is too dense to allow for a more pointed elaboration of its significance, the series of gods and heroes from Jupiter to the Dioscuri in ll. 13–32, with all its descriptive detail, serves no relevant purpose at all. Only in the concluding triad on Augustus does the poem gains momentum and significance, but at this point the overlong poem has already become otiose.

To build a whole poem on a trivial Pindaric motto as a directory that announces the poem's organization was not a good idea. Such a catalogue has a major drawback: sixty lines are both too many and too few to handle a wide-ranging catalogue with enough pregnancy and variety and to sufficiently highlight the particular significance of the arrangement of the subject matter. Virgil's 'Heldenschau' in the sixth book of the *Aeneid*, which owes a debt to Horace's poem,⁵⁶⁴ shows that both more space and integration into a larger overall structure are required to do the job. C. 1.12 is the

⁵⁶⁴ See Norden 1995: 314.

closest Horace comes to an imitation of Pindar in both form and content in the first collection of *Odes*, much closer than its hybrid earlier counterpart, C. 1.2. Of course, Pindar looms large in Horace's major contribution to national Roman poetry, the cycle of the *Roman Odes*, yet, these poems are not predominantly encomiastic. Augustus is only mentioned quasi en passant in compositions that turn to the Roman people rather than the ruler and present a much broader outlook.⁵⁶⁵ With C. 1.12 Horace embarked on outright panegyrics on Augustus's person in Pindaric manner. In comparison to what Horace achieved in C. 1.2 or the *Roman Odes*, C. 1.12 is a piece of clever versification, no more, no less. If it fails by a large margin to reach the level of originality and visionary power of the former it only shows how difficult it is to compose political and panegyric poetry that stands up to the standard established by Horace's work and attests to the greatness of Horace's other works.

At any rate, C. 1.12 remained a unique experiment, and in view of its shortcomings one understands why Horace, in C. 4.2, appears to be sceptical about the possibility of writing good encomiastic poetry in the Pindaric manner on the princeps.⁵⁶⁶ C. 4.4 and 4.14 are something quite different: they present lyric narrative in Pindaric style.⁵⁶⁷ The poems on Augustus in Book IV follow another model: one year after C. 1.12 Horace wrote a further poem on the ruler, again in the Sapphic stanza, that was quite different from both C. 1.12 and C. 1.2. C. 3.14 is a 'Gelegenheitsgedicht' in the best sense of the word: the poem takes us to the preparations for the thanksgiving celebration decreed on the announcement of Augustus's victorious return from the Spanish War in 24 BC. The poet addresses the Roman people and encourages them to participate (A: 1–12). With ll. 13–16 (B), Horace turns to his own feelings of utter relief due to the fact that peace has now restored to the entire world, a peace that grants the poet a carefree life. Thus, the concluding section (C: 17–28), marked off by a new addressee, a servant, is devoted to Horace's private party: he asks the boy to call his beloved Neaera to join him in his celebration.

C. 3.14 is another prime example of a poem that consists of two sharply contrasting external sections joined by a link stanza.⁵⁶⁸ The stanza triad of both A and C each presents a densely packed, self-contained scene: A) the

⁵⁶⁵ Below, pp. 373 ff.

⁵⁶⁶ See Günther 1999; Fedeli 2008: 120 ff.; Günther 2010a: 142 ff.; Fantham below, pp. 448 f.

⁵⁶⁷ For style and structure, see Race in Davis 2010: 167 ff.

⁵⁶⁸ Cf. C. 1.2 and 1.4, analyzed above, pp. 232 ff. and 243 ff.

ruler's victorious return (a: ll. 1–4) causes his wife and sister to proceed to a religious ceremony (b: ll. 5–8) and the poet to exhort the Roman mothers and youth, boys and girls, to join in the celebration (c: 9–12). The link stanza triad (B) abruptly turns to the poet's private feelings; by relating them to Augustus's Herculean achievement it refers back to the beginning, where Caesar's return from Spain was compared to Hercules's return from the same place after having killed Geryon. When we are suddenly transported into the private world of Horace joking with his servant about love, the effect of ll. 13–16 is that of a door flung wide open, allowing the reader to enter an entirely different world. C is again an entirely self-contained scene sharply characterized and packed with plenty of picturesque detail: the adornments; the particular wine for the banquet (fittingly, a *cadum Marsi memorem duelli*, *Spartacum si qua potuit vagantem/fallere testa*, "a jar that remembers the Marsian War, if there is anywhere a crock that has managed to elude the marauding Spartacus"); the girl, with her clear voiceshe is admonished not to fuss around too long with the odious doorkeeper—her hairstyle; and the grey-haired poet, mellowed by old age and not as impatient and violent as he would have been in his youth. C. 3.14 joins what could be two complete, independent poems: one on the preparations for a religious ceremony (A), the other a love poem in the form of an invitation to the girl (C). The public sphere evoked in A and the private sphere of the poet in C are related to each other by the occasion, which affects the life of the entire Roman people and thus that of the poet as well.

C. 3.14 is a sort of counterpiece to *Epod.* 1 and 9: the latter stood out as an immediate expression of Horace's sentiments as a witness of a major historic event. C. 3.14 authentically expresses the universally felt relief that the reign of Augustus would guarantee a lasting peace after the unbearable instability and upheavals of the previous decades,⁵⁶⁹ a relief that earned the princeps the *consensus unīversorum*, "consensus of the entire people," on which Augustus claimed to base his supreme power.⁵⁷⁰ Thus, Horace, in C. 3.14, pointedly addresses the *plebs*, "the common people," and counts himself as one of them. As long as political poetry entailed political partisanship or poetry on war and strife, the public and private spheres of the poet and his personal poetry, which was inextricably bound to the latter, were at odds and implied the contrast between the artistic credo of the Augustan poets and the requirements of national poetry. In poetry on Augustus as the bringer of

⁵⁶⁹ Cf. Syndikus 2001: II 327 f.; Günther 2010a: 155.

⁵⁷⁰ See Kienast 2009: 67 f., 78, 80 f.

peace this contrast between the public and private sphere vanished. Not by chance did the situation of C. 3.14, in which the poet is one of the ordinary Roman citizens grateful to the princeps as the guarantor of peace, becomes the archetype not only of the poems on Augustus in Horace's fourth book of *Odes*,⁵⁷¹ but also of Prop. 3.4 and the concluding section of Prop. 4.6:⁵⁷² there could not be a more natural and genuine way of blending the requirements of public and private poetry. In expressing his deepest personal and, at the same time, publicly shared sentiments on a public occasion Horace was at complete ease to create a work of highest polyphonic subtlety and artistic merit. If proof were needed, C. 3.14 perfectly attests to the truth of Goethe's high esteem for 'Gelegenheitsdichtung' as "die erste und ächtesten aller Dichtarten."⁵⁷³

In conclusion, as far as personal panegyrics on Augustus are concerned, Horace is most successful when he focuses on expressing a public mood, as in C. 1.2, or when he voices his private feelings, as in C. 3.14. C. 1.2, with its ingenuity and originality, its blending of grandeur with charm, remains an entirely unique composition; C. 3.14 becomes the model for the Augustus poems of the fourth book. As an utterly natural and simple expression of the personal admiration and affection Horace felt for the princeps, these poems derive their particular artistic and human quality from the exceptionally close personal relationship between the poet, the upstart of humble origins, and the ruler of an empire at the zenith of his power. This closeness, which endows the poems with human warmth, sincerity, and depth of emotion, is not on display elsewhere in Horace's oeuvre; it transforms a private statement into political poetry and vice versa.

C. 3.14 is not the last poem on Augustus in the first collection of *Odes*; there is, an epilogue on Horace's panegyric poetry: C. 3.25.⁵⁷⁴ This epilogue balances Horace's programmatic *recusatio* in the first book: C. 1.6. In C. 1.6, Horace declared himself a poet of too humble talents to adequately praise the deeds of Agrippa and the princeps (ll. 9–12⁵⁷⁵). Horace, frequently refers to military events in his poems, yet, he never, before C. 4.4 and 14, indulged in the description of battles. Still, with C. 1.2 and 12, he wrote panegyric

⁵⁷¹ Günther 2010a: 147 ff.

⁵⁷² See Günther in Günther 2006: 376 ff.

⁵⁷³ Goethe 1986: 433; Fraenkel (1957: 313 f.) refers to Goethe's 'Gelegenheitsdichtung,' in regard to the *Epistles*; cf., however, p. 483, below.

⁵⁷⁴ Above, pp. 283 f.

⁵⁷⁵ Above, pp. 236 f.

poetry in a register far above the *genus tenue* he claims to be his province in C. 1.6. C. 3.25 is, so to speak, Horace's postponed anti-*recusatio*. The poet claims to be carried away by an attack of Dionysiac ecstasy in order to sing the princeps's praises; Bacchus provides, for a moment, the inspiration to transcend the limits of the genre and sing of something less small and humble, even something beyond the powers of a mortal. In such an attack of Bacchic frenzy Horace can even place Augustus, without, among the gods, where he takes a seat on the council of the king of gods.

6.2. *The Roman Odes*

Even in the metrically extremely uniform Book II Horace aimed at metrical *variatio* in the sequence of poems by preferring alternation to juxtaposition; only once does he allow a series of three poems in the same meter (C. 2.13–15).⁵⁷⁶ Thus, the sequence of six thematically coherent poems (called the 'Roman Odes' at least since Pluess 1882) at the beginning of Book III, all in the same meter, Horace's favored Alcaic stanza;⁵⁷⁷ all of considerable length, including the longest poem of the collection (C. 3.4 with 80ll.) and amounting together to 336ll., stands out as a uniquely coherent block of text.⁵⁷⁸ None of the poems is addressed to an individual;⁵⁷⁹ the poems that do feature addressees, C. 3.1, 3.4, and 3.6, speak to the Roman youth (3.1) or people (3.6 with a generic *Romane*, "Roman," in l. 1) or call upon the Muse (C. 3.4). This lack of addressee in half the poems and the fact that the solemn announcement at the beginning of C. 3.1 apparently refers to this poem alone show that these poems were conceived by the poet to some extent from the very start as a unity. Yet, presumably not all of the six poems were composed at the same time: C. 3.3 and 3.5 belong after 27 BC, when the honorary title *Augustus* was conferred upon the princeps (C. 3.3.11; 3.5.3). On the other hand, C. 3.4, referring to the settlement of the army of the civil

⁵⁷⁶ Cf. above, p. 213. The only sequences of two poems in the same meter in *Odes* I–III are C. 1.16/17, 26/27, 34/35; 3.24/25; C. 1.16/17 and 34/35 are thematic pairs; see pp. 215 and 219 f.

⁵⁷⁷ Above, pp. 215, 221, 223.

⁵⁷⁸ For the composition of the cycle and the dates of single poems, see Syndikus 2001: II 3 ff.; cf. also Heinze 1960a: 190 ff. The view that the whole series is one long poem hardly deserves serious consideration, cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxi. The *Roman Odes* appear to have become exemplary for opening a book of poetry with a cycle of poems rather than a single poem. The first example of imitation is Propertius's third book (3.1–5); later, Horace's fourth book of *Odes* and, at least if one accepts division of 4.1 (see Günther in Günther 2006: 355 ff.), Propertius's fourth book; see Fedeli (forthcoming).

⁵⁷⁹ Above, pp. 313 ff.

wars, is likely not much later than 29 BC, while C. 3.6 probably antedates the restoration of the temples of Rome in 28 BC.⁵⁸⁰

C. 3.1–6 appear to have been written more or less in the same period as the two long poems on Augustus, C. 1.2 (29/28 BC) and 1.12 (27 BC). Presumably, some time after he had written C. 3.4 and 3.6, Horace conceived the idea of integrating them into a cycle of patriotic poems. C. 3.2 and 3 lack an addressee and the opening stanza of C. 3.1.1–4 appears to relate to C. 3.1–3 as a whole. Thus, these poems appear to have been composed together as a cycle of three poems. The invocation of the Muse in ll. 1–4 of C. 3.4 does not fit tidily into the sequence of poems addressed to the Roman youth, but the new addressee may aptly mark the start of a new sequence of poems. Thus, Horace decided to add one further poem, C. 3.5, in order to create a series of three poems balancing C. 3.1–3, which included C. 3.4 and 6. He also divided C. 3.6, with its address *Romane* (l. 2), more or less in tune with C. 3.1–3, from the address to the Muse in C. 3.4, and achieved a diptychon structure of 3 (A) : 3 (A'), marked by a new address in the introduction to the second half.⁵⁸¹

The poet also aimed at a quantitative balance between longer and shorter poems in the sequence: the A'-part is arranged by sharply decreasing length (80 : 56 : 48 ll.). Thus, the A-part presents an almost, but not quite symmetrical, increasing sequence, in which, however, the second poem is shorter than the first (48 : 32 : 72). The exact numerical correspondence between the framing poems, C. 3.1 and 3.6 (both 48ll.), with two large poems at the center of almost, but not quite equal length (72 : 80) should not be coincidental. The content and structure of the poems in the two series A and A' are also carefully matched:⁵⁸² C. 3.4 combines the private and the public

⁵⁸⁰ It is true that to recommend that a ruler do what he has already done is a panegyric device (see above, pp. 321 f. n. 387); in fact, that is the way C. 3.4 and 6 were to be understood when they were published. Still, the change of addressees in C. 3.1, 4, and 6 speaks in favor of separate composition at different times. Thus, a relative date of composition can plausibly be assumed for the cycle despite West's (2002: 65 f. referring to Wright 1983: 148) hypercautious *caveat*.

⁵⁸¹ Cf. the second invocation of the Muse in Book III of Apollonios Rhodios's *Argonautica* and Book VII of the *Aeneid* and the second prooemium of the *Georgica*.

⁵⁸² The most important bibliography about the design of C. 3.1–6 as a unity is referred to in Nisbet and Rudd 2004: xxf. A very helpful survey of elements of Augustan ideology in the *Odes* (the *Roman Odes*, in particular) is offered by West 2002: 3 ff., who in what follows also provides an excellent interpretation of the poems in regard to Augustan politics. Syndikus 2001: II 3–91 and idem in Davis 193–209 are the most authoritative modern treatments and refer to the older bibliography, as far as it is of value; Syndikus's (in Davis 2010: 207) indications of recent supplements (to which add Reinhardt in De Gennaro and Günther 2009: 153–169) is particularly helpful. Despite, or perhaps rather because of the mountains of bibliography,

sphere, and connects the poet's private person and vocation with the destiny of the ruler by their common relationship with the divine powers of the Muses. *C.* 3.6 focuses on religious neglect and moral corruption as reasons for decay, both caused by ancestral sins. These were the single poems already written before Horace conceived a cycle of six poems. If Horace intended to compose a cycle of civic poems addressed to the Roman people, it was clear that *C.* 3.4, with its invocation of the Muse, was suited to open *A'*, and *C.* 3.6, with its different address, should stand last. The introductory poem of *A*, *C.* 3.1, focuses exclusively on the private sphere of the poet, i.e. on his private quasi-'Epicurean'⁵⁸³ virtues. In *C.* 3.2, corresponding virtues are applied to the public sphere. The final accent on religious duties (ll. 25–32) harks back to *C.* 3.1.5–8.⁵⁸⁴ *C.* 3.3, like *C.* 3.6, focuses on moral decay and ancestral sins, put into a religious frame. *C.* 3.5 focuses on military virtues, as does the first half of *C.* 3.2; yet, the military virtue requested in *C.* 3.5 is complementary to the civic virtue requested in *C.* 3.3, and Regulus in *C.* 3.5 is the best example from Roman history for the virtues both of *C.* 3.2.13–24 and of *C.* 3.3.1–8. This illustrates the mutual interdependence of military and civic virtue, and, of, course, the two centerpieces, *C.* 3.3 and 4 feature Augustus, the apex of Roman history, as a future god in the company of deified heroes (*C.* 3.3.11 f.) or as a man attended by divine powers (*C.* 3.4.37–40). The thematic sequence can be summed up thus: *A*: 3.1. the poet's lifestyle as a model of private virtues of frugality and integrity; 3.2: frugality applied to military and civic duties, military achievements (the Parthian War as the ultimate victory to be gained to fulfill Rome's destiny of worldwide rule) as a consequence of true virtue, i.e., personal integrity and religious piety; 3.3: true virtue as a prerequisite for deification (the deified ruler) and a warning from heaven to eschew moral decay, which rests as an ancient curse on the Roman people. *A'*: 3.4: the poet's private life and the public sphere, represented by the divinely willed ruler, united by the divine power of music and harmony inspiring both; 3.5: military (the Parthian War, the deified ruler) and private virtue combined in an eminent example of old warning against the present decay; and 3.6: religious neglect and, in consequence, moral decadence caused by ancestral sins.

Heinze 1960a: 190 ff.; Pasquali 1920: 649 ff.; Fraenkel 1957: 260 ff.; Klingner 1965: 376 ff.; Theiler 1935: 253 f.; and Klingner 1970: 394 ff. on *C.* 3.4 are still basic reading.

⁵⁸³ But see below, pp. 378 ff.

⁵⁸⁴ Below, pp. 377 f.

C. 3.4 is flanked by two poems featuring extensive direct speech, C. 3.3 and 5 (added later to fill the A'-section).⁵⁸⁵ In both poems the speech begins exactly at the same point, in the middle of the second line of the fifth stanza (l. 18b). After this introductory section of $4\frac{1}{2}$ stanzas (17½ lines), Regulus's speech in C. 3.6 comprises $5\frac{1}{2}$ stanzas (22½ lines: ll. 18b–40). The epilogue is slightly shorter: four stanzas (16 lines). The slightly asymmetric division ($4\frac{1}{2} : 5\frac{1}{2} : 4$) of this poem of medium length echoes the heavily asymmetric C. 3.3, with its very long speech ($12\frac{1}{2}$ stanzas = 50½ lines) after its introduction of $4\frac{1}{2}$ lines and the very brief epilogue, of one stanza only ($4\frac{1}{2} : 12\frac{1}{2} : 1$).

C. 3.1 (Odi profanum vulgus)

Horace opens the third book of the collection with an explicit statement about his role as a poet, as he did in books I and II.⁵⁸⁶ C. 3.1.1–4 hark back to the statement of C. 1.1, and surely the latter, written to head the collection, is designed to prepare for C. 3.1. As in C. 1.1,⁵⁸⁷ in C. 3.1 the poet sets himself apart from the crowd. Nothing, however, could be more different in tone and register from the pointed understatement of C. 1.1 than the solemn pose of C. 3.1.1–4. C. 1.1 is a pointedly 'private' prologue addressed to Maecenas. For his cycle of civic poetry, which opens Book III, Horace went back to the model of his political poetry in the *Epodes*, i.e., *Epod.* 7 and 16, where, on the model of archaic Greek elegy, he pretended to address an assembly of the Roman people.⁵⁸⁸ The audience suggested by C. 3.1.1–4 is, of course, not an assembly, but the Roman youth, described as the select few allowed to attend to the words of the poet. Yet, in C. 3.3.1, Horace projects himself back into the role of *Epod.* 16, where at the end of his bold, visionary advice to his countrymen the poet calls himself a *vates*, a prophet; he literally steps into the role this solemnly poetic designation of the poet suggests.⁵⁸⁹ In C. 3.1, he outdoes *Epod.* 16 by calling himself the priest of the Muses (*musarum sacerdos*, l. 3⁵⁹⁰): when he calls for 'holy silence'⁵⁹¹ (l. 1f.) for his hitherto unheard songs, and claims to sing only to virgins and young boys (ll. 2–4), the

⁵⁸⁵ Fraenkel (1957: 267) pointed out the parallel structure of the two poems as flanking the centerpiece C. 3.4.

⁵⁸⁶ In Book II the proem is a *recusatio*; cf. pp. 214 and 283, 317.

⁵⁸⁷ Above, pp. 224 ff.

⁵⁸⁸ See pp. 191 ff.

⁵⁸⁹ See p. 209. For C. 3.1.1–4, see also below.

⁵⁹⁰ Cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 8; Syndikus 2001: II 14 f.; cf. also Harms 1936: 4 ff.; Maehler 1963: 98.

⁵⁹¹ Cf. Mensching 1926. On C. 3.1, cf. also Reinhardt in De Gennaro and Günther 2009: 163 f.

assembly of the people has been exchanged for a distinctly religious setting. The exclusion of the *profanum vulgus*, “the uninitiated crowd,” recalls the esoteric atmosphere of mystery cults. The select few for whom the poet sings are the young; this cannot but conjure up the atmosphere of hope for salvation by a new age unstained by the crimes of the past, a hope Horace himself had given voice to in *C.* 1.2.⁵⁹²

After this introduction the second stanza (ll. 5–8) makes a new start; the elevated register is fully in accord with what one expects after the pompous opening: in the context of Horace’s book of poetry the analogy ‘kings vs. people = Jupiter vs. kings’ must at first sight suggest the ruler as god’s viceroy on earth, as in *C.* 1.12.⁵⁹³ Indeed, the contrast ‘brute force doomed to failure vs. supremely ruling *divine* order,’ with reference to the Gigantomachia later in *C.* 3.4,⁵⁹⁴ is applied to Augustus and the forces of evil, namely Antony. Both concepts surface later in the *Roman Odes*.⁵⁹⁵ However, the qualification of *regum*, “kings,” as *timendorum*, “dreaded,” and the statement that they hold power *in proprios greges*, “over their own flocks,” does not really suit Augustus, and warns us that something else is intended here. The following pair of stanzas (9–15) makes a new start again,⁵⁹⁶ and leads the train of thought in another direction. If now the text speaks of the vanity of political ambition, exposed by the fact that all human ambitions are subject to an inevitable, irresistible fate, leading to death without escape, the previous stanza assumes a meaning different from one’s first suspicions: all high-reaching human aspirations, with all the toil involved, are doomed to failure in the face of the power of the divine ruler who crushes even the most massive forces just by moving his eyebrows.⁵⁹⁷ Lines 5–8 appeared to introduce Jupiter as the ruler of the universe; however, from l. 9 onward the poem takes a turn not wholly in tune with what one may have expected. Jupiter is presented not as the supreme ruler of gods and men, but as the irresistible force of destiny. We have noticed the affinity of the Jupiter of *C.* 3.1.9 ff. to that of *C.* 1.34 and the *Fortuna* of *C.* 1.35, above.⁵⁹⁸ However, there is a difference between these passages, too: in *C.* 1.34/35—in the former poem,

⁵⁹² Above, p. 232.

⁵⁹³ See p. 366.

⁵⁹⁴ See pp. 394 f.

⁵⁹⁵ See pp. 393 ff.

⁵⁹⁶ For the structure of the poem as a series of stanza pairs, see above, p. 326 and below, p. 384 n. 623.

⁵⁹⁷ Cf. below, pp. 394 ff.

⁵⁹⁸ See pp. 297 ff.

in particular—the accent is on the reckless, unforeseeable power of *Fortuna*, whose companion *Necessitas*⁵⁹⁹ is depicted in C. 1.35.17 ff. C. 3.1 does not speak of *Fortuna*, only of *Necessitas*; the emphasis is entirely on destiny as overpowering, irresistible, and inevitable for all. It is depicted not as cruel, reckless, and capricious, but as equal for all, irrespective of any human factor. Jupiter, in the guise of *Necessitas*, is not the just divine ruler, the avenger of evil we expect him to be, if invoked in a civic context. Still, this *Necessitas* is not the completely capricious or unjust *Fortuna*; ‘necessity’ has its own justice, it is just the same for all. In view of this ultimate *Necessitas*, death, everything human, ultimately becomes irrelevant. The proper appreciation of this *Necessitas* reduces man to a humble position, in which he has learned the lesson that he must renounce power and wealth in favor of modesty and humility.

As in many other places,⁶⁰⁰ Horace paints an image of man’s position in accord with archaic Greek morals, namely the ethics promoted by Pindar’s poetry, morals that call for humility in the face of god, that warns of any excessive aspirations (e.g., Pi. P. 3.21–23); he calls for what in Greek one could call *θυνητὰ φρονεῖν*, “to think as mortals should.” By describing the man who accepts this humble position as one who is content with little material wealth, in accord with the Epicurean model he propagates elsewhere (*desiderantem quod satis est*, “the one who desires what is enough”), Horace can convert this concept into an attack on contemporary Roman luxury buildings, and thus into a tirade against contemporary materialistic decadence in ll. 33–40. In the concluding stanzas (ll. 41–44), he then presents himself as a model of the man who restrains his desires for wealth in the usual fashion: Horace, the owner of his modest Sabinum, content with his *paupertas*, his “modest means.” In this way, he is able to also drop a little compliment to Maecenas at the end.

The remarkable change from the solemn beginning, with its expectations of civic poetry, to the private ending has always caused surprise; however, most interpreters miss the essential point because a fundamental misconception prevails. One often asks how Horace, the Epicurean he presents himself as at the end of C. 3.1, can write political poetry in favor of Augustus’s regime, endorsing policies that are contrary both to Epicurean philosophy and Horace’s own lifestyle as described in C. 3.1. How can a ‘hedonistic bachelor’ like Horace endorse Augustus’s legislation on marriage and sex-

⁵⁹⁹ See pp. 300, 310.

⁶⁰⁰ See pp. 207 f., 326 ff.

ual restraint, as he does in *C.* 3.6?⁶⁰¹ Such questions, posing problems that do not exist, stand in the way of a proper understanding of what the surprising development of *C.* 3.1 aims at. First of all, one must be extremely far removed from reality if one assumes that any hedonistic bachelor could seriously think that his lifestyle or the lifestyle of anyone refusing to take part in any public business and refusing to submit himself to any public discipline could be an example for public behavior to be proposed by any political regime. One may, of course, ask whether any hedonist would be interested in writing poetry on matters that appear to be of no concern to him, and we all know that there were and are many artists who propagate hedonism and do not care to write civic poetry. Yet, it comes as no surprise if someone who adopts a hedonistic lifestyle, retired in his private happiness, should not only see that it would be hardly practical if everybody did so, but might also appreciate civic values in others, however different his own choice of life may be, if only because he knows that the very opportunity to enjoy a lifestyle such as his depends on a public order guaranteed by civic virtues. There is not the slightest reason to think that Horace would not have had the good sense to see this nor that he might not have deemed Augustus's policy of restoring public order a sensible one, when, in fact, Augustus's measures aimed at restoring an order in accord with the traditional Roman values Horace was brought up, with according to his own confession. And does Horace present himself in his poetry, and in this poem, in particular, as a mere hedonist? Does he not rather present himself as a man who is content with what he has and refuses to take part in the mindless pursuit of wealth and power? In this poem Horace does not present himself as a hedonist at all; he claims to be a man content with a simple life. This is not only an Epicurean ideal, it is perfectly in line with traditional Roman values. Indeed, in *Serm.* 1.4,⁶⁰² frugality and economy were an important part of what the poet styles as the old-fashioned Roman education he got from his father. However, one need not be familiar with Horace's previous biography to understand that he could believe in the values he propagates in the *Roman Odes*.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰¹ See Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 99.

⁶⁰² Above, pp. 19 ff.

⁶⁰³ It is hard to understand how, in view of Horace's warm words on his father and his traditional upbringing, anyone who has the slightest human sensitivity—and he (or she) who has not or believes he/she must disallow it should perhaps not read Horace—could ever believe that Horace could not have appreciated traditional family values. If anything, it is understandable that the psychoanalytically inclined have asked why Horace did not marry

The lifestyle of the poet, as represented in *C.* 3.1, is not at all that of an Epicurean hedonist. From l. 25 onward Horace adopts an Epicurean stance only in order to advocate restraint in view of the increasing materialism and indulgence in excessive luxury; he puts Epicurean self-restraint at the service of one aspect of Augustus's moral reform, and represents himself, in this respect, as a model of conduct. However, the background of this Epicurean stance reaches beyond Epicurean philosophy. We have seen that humility, converted into Epicurean self-restraint in ll. 25 ff., corresponded to archaic Greek morals: the humbleness of man in the face of divine power. The divine power as described in ll. 4–24 is decidedly non-Epicurean.⁶⁰⁴ It is completely wrong simply to say that in ll. 9–24 the fear of death as a folly is the background against which proper and improper behavior are measured. Similar to the priamel series in *C.* 1.1,⁶⁰⁵ this introduction to the third book of the first collection of *Odes* presents an abbreviated catalogue of rejected lifestyles; in this case Horace concentrates on two, the most exemplary ones that figure in *C.* 1.1: the man with political ambitions and the man of property. It has long been known that Horace, in his depiction of the rich man and his futile efforts to escape the fear of death and a uncertain future, models himself closely on Lucretius's prologue to his second book.⁶⁰⁶ This makes the discrepancy between Horace's attitude and that of the proper Epicurean all the more obvious.

Lucretius, in 2.1 ff., reduces all man's anxieties, which prevent him from enjoying the little the wise man needs to be happy, to the unreasonable fear of death, a fear fostered by superstitions that Lucretius is keen to destroy. In *C.* 3.1, too, *Necessitas* ultimately reveals the equalizing force of its power in death; in the face of the inevitability of death all human efforts must seem to be of little importance.⁶⁰⁷ However, the fear that plagues the man of ambition and wealth in *C.* 3.1 is not the fear of death but rather fear for the future, a fear inspired by their unsuitable aspirations, the fear that his aspirations may not come true. The men in Horace's poem are troubled by their fears of the unpredictable ups-and-downs of life, caused by the capricious *Fortuna* of

or how he must have felt having no son himself. But perhaps we should remind ourselves that to think that traditional family values are not important for a stable and functioning society is a privilege of modern western 'civilization.'

⁶⁰⁴ Above, pp. 288, 294, 297 f., 306 f.

⁶⁰⁵ Above, pp. 225 ff.

⁶⁰⁶ See Syndikus 2001: II 20 ff.

⁶⁰⁷ Cf. *C.* 2.3, above, pp. 326 ff. There, too, Horace characteristically revises the Epicurean background.

C. 1.34/35. The fools of C. 3.1 are the fools of C. 1.35, who prostrate themselves before *Fortuna*'s throne, the fools of C. 3.29, who try to know more than is permitted to mortals.⁶⁰⁸

Horace, at the end, is not the model of an Epicurean sage, he is the humble, modest, and pious poet of C. 3.29, who modestly lives on his little estate without the fears that hover over the impious (*destrictus ensis cui super impia/cervice pendet*, "For the man who has a naked sword hanging over his unholy neck," l. 17f.). The Horace of C. 3.1 is not an intellectual, enlightened by a school philosophy that teaches him that death is nothing to man and thus no ill; he is not the philosopher who does not know fear and lives in complete happiness. The Horace of C. 3.1 is just a humble Roman citizen, not subject to improper ambitions. He does not propagate an enlightened philosophical doctrine; he represents the frugality of ancient Roman life, presented as if this were the true ideal of an Epicurean sage. The Horace of C. 3.1 reasons about the right way to live; the text has its 'intellectual' message as well. The frugal life advocated in the concluding stanza rests upon a worldview that bases ancient Roman frugality on the ethics of humility of archaic Greece, an ethics that still surfaces in Epicurean philosophy. As we have seen elsewhere,⁶⁰⁹ Horace goes back to the roots of Epicureanism in the common Greek worldview and adapts them to the requirements of his personal life.

C. 3.1 ends on an emphatically personal note; if the poet turns to his own private (not poetic) existence, he does so in good Pindaric tradition (cf. Pi. P. 3.107–115). The whole train of thought is constructed in a manner that adapts Pindar's poetic technique: to arrive at the point in question by a detour from somewhere else.⁶¹⁰ Every two-stanza unit⁶¹¹ makes a fresh start, complementing the former from another perspective (A: futility of political ambition in view of death; B: wealth useless to relieve the impious from his fears; C: modest lifestyle guarantees carefreeness; D (conclusion): Fear and menace follow the man indulging in improper luxury everywhere, E: conclusion adapted to Horace's private life, i.e., the poet's lifestyle confirmed). The text presents the poet in a descent from the high ground of the *vates*, the *sacerdos Musarum* who pretends to preach on matters of public importance, to the private existence of man. This private existence is in full accord with

⁶⁰⁸ See pp. 302, 310.

⁶⁰⁹ See p. 378 with n. 600.

⁶¹⁰ For the background of this style, cf. Dornseiff 1921: 114 f.; also Szlezák 2010: 127.

⁶¹¹ Above, p. 377 with n. 596.

the requirements for a Roman citizen of the time; yet, it is not a recipe to be imitated universally. Horace, in ll. 33–39, rehearses a contemporary Roman lifestyle to be rejected. In ll. 40 ff. he does not exhort his fellow citizens, the ‘girls and boys’ of l. 4 to adopt a certain lifestyle, he just turns to himself and assures himself that he has no reason to change his way of life and adopt the ways of the fools who offend both the requirements of reason and of an orderly state. There is nothing surprising, not the slightest hint of incoherence in Horace’s attitude; that he should assume the stance he does in C. 3.1 is more than plausible. What is surprising is something else: it is quite astonishing that a poet would open a cycle of poems on public matters with such a personal statement, proclaiming to speak in a solemn tone on matters of utmost concern to a carefully selected public, and it is a remarkable trait of Augustus’s cultural politics that a poet could do so.⁶¹² Obviously, this statement begs the question of how the poet’s private life, even though it does not offend the standards demanded by the political regime of the day, relates to the life of other citizens, of how the poet’s private persona relates to his public persona and how his life relates to that of other men. Reading the poems in the published sequence, Horace does not answer this question immediately; rather, he approaches it via a detour in C. 3.2 and 3 until he comes back to himself in C. 3.4.

C. 3.2 (*Angustam amice*)

This short piece seems, at first sight, to be a rather disparate unit; the final two stanzas, in particular, have caused much surprise.⁶¹³ It is best understood as a set piece leading from C. 3.1 to C. 3.3.⁶¹⁴ With *pauperiem* in l. 1 the poem refers back to C. 3.1: there, Horace’s Epicurean *paupertas* stood in contrast to materialist decadence. Now, in C. 3.2, Horace applies an analogous lifestyle to the Roman youth, the addressee of the beginning of the cycle (C. 3.1.1–4): a life in *angusta pauperies*, “the constraints of modest means,” is presented as the result of hard military training at an early age. Normally, the frugal lifestyle of old times is presented as a prerequisite of military success; yet, in an address to the youth, the inversion is plausible.

⁶¹² Horace did exactly what Mayakovsky claimed to do (see Günther 2010a: 172); but Mayakovsky committed suicide, while Horace died a rich man. That is the difference between Stalin and Augustus.

⁶¹³ “... quest’ode pare a me la più difficile, forse la sola difficile di tutto il ciclo,” Pasquali 1920: 668, whose interpretations of the poem on the following pages are still among the most perceptive.

⁶¹⁴ See Heinze 1960a: 199.

C. 3.1 spoke of frugality as a desirable quality of the Roman citizen, in general, and Horace claimed that—for all his segregation from the crowd—his *paupertas*, although it is his particular lifestyle, is in accord with this requirement. Now, he preaches military training of the young as a useful preparation for good citizenship. This allows an excursus on the eventual success of a youth who has been so trained in an imminent war against the Parthians,⁶¹⁵ which leads to the famous gnome of the fourth stanza: *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*, “it is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country.”⁶¹⁶ If anyone feels the contrast between the secluded ‘Epicurean’ of C. 3.1.41–48 and the reminder of Tyrtaean fighting spirit, it may suffice to say that Horace—in contrast to many of his modern critics, including Bertold Brecht, who was exempt from military service in World War I—knew what he was talking about from personal experience.⁶¹⁷ But, for all his war experience,⁶¹⁸ Horace never thought fit to style himself as a war hero; he always played down his qualities as a soldier—for obvious reasons. In order to appreciate the taste of Horace’s much-misused words in C. 3.2 we should not only remind ourselves that they do not come from the mouth of an Epicurean armchair philosopher; one should compare the way in which Horace refers to his startling military career and acute war experience to that of modern poets like Gabriele D’Annunzio or Ernst Jünger. If one does this, after Horace’s allusion to his miraculous salvation from the battlefield,

⁶¹⁵ Syndikus 2010: II 196 f. justly draws attention to the Homeric dress in which Horaces clothes contemporary war activities.

⁶¹⁶ Nisbet and Rudd (2004: 26 f.) even produce parallels for *dulce* (also Syndikus 2001: II 28 n. 29; West 2002: 25); and if they point out correctly that normally the pleasant and the honorable are opposed, that is exactly the point of Horace’s, the demi-Epicurean’s, juxtaposition: for the Epicurean, death can be a pleasure (see above, p. 334). He lives always with the idea of imminent death, adapting himself to approach it without the fear of pain. And if death presents itself as a chance to be virtuous, how could it be anything but “sweet.” But Harrison (1993: 91 ff.) has made perhaps the most important point, which conduces at a proper understanding of the psychology of the line by referring to the joy of dying for a beloved friend. If we think that the relationship to the motherland can be described as a quasi-erotic one (beside Cic. *De off.* 1.57, cf. Thuc. 2.43) what could be more plausible than to describe it as sweet as a ‘Liebestod’ (cf. also Drexler 1988: 23, 27). If we are insensitive to romanticism of this kind—for all too obvious reasons—it should not debar us from appreciating that Horace’s words have gained the proof of authentic sentiment by inspiring innumerable people over the centuries with noble feelings. Horace repeats the maxim at the end of C. 4.9 in his depiction of ideal pristine Roman virtue; cf. Syndikus 2001: II 366 f., as regards the poem’s relation to the addressee and the concrete circumstances, see loc. cit. 357 f.

⁶¹⁷ See above, pp. 29 ff.

⁶¹⁸ Above, beside p. 28 ff. also pp. 34, 194.

elsewhere described in a self-deprecatory manner,⁶¹⁹ his call to be prepared to give one's life for one's country does not smell of militarism at all; even less do his words smell of cynicism or servility, and anyone who lacks the sensitivity to feel how Horace's words sound after his allusion to Philippi in C. 3.1 will understand little of Horace's civic poetry.⁶²⁰

Half of C. 3.2 is concerned with military virtues. Horace's point, however, is not the education of good warriors for its own sake; he rather advocates military exercise as a preparation for the civic virtue of *paupertas*. If we understand this, the shift to a praise of virtue personified in the two following stanzas (ll. 17–24) is less surprising. If Horace first turns to a Stoic description of virtue as a self-sufficient value in itself, characterized as independent of the opinions of the crowd (ll. 17–20),⁶²¹ he, at the same time, refers back to the inept political ambitions, criticized in C. 3.1.10–14. Above all—consistent with his views emphasized elsewhere—Horace stresses that true virtue ultimately is a quality of the mind, and this concept is central both to Stoic and Epicurean philosophy.⁶²²

The strictly parallel, but somehow antithetic stanza pair on virtue, which opens the second half of the poem,⁶²³ is like a door with two flappers revolving around the anaphora *Virtus* in l. 21, referring back to l. 17. Virtue, self-content, which does not find or seek recognition on earth—virtue, which by the very quality of being independent of the judgment of this world, opens up to the man who practices it in a way denied to ordinary mortals: to him is granted in heaven the recognition that is denied to him on earth.⁶²⁴ In the first half of the poem the civic virtue recommended in C. 3.1 was complemented by military virtue: military discipline was requested as a prerequisite of the civic virtue of restraint in material wealth, exemplified by the poet's *paupertas*. Both constitute various facets of virtuous behavior. Thus, the second part of the poem raises itself to the common basis of all virtues, virtue itself, which has no home on earth, but in heaven among the

⁶¹⁹ Cf. p. 29.

⁶²⁰ Cf. also below, pp. 391f.

⁶²¹ Cf. Syndikus 2001: II 30 (who refers to Cic. *De off.* 1.74 ff.).

⁶²² See above, p. 375; below, pp. 395 f., 398 ff.

⁶²³ C. 3.2 exhibits a structure almost identical with the series of stanza pairs in C. 3.1 (above, p. 377 n. 596); an appendix of two pairs of stanzas (B: ll. 17–24, C: ll. 25–32) follows a series of four consecutive stanzas (A: ll. 1–16); thus, a bipartite structure arises, with A developing on the *paupertas* of C. 3.1 and BC preparing for C. 3.3.

⁶²⁴ *Negata via*, in l. 22, on the surface means “a way that is denied (to ordinary men),” but in context *negata* also implies the recognition ‘denied’ to the virtuous by the crowd. On this passage, cf. also Newman 2011: 52 f.

gods. With ll. 25–32 the poem reaches an unsurpassable peak.⁶²⁵ The last two stanzas come as a sudden—‘Pindaric’—change, similar to the abrupt end of *C.* 3.1. It is not readily apparent what the importance of discretion is in this context, and various adventurous explanations have been proposed.⁶²⁶ With the reference to religious mysteries in what follows, it becomes clear that after military and civic virtue Horace intends to close with religious duties. Indeed, virtue in respect to the divine is the only major facet of virtue, requested of the perfect Roman citizen, that remains and that can stand after the heavenly virtue of ll. 17–24. Heinze and Syndikus are right in thinking that the final stanzas refer to piety (alluded to already en passant in *C.* 3.1.17 f.).⁶²⁷ Still, the strange introduction via the adaptation of a Simonidean (*PMG* 582) gnome (*est et fideli tuta silentio/merces*, “there is also a sure reward for loyal silence,” ll. 25 f.), referring to silence, calls for an explanation.

This new start is surely meant to puzzle the reader and can only be intended as a surprise. Is there really anything to say after the tone had risen to the level of ll. 17–24? Anything more would be excessive: eternal glory in heaven is the highest reward mortals may hope for; to hope for more would be *nefas*.⁶²⁸ With the concluding stanza pair the poem suddenly comes to a stop; these two stanzas serve as a kind of ‘Abbruchsformel,’ as, probably, does the Simonidean model of ll. 25 f.⁶²⁹ If the poem ends beautifully in a vague and mysterious atmosphere, it is hardly coincidental that the Simonidean gnome appears to have been a favourite quote of Augustus’s (*Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apopht.* 207C),⁶³⁰ who was also initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries (*Suet. Aug.* 93). The insider would have taken the hint that the pious Augustus incorporates the epitome of virtue, which surely will not remain without its due reward.

⁶²⁵ “Andere Dichter hätten wohl mit diesem Höhepunkt das Gedicht beendet. Nicht so Horaz. Er liebt ein leiseres Verklängen. Dabei gewinnt er für das Bild der Tugend eine neue Tiefendimension.” Syndikus (2001: II 31) thus describes the function of the epilogue with great sensitivity for Horace’s poetic technique.

⁶²⁶ Even Nisbet and Rudd (2004: 32) revive the view that the reference is to discretion in respect to state secrets.

⁶²⁷ Syndikus 2001: II 31 f.

⁶²⁸ Basically, Pasquali 1929: 678 ff. has rightly made the point, even though he is too specific.

⁶²⁹ See Pasquali 1929: 680 f.

⁶³⁰ Cf. also West 2002: 28; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 31; Newman 2011: 137.

C. 3.3 (*Iustum et tenacem*)

Both C. 3.1 and 2 lead up to the first highlight of the cycle, C. 3.3. The poem's introduction (ll. 1–16) takes up the theme of the central part of C. 3.2 (ll. 17–24): virtue, which has its reward in heaven. In C. 3.2.17–20, virtue was characterized as independent of the opinions and favors of the crowd. C. 3.3 begins (Aa: ll. 1–8) with *iustitia*, “justice,” the basic virtue, the cornerstone of virtuous behavior, which is combined with steadfastness, its indispensable prerequisite. In two further stanzas (Ab: ll. 9–16), Augustus is mentioned in the middle between four demigods (Pollux, Hercules, Bacchus, and Romulus) who have acquired divine status by displaying this virtue.⁶³¹ The last hero, Romulus, serves as a tag for an extensive speech by Juno (B: ll. 18b–68 after a brief introduction with a *verbum dicendi*), who guarantees her assent to Romulus's being made divine on the condition that Troy will never be rebuilt. A Pindaric ‘Abbruchsformel’ (C: ll. 69–72) brings the poem to an abrupt end.

Fraenkel was right to insist on the parallel arrangement of C. 3.3 and 3.5, both centering on a long speech, as a frame for C. 3.4: the speeches of Juno in C. 3.3 and of Regulus in C. 3.5 unfold two complementing sceneries, one from Greek myth and one from Roman history. In fact, ll. 1–16, ending with Romulus, are the tag for Juno's speech; the technique is quite similar to that of C. 3.11 or 27.⁶³² Yet, in C. 3.3, the two parts interact in a most subtle manner. Juno's speech carries a message of general importance, which, at first sight, strays quite far from the topics touched upon in ll. 1–16: Juno's appeal not to rebuild Troy is couched in a denunciation of Troy as a model of decadence, which occupies the first part of the speech (Ba: ll. 18b–35). A second contrasting part follows (Bb1: ll. 37–56), which predicts the Romans' eternal worldwide rule as long as they resist the temptation to fall back into the old decadence, but ruin equal to that of Troy if they fail to (Bb2: 57–68).⁶³³

It is still contested whether C. 3.3 refers to attempts to shift the center of power from Rome to the East or to create a second capital at the site of Troy or whether Troy is only a metaphor for moral decay and bears no relevance for contemporary politics. Of course, Juno's speech contains a general message. It refers to the moral decay that was castigated in C. 3.6: neglect of the gods and, as a consequence, sexual licence. The projection of this decay

⁶³¹ See above, p. 375, and below, pp. 395f., 398ff.

⁶³² Above, pp. 242, 345ff.

⁶³³ The proportions between the different parts are 4 (A = 2 : 2) : 13 (B = 5 : 5 : 3) : 1 (C) stanzas, i.e., 2 : 2 : 5 – 5 : 3 : 1 stanzas.

back into the mythological past underpins the interpretation of the political and moral crisis of the day as the result of the sin of Rome's forefathers, a central piece of political ideology canonized by Horace in *C.* 3.6.⁶³⁴ That such an interpretation of Rome's destiny and purpose is projected back into the mythological past and put into the mouth of a goddess as a prophecy or command is, above all, an artistic device. When Horace sets Juno's speech into the context of the council of the gods in the first book of Ennius's *Annals*, the council that decided on Rome's future and Romulus's deification in particular, he creates an epic scene pointing ahead to Virgil's *Aeneid*. To interpret Rome's history in the mirror of a narrative on Rome's mythological past, in the course of which omens and prophecies open up windows into the future, was Virgil's solution for the problem of how to compose an 'historical' epos on Rome that satisfied the artistic standards of Augustan aesthetics. I cannot understand why Virgil's announcement in *G.* 3.10–16 that he would write an epos in which Augustus held center stage should indicate that Virgil at this time still thought to write an annalistic historical epos. Such a solution could only have appeared utterly inartistic for any Augustan poet's aesthetic ideals, and therefore Virgil, like every other poet of note, refused to write a national epos. Virgil announced his plan to write a national epos, one that would place Augustus at the center of Rome's historical destiny, precisely when an artistically satisfactory solution to the problem of how to do this had taken shape in his mind: the plan of the *Aeneid*. We can be pretty sure that Horace, as in fact everybody in Virgil's the inner circle, knew about this concept; it is even conceivable that the idea was not completely Virgil's own. In any case, the concept of interpreting the Roman present in the mirror of its mythic past was the artistic concept of the day. It was a concept that concurred supremely well with the ideological set piece of an ancient curse lingering over the Roman people and causing their present suffering.

Thus, even on a more specific level, the agreement between Juno's ban on the resurrection of Troy as a precondition for Roman domination of the world in *C.* 3.3 and the twelfth book of the *Aeneid* is easily explained in the context of the existence of the concept of explaining the present through the mythological past. However, it is uncertain whether Horace or Virgil is to be credited with the idea. Perhaps it is futile to pose the question in these terms. The ban on rebuilding Troy is not just a poetic ad-hoc invention in reference to contemporary politics, it is a plausible motif in this

⁶³⁴ Below, pp. 401ff.

context, because “when a proud goddess makes an important concession, she must at least be permitted to score a modest point,” as Fraenkel says. Of course, to shift the capital to the ancient site of Troy was not a serious option in Augustan politics. Horace was in no position to dissuade Augustus from any matter of political concern, nor did Augustus need Horace or any other poet as his mouthpiece to influence public opinion. Even the lucky few, who were able to appreciate Horace’s art, would hardly be inclined to model their political opinions on the precepts of the poetry they may have admired. But when it is certain that there was at least talk of such a project at the time, that there was talk of Caesar meditating on transferring the power center to Alexandria and Troy, or that Antony had analogous plans, a poetic motif like that of Juno’s ban on leaving Rome for a new Troy as a prerequisite of Roman success is clearly related to this contemporary issue. The point is not that *C.* 3.3 is intended to preclude any serious political decision of the day; the rumors about Caesar’s or Antony’s plans were part of Augustan self-representation in the context of Augustan propaganda depicting the power struggle between Octavian and Antony as one of West against East. The poetic motif of Juno pronouncing a ban on the resurrection of Troy, whatever the origin of the idea, simply mirrors the self-stylization of Augustan politics. If, in *C.* 3.3, Horace depicts Troy as the epitome of eastern decadence he only interprets this specific motif in its wider propagandistic context; the contrast ‘East vs. West’ was, of course, intended to signify the contrast between eastern decadence and Roman probity.

Only if the specific contemporary appeal of the ban on Troy’s resurrection is taken into account does the interdependence of the introduction and Juno’s speech become apparent, as Nisbet and Rudd noted. They appear to be the first interpreters to have appreciated this crucial point: *C.* 3.3 praises Augustus for displaying steadfastness and promises that this will earn him a place among the gods. Steadfastness *eo ipso* is neither a cardinal virtue claimed by Augustus for himself nor is it of particular relevance for any of his deified companions (except to some degree for Hercules, sometimes styled as a Stoic saint, which had become a philosophical commonplace). Yet, in the specific context of *C.* 3.3 steadfastness acquires a special significance in respect to Augustus. He is persistent in resisting any temptation to alienate the Roman people from the path assigned to them by their divinely willed destiny; he is the man to redirect their path once and forever toward the conditions under which the divine will granted their founder Romulus to become the deified patron of a nation destined to rule eternally over the world. The assignment to the Roman people of the holy site of Rome is the outward token of their duty to remain faithful to the values of their

primordial destiny. In restoring the Roman people to these values, binding them forever to the place assigned to them by the gods, Augustus, in being unshakably true to this purpose, seals Romulus's heritage and becomes Rome's second and last founder: the apex and the destiny of Roman history.

To admit a contemporary context, even to admit that *C.* 3.3 mirrors the basic concept of Augustan self-representation in contemporary political propaganda takes nothing away from the artistic merit of the poem. On the contrary, its artistic merit consists precisely in the fact that Horace succeeded extremely well in writing a poem that not only perfectly fulfilled its task as a piece of political propaganda, but also endowed concepts relevant to a precise historical situation with a shape in which they could be of general appeal for times to come. Here again a prime characteristic of Horace's art manifests itself in the most tangible manner: he reduces everything personal and specific—without giving anything away—to its basic, general essence, to what makes it relevant for any reader of his poetry, the contemporary addressee (or addressees) as well as the general reader of any age. Thus, Horace succeeded precisely in what Augustan cultural politics aimed at: not to influence public opinion of the day or to show off an artistically cultivated façade, but to enshrine the essence of its self-stylization in a form that could appeal to every person of culture across the centuries to come.

C. 3.4 (Descende caelo)

C. 3.4 clearly marks a caesura in the cycle of the six poems. After the 'Abbruchsformel' at the end of *C.* 3.3 it begins with an invocation of the Muse to come down from heaven and inspire the poet with song.⁶³⁵ As *C.* 3.1 began with an introductory stanza, set off from the rest of the poem, *C.* 3.4 starts with such a self-contained unit: a new addressee for the second half of the cycle: the Muse Horace chose to invoke is Calliope, called by Hesiod ἡ δὴ προφερεστάτη ἐστὶν ἀπασῶν, "who is the most eminent of all," and associated with the power of speech, which she confers upon kings (Hes. *Theog.* 79f.).⁶³⁶ She is invoked not just to inspire the poet, she is—in an

⁶³⁵ See Pasquali 1920: 692; Syndikus (2001: II 48 n. 1) objects, unjustly. It is true that *C.* 3.4 was probably conceived earlier than *C.* 3.1–3; however, if Horace felt that the 'Abbruchsformel' were inconsistent with the beginning of *C.* 3.3 why would he have used it at the end of a poem he conceived precisely for the position before *C.* 3.4. As there is a clear analogy between what is rejected in *C.* 3.3.70–72 and prayed for in *C.* 3.4.1–4 it must have been Horace's intention to stress precisely this contrast between break-off and new beginning.

⁶³⁶ Her epithet, *regina*, "queen," translates as Greek *πότνια*.

almost cletic hymn—called to appear upon earth and to sing a long poem (*longum melos*). The beginning transports us entirely into the world of Greek lyric poetry, where such invocations of the Muse are at home;⁶³⁷ to this world belongs the choice of instruments, flute or lyre, alluding to different forms of lyric poetry.⁶³⁸ The purpose of the song the Muse is asked to sing is left open; what is asked of her is only called a *longum melos*, vaguely announcing something sublime, something of particular importance: in fact, C. 3.4 is the longest poem of the whole collection. West has justly drawn attention to the exceptional accumulation of Greek words in ll. 1–4; but there is also a vis-à-vis of Greek words and Latin ‘glosses’: Calliope (i.e., “with beautiful voice,” cf. Hes. *Theog.* 68) is glossed by *voce* (“voice,” l. 3) and *cithara* by its Latin synonym *fidibus*.⁶³⁹ After the ‘Abbruchsformel’ at the end of C. 3.3 this beginning announces some new kind of grandeur; certainly not the tone of a *iocosa lyra*, “cheerful lyre,” nor the *nugae* of Callimachean craftsmanship, but something different from the epic grandeur of Juno’s speech on Rome’s military supremacy. And something very different is indeed to come in ll. 5 ff., something completely unexpected, something that, when it begins, frustrates the vague expectations of grandeur and pompousness aroused by *longum melos*.

C. 3.1 took an unexpected turn after the introductory stanza and led to a surprisingly private end;⁶⁴⁰ in C. 3.4, the surprise comes even sooner. The second stanza pretends that the prayer to the god for aid is granted: the poet seems to be risen to an inspired state of divine madness.⁶⁴¹ He hears the Muses’ voice and is transferred into a heavenly landscape, into the sacred grove of C. 1.1, where he finds the inspiration for his poetry.⁶⁴² But from ll. 9 ff. onward the hitherto entirely Greek world and the ideal landscape of the Muses is blended with references to Horace’s provincial homeland. We suddenly seem to be transferred into a real contemporary Italian landscape, sketched in a few strokes by attaching significant epithets to a series of remote insignificant places of southern Italy where the poet is at home.⁶⁴³ After the inspiration to divine madness one would expect the poet—as he

⁶³⁷ The request that the Muse sing is epic, but the summons of the Muse is lyric; cf. Sapph. 127, 128 PL; Stes. *PMG* 240; *PMG adesp.* 935; Alcm. *PMG* 14 (a).

⁶³⁸ The text is difficult, cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 57 f.; either one should adopt Theiler’s 1935: 397 view or indeed, Naylor’s *si voce* instead of *seu voce*.

⁶³⁹ For this technique, cf. Günther 1994; on the text, cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 58.

⁶⁴⁰ Above, pp. 378 f.

⁶⁴¹ See West 2002: 46 f.

⁶⁴² Above, pp. 228 ff.

⁶⁴³ Above, pp. 2 f., 9 ff.; also West 2002: 47 f.

does in *C.* 3.25—to be impelled to sing the praises of Augustus, perhaps in an even more elevated manner than in *C.* 3.3; later in the poem he does. But here Horace first speaks of childhood memories in obscure places of the Roman province.⁶⁴⁴ The Muse literally has descended from heaven into the small, restricted provincial space where the future poet was born. But what he purports to be childhood memories, located in remote places in the concrete landscape of his childhood, vividly depicted in all brevity,⁶⁴⁵ are events taken at random from the tales of Greek myth, from the biographical tradition of poet's lives,⁶⁴⁶ one might say from poetic hagiography. Thus, the small, restricted world of Horace's childhood is integrated into the ideal realm of the world of poetry, or the world of poetry descends from heaven to the provincial countryside of Horace's humble origins.⁶⁴⁷ The poet's life from its beginnings in its remotest past is transfigured in the light of his vocation as a poet, which enacts itself in the very development of this poem: from his humble beginnings he is raised high by his divine patronesses to the heights of the country resorts where the successful poet and distinguished member of Roman society resides.⁶⁴⁸ Thus, he recognizes that it was his vocation as a poet that saved him from major and minor catastrophes in his life, from the

⁶⁴⁴ Cf. Fraenkel 1957: 275 ff.

⁶⁴⁵ Cf. above, pp. 9 ff.

⁶⁴⁶ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 53; Syndikus 2001: II 52; for the textual problem in l. 10, see Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 60, who rightly reject *Pulliae* (an easy corruption from the obviously corrupt *Apuliae*) and favor Baehrens's *pergulae* (an alternative is Delz's *dum vagor*). The story about infant Horace's miraculous salvation alludes, above all, to Pindar (cf. *P. O.* 6, 45 ff., 55 ff., Philostr. *imag.* 2.12, Paus. 9.23.2). It is barely understandable that there should have been such a debate about whether or how this tale refers to Horace's real life (cf. Syndikus 2001: II 53). Of course, the details of the story are chosen with a view to their specific significance in the context of stories about divine protection for poets. To what extent the story resembles any specific event (or events) in Horace's real life is unimportant. If one asks whether Horace 'believed' in being protected by divine powers, one must be conscious of what 'belief' means (see also above, pp. 284 ff.). We have already seen (pp. 297 ff.) that Horace rejected the Epicurean doctrine of non-interference by the gods in human affairs, and he did so precisely because he felt the presence of divine powers in his poetry and his life as a poet. He believed that he was chosen by the higher powers for his vocation as a poet and that the events of his life, even the most trivial ones, had a significance in respect to his divine vocation. This conviction is the ultimate reason for Horace's self-stylization in his poetry (see above, pp. 307 ff.). It is a conviction not fundamentally different from what Arnold Schönberg meant when he said that he could learn something even by observing how Gustav Mahler tied his tie, as there is nothing incidental about a great man.

⁶⁴⁷ The remoteness of the provincial places renders Horace's raise to the heights of his poetic vocation and social standing even more astonishing; basically, Horace plays on the same trick in the story about his first encounter with Maecenas; see above, pp. 23 ff.

⁶⁴⁸ By beginning with the *Sabinum* in ll. 21 ff. Horace also drops a compliment to Maecenas; see West 2002: 50.

horrors of the battlefield, where he desperately fought for the wrong cause,⁶⁴⁹ as it saved him from the minor accidents that befall man in his everyday life, that have no meaning for ordinary men, whose life is nothing but an everyday life, but that become meaningful in the life of a man who is singled out by divine powers for a higher vocation.

In ll. 9–20, the ideal, timeless Greek world of poetry mixes inseparably with the contemporary Roman one. In ll. 21ff., the Greek Muse of ll. 1–4 has been transformed into the Latin *Camēnae*.⁶⁵⁰ In a hymnic address to them (*vester ... vestris ... vos* ll. 21/25/29) the poet turns from the past to the present and reaffirms the divine protection he enjoys in his life. It is through his achievement as a poet who transferred the ideal world of Greek poetry to the contemporary reality of Rome that Horace reached his position in Roman society. From here the horizon opens to the furthest frontiers of the Roman empire, of the entire world ruled by Rome's power and supremacy. The man who has won acclaim as a Roman poet is sure that in the company of his poetry he is safe everywhere, he need not fear even the most ferocious people. The divine madness inspired by the presence of the Muse transports Horace into the past (ll. 9–20), the present (ll. 21–28), and the future (ll. 29–36) of his life; elevated into the realm of his poetry, the poet's life in its past, present, and future incarnations assumes its higher significance. In this sphere everything, even the most remote place, the most trivial accident, gains equal significance; the transformation of reality into music unites all aspects of reality. In this sphere the poet and his 'trivial' private existence are united even to that of the ruler, the person who embodies the destiny of the whole Roman empire.

With ll. 29–36, the poem's ambit broadens out to the whole inhabited world; there the perspective suddenly changes completely: in ll. 37–40 it is no longer the poet who enjoys the company and the protection of the Muses, but the ruler who is attended by them. The Muses refresh Augustus, who is eager to rest from his labors after he has successfully accomplished his task of bringing peace and settling his troops after the war. The change of perspective is as sudden as it is prepared by the wider space into which Horace's vision penetrates from ll. 21 to 36. And with the grotto of the Muses in l. 36, where Augustus enjoys their company, we are back in the ideal landscape of poetic inspiration from which Horace's vision started in ll. 6ff.

⁶⁴⁹ Above, pp. 26ff.; West (2002: 49) rightly points out that the mention of Horace fighting at Philippi is, at the same time, an homage to Augustus's clemency and magnanimity.

⁶⁵⁰ See West 2002: 49.

The close inner unity of the spheres of the poet and the ruler, despite or because of its apparent otherness, is stressed by the anaphora *vos ... vos* at the beginning of stanza in ll. 37 and 41, an anaphora that strictly continues the hymnic anaphoras from l. 21 onward (*vester ... vestries*, ll. 21 and 25 at the stanza's beginning; cf. also *vos* in l. 31),⁶⁵¹ where Horace changes from the address to Calliope in l. 2 to the collective *Camēnae* in l. 21. With ll. 37–40, the poem, which hitherto appeared to try to find its direction, has reached its peak and its purpose:⁶⁵² the protective forces of the Muses, who inspire security and peace, unite the poet, who is their mouthpiece, and the ruler, after he has laid to rest the forces of evil and brought peace to the outside world.⁶⁵³

The following stanza (ll. 41–44) is still related closely to what precedes by the anaphoric *vos* at its beginning. Not only do the Muses refresh the emperor by their song, they even counsel him on politics: they give *lene consilium*, “gentle advice” (l. 41). *Lene*, “gentle,” refers to Augustus's policy of clemency and national reconciliation after Actium. Implicitly, the lines add a further important facet of self-representation of the regime, which had already surfaced in the dedication of C. 1.4 to Sestius toward the beginning of Book I.⁶⁵⁴ Horace's references to the part he had himself in fighting on the other side at Philippi in C. 2.7 and in ll. 25 f. of this very poem have to be seen in this context.⁶⁵⁵ If the Muses are said to inspire Augustus to such a policy, this harks back to the Hesiodic role of Calliope, named in the initial stanza, as the Muse “who is the company of kings to be revered.”⁶⁵⁶ From now on, however, it is Pindar—a model who shines through with *cithara Phoebi*, “the

⁶⁵¹ See Syndikus 2001: II 59, cf. also 53 f.

⁶⁵² Basically, the poem falls into two halves, the ‘personal excursion’ and the ‘official’ climax; however, the two parts (A and C) are not neatly set apart; the break in the middle is concealed by the anaphora suggesting continuity. Thus, the two halves are linked by a sliding transition (B), which reaches slightly beyond the precise numerical middle of the poem, i.e., vv. 39/40. The first half (A: ll. 1–39) is subdivided into the introductory stanza (a: 1–4), four stanzas on the poet's infancy (b: 5–20), four stanzas on his subsequent life (c: 21–36), and one final stanza, which forms the first part of the link passage (B: 37–40); after the appendix on the link passage (B': 41–42a), follow 5½ stanzas on theomachiae (Ca: 42b–64), one gnomic stanza (Cb: 65–68), and the coda of three stanzas (Cc: 69–80) on sinners punished in the underworld.

⁶⁵³ Cf. also Griffin 1985: 73 f.

⁶⁵⁴ See p. 244. Of course, Horace praises Augustus's clemency; he was hardly in the position to give advice to the princeps.

⁶⁵⁵ Above, pp. 25 ff., 192.

⁶⁵⁶ Above, pp. 385 f.

lyre of Phoebus" (cf. *Pi. P.* 1.1 f.), already in the first stanza⁶⁵⁷—who dominates the rest of the poem.⁶⁵⁸

In mid-line (l. 42b), Horace appends a mythological example of 22½ ll. (l. 42b–64) to his statement about the influence of the Muses' powers on the ruler. The technique of appending a long mythological narrative as illustration of a gnomic utterance is a device typical of Pindar's style, and Horace's mythological example is derived from Pindar, who uses it in a context very similar to that of Horace's poem: the unsuccessful rebellion of the forces of darkness, the Titans and Giants, against the Olympic gods.⁶⁵⁹ The symbolic contrast 'forces of light vs. forces of darkness and evil' is found already in Hesiod, but in his first *Pythian Ode* Pindar⁶⁶⁰ applies it to the enemies of his patron Hieron of Syracuse by contrasting them to the peaceful influence of music (ll. 1 ff.).⁶⁶¹ The power of music, which subdues everything violent that is alien to the harmony music embodies, is parallel to the power of Zeus (ll. 13 ff.) and of the ruler who, by subordinating himself to the divine power, knowing that all human faculties are derived from the gods (ll. 42 ff.), becomes a copy of the appeasing power (ll. 90 ff.) of music and of the highest god.⁶⁶² Not only the disruptive style, which highlights single episodes from different theomachiae instead of providing a coherent narrative, echoes Pindar's lyric narrative.⁶⁶³ Horace concludes the myth, which had begun rather abruptly in l. 42b (ll. 41 f. spoke about the *lene consilium*, to which the forces of evil in the myth stand in implicit contrast), with a gnome in l. 65 (*vis consili expers mole ruit sua*, "power without good sense comes crashing down under its own weight"). To round off a narrative illustrating a maxim with a gnome is, of course, again Pindaric. Horace's gnome is illustrated by a

⁶⁵⁷ Apart from the miraculous events from Horace's childhood depicted in ll. 9–20, which allude mainly to similar stories about Pindar (pp. 9 ff., also 2 n. 8), the syntax and the lack of an apparent direction in the train of thought in ll. 1–36 (Syndikus 2001: II 51) resemble Pindar's style.

⁶⁵⁸ Cf. Fraenkel 1957: 276 ff.; Harms 1936: 12 ff. is still a very useful, succinct, and sober survey of the Pindaric elements in *C.* 3.4.

⁶⁵⁹ Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 54 ff. and Syndikus 2001: II 61 ff., who aptly describes the Pindaric style of Horace's narrative (61, 65 f.) and contrasts Horace's depiction of the Olympian gods as conquering the brute force of their enemies with gentle ease to Greek representations of such fights (63 f.).

⁶⁶⁰ For similar concepts in the eighth *Pythian*, see Syndikus 2001: II 61 f.; also Gundert 1978: 71 ff.

⁶⁶¹ In addition to Fraenkel loc. cit., cf. Klingner 1965: 376 ff. and 747 ff.

⁶⁶² Cf. Maehler 1963: 81 ff.

⁶⁶³ Syndikus 2001: II 64 ff. (this narrative technique is mirrored, so to speak, in the syntax, as described by Dornseiff 1921: 86 ff.); for the affinities with Roman painting, cf. Schefold 1952: 88 ff.

further series of various mythical examples of notorious sinners punished in the underworld (Gyges, Orion, Tityos, Peirithoos). Where the crime is made explicit (ll. 70–72 and 79 f.) it is sexual. Thus, this appendix introduces a new motif, which prepares the way for *C.* 3.6.⁶⁶⁴

If Horace, in *C.* 3.4, parallels the poet and the ruler, united by being protected and inspired by the same divine power, the power of the Muses, he also expands on a Pindaric concept used already in *C.* 3.1: Pindar, like Horace, defines his role as a panegyric poet vis-à-vis the role of his kingly patron. Of course, Pindar cannot claim to be equal to the royal powers of his patron, but he is a poet who by his song ennobles and preserves for ages to come the triumphs of the king. Pindar has his share in the divine grace bestowed upon the king (Pi. *O.* 1.106 ff.; cf. also *P.* 3.107 ff.),⁶⁶⁵ and he even arrogates himself a position from which he is fit to give moral advice and to remind the ruler of his own inborn nature (*P.* 2.71 ff.).⁶⁶⁶ Horace goes even further: in *C.* 3.1 he recommends his private style of life—not as *the* example of civic conduct, but as *one* example of proper behavior for a Roman citizen.⁶⁶⁷ Horace, the poet, does not only live in his ideal world, he has a place in Roman society: he is a member of society who contributes to the welfare of the whole. With its sudden ending, by which the poet retreats into his private existence, far from the political life to which he referred in what preceded, *C.* 3.1 posed the question of how this private existence related to the whole of the community, of what bestowed on Horace, the poet, the privilege both to withdraw from active involvement in the political and military duties of the ordinary citizen yet to represent nevertheless in his private lifestyle a model of civic conduct. *C.* 3.4 provides the answer: like the ruler, the poet is elevated beyond the life of ordinary men by divine powers, and ultimately these divine powers are identical. Peace and harmony, both qualities of the spirit, embody the essence of what is common to both poetry and the rule of justice. True virtue is a quality of the mind that belongs to the same spiritual realm as the power of the Muses, a power that assigns to the poet his place in an ideal world, as his sublime virtues raise the ruler above human status to the gods in the song of the poet inspired by the Muses.⁶⁶⁸ With his civic poetry, especially that of his *Roman Odes*, Horace becomes,

⁶⁶⁴ Below, pp. 401 ff.

⁶⁶⁵ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1922: 234; Gundert 1978: 83 ff.

⁶⁶⁶ Above, pp. 321 f.

⁶⁶⁷ Above, pp. 378 ff.

⁶⁶⁸ Cf. also Maehler 1963: 83.

similar to Pindar, a servant and herald of virtue.⁶⁶⁹ The private, personal parts of C. 3.1 and C. 3.4 together testify to an attitude analogous to that of Pindar expressed in the personal closure of *P.* 3 (ll. 107 ff.).

Like C. 3.3,⁶⁷⁰ C. 3.4 is full of references to a precise historical context and the political concepts of a specific regime. It carries a message adapted to the needs of the concrete situation in which it has its origins, yet, this very essence of the poem speaks to future generations as well, at least to those who care to tune their ears to Horace's poetry. There is no better summary of the historical significance of Horace's panegyric poetry, 'historical' significance in the full sense of being relevant for its time and for the times to come, than the concluding remarks of West's⁶⁷¹ excellent overview of the poem, with special reference to its Augustan agenda:

Our age is out of harmony with political panegyric in verse. To tune our ears to it in this ode, we have to respond to Horace's reverence for the poetry of Pindar, to enjoy his love for the country places of Italy, and when we come to the points of praise for Augustus, we have to remember that after the victory at Actium which ended a century of civil strife, Augustus promised a Golden Age of peace, prosperity, and respect for law. He was also building a city, which had some claim to be the wealthiest and most splendid upon earth. He was even a patron of poets and allowed them, on occasion, to be amusing. To celebrate his achievement and support his attempts to fulfil those promises was not, in 23 BC, anything to be ashamed of.

C. 3.5 (*Caelo tonantem*)

C. 3.5 is a slightly shorter counterpiece to C. 3.3 in every respect.⁶⁷² It mirrors the structure of C. 3.3 with its long central speech.⁶⁷³ The example from the mythological past in C. 3.3,⁶⁷⁴ Juno's acceptance of Rome's domination of the world, is balanced by a notorious example of morality from Roman history, Regulus's unbending stance toward the ransom of captives in the First Punic

⁶⁶⁹ Gundert 1978: 77 ff.

⁶⁷⁰ See pp. 386 ff.

⁶⁷¹ West 2002: 53.

⁶⁷² Syndikus (2001: II 68) rightly suspects that the poem was devised as a link between C. 3.4 and 6 in order to complete the cycle. It not only bridges the gap between the latter two poems, it sums up the whole string of topics mentioned in C. 3.1–3.

⁶⁷³ Whereas in the long C. 3.3 the A and B sections framing the long central speech are heavily asymmetrical (see above, p. 386), C. 3.5, with its much shorter speech, eludes a symmetrical arrangement by a slight enjambment (4 : 6 : 4 stanzas): A: ll. 1–18a, B: ll. 18b–40, C: ll. 41–56, i.e., 4^{1/2}—5^{1/2}—4 stanzas.

⁶⁷⁴ Above, pp. 386 ff.

War.⁶⁷⁵ In C. 3.3, Juno gave her assent to Roman domination over the world; in C. 3.5 Horace proclaims the conquest of Britain and, in particular, victory over the most pertinacious enemy, the Parthians, still resistant to Roman domination, as the ultimate national duty.⁶⁷⁶ As C. 3.3 combines and interprets the central motifs of the preceding poems, C. 3.5 combines and sums up almost all the various motifs of C. 3.1–4. The opening stanza takes up the deification of the ruler, a topic that runs through the whole series C. 3.3–5. Horace now places it at the head of the poem. Augustus is named in explicit parallel to Jupiter; the expectations that were vaguely aroused by C. 3.1.5–8, but frustrated in the course of the poem, are fulfilled now: as in C. 1.12 Augustus appears as the highest god's representative on earth.⁶⁷⁷ However, Horace gives the conventional topos and slogan of Augustan propaganda a special twist: the divine status of Augustus as *praesens divus*, “a god on earth,”⁶⁷⁸ is postponed and made dependant on the condition of conquering Britain and the Parthians. One should not make too much of Horace postponing Augustus's deification or of the fact that he advocates worldwide rule of Rome by new conquests. Whatever Augustus's later ‘Realpolitik’ was,⁶⁷⁹ the ambitious expectations aroused in the post-Actium period that Augustus might fulfill Rome's ultimate aspirations of worldwide rule was a useful political slogan to enhance the emperor's dignity and emphasize national pride. Neither Augustus nor Horace need have taken it too seriously.⁶⁸⁰ But the interconnection of Augustus's future deification and the Parthian Wars makes the introduction (ll. 1–12) a suitable tag to which to attach the Regulus anecdote, just as C. 3.3.1–16 served as a tag for Juno's speech. The request to conquer the entire world, i.e., Britain and the Parthians, leads to the indignant question of how it is even conceivable that the prisoners of war after the humiliation of Carrhae—not mentioned explicitly—could have chosen to give up their Roman identity for barbarian wives and servile customs.

⁶⁷⁵ Cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 80 ff.

⁶⁷⁶ Syndikus 2001: II 71. The Parthian War already appeared in C. 3.2; see pp. 382 ff.

⁶⁷⁷ Above, p. 366; for the roots of the idea in Hellenistic ruler cult, cf. Syndikus 2001: 69 f.; cf. also Kienast 2009. 244 ff.; for Hellenistic political panegyric poetry cf. also Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004: 350 ff.

⁶⁷⁸ For the connotations of *praesens*, see Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 83; also Syndikus 2001: II 70.

⁶⁷⁹ Cf. Syndikus 2001: II 71; Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 80.

⁶⁸⁰ This does not mean that the ‘humane’ and moderate peacelover Horace was indifferent or opposed to military adventures that enhanced Roman national pride. To find poets, even great poets, to celebrate their country's war efforts, one need not look very far.

This train of thought allows Horace to point the finger at the present moral decay and contrast it to pristine, uncontaminated virtue;⁶⁸¹ by emphasizing the shameful union of Roman soldiers with barbarian wives he can even allude to the sexual connotations of the list of sinners at the end of *C.* 3.4 and prepare for *C.* 3.6.⁶⁸² But all these facets of the train of thought are of subordinate importance. The Carrhae episode allows Horace to contrast the behavior of Roman soldiers from the immediate past to the example of Regulus, and Regulus's example has an appeal that reaches far beyond the special case of proper behavior in war and defeat.⁶⁸³ The extreme position advocated by Regulus that a Roman soldier should know no alternative but victory or defeat, and that whoever does not comply with this rigorous standard can never be a useful member of society (ll. 25–36), has often been viewed in contrast with Horace's much-invoked humanity and moderation, not to mention his less than militaristic attitude in what he says about his own behavior in battle in *C.* 2.7.⁶⁸⁴ It is true that the rigorous stance advocated in *C.* 3.5, though in good old Roman tradition, is portrayed as anything but a matter of course in a comparable case (the defeat of Cannae) by Livy (22. 61.1); Cicero (*Clu.* 128) takes a much more accommodating view. In Horace, however, there is no hint of the poet distancing himself from Regulus's words. Still, it must be remembered that we hear Regulus's words, not those of the poet. Not that Horace does not endorse them, but the text induces the reader to admire Regulus's unbending, almost superhuman rectitude. Horace's comment on Regulus's behavior forms the poem's conclusion (ll. 41–56), which is almost equal in length to Regulus's speech.⁶⁸⁵ When Regulus in utter serenity bids farewell to his wife and children, the emphasis falls on the strength of character of a man who incarnates the self-content stoic virtue that resides in the power of the mind, the virtue praised in *C.* 3.2.17–20 and, above all, in *C.* 3.3.1–8.⁶⁸⁶ The 'private' coda of

⁶⁸¹ With *hoc caverat*, "this he (i.e., the far-seeing mind of Regulus) had sought to prevent" (l. 13), the present is measured explicitly by the past; cf. Syndikus 2001: II 73.

⁶⁸² Above, pp. 394 ff., and below, pp. 401 ff. For the allusions to Augustus's political program in ll. 9–12, see West 2002: 57.

⁶⁸³ Mommsen's view that Horace argues against ransoming the prisoners of war from the defeat of Carrhae is even less plausible than his idea that in *C.* 3.3 Horace denounces an actual plan to shift the center of power to Troy (above, pp. 386 ff.); cf. Fraenkel 1957: 273.

⁶⁸⁴ See pp. 29 ff., 192.

⁶⁸⁵ Excellent interpretation by Syndikus 2001: II 79 f.; for the emotional appeal of ll. 41 ff., cf. also West 2002: 57 f.

⁶⁸⁶ Above, p. 386. It should be remembered that Cicero in *De off.* 1.39 and 3.99 ff. adduces Regulus as the supreme example of *fides*, as a model of the subordination of personal to public interests; this uncompromising stance is the result of his steadfastness and consistency,

C. 3.5 reminds one of the surprisingly private conclusion of C. 3.1.⁶⁸⁷ Regulus's unwavering acceptance of death in the interest of his fatherland illustrates that the military virtues, demanded of a Roman youth in C. 3.2.1–16 and culminating in his readiness to gladly die a lover's death for his country,⁶⁸⁸ ultimately reside in virtues and attitudes that pervade the whole person: Regulus is the example of a man who truly combines the civic and military virtues advocated in C. 3.1–3.

Of course, in the light of certain twentieth-century experiences the demand to fight or die evokes extremely uneasy feelings, as do the aspirations to worldwide rule by military force, and the seemingly racist condemnation of mixing with a barbarous enemy evokes awkward memories as well. However, the enormous gap between Horace's historical surroundings and an age in which (white) racism, aspirations to global domination, and mindless militarism have gained an entirely different dimension⁶⁸⁹ should prevent us from rashly either condemning Horace as a mindless or servile follower of the political propaganda of a certain regime or excusing him by playing down his engagement and not taking his words seriously. Horace's emphasis is not on particular actions such as military courage or proud disdain for mingling with inferior tribes, but on his admiration for unbending consistency and strength of character, which proves itself in extreme situations. And here I come back to a point made above on C. 3.2:⁶⁹⁰ in order to grasp the special essence of Horace's patriotic poetry one has to really appreciate the gap between his entirely serious exhortation to the young to be ready to die for their country, and his self-depiction as the man who threw away his armour at Philippi (cf. also *Epist.* 2.1.124),⁶⁹¹ a scene evoked in the very cycle of the *Roman Odes* in C. 3.4.25f., where he speaks of *versa acies retro*, "the rout of the battle line."⁶⁹² We are always tempted to imagine

a consistency that owed keeping an oath to its self-respect, not to the fear of divine punishment. Thus, Regulus is portrayed as the model of the self-sufficient Stoic virtue of C. 3.3.

⁶⁸⁷ Above, pp. 378 ff.; for the anachronistic element in C. 3.5.41 ff., cf. West 2002: 60.

⁶⁸⁸ Above, p. 383 with n. 616.

⁶⁸⁹ We are used to expressing distaste or even horror or revulsion at the inhuman or cruel attitudes of earlier times, measuring them by what we suppose to be the ultimate standards of humanity and rationality that mankind has finally achieved in our enlightened age, just as we often use the term 'medieval' as a synonym of 'cruelty and superstition.' If we asked ourselves more often whether any age has ever surpassed the crimes committed against humanity by Europe and western 'civilization' in the 20th (and 21st) century, our complacent judgments of attitudes and events of previous epochs might appear in a slightly different light.

⁶⁹⁰ See pp. 382 ff.

⁶⁹¹ Above, pp. 29 ff.

⁶⁹² Above, pp. 391 f.

Horace as the wealthy, hedonistic, and worldly wise courtier, the poet who soon became a classic, the acclaimed poet laureate of a highly successful political regime that provided its favorite poets with cosy private surroundings. Horace's words would then sound rather shallow indeed: a descent into cheap political propaganda. Yet, one has to remember that Horace knew better than most of his admirers or critics what he was talking about. When he spoke of death on the battleground, he spoke from personal experience.⁶⁹³ He was not the 'American grandpa' who did nothing but publish book after book, was read in school, and honored by the authorities of the state, as Robert Frost appeared to Anna Akhmatova, when he visited her in 1962.⁶⁹⁴ To be sure, he was not a dissident national poet, who underwent nothing but humiliation and suffering, and his Muse was not she, who dictated to Dante his *Inferno*. Yet, Horace not only experienced firsthand the worst slaughter of his age, he experienced, as a man of military action and strong political convictions, the complete collapse of a world he ardently believed in; he experienced this collapse presumably more acutely than any other Augustan poet. And here we have an analogy to twentieth-century experiences indeed: I have compared Horace's war experience with that expressed in Stefan George's poem, "An einen jungen Führer aus dem ersten Weltkrieg."⁶⁹⁵ Horace could speak of this experience with much greater authority than Stefan George could. This is the reason why Horace is both less pompous about himself than George is when he talks about somebody else, and that is the reason why he can also be so crude in his requests upon others. It is not just as a polite and opportunistic gesture toward the victorious side that Horace downplays his military engagement, up to the self-deprecation of C. 2.7; Horace's offhand manner in speaking of his military past reveals the attitude of a man whom life had taught not to pity himself, and who equally has no pity for others.⁶⁹⁶ Much has been said about Virgil's sensitivity and compassion for the losers; Horace does not share this compassion, but his lack of compassion is not in contrast to the insight and sympathy with human weakness he so abundantly displays elsewhere. On the contrary, both his lack of pity and his deep understanding of the human self

⁶⁹³ Above, pp. 26 ff.

⁶⁹⁴ Orlowa and Kopelew 1989: 33 f.

⁶⁹⁵ Above, pp. 31 f. and Günther 2010a: 157 ff.

⁶⁹⁶ Above, p. 53. If anyone needs a lesson on poetry and militarism one could compare Horace's manner of speaking about his war experience with that of D'Annunzio or Ernst Jünger, although one should note that one does not do justice to the latter by judging him only on his 'In Stahlgewittern.'

are the result of coping with the extraordinary ups-and-downs of his exceptional biography.⁶⁹⁷ If Horace admires and advocates a behavior that holds on uncompromisingly and at all cost to rigorous principles in extreme situations,⁶⁹⁸ he is in a position quite different from that of most of his subsequent readers. Readers who fail to appreciate this difference will never understand much of Horace's poetry, a poetry that, despite all its autobiographical references, induces one to forget too easily that Horace did not grow up in a comfortable armchair. That his poetry does make one forget this is one of its foremost qualities.

C. 3.6 (*Delicta maiorum*)

The last poem of the cycle, C. 3.6, is closest to Horace's early political poetry of the *Epodes*;⁶⁹⁹ the content and moralizing tone very much resemble C. 3.24, which is probably contemporary with C. 3.6.⁷⁰⁰ With the address to the Roman people in l. 2 Horace projects himself even more closely than in C. 3.1 into a situation analogous to that of *Epod.* 16.⁷⁰¹ However, the solemn address, with the generalizing singular *Romane*, "Roman," clearly strikes a religious note (as does the address in C. 3.1). It does not project us into a political assembly as does *Epod.* 16: it is the language of the prophet, of the Delphic or Sibyllan oracles.⁷⁰² Thus, we are again more or less in the situation evoked at the beginning of the cycle in C. 3.1.1–4: the poet speaking in the role of a *sacerdos*, "priest" of the Muses.⁷⁰³ Only there, the poet pretended to speak only to a part—the *melior pars*, "the better part," of *Epod.* 16—of the Roman population: the youth, uncontaminated by the crimes and decay of the past. In fact, the stance Horace assumes at the beginning of C. 3.1, written later in order to integrate C. 3.6 into a cycle, is devised to be taken up by this poem, which concludes the series.⁷⁰⁴

⁶⁹⁷ Above, pp. 2 ff.

⁶⁹⁸ Cf. Horace's admiration for the Stoic ideal in *Epist.* 1.1, an ideal he admits not being able to achieve himself; Günther 2010a: 69 ff.

⁶⁹⁹ Fraenkel 1957: 286.

⁷⁰⁰ Above, p. 242.

⁷⁰¹ Above, pp. 191 ff.

⁷⁰² See Syndikus 2001: II 83.

⁷⁰³ Above, pp. 376 ff.

⁷⁰⁴ Of course, the situation evoked by C. 3.1.1–4, which makes one think of the performance of a religious ceremony before the adherents of an esoteric cult (Syndikus 2001: II 13 f.), is not identical with that of C. 3.6, it just evokes a religious atmosphere, which then returns at the end of the cycle. It need not be identical, because C. 3.4 has a completely different address. The oracular language of *Romane* would not suit C. 3.1, with its private aim, at all; the poet, explicitly cast into the role of a priest of the Muses before an esoteric audience, suits the emphasis on the poet's lifestyle as segregated from the crowd of ordinary people.

A comparison with *Epod.* 16 or *C.* 3.24, even closer in content to the moralizing attacks in *C.* 3.6,⁷⁰⁵ highlights the particular style and character of the latter: instead of accumulating parallel images, *C.* 3.6 concentrates on a selection of a few massively elaborated items, a technique characteristic of Horace's mature odes of the time, such as *C.* 1.2.⁷⁰⁶ Thus, Horace puts the focus on just two of the various aspects of the present moral decay, in comparison with that of the past, which he also adduces elsewhere in similar contexts:⁷⁰⁷ neglect of cult and sexual licence of women. The language is laconic, monumental, with rather few, but poignant epithets and added emphasis by anaphora, antithesis, and hyperbaton.⁷⁰⁸ The poem is divided into three blocks of precisely equal length, i.e., four stanzas⁷⁰⁹ (A: ll. 1–16: neglect of cult as the reason for Rome's misfortunes; B: ll. 17–32: sexual licence of present-day women; C: ll. 33–48: the good old times contrasted with present decay in the last stanza). Except for one case of enjambment (between ll. 40 and 41), every stanza forms a neat syntactical unit.⁷¹⁰ The symmetrical arrangement 4 : 4 : 4 echoes the series of stanza pairs in *C.* 3.1.⁷¹¹ Horace's choice of issues is due, of course, to the fact that the restitution of religious observance⁷¹² and the curbing of excessive sexual licence⁷¹³ were a cornerstone of Augustus's attempt to stabilize his regime. *C.* 3.6 was almost certainly written ca. 28 BC, i.e., in the very period when the restoration of religious monuments was underway:⁷¹⁴ a fitting opportunity not only to support the princeps's political efforts, but also to celebrate him as the author of Rome's future adornment with splendid new buildings. Augustus's first attempts at marriage legislation belong to 28 BC, too.

However, the combination of these two seemingly unconnected issues is intelligible not only for purely external reasons. Neglect of worship vs. religious observance and sexual licence vs. chastity are easily correlated

⁷⁰⁵ For the differences, cf. Syndikus 2001: II 87.

⁷⁰⁶ Above, pp. 323 ff.

⁷⁰⁷ Cf. Syndikus 2001: II 81 n. 2.

⁷⁰⁸ Syndikus 2001: II 85.

⁷⁰⁹ Cf. Syndikus 2001: II 82.

⁷¹⁰ This is the style of, e.g., *C.* 1.10; above, pp. 277 ff.

⁷¹¹ Above, pp. 376 ff.

⁷¹² Cf. Kienast 2009: 220 ff.; Zanker 1987: 107 ff.; for references to Augustus's political agenda in general, see West 2002: 66 ff.

⁷¹³ Syndikus 2001: II 86 f.; Kienast 2009: 164 ff.

⁷¹⁴ Syndikus 2001: II 85.

issues.⁷¹⁵ Sexual offences suggest impurity,⁷¹⁶ as does the neglect of ritual prescriptions: sexual abstinence is itself a prescription of ritual purity. When Horace, in *C.* 3.6, demands proper religious behavior as a precondition of a flourishing community, he first of all emphasizes proper compliance with a corpus of rules of worship, i.e., he refers to this basic concept of ancient religiosity, which is at the very heart of Roman *religio*, with its legalistic concept of the relationship between man and the higher powers.⁷¹⁷ And the contemporary occasion on which Horace tags his poem, the princeps's intention to rebuild the ancient sites of the gods, exactly mirrors this concept of *religio*: Augustus's 'Bauprogramm' was meant literally to restore traditional religious behavior by a symbolic act of piety by the ruler as the representative of the Roman people. In such a context guilt implies neglect of ritual observance, i.e., impurity, pollution. This impurity, which implies an objective notion of guilt or responsibility,⁷¹⁸ falls from the previous generation upon the next. Guilt, in this sense, is a stain, something that *eo ipso* can or must be passed on by one generation to the other, but also something that can be cleansed by proper observance of certain rules.

In this context, it is no coincidence that if impiety is the reason for Rome's present moral decay this decay is illustrated by sexual transgression. Sexual transgression emphasizes this very aspect of improper behavior: impurity, something that left a stain on primordial purity, as a stain that has to be cleansed (explicitly emphasized in the text in l. 18 by *inquinavere*, "they (i.e., the recent generations) defiled, sc. marriage").⁷¹⁹ If we look both at Horace's poem and at Augustus's attempts to restore a stable political order in the

⁷¹⁵ Syndikus (2001: II 87) also justly points to the religious significance of the marriage ritual.

⁷¹⁶ For the concept of purity/pollution in ancient religion, cf. Parker 1983; for Rome, cf. Latte 1960: 47 ff., who lists the respective Latin terms.

⁷¹⁷ Above, pp. 286 ff.

⁷¹⁸ Cf. also Newman's (2011: 46 ff.) perceptive remarks on *vitium*: he explicitly refers to the end of *C.* 3.6 (*progeniem vitioriorum*, l. 48). But perhaps it is worth mentioning that Latin has a word (*culpa*) that corresponds to something like 'guilt,' whereas in Greek the notion of guilt (or responsibility) is covered by several words (above all ἁμαρτία, ἄτη, μίσημα), none of which is synonymous with guilt (if the *HWP* VIII 1442 ff. s.v. 'Schuld' lists ἁμαρτία, ἀμάρτημα, ὀφειλήμα as synonyms for 'guilt' this fact alone reveals the author's extremely simplistic approach). If modern scholars were more aware of the difficulties of defining precisely what guilt, in contrast to responsibility, means in our perception and that ἁμαρτία is not in the least synonymous with our concept of guilt, however we may define it, many pitfalls of modern interpretations of Greek texts, Aristotle and Greek tragedy, in particular, could have been avoided; cf. Lurje 2004.

⁷¹⁹ The same point is emphasized even more strongly in the previous poem, *C.* 3.5.26 ff.

context of the ancient, specifically Roman concepts of religion, ethics, and guilt (or responsibility) and take them seriously, it is immediately obvious why Horace could easily single out and combine in this poem two key issues of Augustus's moral reform, namely restitution of cult and proper sexual behavior, in a meaningful way: the issues were closely related in the religious and ethical mentality of the time, and this relationship was felt in the same way by Horace, Augustus, and their contemporaries.⁷²⁰

To measure the present against an ideal past is, of course, one of the most trivial Roman figures of thought,⁷²¹ and to view the present in the light of a transfigured ideal past as a link in a chain of continuous deterioration is a figure of thought common in antiquity, in general. However, in *C.* 3.6, Horace adopts a very specific version of this ideology, which, as Kerkhecker⁷²² has shown in his paper on Cicero's Caesarian speeches, was to become an expedient both of Roman political analysis and self-consciousness at the dawn of the arrival of a new order. The present disasters were traced back to an ancient guilt bequeathed upon the present by the sins of their forefathers.⁷²³ Such an explanation, which both exculpated the present generation and eventually exonerated it from taking responsible political action, was politically extremely expedient in order to cover up the transition of power from the old political elite to an autocratic regime. The old concept of inherited guilt, of crucial importance for the understanding of ancient Greek myth and thought, Aeschylus and Greek tragedy, in particular, is based on the concept of guilt as a physical stain, a *μίσμα*;⁷²⁴ Horace, in *C.* 3.6, adapts this concept pointedly to a political slogan of his time.⁷²⁵

With *C.* 3.6, Horace placed at the end of his cycle a text that ultimately establishes respect for the higher powers as the basis of proper conduct of a Roman citizen. It reduces everything said so far to the famous gnome: *dis te minorem quod geris, imperas*, "it is because you hold yourself inferior to the gods that you rule" (*C.* 3.6.5). If we read the cycle as it stands, *C.* 3.6

⁷²⁰ After what has been said above (pp. 296 ff.) on Horace's religiosity there is not the slightest reason to believe that Horace is not serious in what he says. On his personal stance toward Augustus's marriage legislation, see above, pp. 379 f.

⁷²¹ See Syndikus 2001: II 73.

⁷²² Kerkhecker in Schwindt 2002: 93 ff., especially 102 ff.; also Reinhardt in De Gennaro and Günther 2009: 158 f.

⁷²³ Accordingly, the 'Bildprogramm' of Apollo's temple on the Palatine suggested expiation of past sins by religious observance; see Zanker 1997: 91.

⁷²⁴ See above, p. 403 n. 718.

⁷²⁵ He had already applied the concept of the curse in *Epod.* 7 (ll. 17–20) and 16 (l. 9) to Roman history, using the story of Romulus and Remus; cf. Watson 2003: 268 f.; 282 f.; 494 f.

puts the final accent on a theme that shone through all previous poems in various forms and facets: indeed, the supreme power of Jupiter was proclaimed immediately after the opening address in *C.* 3.1. Thus, in view of the chronology of the composition of the poems, *C.* 3.1–3 and 5 were likely devised to prepare for *C.* 3.6, which was intended to form the conclusion of the cycle. The various styles of life, the civic virtues, the ordinary citizen, the poet, and the ruler, are all united in their relationship, their subordination to the divine sphere. A special closeness to the divine unites the poet and the ruler.⁷²⁶ Their closeness consists in a special vocation, but it is a vocation that subjects them to reverent observance and gratitude to the higher powers on which their elevated status depends. Proper civic behavior of whatever sort and in whatever circumstances refers back to an inner state of mind that elevates man above the level of his involvement with the world and earns him a place in heaven (*C.* 3.2.17–24; *C.* 3.3.1–16).⁷²⁷ *C.* 3.6 teaches that the proper way for man to attain this state of mind is the reverent observance of the ancient rules of cult.

If the first two sections of *C.* 3.6 (A: ll. 1–16 and B: ll. 17–32) painted a dire picture of the religious and sexual decadence of the present, the final part (C: ll. 33–48) opens the view into the bright ideal past, which serves as a model for a better future. As Horace often does, and did in the previous poem, *C.* 3.6 seems to be destined to end not on a bitter, but on a peaceful and positive note; yet, this is not quite so.⁷²⁸ The last stanza returns to the vices of the present and seems to end in a cynical commentary on the present generation's lack of capacity for giving birth to a better one. Is this the message the priest of the Muses of *C.* 3.1 has in store for the selected boys and girls he pretends to address in *C.* 3.1.1–4?

The ideal life of old that Horace paints in *C.* 3.6.33–44 is not the untroubled life of the Golden Age or the Isles of the Blessed, it is a life of hard labor (ll. 37–41), occasionally even of military strife (ll. 33–36). But labor has its reward: the depiction of the ancient Roman society of farmers and soldiers finishes in a bucolic evening landscape, suggested by a few highly evocative strokes, where humans and animals rest together in the light of the departing sun.⁷²⁹ Virgil's bucolic landscape transformed nature into a symbol of escape from the oppressions of the realities of life; in his image of

⁷²⁶ Above, pp. 393 ff.

⁷²⁷ Above, pp. 382 ff., 386 ff.

⁷²⁸ On the conclusion of the poem, cf. the excellent remarks of Syndikus 2001: II 89 ff.

⁷²⁹ Syndikus (2001: I 89 n. 50) aptly compares Virg. *Ecl.* 1.82 f. and 2.66 f.; cf. also Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 111 f.

life among the farmers in Rome's golden times Horace reconciles ideal and reality in a projection of the transfigured life of older times into a future reality modeled on the example of the past. This bright life of the future is the prophet's message for the boys and girls of *C.* 3.1.1–4; beside this new generation, unstained by the crimes of the past, the polluted present generation can only be dispatched with a disdainful gesture that at best can serve to remind the present to do its best to provide at least a basis for the brighter future for which it can hope.

The *Roman Odes* perfectly express the mood of the years immediately following Actium, the years in which a new order began to establish itself.⁷³⁰ Shortly after the disastrous upheavals of the past this new order could be a concrete and definite hope, but not a certainty. Equally, the new regime had to be careful to emphasize continuity with the past, to pretend at least that traditional civic values, such as the people's participation in political and military affairs, were still the order of the day. Later, in the fourth book of *Odes*, the situation was much different; the new order had by then firmly and definitely established itself. No one is called to arms any longer, no one needs to participate in political affairs, as all is laid to rest by the emperor and his assistants (*C.* 4.15.17 ff.; *C.* 4.5.17 ff.; also *C.* 4.4.37 ff.; *C.* 4.14.34 ff.).⁷³¹ Now, the present generation is already blessed, and this new life of the present surpasses that hoped for in *C.* 3.6. It faintly echoes the serene aspects of the Roman farmers depicted in *C.* 3.6,⁷³² and is almost that of the Golden Age or the Isles of the Blessed to which the desperate *vates* of *Epod.* 16 once promised to lead the 'better part' of his people.⁷³³

⁷³⁰ Above, pp. 237 ff.; see also Syndikus in Davis 2010: 206 f.

⁷³¹ For the character of Horace's political poetry in the fourth book of *Odes*, cf. Günther 2010a: 142 ff.

⁷³² Cf. *C.* 4.5.17–24 (as in *C.* 3.6 the emphasis is on purity); *C.* 4.5.29–32 and the happy drinking party in *C.* 4.15, 25 ff. correspond to the rest from labor in the evening in *C.* 3.6.

⁷³³ The mood and attitude of Horace's address to the young in the *Roman Odes* are quite comparable to those in Stefan George's poems, *Der Krieg* and *Der Dichter in der Zeit der Wirren*, composed after the First World War. Horace, however, lived to see his hopes come true; Stefan George knew they would not come true even in the next generation.

THE FIRST BOOK OF LETTERS

Elaine Fantham

Abstract: When he published the first book of letters, Horace was conscious of his age but proud of both his mature perspective and the originality of his art form. Lucilius may have written some satires in letter form but Horace's collection was a new kind of achievement: in variety, in arrangement, and above all in expressing his personality and adjusting to the nature of his addressees. These letters convey their moral inspiration with such lightness and simplicity that the reader scarcely notices the reiterated ideal of living well and wisely, living freely and fittingly to one's years and circumstances. Conventional letters of recommendation (to Tiberius, 9) and invitation (to Torquatus 5), of advice to the younger generation, simultaneously convey their characters to us and veil his criticism. Loving descriptions of his Sabine farm are motivated as replies to the urban Fuscus and Horace's discontented bailiff (10, 14). Maecenas he hails as subject of his first and last poetry, and treats with intimate frankness, blaming Maecenas for failing to reproach him like a good friend, and refusing his pressure to stay in Rome (the problematic 7 and 19 justify and affirm his claim of pioneering independence).

Keywords: Self-portrait, friendship, innovation

Readers (and I do mean readers, since I cannot imagine that Horace intended his letters to be 'published' by recitation) must have been as amazed in 20 BC as they still are, if they come to Horace's *Epistles* from either the *Odes*, published three years before them, or the *Satires* and *Epodes* of the thirties. And probably they are as charmed as I was when I attended Eduard Fraenkel's seminar on the First Book, when he was writing his book devoted to his beloved Horace in the mid-1950's. Fraenkel was not the beginning of our understanding; he and all Horatians owe our basic approach to Richard Heinze, both his essay and his enhancement of Kiessling's edition.¹ But Fraenkel's book would be the beginning of a series of penetrating studies by scholars, one of which deserves special recall. Gordon Williams deliberately opened his compendious *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford, 1968) with a chapter on *Epistles* I hailing the book's unique originality and using these letters to probe the kind of interpretative questions we should

¹ See Heinze 1919, reprinted 366–380 in Kiessling and Heinze ed. 6 of 1959.

ask about Roman poetry, and about each poem. It is still rewarding to use his outline (p. 30) of interrogative approaches for students of Augustan (and any other) poetry to adopt. I shall follow Williams, and the assumption of "New Criticism" that readers should be able to deduce everything that the poet wanted them to know from close study of the poem.²

Horace probably did not know Cicero's *Letters to Atticus*, but he may have read some of the *Letters to his Friends*, sixteen books mostly grouped by correspondent, and ordered (mostly) chronologically within each correspondence. It is also likely that Horace read some of Epicurus's letters to his friends and fellow students of philosophy, which circulated widely and were quoted two generations later by Seneca in his *Moral Letters* to Lucilius.³ (Seneca owed a great deal to Horace's collection, but he will not acknowledge it.) When he set out to compose his poetry book of letters, Horace could have chosen to include more than one letter to intimate friends—as he actually did for Maecenas, dedicatee of all Horace's work up to this time, and more inexplicably for young Lollius. And he could have addressed formal and respectful letters as a compliment to important men like Agrippa (*Odes* 1.6), Sestius (*Odes* 1.4) and Asinius Pollio (*Odes* 2.1): he would follow this pattern again in *Odes* 4, which addresses poems to the consuls of 11, 10, and 8 BC and makes the prince Drusus, consul of 9 AD, hero of the fourth poem. Instead, he sought to spread the letters across as many friends as possible, and in order to write openly about his personal concerns, he chose to address most of the letters to young men, and to lesser or unknown figures like Numicius, Bullatius, and Vala. As Williams has shown, there is no reason to doubt that these men existed among Horace's friends, but another element of each letter—its occasion—is far more fictitious. An obvious example is the invitation to a relatively grand friend, Torquatus (*Epist.* 1.5), to come from Rome to dinner the same evening, apparently at Horace's farm, and to let Horace know what additional guests Torquatus would like to invite (or bring with him?). An impossible situation, with which we may compare 1.13 to Vinnius Asina, who is already on his journey to Augustus across the Pyrenees. How is that letter to reach the traveling messenger? How, for that matter, did Ovid's Penelope expect her letter to reach the wandering Ulysses? Ovid, too, exploits an impractical fiction.

² Modern readers, no longer content with "what the poet wanted readers to know," tend to focus behind the poet's back on Freudian or Foucauldian interpretation.

³ Seneca owed a great deal to Horace's letter book, but he would not acknowledge it by explicit reference, as he did other works of Horace: even *Epist.* 1.11.27 is reworded without credit at *Ep. Mor.* 28.1.

So *Epistles* Book 1 includes letters addressed (and probably sent as a courtesy) to fifteen acquaintances. They are also diverse in function: the invitation to Torquatus (5); a letter of recommendation to Tiberius, the grandest of Horace's correspondents (9); and enquiries from the Campanian Vala about local amenities (15), but their predominant purpose is moral: the exchange of moral encouragement such as we find from Cicero to the younger politicians Curio (*Fam* 5.2) and Caelius, but also the occasional personal confession (8). The need for letters is explained by allusions to physical separation, from the *studiosa cohors* accompanying Tiberius to Asia on his diplomatic expedition for negotiation with Parthia (letters 3, 8, 9) to Horace's own absence from Rome (2, and, most crucially, on the move in 7). Apart from 2, addressed from Praeneste to Lollius at Rome, the actual location of his correspondents is seldom given. And if we are judging the epistolary nature of these poems by their power of communication, we are bound to question whether his bailiff, detained on the Sabine farm, while Horace felt obliged to stay in Rome and console his bereaved friend Lamia, would be able to read, still less understand, Horace's comparison of the merits of town and country in 14. Bailiffs had to be literate to keep accounts and administer veterinary remedies to sick sheep, but the literacy of the uneducated was usually limited to lists and routine instructions and ingredients.

What appeals so much to readers is the combination of simplicity and diversity in this spread of letters, many of them as short as odes. Without embracing ethical doctrine or overt preaching, Horace, "not committed to swear on the words of any teacher" (1.14),⁴ writes powerfully of taming the emotions, both the individual's spontaneous desires and fears, and his uncontrolled reactions to other men and circumstances. And as Seneca will do after him, he softens any possible arrogance in advising with admission of his own weaknesses and failures. Horace has matured: *non eadem est aetas, non mens* (my age and attitude have changed, 1.4) and his opening regret at aging helps to explain his mellow sympathy with his addressees and eliminates the mockery that sometimes alienates in the early Satires. But he has not lost his gift for vivid narrative and swiftly outlined animal fables and satiric social vignettes.

⁴ In this he is echoing Cicero *Tusc.* 4.7: "I will not be tied to the tenets of any single school as something I must obey in my philosophy," (tr. Graver).

Maecenas comes first, and last (apart from the envoi to the little book, 20), and it is probably best to take together *Epistles* 1 and 19, although we cannot be sure that they were written at the same time: opening poems are often programmatic and written after the rest of the book they are designed to introduce. The opening letter uses surprise tactics: first, the grand and comprehensive address to Maecenas, whom Horace had honored in his first poetry, *Prima dicte mihi*, and would honor in his last, *summa dicende Camena*, not just, I think, the first and last letters of this book, but of Horace's poetic career; then, the switch to the world of the arena in which Maecenas wants to confine Horace to his old training school although he has earned his discharge like Veianius. Perhaps we need to give more attention to *includere*: does it foreshadow Horace's resistance to being confined to Rome with Maecenas in the seventh letter?

The question of age surfaces in Horace's first reaction (4) and is reflected in the images of the retired gladiator and the aging racehorse (8–10), both risking disgrace if they persist to the end (*extrema*, ... *ad extremum*, with different senses), but before Horace thrusts his new mission into the foreground he makes an ostensibly simple but really quite ambiguous statement:

Nunc itaque versus et cetera ludicra pono.

So now I set aside verses and other playful activities.

While the gladiator and the racehorse both suggest taking *ludicra* as performance at the public *ludi*, other related passages in this book and in *Epistles* 2.2 to Florus, invite us to see verses as part of the world of play, and the symposium, like the Greek use of *paignia*/*paizein* imitated by Catullus; this would treat the lyric poetry of the *Odes* as symposiastic and erotic, although Horace's collection rose above such lyric themes to patriotic encomium. In support of *ludicra* as "amusement" I would cite 1.14.36, *nec luisse pudet sed non incidere ludum* ("I am ashamed not to have sported but to have failed to put an end to my sport") and the fuller development in *Epist.* 2.2: 55–56: *singula de nobis anni praedantur euntes/eripere iocos, Venerem, convivium ludum*, 142 *tempestivum pueris concedere ludum*, 183 *cessare et ludere et ungui*, and 214 *lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti*. ... ("The years rob us of each thing as they pass, jesting, love, parties and sport," "to yield up sport, more timely for boys," "to idle and sport and put on perfume," and "you have sported enough and eaten and drunk enough. ...")

Horace is explicit here (and again in 1.14) that he recognizes his advanced age has made his old amusements inappropriate. But the testimony of Seneca's letters or for that matter Augustus's letter to Maecenas (quoted by

Macrobius) suggests that Maecenas had not matured along with Horace, and it may have been an unspoken issue that Horace was finding it increasingly hard to go along with Maecenas's frivolity.⁵ The other surprise in 1.1.10 is the claim that Horace is setting aside verses, since he is penning the *Epistles* in skilful hexameters. To this the answer is that hexameter was the basic medium for didaxis and satirical writing from Lucilius to Lucretius: discarding lyric *carmina* did not mean discarding expository hexameters.

The new commitment is more straightforward: Horace will devote himself to discovering what is right and fitting (*quid verum atque decens*). *Condere*, *componere*, and *depromere* are verbs of storage and retrieval, and the poet implies the providence of the good housekeeper looking ahead to winter, or perhaps the ant or bee. Philosophical schools were very prominent at this time (Augustus and his family maintained their own philosophers) and Horace might be expected to attach himself to a household (*quo Lare*) or school of thought. Instead, like Cicero,⁶ he rejects any affiliation and describes his life as floating freely like a rudderless ship, between Stoic commitment to civic duty (*mersor civilibus undis*) and the self-indulgence of the Cyrenaic Aristippus. Such a description is designed to mark his failure, and throughout Book 1 Horace will balance admirable moral aspirations with acknowledgment of present discontents.

We know a great deal of anecdotal material about Aristippus and his near-opposite, Diogenes the Cynic, from the later evidence of Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, and we can be sure that the same stories had already become canonical in Peripatetic and other philosophical Lives: certainly Horace and his audience were familiar with stories of their confrontations from school exercises (*Chriae*). Now Horace depicts himself experiencing inconsistent changes of purpose and impatient to start reforming his inner self, as impatient as ordinary men are to enjoy a girl or end the day's work (*opus debentibus* 21 evokes the bondage of *addicti*?) or as boys long to be independent of their parents. Maecenas himself has been left behind (he is not the subject of *possis* in 27) as Horace moves into the secular world.

Using the common comparison of physical and moral strength, Horace reviews successively avarice and ambition (*laudis amore*), envy, irascibility, sloth, drunkenness, and lust, using ritual language to make a different comparison, between religious atonement (*piacula, pure lecto*) and moral cure.

⁵ For the letter cf. Macrobius *Sat.* 2.4.11, and for Maecenas's playboy habits, note the shrewd reactions of Peter White (1993) 137 f.

⁶ *Tusc.* 4.7, quoted above.

This brings him to the material world of financial stringency and political defeat (43) and a parodic expression of worldly hypocrisy voiced by Janus, god of the Exchange; *virtus* (41) must come after cash (54) as the smart man struggles to get ahead and reach the census of the Equestrian class: in the face of the shameless urge of the people to make money at all costs—in order to enjoy the closer equestrian seating at bad performances—Horace opposes the innocent good sense of children's play, with virtue seen as the key to moral freedom, being *liber et erectus*. But *Libertas*, the theme of Johnson (1993), is in fact only one of the ideals around which Horace has constructed his book (see discussion of 1.7. 36, 10.38, etc): in this first *Epistle* it is rather hinted at by words like *solve* (8) and *addictus* (14), and emerges only in the last *sententia*: *Sapiens uno minor est Iove, dives/liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum* ("The wise man is inferior only to Jupiter, wealthy, free, honored, handsome, in fact king of kings:"107–108).

Horace began his *Odes* by stressing his voluntary withdrawal from the common people (1.1.29–32): he excludes the *vulgus* from his priestly invocation in *Odes* 3.1–4, and rejects their good will in *Epistle* 1.19.37 (*ventosae plebis suffragia*) as he will reject their literary judgment in *Epistle* 2.1.18: *tuus hic populus*. So, too, in *Epist.* 1.1.70–76, he shuns popular values, comparing the people to the carnivorous lion in the fable, and to Plato's 'many-headed beast'.⁷ From this starting point it is easy for Horace to launch a satirical parade of popular greed through tax companies, fortune hunting or usury, and popular inconsistency, as the unphilosophical restlessly move from one luxury villa to the next, and the discontent (*mempsimoiria* as in *Satires* 1.1) with which married men praise celibacy and bachelors marriage. The beast with many heads of 76 becomes the shape-shifting Proteus in 90, and the humbler parts of the people don't escape his reproaches: the poor man is as greedy and restless as the rich (91–92). Just as virtue is equally beneficial, and its opposite harmful, to rich and poor (25: *aeque prodest ... aequae nocebit*), so sea voyages (recall 15–16) make rich and poor equally seasick (*aeque/nauseat* 92–93). The sequence of motifs and the oscillation between material and moral illustrative examples are almost dazzling, but this *Epistle* has to embrace the separate themes of its shorter successors, limited by the perspectives of their addressees.

Now that Horace's argument has run full circle he returns to his friend and himself, his trivial flaws of grooming, which Maecenas corrects, and his serious moral inconsistency. Maecenas does not see this (as he should?) as dan-

⁷ The phrase goes back to Plato, *Republic* 9.558c.

gerous mental instability justifying a doctor or power of attorney; although Horace sees him as the protector of his world (*rerum tutela mearum*⁸). The language has become genuinely serious and touchingly affectionate. (We should remember this when we read letter 7.) There is no obvious way to end the letter, and Horace resorts to a flippant generalization on the supremacy of the wise man—except when he sickens with a cold. The last lines soften the earnestness of the real message to Maecenas himself, contained in 94–105.

Letter 19 sounds like a conversation rather than a letter, and starts abruptly with a literary pronouncement, like *Satires* 1.10. The debate is on whether sober water drinkers can hope to write lasting poetry. Horace seems at first to enroll the poets as madmen or as at least enthused with Bacchic passion (*male sani*), making a formal edict to exclude serious men from composing poetry. But this is not his point. Rather, he is showing how such declarations will lead the third rate into imitating the vices rather than the skills of poets.

Just as one cannot emulate Cato by imitating his skimpy philosophical dress, or the historiographer Timagenes by copying his sharp tongue (16), Horace moves from the general “a model is easy to imitate in its faults” to his imitators, and from them to his own claims to originality. No slavish imitator, he has stepped freely into unexplored space, not setting foot in another man’s territory (*libera per uacuum posui uestigia princeps*: 21). Freedom here is freedom from the imitative mode of ancient rhetoric and poetry, and the core of the poem is Horace’s explanation of his relationship to the Greek lyricists (23–34). He was first to show the Parian iambi of Archilochus to Latium (in his *Epodes*), but without cruel subject matter such as Archilochus’s persecution of Lycambes. It was not that he was afraid to change the meter and style of poem, he did only what Alcaeus and Sappho had done before him: “Sappho masculine in her rhythm softened the muse of Archilochus as did Alcaeus, changing his material and arrangement (*rebus et ordine dispar*) neither attacking his father-in-law nor causing the hanging of his betrothed.” The poet has now made the same point twice, about his own work and that of Alcaeus, so it deserves more attention than it usually gets. Horace is proud not to have used his verse destructively, and to have shown the same kind of originality as Alcaeus. And it was Alcaeus, unadapted by any other voice, whom he made famous as a Latin singer. Rather than reiterating the theme of priority that we find in Ennius and Lucretius and the *Georgics*,

⁸ For the legal and financial coloring of *tutela*, see White 1993: 278 n. 32.

Horace has vindicated his own originality by showing how it was parallel to that of Alcaeus in adapting Archilochus's meter.

At this point the *Epistle* seems entirely technical, but in voicing his delight in being read by the eyes and in the hands of freeborn Romans (*ingenuis oculisque legi manibusque teneri*), Horace reaches his real climax. Readers matter, so how does he think these readers react? Their criticism is for public show, whereas each man enjoys and praises the poetry in private (*laudet ametque domi*). The only possible theme of public criticism must be just what Horace himself offers as explanation of men's resentment: He was publishing his poetry in book form without reciting it or canvassing the critics (*grammaticas ... tribus*, as if he were an election candidate). When Horace excuses himself in modest terms, the antagonists jeer that he is saving his work for the Supreme Reader (Jupiter = Augustus), confident in his unique merit.

Horace makes no attempt to deny this. Instead he cries off, asking for an interlude between contests (*Diludia*). Here *ludus*⁹ has taken on the coloring of competition and the poet declines, since competition escalates into anxious contention and anger, leading to grim feuding and deadly warfare. One thing this letter has in common with *Epist.* 1.1 is the final retreat. And neither poem reaffirms its status as a letter by any personal good wishes or formula of farewell.

Let us go back now to the less important recipients of letters 2–6. Lollius (*Epistle* 2) is singled out by receiving a second letter (18) immediately before Maecenas.¹⁰ We do not know why, but he seems to have been young enough to make fatherly advice appropriate; he was still declaiming at the rhetor's school, not so many years after studying Homer. Ten lines of this letter (6–16) are given to the *Iliad*, as the seething conflict of foolish kings and people: Antenor and Nestor, proposing sensible measures, are defeated by the selfishness of Paris on one side and Agamemnon and Achilles on the other, while the Greeks suffer for their masters' folly, with equal doses of treason, deceit, crime, lust, and anger on both sides. The *Odyssey* lent itself better to Stoic interpretation; Ulysses, like Hercules, was the model of endurance, who escaped becoming a dirty dog or mud-friendly swine (*canis immundus vel amica luto sus*—marvelous anticlimactic line end) because he was not stupid or lustful (17–26).

⁹ Moles (2002: 142 f. and 147) articulates ten different applications of *ludus*.

¹⁰ For this Lollius, and the remaining correspondents of the Letter book, see White 1993: Appendix 2A, listing Horace's acquaintances alphabetically. Lollius Maximus (2A: 37) is probably a son or close kin of Lollius, Cos. 21, and addressee of *Odes* 4.9.

So where do ordinary people fit in? As pleasure-loving suitors or Phaeacians.

Now Horace turns on his addressee: if muggers can get up at dawn to do their job, surely you can get started on learning to live right? The last part of the poem sets up more examples of foolish worldly desires, which spoil the enjoyment of what is desired like a physical sickness,¹¹ increasing the pace at 55 to enumerate lust and greed and envy and anger, seen as the worst passion, a madness that causes irretrievable harm and will become a tyrant if it is not controlled *qui nisi paret/imperat*. Remembering that he is addressing an unformed lad, Horace compares the training of horse and hound. Like a pot in which its first perfume lingers, so Horace implies that the youth will maintain his early behavior; now is the time for him to heed other, better minds (these *meliores* are like the *melior* of 1.1.48). If he lags behind or runs on ahead, Horace will not put himself out.

With *Epistle* 3, to Florus, Horace is preparing the way for a group of letters and for his readership to know what to expect. Julius Florus will grow up to earn one of Horace's fullest and most carefully written letters:¹² for now, even without knowing where the retinue has reached (Thrace, the Hellespont, the cities of Roman Asia?) he treats Florus as a postbox for messages to Tiberius's flock of young intellectuals (*studiosa cohors*): Titius, the would be Pindar showing his Callimachean disdain for cisterns and open watercourses, but who may equally be indulging in tragic bombast; Celsus, whom Horace has already warned against plagiarizing from current poets in the new Augustan library, in case he should find himself bald when the poets have reclaimed their feathers (*colores* is a pleasant pun on the rhetorical spin that poets could put on traditional material); then, turning to Florus himself, a busy-bee poet among the thyme (but not unhealthy like the shaggy sick bee of *Georgics* 4: *incultum et turpiter hirtum*). But Florus is still young and Horace recognizes he is not yet committed to poetry, since he may still be practicing oratory or studying civil law. Yet apparently Florus is beset by material worries (*frigida curarum fomenta*) instead of pursuing wisdom for the sake of kin and country. At the end comes a real warning ad hominem, surely the actual occasion for a real letter. Florus should be reconciled with Munatius, instead of quarrelling in hot blood or sheer ignorance like fierce colts. When Horace ends with the heifer now grazing to fill his vow for

¹¹ All Horace's comparisons between mental weakness and physical sickness have precedents in, e.g., *Cic.Tusc.* 4.23–28.

¹² This is the important literary critical *Epist.* 2.2. Julius Florus in White 1993: 2A, 32.

their return (*pascitur in reditum votive iuvenca*) we may read the young men's return to friendship (*reditum in gratiam*) as a subtext to the cohort's successful return from their expedition.

Scholars agree that Albius, addressee of *Epistle* 4, must be Tibullus.¹³ What message does Horace have for him? It seems Tibullus is alone on his estate, either composing verse (to outdo the now-forgotten Cassius of Parma) or meditating on moral philosophy. Although Horace compliments his good sense (*non ... sine pectore*), his praise is all material—for Tibullus's good looks, wealth and ability to enjoy it (even the good sense (*sapere*) is yoked to his rhetorical power of expressing it), his popularity, reputation, good health, and good larder (6–11). These are the purely external goods that, as Horace says parenthetically, the old nurse wishes for her nurseling. But he still needs the wise man's perspective; Tibullus, it is implied, is victim of his emotions—hope and anxiety, fear and anger—and should treat each day as his last so that each unexpected hour will be welcome. Surely this message has been prompted by melancholy or hypochondria—something readers may sense in Tibullus's elegies. As a farewell, Horace offers his own sleek and cheerful company when(ever) Tibullus wants some laughter.

Epistle 5 is cast as an informal invitation to Manlius Torquatus (White 1993: App. 2A, 42), who is also honored in *Odes* 4.7. This is the only invitational poem in the book, shaped in the tradition of Catullus 13 (“Come to dinner and bring almost everything with you”) and even closer to Philodemus's invitation to Piso (*Epist.* 27 Sider). Like Philodemus, our poetic host stresses his humble home, justifies the party on the eve of Caesar's birthday (for Philodemus it is Epicurus's birthday), but then departs from the formulaic invitation to sketch a wild celebration under the powers of wine (14–20). Horace has already identified the wine as from his guest of honor's home region (between Minturnae and Sinuessa), and while Horace had only humble wooden couches and a vegetarian meal to offer, he speaks proudly in the last section of supervising the dinner setting (earlier, he bade Torquatus, the descendant of the republican Manlius Torquatus Imperiosus, accept his command; *imperium fer*¹⁴). Now he depicts himself as under command (*imperator*), organizing his household and excluding any one who would spread gossip, while matching each male guest to his neighbors. While the invitation already raised queries about the plausibility of inviting a prominent Roman to come out into the hills for dinner at short notice, the

¹³ See White 1993: App. 2A, 3.

¹⁴ Here, I follow the detailed interpretation in Williams (1968).

probability is stretched beyond belief by Horace's last instructions. Fellow guests will be Butra, Septicius, and Sabinus, if his girl doesn't preempt him: Torquatus should let Horace know if he wants secondary guests (*umbrae*), then slip out by the back door to escape his clients. Did Horace send this poem privately to Torquatus? And did Torquatus enjoy the fantasy?

Numicius is harder to envisage. We don't know his age, class, or family, and *Epistle* 6 does not help.¹⁵ The opening warning follows an ancient tradition found in Pythagoras and Democritus, then endorsed by Stoics and Epicureans, against admiring (and so coveting) material things. Only *nil admirari*, avoiding the feverish desires and excitement of such false joys, can make a man happy and keep him happy (2)—but does *beatum* here have its moral sense of blessed, or does it borrow the materialist's own meaning of "well off"? It is always a word to eye with suspicion. It seems Numicius is simply a conspicuous consumer. Horace moves rapidly from the admiration rightly given to the celestial bodies, to gaping at the produce of earth (precious metals) and sea (gems and spices that enrich the Arabs), and the lavish spectacles of show business in the arena. The corollary of such admiration is the other emotional extreme: fearing misfortune and loss, an attitude as silly and vulnerable as eager admiration. Even the wise and just man will earn the name of fool and unjust if he pursues his goal of virtue to excess (16). Where is this letter going? Is the pursuit of Virtue itself folly if it is too passionate?

Derisively (*Inunc* is the Satirist's standard jibe, normally only addressed to the dead or fictitious), Horace eggs on Numicius to revel in silverware, marble and bronze statues, purple, and jewels; to rejoice that men admire him when he speaks, dominating the forum and obsessed with outdoing a rival. Yet, when Nature brings all the treasures out from underground she will bury what now gleams so brightly. And after winning public attention and fame he will still join the ancient dead. Virtue is the only talisman (30). So if Numicius thinks Virtue and a religious grove have no meaning let him return to chasing money, getting first into port, and bidding first for exotic merchandise, until his fortune is rounded out and squared off (*rotundentur ... quadret*) to the equestrian census of 4,000 talents. Then money will get him a wife and credit and friends and family and good looks, and charm and eloquence (*suadela Venusque*) adorn him. But riches are relative, like the cash-poor king of Cappadocia (whose subjects were notorious among Roman slaves).

¹⁵ See White 1993: App. 2A, 50.

An anecdote about Lucullus, who did not know how many purple cloaks he had in store, leads back to the main point: what makes a man *beatus*? (47 = 2, but now *res sola* has replaced *nil admirari*). From here on, Horace reverts to the sarcastic encouragement of *Inunc*. Go chase money, if that is what you want. But if you think beauty and popularity make a man fortunate, let us buy a slave secretary to name voters. Or if good dining is good living, let us hunt and fish, like poor Gargilius who paraded his hunting equipment but still had to buy himself a wild boar. Let us dine bursting with indigestion, like Odysseus's crew, who put forbidden pleasure (the oxen of the sun) before returning home. Or if, as Mimnermus judges, life is joyless without sex and play, live amid sex and play (the tactful associative first-person plural, *mercemur ... eamus, piscemur*, etc., has suddenly become second-person singular *vivas*).

The poet's farewell adapts a senatorial formula to urge Numicius, if he knows any better recommendations, to speak out, but, if not, to act on Horace's recommendations. Yet, from 46–66, Horace has been presenting ironic and unacceptable recommendations, so where is the firm center of this letter? If Numicius is real, how can this letter not be a public insult? What does it mean for Horace to publish so unflattering and futile a message?

In a way, this issue of tact, trivial while it concerns a marginal figure, has dominated the anxieties of scholars "reading" the important *Epistle 7* to Maecenas. If we believe in Horace's heartfelt friendship with his patron, how can he display the assertion of independence that is the main theme of this letter? I do not know of any scholar who has questioned the genuine nature of their friendship, and I shall not do so. We come into the middle of Horace's situation. He has already stayed away in the country for the whole of August, and we assume Maecenas has protested and asked him to return. In his reply, Horace counts on Maecenas's indulgence (*dabis ... veniam*: 4–5), calls himself *vates tuus*, and caresses his absent friend with the endearment *dulcis amice* (11–12), but announces that he will stay away—even go further away—through winter, reading in a huddle (*contractus*) and returning only in spring—*si concedes*: if Maecenas will let him stay away. Or if he will let Horace return?

In the first of four marvelously varied vignettes Horace absolutely denies that Maecenas's generosity is like that of the Calabrian host dumping his surplus pears on a guest. Here, there is no cause for embarrassment. Maecenas is like the good and wise man who is ready to help, *digni* (22), and Horace will show himself as *dignus* (24). But Maecenas must let him go, unless he can restore Horace's youth and health, *reddes forte latus ... red-*

des dulce loqui, reddes ridere decorum. We should watch out for the motif of restoring: look ahead to 14.1, to the bailiff of the little estate that restores me to myself, *mihi me reddentis agelli*. Instead, Horace sketches an animal fable in which the hungry fox, after creeping into the granary, gets too fat to escape and is reminded by the weasel that he will have to grow thin again in order to escape. Does this apply to Horace? Then he must renounce all his benefits. If he wants the sleep of the poor and carefree leisure, *otia ... liberrima* (36), he will not exchange this for all the wealth of Araby. The third of his four parallel tales is less challenging: Horace recalls how Telemachus refused Menelaus's lavish gift of horses, because his rocky native island could not sustain them (43 = Odyssey 4.60f.) Here, stress is on the inappropriate nature of the gift, though Maecenas is not at this point offering Horace more luxurious gifts, but begging him to return to imperial Rome and keep him company. What he needs is a small setting, empty of crowds, like peace-loving (and pleasure-loving) Tarentum.

The entire second half of this letter is filled with the detailed account of Philippus's wooing of the humble Menas. Seeing Menas at leisure and envying his relaxation, Philippus does not rest until he has befriended the simple townsman and saddled him with buying a farm on borrowed money. The climax comes when the disheveled Menas, distraught with farm losses, begs Philippus, by his personal guardian god and his bond (*per genium dextramque deosque penates*), to restore his previous way of life: *vitae me redde priori* (95). Is this how Horace sees Maecenas's gift and his present prosperity? The opening of 14 (*mihi me reddentis agelli*) gives the lie to that. Instead, we should probably see Horace as portraying his own irrational inconstancy, the same restless dissatisfaction that he will declare in the very next letter (8). Why he is not even content to stay at his farm through the winter (7.10–12)?

Epistle 8, addressed to the Celsus named in 3.15–20,¹⁶ uses the Muse as go-between to report that Horace himself is at a loss, after many fine promises, failing to live rightly or pleasantly (*nec recte nec suaviter*) not because he has suffered farm losses from a hailstorm (cf. 7.86–87) but from his own lethargy and sickness of mind, chasing harmful things and refusing remedies, equally discontent at Rome and Tibur (praised in 7.45).

This letter, too, supplements our understanding of letter 7. Then comes the actual message: how is Celsus pleasing the prince and his escort? Is Celsus's imagined *recte* casual or dubious? This will explain Horace's farewell,

¹⁶ See White 1993: App. 2A, 2.

first reiterating his injunction to the muse to wish Celsus happiness, then asking her to warn him (*memento*) that his friends will treat Celsus as he treats his (good) fortune.

The next letter (*Epistle* 9) imitates a recommendation, trading on the usual triangular complexity in which the recommender trades on both the merits of the patron to be and the man recommended. Horace does not hesitate to address the prince Tiberius directly (*Claudi* 1), and praises Septimius,¹⁷ along with the future patron, in the same language used in 1.7.23–25. While Septimius's request for a recommendation is a guarantee of Tiberius's esteem, Horace insisted that Septimius overestimated his influence (6). But in return he was seen as an Eiron, deprecating his own gifts. (*dissimulator opis propriae*). So he claims he has chosen the lesser breach of propriety, putting on the city dweller's effrontery to avoid the discredit of a greater offence: *maioris opprobria culpa*. As antidote to this elaboration comes the simple request to Tiberius: enroll him in your flock as a gallant and good man.

At the center of the book comes *Epistle* 10, to Aristius Fuscus, the old friend of Satire 1.9.¹⁸ It opens with mock formality, treating the friends as adversaries in an old debate; Fuscus is *urbis amator*, Horace a lover of the country. Yet they are a match in almost everything else, yeaving and naying everything alike (note the suggestive rhythm of 4–5: *quicquid negat alter, et alter/adnuimus pariter*). But it is Fuscus who is called the home lover (*nidum servas*) while Horace flies far afield praising streams and mossy rocks. Repeatedly, Horace associates *vivere* (8, cf. 12, and *vita*, 33) with the release he feels on leaving town. Citing the Stoic catchphrase *vivere Naturae convenienter*, Horace uses it to argue the privilege of the country (*rure beato*), where climate is gentler in both winter and high summer (Leo and the dogstar stand for August), and sleep is sweeter in the grass, by a burbling stream. As a new argument (22), Horace points out that men praise city homes for a wooded peristyle or a view of the countryside: if you drive out Nature (as men drove out rival landholders with a pitch fork), she will still return triumphant and break through your fussy disdain (*mala fastidia*).

Somehow, Horace has turned this debate into a quarrel between simplicity and luxury, comparing the man who cannot tell real from false values to one who cannot tell inferior dye from Aquinum from the superior Tyrian stuff. This is the foolish admiration of prosperity that will make a man

¹⁷ For Septimius, see White 1993: App. 2A, 78; he is also found in *Odes* 2.6.

¹⁸ See White 1993: App. 2A, 7.

reluctant to lay luxury or the pursuit of grand things aside. One is free to live a life superior to kings and their cronies in a poor man's hut, but the man fearful of poverty is without freedom: *libertate caret*. The fable of the horse and the stag¹⁹ reasserts the prime importance of *libertas* and knowing how to make use of humble circumstances. We can hear the echo of the last line of 1.7, *metiri se quemque suo modulo et pede*, in the last analogy of this poem, the ill-fitting shoe. Tactfully, Horace returns to living wisely (*vives sapienter*, *Aristi*) and invites (the future *dimittes* is a polite command) Aristius to scold him when he becomes greedy or miserly: if money is not kept subordinate like a slave, it dominates like a tyrant. Uniquely, this letter describes Horace's circumstances as he dictates (not writing himself!) his message behind the temple of Vacuna, happy in everything except Fuscus's absence.

Epistles 11 and 12 have in common their relative shortness (30 lines) and the distance of their worldly addressee, with Bullatius (an older and moneyed Roman) traveling for touristic pleasure in Asia and Iccius (addressee of *Odes* 1.29) administering Agrippa's estates in Sicily.²⁰ Bullatius's letter opens like a travelogue, listing the great islands, Chios, Lesbos, and Samos, then three famous mainland cities, Sardis, Zmyrna, and Colophon. Has Bullatius found them disappointing compared with the Tiber and Campus Martius? Has he formed ambitions to settle in one of the great cities of Attalus of Pergamum, or has weariness with sea and road led him to praise humble Lebedos? If 6–10 are Horace's words, he hankers after the oblivion of deserted Lebedos, less populated than even Gabii or Fidenae (faded villages now dwarfed by Rome). But what would Horace mean by *oblitus ... meorum*? Is it instead Bullatius who longs to forget and be forgotten by his kin, far from the raging sea? Horace's reply treats this longing as mere temporary discontent after hard travel; an inn or bake house or baths are only short term solutions. Just as Bullatius would not abandon or sell a ship out of disgust at sea storms, so the lovely resorts of Rhodes and Mytilene have no more appeal for the traveler in good condition than a cloak in winter, a kilt in wintry winds by the Tiber, or a stove in August. So long as Fortune smiles it is better to praise Rhodes and Chios and Samos from the distance of Rome (*Romae ... absens*). Instead of hankering for more travel, so Horace implies, Bullatius should be thankful for each pleasant hour, without anticipating amusements, so that he can claim to have enjoyed his life wherever he is.

¹⁹ Cited by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 20.20.5, from Stesichorus.

²⁰ For Bullatius, see White 1993: App. 2 A, 10; for Iccius, App. 2 A, 30: he was also addressed in *Odes* 1.29.

If it is reason and sound judgment, not lofty seaside residences, which remove men's cares, the cause is that men who rush overseas change only their setting, not their state of mind. Traveling is a kind of energetic lack of action, when we use chariots and ships as a means to live well, and Bullatius, like others, will find peace here or even at empty Ulubrae, if his even temper or mental calmness does not let him down. This is the first mention of the other crucial ideal of the letter book, the tranquility of mind (Greek *euthumia*, praised as an ideal by Democritus) or *animus ... aequus*, which every man should aspire to.²¹ Iccius, in *Epistle* 12, must have been complaining (*tolle querelas*, 3) instead of making the right use of Agrippa's revenues: but if a man's use of property is adequate he cannot be poor. So Horace adds that if Iccius enjoys good digestion and lungs and feet, wealth will add nothing, and if he diets on nettles and herbs in the midst of plenty he will live as well as if the stream of good Fortune instantly covered him with gold, since money cannot change a man's nature, and Iccius rightly recognizes that everything is inferior to Virtue alone. Iccius's good judgment seems to be fact and not hortatory wishful thinking, so here at last is a correspondent who does not need converting.

For Iccius is genuinely preoccupied with philosophy. Like Democritus, he is so absentminded that his flocks consumed his fields. Iccius, though surrounded by greed and corruption, practices lofty wisdom and concerns himself with the celestial bodies, worrying about the tides and season, the motion of the stars (or better the planets; *vagentur et errant*), the disappearance and renewal of the moon, and the reason for the clashing harmony of the universe. This is the kind of study of natural philosophy that Propertius for example, promised to take up—in the future when he outgrew love.²² Horace teases him with the suggestion that he is weighing the fifth-century Empedocles (the Sicilian philosopher in the materialist succession descending from Democritus to Epicurus) against the clever argumentation of Stertinius—a contemporary Stoic ironically called the Eighth Sage (*sapientum octavus*) in *Sat.* 2.3.33.

Only now does the letter reveal a practical purpose—to recommend extending kindness to Pompeius Grosphus,²³ who will ask only for what is

²¹ Cf. 1.18.112: *aequum mi animum ipse parabo*. We owe to McGann (1969) the understanding of the philosophical tradition of *euthumia*, going back even to Democritus and forward to Seneca and Plutarch. Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.10 in *(partem animi) particeps rationis ponunt tranquillitatem, id est placidam quietamque constantiam*, "in the part that has a share in reason they put tranquility, that is a calm and quiet consistency" (tr Graver).

²² Prop. 3.5. 23–30.

²³ See White 1993: App. 2A, 65.

right and fair (*verum ... et aequum*). The harvest from friends, he says (recalling Iccius's own business of controlling Agrippa's arable tenants) is cheap when a good man needs something—a curiously self-interested motivation of future generosity. A final short paragraph offers news of military success—also a way of dating the letter to 20 BC—of Agrippa in North Western Spain over the Cantabri, and Tiberius Nero over Armenia, while Phraates has acknowledged Caesar's authority as a suppliant at his knees, and the golden abundance of Italy continues to pour from an overflowing horn.

Epistle 13 is addressed to the messenger, not its ultimate addressee. Nine lines reiterate to Vinnius instructions he was already given before departure. Where is Horace? The default assumption is Rome, and Vinnius, if he is the praetorian centurion Vinnius Valens,²⁴ is surely an official messenger to Augustus in Spain, loaded with dispatches more important than Horace's volume of Odes: *carmina* (17). However colorful the image of Vinnius angrily thrusting his pack (like his father Asina?) on Augustus, or sweating over hill and dale with the precious volume under his arm like a shepherd or citizen out to dinner or a stealthy slave girl (and Pyrrha is a good name for her) what matters in this letter is Horace's message for Augustus that he does not want to disturb him. For the public this affirms the poet's good terms with Augustus, for Augustus it expresses due modesty, like the more expansive comment of *Epistle* 2.1: 3–4, 219–228, the long letter Augustus extorted from Horace by complaining that the poet had written letters to many but not to himself.

It is fair to see *Epistle* 14 as a counterpart to *Epistle* 10: Horace still loves his country farm (*mihi me reddentis agelli*), but this time the townsman he is addressing is not free to stay in town like Fuscus, but has been sent by Horace to serve as his country overseer. What does he oversee? If there are five tenants they are presumably producing whatever crops they can on the level ground, leaving Horace and his bailiff to supervise the rough pastures and brush (*silvarum*, l. 1) around the estate. The bailiff is discontent, but he was also discontented with his general duties in town and wanted promotion to the country (unvoiced; *tacita prece*). Yet 4–5 and 28–30 make it clear that the bailiff does the heavy lifting (weeding and clearing the fields, hoeing neglected rock-hard ground, tending cattle and damming the banks of swollen streams) while Horace is merely extracting thorny decisions from his mind: we may catch him in 39 shifting sod and boulders, but for him the stream is just an ideal setting for a siesta. To own a place in the country

²⁴ Cf. Nisbet 1995: 1–5.

can be a joy, but not to labor in it. Hence, their mismatch (*disconvenit inter /meque et te*, 18–19), and lack of harmony (*quid nostrum concentum dividat*, 31).

Horace, too, is not where he wants to be because concern for his bereaved friend Lamia is keeping him in Rome. He admits that he is another case of *mempsimoiria* (cf. *Sat.* 1.1) and his surroundings are not to blame for the discontent bred by his mind. But rather than gripe about the city Horace shows he can imagine the bailiff's frustration and attribute it to his youth, which Horace has now left behind (32–36), ashamed to have persisted so long in the *ludus* of the young. While there are no neighbors to criticize or begrudge Horace, the bailiff finds even his fellow slaves begrudge him wood and meat and vegetables. As in letter 7.98, the final message is one of appropriateness; every man should match his own scale and each of them, master and bailiff should practice the skills he knows (*quam scit ... exerceat artem* 44).

Epistle 15, the letter to Vala (White 1993: App. 2A, 52) is perhaps the least enjoyable of Horace's messages, not just because we cannot share its main preoccupation with the facilities of possible summer holidays, but because Horace is distorting his self-image, making himself appear fussy and petty: he even frustrates the reader by opening a parenthesis in line 2 that is never really closed. From 1–10 we learn that Antonius Musa has forbidden him his usual resort of Baiae, forcing him to bathe in chilly water in midwinter (*per medium frigus*, 5) The locality complains that people are now abandoning its myrtle groves and scorning its sulfurous waters, and resent the sick, who instead subject their head and digestion to the waters of Clusium and Gabii. This is why Horace begins by asking about the winter climate of Velia and Salerno, the traveling and the local population of that area. He has to change his resort and lead his horse past its familiar places. The rider tries to rein in his horse by jerking the left rein, but the horse disobeys; his ear is in his mouth (appetite?). (This is where editors close the parenthesis.) Though Horace does not say so, we infer that greed and habit govern men as much as they do horses.

The inquiries resume—which community enjoys a greater supply of wheat? is their water from cisterns or ever-flowing streams?—and he is off again into a new parenthesis. It turns out that Horace only cares about the water out of distaste for the local wine. He can put up with anything on his own estate but by the seaside he needs a noble and smooth wine to drive away care and seep into his veins and spirit, bringing rich optimism, supplying him with words, and making him seem a young man to the Lucanian girls. This is the fussy, discontented Horace of letter 8, next asking

which region breeds more hares and boars, which waters hide more fish and sea urchins, sending him back home again a plump Phaeacian pleasure lover (we met them in 1.2.28–31)? Abandoning his cross-examination Horace now turns Satiric, with a full description of the glutton Maenius (26–41) who became a parasite and slanderer (30) after spending his patrimony, governed by his stomach, and fed on lard and quantities of mutton whenever he ran out of supplies. In an internal parenthesis he notes that Maenius was like the reformed spendthrift Bestius, denouncing gluttons, while himself greedy for any substantial prey. Such behavior is an obvious variety of inconsistency such as Horace condemns elsewhere, but what has it to do with Horace's summer plans? Only this: he confesses (42–46) to being himself another Maenius, praising humble fare when he runs out of money but as soon as better and richer food comes his way he declares that only men with money splendidly grounded in gleaming villas are wise and know how to live.

Epistle 16, to Quinctius (probably the same Quinctius addressed in the sympotic ode 2.11²⁵), starts from Horace's beloved villa, which he describes in 1–16: first note that Quinctius's imaginary inquiry lists Italy's main produce: arable grain, olives, fruit, grasses, and elm-trained vines. But Horace's reply mentions nothing productive, only a landscaper of rolling hills and a valley traversed by the shifting sun. Otherwise, his land is all pre-agricultural wilderness—brambles and thickets bearing cornel berries and plums, and the oak and ilex, with their acorns and berries, giving welcome shade to their master. For Horace it is like a closer version of Tarentum, and the pure chill of his spring evokes the Thracian Hebrus, sheltering him and keeping him healthy in the fever season of September.

The rest of the letter is about the larger issue of right living (*recte vivere* 17 = *recte ... valentem* 21) and the difference between winning the name *beatus* (18, 20), “fortunate, well-off,” in public esteem, and possessing real goodness and good sense (*sapiens* 20, *sapiens emendatusque* 30, *bonus ac prudens* 21). As such, it requires our careful analysis. Public opinion was evidently very important to Quinctius, and public opinion, as a corollary of the quest for office, is the real villain of this letter (21–24 and 25–31). If the fulsome flattery of 27–28, “may Jupiter, who cares for the good of you and the city, keep in dispute whether the people wants your well-being more or you want well-being for it,” is the kind of flattery addressed to Quinctius, although it is only proper

²⁵ See White 1993: App. 2A, 68, whom he distinguishes from “Hirpinus,” 2A, 69.

praise for Augustus, it suggests a counterpart of imperial adulation in a corrupt political world. In this letter especially rewards and penalties are all associated with political ambition, and public opinion is again the target in 33 f., first giving then taking away falsely, denouncing a man as a thief, impure, and a patricide. By public agreement a man is good (*vir bonus*, 40, defined 41–43) who respects civil rights and the decrees of the senate and law, who resolves major lawsuits, and who maintains business as a guarantor and cases as a witness. But the same person may expose his shamefulness to all his household and neighbors, showing that his moral beauty is only skin deep (*speciosum pelle decora*, 45).

From here on Horace works with a double comparison, between the status of free man and slave, and the moral freedom or slavery of the good or weak man. It is not enough to avoid conventional offences: the slave who neither steals nor absconds and has not killed anyone is rewarded by escaping torture, but to go beyond this and claim that he is good and decent (*bonus et frugi*) provokes Horace's Sabine skepticism. Motive, not behavior is crucial. Preying wolves, kites, and hawks dodge traps out of caution, but the good man avoids offending out of a true love of virtue. So if you avoid offending out of fear of punishment, you will still jumble sacred and profane property if there is any hope of going unnoticed. Disregarding trivial thieving, Horace portrays the "*vir bonus*" whom everyone respects in business and the courts as backing his sacrifices to Janus or Apollo with a surreptitious prayer to the goddess of thieves, to cover up his offences so he can maintain his reputation *iusto sanctoque videri*. The miser is in no way better or freer than a slave, as he stoops to pick up a penny glued to the pavement. His covetousness entails being fearful and no fearful man will ever be free. "Such a man can lose his weapons and desert his brave man's duty. No need to kill such a prisoner: you can sell him instead to work as a shepherd or ploughman or sail through storms at seas, increasing the grain crop and conveying grain and supplies." Horace is gliding between the literally unfree (*captivum*) and the money-grubber's lack of moral freedom, between slave prisoners used as laborers and freeborn men enslaved by their quest for money.

The immediate application of these judgments can only be disagreeable to Quinctius, so Horace cuts away to a situation without Roman parallel. The good man (*vir bonus et sapiens*) has been taken prisoner by Pentheus and protests an undeserved penalty. Seeing that his captive is indifferent, when he threatens to confiscate his property, the King threatens to confine him in shackles. But the good man has an answer: "My god will set me free when I want; (that is), I shall die." Death is the *ultima linea*, the limit to both

physical and moral enslavement. Why has Horace set two letters addressed to young men making their careers by patronage next to each other? We already know Lollius, the well-born addressee of letter 2. It seems most likely that Horace aimed to present *Epistle* 17 to the unknown Scaeva (White 1993: App. 2A, 76) as a foil to *Epistle* 18 to Lollius. There is a skilled portrait of what was expected of “[t]he poet as companion and protégé” in White’s opening chapter but as White himself says (p. 33), “it is artificial to have isolated the social relations of Roman poets ... as though they had some objective reality as a distinct set.” Young men in those days were poets the way they are students in the modern world. Thus, Lollius is clearly a poet (1.18.40), but Scaeva seems not to be. Certainly the two openings suggest a different attitude and a different class of “companion.” While Scaeva is out for the main chance—he can look after himself (*satis per te tibi consulis*). Horace suspects that the free-spirited Lollius may stand on his dignity and offend, afraid to look like a parasite or jester (*si bene te novi ... metues scurrantis speciem praeberere*). But the letter to Lollius is not just longer (at least a third longer) than the message to Scaeva, it is the longest letter in the book. Why? Because unlike the unscrupulous Scaeva Lollius has a serious future. Indeed, the opening distinction between respectable wife and courtesan (1.18.3), coming after the reference to courtesan’s tricks in letter 17.55–57, suggests that Scaeva came closer to the courtesan, or *infidus scurra*, in his version of *cultura potentis amici*.

Serving the whim of a patron was a part of Roman life that affected even the nobly born while they were in the apprentice phase. So what kind of advice does Horace give to the careerist in 17? If Scaeva wants a quiet easy life he had better leave the city and live unknown: *qui natus moriensque fefellit* evokes the epicurean *lathe biôsas*. But if he wants to help his family he will sacrifice his own comfort and go hungry to salute his well-fed (*unctum*) patron. This is Horace’s cue to return to the antithesis of Aristippus (18–32: cf. 1.1.18) and the (unnamed) Diogenes.²⁶ Their exchange of insults hinges on the relative importance of pride in independence, or enjoyment of dependent comfort. *Rex* is both the autocratic Dionysius of Syracuse, who kept Aristippus at court, and the generic term for a patron: *regibus uti* echoes *maioribus uti* in 2. Aristippus cheerfully plays parasite in his own interest, acting his role (*officium* is not duty, but function) of ensuring that he rides on a horse at the king’s expense, not depending, like Diogenes, on the common people as he begs for scraps. But while Aristippus

²⁶ On these opposed philosophical types, see Moles 2002.

could handle any circumstances, neatly wearing the mask of either type (29), Horace refuses to believe that a switch to comfort would suit the ragged Diogenes, who would rather die of cold than wear anything but his rags.

So the poet is not recommending austerity rather than obliging the powerful—nor would we expect him to. He sees winning the approval of important men as acceptable, even praiseworthy behavior (*non ultima laus*). It takes energy to succeed, symbolized by the luxurious city of Corinth, and confidence that will carry the determined man to the end (36–41). This is a kind of virtue, and unless we treat Virtus as meaningless, the man of initiative is right to seek glory and the prize.

Yet, from here on (43–62), Horace urges discretion not as morally superior but as more profitable: dependents who keep quiet about their poverty will win more from their patron than those who make demands and provoke competition that will only divide the spoils. When traveling to Brundisium (as Horace himself traveled with Maecenas in *Sat.* 1.5), to complain about the rough road or lost luggage is to behave like a harlot, or the fake cripple at the crossroads, leaving *nulla fides damnis* (57): no man will believe his loss is real. We may compare the satiric turn of Horace's last twenty lines to Quinctius, based on comparison not with a harlot but with a slave.

Lollius instead is cautioned against gruffness and careless grooming displayed as freedom and moral integrity: *libertas mera, veraque virtus*. He must steer between obsequiousness and touchy quarreling over trifles, such as rival artists (gladiators? Grammarians?) or choosing the best route to Brundisium. The wealthy "friend" loathes extravagant womanizers or gamblers, poor men who try to seem rich. Satire takes over for the story of Eutrapelus who gave men expensive costumes to ruin them. More briefly, Horace rehearses the need to keep secrets and avoid praising one's own hobbies or composing poems when the patron wants to hunt: the Theban myth of Euripides's *Antiope*, in which her son, the musician Amphion, gave way to his brother Zethus the hunter leads to the tongue-in-cheek advice to discard the tedium of discourteous poetry (*inhumanae ... Camenae*) and share the meal of delicacies strenuously hunted down.

Uniquely, in these letters Horace turns aside (50–64) to give biographical details about his addressee, praising Lollius for his fighting fitness and military service in Spain and under Tiberius (55–57) and describing the mock naval battles he and his brother played on the family estate, in imitation of Actium.

Returning to 39 (*tua laudabis studia*), Horace makes the point that the patron who believes that Lollius shares his enthusiasms (*consentire suis studiis*) will give his game/performance full support (*fautor utroque tuum*

laudabit police ludum, 65–66), but what game is this, if not that of patron hunting? And Romans, who associated *ludus* with *ludificare*, ‘to hoodwink,’ would see our Lollius as pursuing a self-interested course at the patron’s expense. Keeping one move ahead, Horace now groups together missteps involving third parties: don’t keep company with gossips, don’t seduce slaves or maids, or recommend the unworthy. In contrast, you should resist false accusations against a known friend; if let pass, those slanders will move on to you next: *tua res agitur* (84).

The introductory theme returns *da capo* at 86, with the hazards of paying court to a powerful friend (*cultura potentis amici*). The conflict between merry and melancholy companions and the warning against being thought unfriendly, for refusing drink, or bitter, for keeping quiet, again suggests that Lollius was inclined to withdrawal. Finally, at 96, Horace moves from cautions to positive advice: Lollius is to consult learned men on how to pass through life gently, escaping needy desire and fears and hopes about matters of moral indifference, to learn what behavior will make him friendly to himself and provide unsullied calm (*qui te tibi reddat amicum/quid pure tranquillet*, 101–102), on a secluded path, living one’s life unnoticed.²⁷ As a model, he quotes his own thoughts and prayers—these form the last strictly moral example in the letter book. May the gods allow him his present circumstances for what is left of his life, with sufficient reading and year-round supplies, and freedom from anxious dithering—*neu fluitem dubiae spe pendulus horae*. If Jupiter will grant him life and a living (*opes*), Horace will provide his own tranquility of mind: *aequum mi animum ipse parabo*.

As we saw, letter 19 speaks to Maecenas on literary, not ethical topics, pulling away at the end from quarrels that will turn into deadly warfare. It is in fact the end of the collection apart from its envoi, with the book itself anthropomorphized as a slave who longs to be free for adventure away from his master. And this slave boy is eager for profit: Janus, center of business in the Forum, stands for the profit principle as in letter 1.54, and Vertumnus’s statue presided over the luxury Vicus Tuscus. The pun continues as the polished book displays itself like a depilated hustler. But once it has made itself promiscuous there is no return. Acting as a prophet Horace acknowledges that the book will be a favorite while its youth lasts (10), but once fondled by the crowd it will either feed the moths (we have left the slave image behind) or become a fugitive in Africa or prisoner in

²⁷ *Secretum iter et fallentis semita vitae* (103): Horace’s translation of the Epicurean precept *lathe biōsas*.

Spain (is there a point behind these former Pompeian civil war locations?). Then, it will be Horace's turn to laugh, like the donkey driver who drove his disobedient creature over the cliff. Worse—or so it seems—when toothless old age seizes the book it will be used to teach children the alphabet in a dead-end street. As we reach the end a kind of counter movement comes with relief as the evening sun brings out a street audience. The last eight lines put in the book's mouth what would have been Horace's *Sphragis*, if this sign-off had given his name: the nearest comparison must be his friend Virgil's *Sphragis* to the *Georgics*, contrasting the poet's humble themes and ignoble and retired life with Octavian's victorious campaigns. Horace speaks only of his life as the child of a freedman father in poor circumstances, who spread his wings, then pleased the city's leaders in war and peace (*primis urbis belli placuisse domique*, 23, cf. 1.17.35: *principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est*). He was short, prematurely grey, and fond of the sun, quick to get angry, but then easily appeased. And if anyone asks, the poet completed forty-four winters in the year (20) that Lollius²⁸ called Lepidus his consular colleague. This marks less the poet's birth date than the completion of his poetry book, just as any individual letter would have ended with a word of farewell and its date.

²⁸ For the failed commander Lollius, see White 1993: App. 2A, 36. Surely this is no coincidence of family name and the consul is father or close kin of Horace's young addressee.

THE *CARMEN SAECULARE*

Hans-Christian Günther

Abstract: The *Carmen Saeculare* is Horace's only poem destined to be performed in public at the occasion of the *Ludi saeculares* of 17 BC. The analysis pays attention to Horace's poetic achievement as well as to the central political ideas expressed and to the role of the poem in public ceremony.

Keywords: ludi saeculares, political poetry

The performance of the *Carmen Saeculare* on the 3rd of June 17 BC marks a special moment both in Horace's poetic career and in Latin literature. Horace wrote a poem about the performance of his poem (C. 4.6¹) and he refers to it with apparent pride in two other passages of his work (C. 4.3² and *Epist.* 2.1.132 f.³); obviously it was Augustus's request (cf. *vita* 38 ff.⁴) to compose a poem for the unique event of the *ludi saeculares* of 17 BC⁵ that gave Horace the impulse to come back to his lyrical poetry after he had turned to the *musa pedestris* of the *Epistles*.⁶ The poet's renewed interest in lyric poetry later even resulted in a fourth book of *Carmina*, which in part—but *only* in part—also responded to a request made by the emperor.⁷ With the task of writing a poem for the event, by which the new regime chose to celebrate its own definitive establishment, sealing the past and looking forward to a new, brighter future, Horace became the most 'official' poet of the regime, but he also achieved the ultimate goal of his personal aspirations as a poet: 'to serve his country by his word,' to play a meaningful role in the life of the Roman state.⁸ Now, he had assumed in real life the role of the *vates* instructing the

¹ Cf. Fantham, below, pp. 451 f.

² Fantham, below, pp. 446 f., 451.

³ Below, pp. 471, 489.

⁴ Above, p. 45.

⁵ For an account of the proceedings, cf. Schnegg-Köhler 2002; also Mommsen 1913: 566–626; Nilsson 1920. The text of the oracle (preserved in Zosimus 2.6.1 and Phlegon = *FGrH* 257 F 37.137–169) commissioned for the occasion is printed in Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 467 f. and now also in Thomas 2011: 165 ff.; see also Diels 1890.

⁶ Above, pp. 37 ff. and Fantham pp. 410 ff.

⁷ Above, p. 45 and Fantham pp. 445 f.

⁸ See pp. 33 ff. and 470 ff.

still uncorrupted Roman youth, the role into which he had projected himself ideally in the *Roman Odes*. As this was Horace's only poem destined to be sung in a public performance the poet did not integrate it into a collection and it was only added later to the complete edition of his works.⁹

Quite apart from the symbolic significance of the *ludi saeculares* for Roman history and politics, the performance of Horace's poem was a unique event in Roman literary history as well: poetry never had in Rome the public role it had in fifth-century Athens or at a Hellenistic court. We know little about genuine Roman cult songs;¹⁰ that a well-established poet should be asked to compose a work to be performed in a ceremony of state is such an unusual event that we know of only one other example, the procession song Livius Andronicus wrote in 207 BC (Liv. 27.37; another song is attested for 200 BC in Liv. 31.12.9). And Horace's poem was not a traditional cult song at all: with the *Carmen Saeculare* Horace composed a lyric poem in the very personal form of poetry he introduced to Roman literature and in which he remained without successor.¹¹ Such a poem was commissioned for a state festival, an event by which the political regime chose to define itself. With the *Carmen Saeculare*, Horace had not only become the official poet of the regime as nobody else had been, not even Virgil with the *Aeneid*. The regime itself, in turn, chose to define itself by a ceremony in which a poem in the ostentatiously personal manner of a great contemporary poet would hold a special place.¹² The *Carmen* was performed at the end of the

⁹ Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 471.

¹⁰ See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 253. That Catullus's hymn on Diana, in Sapphic stanzas and among the models for both C. 1.21 and the *Carmen Saeculare*, was destined for public performance seems extremely unlikely to me.

¹¹ Above, p. 211.

¹² In modern times one could compare the commissioning of national anthems. The modern Greek state chose, with Solomos's hymn to liberty, a major achievement by a great poet (although not with the best musical setting), but the poem was not composed for the occasion. When contemporary poets were asked explicitly to do the job they have hardly ever been artists of top quality nor are the results particularly appealing; the difficulties of finding artistically convincing solutions for such a task are illustrated by the anthem of the German Democratic Republic: there was little to choose between the childish proposal of Bertolt Brecht and the version of Johannes R. Becher (a more distinguished poet than his 'official' poetry would make one believe), which was eventually preferred. Perhaps even more than both texts the music of Hanns Eisler, whose only merit as a composer is probably the fact that he had been a pupil of Arnold Schönberg, verges on the unintentionally ridiculous, in particular, when one realizes that Eisler in 1949 modeled his tune, which could be used equally with the text of the "Deutschlandlied," on Beethoven's *Bagatelle* op. 119, 11. The melody had already been used by one of the most successful composers of German 'Schlager' of

religious ceremony and Fraenkel¹³ emphasized the fact that it was not a traditional cult song destined to accompany the ritual. The *Carmen* was surely an integral part of the festival and fully conformed to a religious and ideological program; yet, it is true that it did not simply accompany but rather complemented and interpreted the ritual. As Feeney¹⁴ very aptly put it, by not being tautological with the ritual, the *Carmen* “marks out a space for poetry as a distinctive discourse.” That an official political and religious event like the *ludi saeculares* of 17 BC should allow for such a prominent space for poetry in its own right is all but a matter of course. Yet, the fact that hitherto Horace had written religious poetry that adapted the forms of actual Greek cult songs to merely literary constructions made the unique generic experiment of the *Carmen Saeculare* possible.¹⁵ In the *Carmen* he writes a paean in the form of his earlier literary adaptations of these forms to Latin poetry to be performed in the context of a festival that featured a religious ceremony, based on a Greek oracular tradition in which the gods were worshipped *Achivo ritu* (*acta* D-M 91).

Works commissioned for official occasions, when they have to conform to certain ideological premises, are not normally great works of art. Horace's *Carmen Saeculare* seems to have been a great success at the time, yet, as many works of art, which were highly popular with contemporaries, it later attracted much unfavorable criticism, or rather, in view of the low expectations one has for a work of this sort¹⁶ it simply appears not to have been taken seriously as a work of art. However, since the official records of the *ludi saeculares*, the ‘Acta,’¹⁷ were discovered in 1890, they constitute by far the most precise description of any ritual of classical antiquity. The ritual the ‘Acta’ are concerned with was a novelty and a major propagandistic event at one of the most incisive turning points of European history. For wholly understandable reasons the modalities of the performance and the relationship of Horace's poem to the festival program have been the prevalent focus of most of the

the Nazi period, Peter Kreuder, in a song entitled “Good bye, Johnny” (censured by the Nazi authorities for its indulgence in Anglicisms). Kreuder failed to cash in on royalties after the war, because the copyright commission of the UN ruled that both Kreuder and Eisler had used Beethoven.

¹³ Fraenkel 1957: 379 ff.

¹⁴ Feeney 1998: 36 f.

¹⁵ Above, pp. 277 ff.

¹⁶ Cf. Putnam 2000: 3 f.; Barchiesi in Woodman and Feeney 2002: 107 f.

¹⁷ Text, translation, commentary, and photographic reproductions can now be found in Schnegg-Köhler 2002.

research on the poem; studies of the poem's literary merit have been few. Among the most penetrating interpretations of the poem is Vahlen's paper¹⁸ in response to Theodor Mommsen's outright condemnation of the *Carmen*'s poetic quality in a lecture¹⁹ following upon his groundbreaking study of the 'Acta.'²⁰ For a long time Fraenkel was alone in his extensive sympathetic treatment of the poem in his monograph,²¹ whereas even Becker's admirable book on Horace's 'Spätwerk' almost completely neglects the poem.²² However, in more recent times the *Carmen* has been the subject of a commendable monograph by Putnam;²³ two excellent recent treatments by Feeney²⁴ and Barchiesi²⁵ have also done much to advance a better appreciation of the artistic merits of Horace's poem.

Traditionally, the *ludi saeculares*, celebrated for the first time in a major crisis during the First Punic War in 249 BC, had been a nighttime festival of apotropaic character, dedicated to the chthonic deities. When Augustus decided to revive the tradition in 17 BC in order to celebrate the consolidation of his power and to inaugurate a new epoch of the Roman state, the festival assumed a completely different character.²⁶ In fact, the major change in the ritual Augustus and his advisors introduced in regard to the tradition of the *ludi* consisted in the transformation of a nighttime ritual of expiation to the chthonic deities into a festival with sacred ceremonies spread over three days and nights, beginning with the eve of the 1st of June and ending on the 3rd of June of 17 BC. In addition to the nights, dedicated to the powers of the nether world, the three days were taken up with worship of the upper gods, and Dis and Proserpina were exchanged for the goddesses of fate (the *Μοῖραι* or *Parcae*; first night: *acta* D-M 90–102),²⁷ the *Ilithyiae* (the goddesses

¹⁸ Vahlen 1923: 369 ff.

¹⁹ Mommsen 1905: 351–359.

²⁰ Mommsen 1913: 566–626.

²¹ Fraenkel 1957: 364 ff.; Pasquali 1920: 734 ff. is also of value; Gagé, in Oppermann 1972: 14–36, offers an account of the discussion after Mommsen; Schnegg-Köhler (2002: 229 ff.) gives valuable factual information but her interpretation is strangely unperceptive.

²² After a few remarks (Becker 1963: 114 f.) he shifts to C. 4.6.

²³ Putnam 2000: the excellent paraphrastic interpretation of the poem proper (pp. 51–95) marks a major step in modern understanding; my brief analysis below is heavily indebted to Putnam's book and also to his excellent shorter paper in Davis 2010: 231–249.

²⁴ Feeney 1998: 32 ff.; on the *ludi*, also 28 ff. The recent commentary by Thomas (2011) was published too late for me to be taken into account.

²⁵ Barchiesi in Woodman and Feeney 2002: 107–123.

²⁶ For the historical and ideological context see Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 466 f.; Radke 1972; Kienast 1999: 117 f., 223 ff.; and Galinsky 1996: 100–106.

²⁷ References are to Schnegg-Köhler 2002: 24–45.

of childbirth; second night: *acta* D-M 115–118),²⁸ and the Earth (*Terra Mater*; third night: *acta* D-M 134–137), i.e., the divine powers of fertility. The daytime ritual was dedicated to Jupiter (first day: *acta* D-M 103–110), Juno Regina (second day: *acta* D-M 119–133), and the divine siblings Apollo and Diana (third day: *acta* D-M 138–146).

Mommsen thought that Horace should have exploited the dichotomy ‘upper/lower goods’ of the festival for a poem that showed “die Herrlichkeit wie Bedingtheit” of the lot of man walking “zwischen dem Himmelsgewölbe und dem Schoße der Tiefe ... in zweifacher Bildermacht.”²⁹ Horace certainly did not do this, above all, because this was not his job. Mommsen’s metaphysics was not what one expected from a poem destined to grasp the essence of a unique official occasion in which one celebrated the dawn of a new age of undisturbed peace, untarnished virtue, and plain abundance. With the *Carmen Saeculare*, Horace was bound to certain premises and one may ask how he succeeded in meeting them. To write a good poem, which would strike an entirely positive and optimistic note for an official celebration, as was requested for a poem like the *Carmen Saeculare*, without sliding into banalities, is a difficult task indeed, and even more so when it had to codify a rather unexciting political and seemingly philistine moral program; the versification of the emperor’s marriage laws in ll. 16–20 has annoyed not only unsympathetic readers. Of course, aesthetic judgments are subjective. It is certainly possible, however, to argue that Horace succeeded very well in his almost impossible task. Perhaps Pasquali,³⁰ who is by no means uncritical of the poem, best sums up Horace’s artistic achievement:

Il dovere scrivere un carme, si direbbe, a rime obbligate, ha nociuto a Orazio meno che avrebbe fatto a qualsiasi altro, perchè egli possedeva in grado eccellente l’arte di dire con precisione e tuttavia con nobiltà cose difficilissime a esprimersi in poesia; testimonio la strofa sulle leggi intorno ai costumi, sui *patrum decreta super iugandis feminis prolisque novae feraci lege marita*. Pure, mentre i tempi nuovi si annunziano nel cresciuto orgoglio di Romano, nell’identificazione sempre più chiara del sovrano e dello stato, nella favola troiana divenuta ormai leggenda nazionale, l’arte è rimasta quell’antica.³¹

Horace’s poem was performed on the third day (dedicated to Apollo and Diana), after the religious ceremonies were finished (*sacrificio perfecto*; *acta*

²⁸ The ‘Acta’ (cf. also the oracle, ll. 9 and 18) speak of Ilithyiae in the plural; for the singular in Horace, see below, p. 437.

²⁹ Mommsen 1905: 357.

³⁰ Pasquali 1920: 735 ff.

³¹ Pasquali 1920: 737 f.

D-M 147–152). It was sung twice, first on the Palatine, where Augustus and Agrippa had made the same offering to Apollo and Diana that Augustus had made to the Ilithyiae on the second night (nine *liba*, nine *popana*, and nine *phthoes*, i.e., various kinds of sacrificial cakes; *acta* D-M 115, 139 f.), then on the Capitol, where Augustus and Agrippa had sacrificed one ox each on the first day (*acta* D-M 103 f.). After the *Carmen* had been sung the *ludi* continued with theatrical and athletic performances.

As are most of Horace's hymnic *carmina*, the *Carmen Saeculare* is written in Sapphic stanzas.³² Its style very much resembles the hymns of the first collection of *Odes*, such as C. 1.10:³³ there is no enjambment at the stanza boundary, and every stanza constitutes a neat syntactical unit.³⁴ However, the relatively frequent break after the sixth syllable of the Sapphic hendecasyllables is more in tune with Book IV than with books I–III;³⁵ it often occurs in succession (ll. 14 f., 18 f., 53–55, 58 f., 61 f., 73 f.; the other places are ll. 1, 35, 39, 43, 51, 70). Very often, successive verses show a second common break after the major break, after either the fifth or sixth syllable (ll. 2 f., 5–8, 9 f., 18 f., 22 f., 25 f., 45 f., 49 f., 53–55, 58 f., 66 f.; quite often after *-que*). Horace's *Carmen* is dedicated above all to the two divine patrons of the third day who had been honored immediately before the *Carmen Saeculare* was sung, Apollo and Diana; it corresponds to the oracle's request for ἀειδόμενοι (τε) Λατῖνοι/παιῖνες κούροισι κόρησί τε, "Latin paeans sung by boys and girls" (l. 18 f.). The divine siblings are invoked at the beginning (ll. 1–4) and they return in the middle (ll. 33–36) and at the end (ll. 61–72). Immediately after the opening address the chorus states explicitly that it sings its song in obedience to the sibylline verses (ll. 5–8).

As Mommsen and Vahlen³⁶ have seen, the poem falls into two halves (A: 1–36; B: 37–72), each of which consists of 3 × 3 stanzas and the whole is rounded off by a final stanza forming an appendix (C: ll. 73–76). The triadic structure is, of course, motivated by the role of the holy numbers three and nine in the ceremony of the *ludi*: the *Carmen* was sung by a double chorus of 27 (= 3 × 9) boys and girls (*acta* D-M 147), three times nine cakes were offered, and so on. But Horace had already built Pindaric poems in triads with C. 1.12 and C. 1.2.³⁷

³² See above, pp. 221, 223; cf. also Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 472; I do not understand Putnam's (2000: 106) discussion of the meter.

³³ Above, pp. 277 f.

³⁴ See p. 402 with n. 710.

³⁵ Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xlv.

³⁶ Mommsen 1913: 602; idem 1905: 357 f.; Vahlen 1923/1970: 369–387.

³⁷ See pp. 232 ff. and 363 ff. See also Fraenkel 1957: 370 n. 2.

The first half (A) after Apollo and Diana addresses the three chthonic powers, *Ilithyia*, *Parcae*, and the Earth (*Tellus*, l. 29), with a prayer for fertility of the women and of the land; the second half (B) prays to the patron gods of Rome for prosperity and continuance of the Roman state, but whereas in A the accent was on the physical conditions, in B the emphasis falls on moral and political values.³⁸ As the oracle prescribed that the girls and boys should form separate choruses (χωρίς δὲ κόραι χορὸν αὐταὶ ἔχοιεν, / καὶ χωρὶς παίδων ἄρσιν στᾶχος, l. 20f.), they probably alternated, and it is a likely guess that the girls sang A, with its emphasis on Diana and female goddesses, while B, which praises manly virtues and the princeps, was assigned to the boys (cf. ll. 71f.);³⁹ in the final sphragis, where the chorus speaks in its own name, the two choruses join.⁴⁰

By returning both in the last stanza of A (ll. 33–36) and the concluding triad of B (ll. 61–72), the pair of the initial invocation, Apollo and Diana, encloses the poem in a double ‘Ringkomposition’;⁴¹ Apollo’s and Diana’s overriding presence is felt throughout the poem, the first half in particular. The initial epithet *lucidum caeli decus*, “radiant glory of the heavens” alludes to the identification Apollo-Sol/Diana-Luna, which dominates the first half: Sol is addressed in the third stanza (ll. 9–12) and Luna, instead of Diana, stands beside Apollo in ll. 35f.⁴² Putnam⁴³ has drawn attention to the continuous etymological wordplay and alliterations in the poem; already the choice of the name Phoebus for Apollo alludes to the (pseudo)etymology φῶς, “light,” and Diana⁴⁴ looks forward to *dis* (l. 7)—*dicere* (l. 8)—*diem* (l. 9; echoed by *idem* in l. 10)—*diva* (l. 17; like *dis*—*dicere* at line beginning)—*die* (*claro!*; l. 23)—*dictum* (l. 26).⁴⁵ The notion of time (*semper*—*tempore*,

³⁸ Fraenkel 1957: 375; also Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 471.

³⁹ Cf. also *C.* 1.21.1–4, with Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 253 f.

⁴⁰ Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 472.

⁴¹ Putnam 2000: 52.

⁴² If Luna replaces Diana, one may speak of identification *stricto sensu*; Heinze (who even states explicitly that *lucidum caeli decus* in l. 2 refers—against the obvious understanding and ancient tradition [see Fraenkel 1957: 373 f. with n. 8]—to Diana only) and Fraenkel refuse to speak of the identification of Sol in ll. 9 ff. with Apollo (the oracle, l. 16 f., identifies the two), but this is a mere verbal quibble. Ancient gods are not fixed entities, neatly defined and separated from each other. Recent interpreters like Feeney and Putnam rightly stress the association of Sol with Apollo in the poem.

⁴³ Putnam 2000: 52 ff.

⁴⁴ The etymologies are made explicit by the epithet *lucidum decus* and, as regards Diana, by the identification with Lucina in l. 16. The etymology of φοῖβος is unknown; for Diana, see DÉLL s.v.; cf. also *Cic. nat. deor.* 2.69; Maltby 1991 s.v.; cf. also DÉLL s.v. *luc*-.

⁴⁵ The adnominatio *Diana/dis/dicere/dies/diva* is in alliteration with *decus* (l. 2)—

ll. 3f.; *certus undenos decies per annos orbis ut cantus referatque ludos*, “so that the unfailing cycle of ten times eleven years may bring round singing and games” ll. 21f.) and the change between day and night (*Sol ... diem qui promiss et celas aliusque et idem nasceris*, “sun, who brings forth the day and hide it away, who are born anew and yet the same,” ll. 8–11; *ludos ter die claro totiensque grata nocte frequentis*, “games that are thronged with people three times by daylight and as often in the pleasant time of night,” ll. 23f.) runs through the whole first half of the poem. Time is depicted as an eternal circular movement of coming and going that evolves according to an eternally fixed rule (*vosque veraces cecinisse, Parcae/quod semel dictum stabilis per aevum/terminus servet, bona iam peractis/iungite fata*, “you Fates who truly tell what had been decreed [and may that be preserved by the immovable landmark of our fortunes],” ll. 25–28). Horace does precisely the opposite of what Mommsen thought he should have done; he does not emphasize the polarity between day and night, upper and nether powers. His *Carmen* was performed after the final daytime ritual, on the day dedicated to Apollo and Diana, and it had to sum up the positive overall message of the festival. Thus, the emphasis clearly falls on day and light, i.e., the daytime part of the festival,⁴⁶ and accordingly on the benign, not the threatening, nature of the divine.⁴⁷ The movement of A traces the rising of the sun by lifting the gaze to the *septem colles*, the “seven hills” in l. 7 and to the chariot of the sun at the pediment of the Palatine temple of Apollo in l. 9 (cf. Prop. 2.31.11).⁴⁸ In parallel, ll. 13ff. speak of fertility as a process of maturing, opening up, and bringing to light (*maturos aperire partus*, “to open the way for birth in due season,” l. 13; *producas*, “bring forth,” l. 17). The sun invoked in ll. 5ff. seems to provide the daylight, in which the fruits can ripen, nurtured by the ‘beneficial waters and winds’ of the bright sky (*aquae salubres et Iovis aerae*, “Jove’s wholesome showers and breezes,” ll. 31f.), whereas *condito ... telo*, “the weapon laid aside” (l. 33) at the beginning of the last stanza suggests the sunset and the rising moon (*siderum regina bicornis ... Luna*, “crescent-shaped queen of the stars,” ll. 35f.⁴⁹), with its favorable influence on vegetal life (cf. Horace’s self-interpretation C. 4.6.37–40⁵⁰).

pro-ducas (l. 17)—*decreta* (l. 18)—*decies* (l. 21); for the other assonances in the passage and the wordplay (*decus*)—*decreta*—*decies*, in particular, see Putnam loc. cit.

⁴⁶ Putnam 2000: 53.

⁴⁷ See below, p. 439.

⁴⁸ Cf. also Putnam 2000: 59f.

⁴⁹ *Bicornis* (of the crescent moon) at the same time suggests the bow, corresponding to *condito ... telo* for Apollo; see Putnam 2000: 70f.

⁵⁰ See Fedeli and Ciccarelli 2008: 318f.

The prayer to the powers of the nether world for fertility are integrated in this frame; although the actual sequence of worship at the *ludi* was Moirai, Ilithyiae, Earth, Horace begins with Ilithyia (in the singular) because she is directly concerned with the fertility of women and thus allows a reference to the Augustan legislation on marriage;⁵¹ of course, he prefers the singular, because this suggests identification with Diana.⁵² The series of chthonic goddesses is arranged in decreasing length. After the opening triad on Apollo, Diana, and Sol, a whole triad is dedicated to Ilithyia and childbirth; the *Parcae* and *Tellus* receive one stanza each; and the last stanza of the triad of A returns to Apollo and Diana. Horace is keen to emphasize by positive epithets (*lenis*, “gentle,” l. 14; *bona*, “good,” l. 27; *salubres*, “wholesome,” l. 31) the benign nature of the nether powers. Accordingly, Apollo in ll. 33–36 is called *mitis placidusque* “mild and gentle,” and at the end (ll. 61–65) he is addressed in his functions as the god of foreseeing the future (*augur*), of music, and medicine. His bow is mentioned in l. 61, but no reference is made to its destructive power; on the contrary, l. 33 depicts him explicitly *condito ... telo*, “weapon laid aside.” This indirect allusion to his destructive powers as an avenger of evil is perfectly in line with the ‘Bildprogramm’ of the Palatine temple, which featured the killing of the daughters of Niobe and the expulsion of the Gauls from Delphi on the doors of the building, whereas the statues of Apollo in front of the temple and in the *cella* represented Apollo Citharoedus (Prop. 2.31.12–14 and 4.6.69).⁵³

The explicit reference to Augustus’s marriage laws in ll. 17–20 placed the emperor’s moral reform, and his revival of traditional family values, in particular, at the center of the poem. Already, in C. 3.6, Horace had depicted sexual license as the ultimate indication of Rome’s decay; there, he combined it with the concept of a curse resulting from an inherited guilt, which had to be expiated.⁵⁴ In a way, the second part of the *Carmen Saeculare* is a positive counterpart to C. 3.6. In the first half of the poem the chorus prayed for the external benefits of Augustus’s moral reform; the

⁵¹ With the appendix of ll. 21–24, the versified summary of the law is beautifully linked to the youthful chorus and the festival situation, cf. Fraenkel 1957: 373 ff.

⁵² Cf. Romano 1991: 933; cf. also C. 3.22 (above, p. 281). For the implication of the alternative addresses *Lucina* and *Genitalis*, see Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 248 f., with further references; cf. also above, p. 437. For *Lucina*, see Kiessling and Heinze 1955: 474; Putnam 2000: 61 f. *Genitalis* is not attested elsewhere as a name of *Lucina* and it must strike one as strange to read a Horatian ad-hoc invention in the context of this traditional hymnic formula, thus Bentley’s *Genetyllis* (printed by Shackleton Bailey and approved by Delz 1988: 497) may be correct.

⁵³ See Zanker 1997: 91.

⁵⁴ Above, pp. 401 ff.

second half focuses both on the Roman past and on the moral values on which Rome's future success is based. In ll. 25–29 the chorus had prayed that the *Parcae* might add “a happy destiny to what had already been fulfilled” (*bona iam peractis iungite fata*); thus B begins with a recollection of the *peracta*, and roots present and future in the past by aligning Augustus with Aeneas. He does not call Augustus by name, but calls him *Anchisae Venerisque sanguis*, “descendant of Anchises and Venus.” With admirable brevity, and in manifest reference to Virgil's *Aeneid*, ll. 37–52 sum up key elements of Augustan ideology as presented by Horace in his poetry, namely the *Roman Odes*. Aeneas's arrival in Latium marks a new beginning that leaves behind the crimes of the past (*sine fraude*, “without deceit,” l. 41) and thus guarantees the Roman people's prosperity and well-being based on moral rectitude. What in Juno's speech in *C.* 3.5⁵⁵ was a stern divine warning is transformed here into a prayer to gracious gods who can be assumed to be such and to grant what they are asked for because Rome is their creation and they had paved Aeneas's way from the ashes of Troy to a better lot for the elected part of his people. The lines on Aeneas leading the way through burning Troy, which recall Virgil's *Aeneid*, vaguely allude to Aeneas's standard epithet, *pius*, but Horace calls him *castus*, “chaste”; of course, this pointedly alludes to the concept that Roman rectitude is based on proper behavior *in rebus eroticis* as expounded in *C.* 3.6. Yet, for a Trojan hero the epithet stands in pointed contrast to Paris,⁵⁶ who by his illegitimate sexual instincts caused Troy's destruction, and is thus less out of place than may appear at first sight.

Mommsen⁵⁷ censured Horace for addressing the prayer of ll. 37 ff. to the general *di*, “gods” (l. 45 f.), which, in his opinion, after ll. 33–36 suggests Apollo and Diana. However, the ‘Acta’ revealed that Apollo and Diana were honored with sacrificial cakes.⁵⁸ In ll. 49–53 the gods of ll. 37 ff. are asked to fulfill the Emperor's prayer for those who sacrifice white oxen. According to the ‘Acta,’ Augustus and Agrippa on the first day each offered a white ox to Jupiter. Yet, although Apollo and Diana are mentioned directly before ll. 37 ff., nobody could refer *vestrum*, “your,” in l. 37, exclusively to Apollo and Diana; Rome cannot be called their creation. If Rome is the creation of any Olympian god, then it was founded by the will of Jupiter and by the

⁵⁵ Above, pp. 396 ff.

⁵⁶ Putnam 2000: 75.

⁵⁷ Mommsen 1905: 357 f.

⁵⁸ Above, p. 436.

assent of Juno; if ll. 37–40 suggest any particular god they suggest Jupiter, certainly not Apollo and Diana. The general second-person plural in 37 ff., not defined by any more specific addressee than the general *di* in ll. 45 f., cannot be tied down to Apollo and Diana but must refer to the gods that protect Rome in general, as did the *dis* in l. 7 (cf. also ll. 73–76). In fact, *Roma si vestrum est opus*, “if Rome is indeed your creation,” refers back to *dis quibus septem placuere colles*, “to the gods who look with favor on the Seven Hills,” in l. 7. The emphatic anaphoric *di* in ll. 46 takes up the word-play *Diana/di/dicere/diem/diva*.⁵⁹ It is surrounded by further d-alliterations: *daturus* (l. 43)—*docili* (l. 45)—*date* (l. 47)—*decus* (l. 48), similar to *decus—date* in ll. 2f. and *decreta—decies* later in ll. 17 ff.⁶⁰ The connotations ‘day, brightness, light,’ suggested by the (pseudo)etymological association with *dies*, are made explicit by *albus*, “white,” and *clarus*, originally “clear,” in ll. 49 f., as they were made explicit by *lucidum caeli decus*, “radiant glory of the heavens,” in l. 2. Moreover, the gods to whom the chorus prays need not be identical with those to whom Augustus sacrifices. Far from being an obscure reference to gods that only a participant of the festival could identify, as Mommsen claims, the general *di* provides for a sliding change from the gods mentioned in A to Augustus’s sacrifice to Jupiter, the supreme protector of Rome, in 49–52.

As the gods to whom the prayer is addressed are not named, Horace replaces the emperor’s name in l. 50 by the circumscription *Veneris Anchisaeque sanguis*, “descendant of Anchises and Venus,” which stresses Augustus’s relationship with Aeneas and thus the continuity between past and present. At the same time, *Anchisae* makes the allusion of *bellante prior, iacentem lenis in hostem*, “victorious in battle over his foes yet merciful once they are down” (ll. 51f.), to Anchises’s words in Virgil’s *Aeneid*⁶¹ explicit and *Veneris* allows for wordplay with *veneratur* (l. 49).

Augustus stands at the beginning of the central triad of A: in the pose of the worshipper he represents religious devotion as the basis of moral behavior (implicitly as an expiation of inherited sins) and thus complements Aeneas’s epithet, *castus*, in l. 42. Religious devotion, subordination

⁵⁹ Above, p. 437.

⁶⁰ Above, pp. 437 f. n. 46.

⁶¹ Cited below, pp. 469 f. Horace, for obvious reasons, has the natural order against Virgil’s ὕστερον πρότερον; Norden 1995: 337 cites Leo (*per litteras*): “Die Wirkung des Verses und Abschlusses liegt im ὕστερον πρότερον: die natürliche Folge ist *bellante prior, iacentem lenis in hostem*. Virgil übt mit dergleichen eine geheimnisvolle und unnachahmliche Wirkung ...” For the rhetorical elaboration of the passage, cf. also Norden 1995: 334 ff.

to the divine, prevents hubris and crude violence, it makes man listen to the *lene consilium*, “gentle advice,” which guarantees that a ruler is *bellante prior, iacentem lenis in hostem*.⁶² This attitude triumphs over brute force, and lays the foundation of Rome’s worldwide power. The second half of the poem (B) revolves around the image of the emperor engaged in worship; he embodies continuity with the past and thus opens the view from the past onto the future, from the ashes of Troy and its destitute exiles to the furthest borders of the Roman empire. The following stanzas (ll. 53–56 and 57–60) celebrate side by side Rome’s military and moral superiority,⁶³ and Augustus as the triumphant bringer of peace and the *curator morum*, the disciplinarian of Roman manners.⁶⁴

Horatian poems do not end fortissimo; as usual, Horace appends a coda. The final triad returns to the two deities of the opening stanza. The address to Apollo, invoked in all his benign functions,⁶⁵ directs the gaze from the borders of the empire back to the place of actual worship, the Palatine temple of the victor of Actium and another of the seven hills, the Aventine, with the temple of Diana (cf. *acta* D-M 10 and 31f.). The mention of the *XVviri*, the council of the fifteen men, who were in charge of the organization of the *ludi*, and of the boys, who probably sang the second half of the *Carmen*,⁶⁶ brings us back to the human agents of the festival. And the song ends with a personal sphragis, as other Horatian poems, not least C. 3.1, end on a personal note.⁶⁷ But here it is the chorus who speaks on its own behalf of its confidence that his prayers will be granted.

Horace’s *Carmen Saeculare* is an official poem. It duly displays the ideological premises by which Augustus’s regime defined itself, and that is what Horace wanted it to be. If one chooses to use the term—and if one takes it in an unbiased sense one need not shy away from doing so—the *Carmen* is a piece of political propaganda, even more than Horace’s other political

⁶² Cf. above, pp. 393 f. on C. 3.4.

⁶³ Above, pp. 439 f.

⁶⁴ Cf. Kienast 1999: 112. The idea that the state is responsible for promoting the moral standard of its citizens finds as little favor in modern political discourse as Augustus’s marriage laws found with the Roman senate; a modern constitution like that of the People’s Republic of China, which explicitly defines this as a duty of the state (art. 24), is not among the most popular constitutions today. However, the present discussion in western democracies about the need for a consensus in common civic values in the context of immigration on an unprecedented level comes closer to such a concept than most people seem to realize.

⁶⁵ Cf. above, pp. 437 ff.

⁶⁶ Above, p. 437.

⁶⁷ See pp. 381 f.

poems. And in contrast to most of them the fact that the *Carmen* had to fit a public event makes it lack any tension between the poet's individual person and his role as a public advocate of a political program, the tension that endows the Augustan *recusatio* poetry with a unique authenticity and emotional intensity.⁶⁸ Still, Horace arguably succeeded supremely well in converting political propaganda into a highly original and beautifully crafted poem that avoids any hint of triviality, even where it refers to the most trivial concepts of contemporary politics. But it is more than that. Like Horace's *Actium Epodes*⁶⁹ the *Carmen Saeculare* is the immediate reflection in a work of art of the prevalent mood at a major historical event; there are few such works that could stand up to the moment and express its essence in a form that was valid over time.⁷⁰ I do not know any piece of 'official' poetry or art that does, if not Horace's *Carmen Saeculare*.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Above, pp. 256 ff.

⁶⁹ See above, pp. 191 ff.

⁷⁰ See above, p. 396.

⁷¹ What Horace achieved with the *Carmen Saeculare* is, of course, not substantially different from Pindar's achievement with a poem like *P. 1*; poets like Pindar were official panegyrists bound to model their poetry in accordance with a certain conventional moral code. Thus, with the *Carmen*, Horace assumed the role of the Pindaric *vates* in the most eminent sense; the only difference from Pindar consists in the fact that the regime and the events Horace celebrated in his poetry were of incomparably greater historical importance than any event Pindar could ever dream of praising in his verse. In order to find official panegyric poetry on an emperor's court that meets the highest poetic standards one has to look outside Europe, to the Japanese court poet Hitomaro, for example (cf. Miner 1968). In any case, if one compares official art for similar events from more recent history one will not find anything comparable to Horace's poem, certainly not in poetry. An exceptionally good modern work of this kind is Shostakovich's 2nd Symphony (on the 10th anniversary of the Russian Revolution), an avant-garde work (in contrast to his 9th and 12th).

THE FOURTH BOOK OF *ODES*

Elaine Fantham

Abstract: Suetonius implies that Horace would not have composed this book without the pressure from Augustus to celebrate his stepsons' victories. Certainly, the book is constructed around the two pairs of Odes, 4–5 and 14–15, that cap Pindaric praise of the young commanders with greater protestations of national gratitude and loyalty to the princeps. His triumph is also honored as Horace contrasts his own humble role in the Roman crowd with the soaring poetic ambition of Iullus Antonius. The Pindaric language of 4.2, 4.3, and 4.6 to Melpomene and Apollo reflects Horace's new authority as poet of the secular hymn. Other odes have more conventional lyric and sympotic themes, love objects, gay and straight (4.1; 4.10, 4.11, 4.13), the renewal of spring and human mortality: the less successful 4.8 and 4.9 combine dedication to a nobleman with panegyric motifs from myth and history. Opening with an appeal to erotic Venus the book returns to her transformed as nurturing ancestress of Caesar.

Keywords: panegyric; Pindar/Pindaric, sympotic poetry

Scholars respond in very different ways to Horace's last book of *Odes*, and their reactions tend to be matched by equally different approaches to reading the collective poetry book (*Gedichtbuch*). Should we reconstruct it genetically, starting with the *Odes*, that Horace will have composed first? Or follow the order in which Horace has arranged his poems? The first Ode is almost certainly a later composition, designed to foreshadow the different components of the *Odes*, which it introduces. Surely, we must do both, but do it in reverse order, with a first reading that follows Horace's ordering (like that of Syndikus and, e.g., Putnam), before turning back to trace what we believe was Horace's procedure as their composer. But again, even before such a first reading, students will be influenced by Suetonius's comment in the *Vita Horati* that "Augustus so greatly admired Horace's writings, believing they would be immortal, that he commissioned him to compose the Secular Hymn and an ode on the victory of his stepsons Drusus and Tiberius over the Alpine Vindelici" (*sed et Vindelicam victoriam Tiberi Drusique componendam iniunxerit*) and compelled him on this account to add a fourth book, after a long interval, to his three books of *Odes* (*eumque coegerit propter hoc tribus carminum libris ex longo intervallo*

quantum addere, Suet. *De Poetis*, 40). Leaving aside disputes about the level of coercive pressure involved,¹ we do seem to have evidence that advances composition of the fourth *Ode* close to the princes' campaigns in 16, and makes it likely that Horace's other poem honoring the princes (C. 4.14) and the two *Odes* addressed to Augustus (C. 4.5 and 4.15) will also have been early compositions.

Becker² is surely right to see *Odes* 4.6, to Apollo, and 4.3 as early and proud reactions to the successful reception of Horace's first public hymn, the *Carmen Saeculare* of 17 BC. There are three main elements in the poems of this collection, and most of the *Odes* encompass at least two of them: (A) panegyric of Augustus and his sons (and on a smaller scale, of other grandees like Paullus Fabius Maximus in C. 4.1 and Iullus Antonius in C. 4.2); (B) rejoicing in the power of poetry to honor and immortalize (C. 4.3 and 6; C. 4.8 and 9); and (C) personal responses to love (C. 4.1; 4.10; 4.11 and 13), aging, and death (C. 4.1; 4.7; 4.10, 11, and 12).

With this in mind we can embark on the sequence of *Odes* and read them both consecutively and across such thematic divisions. Horace's appeal against Venus's aggression in *Odes* 4.1 (*rursus bella moves ... parce precor, precor*) sends his reader back to the earlier books of *Odes* and particularly to C. 1.19 and 30, then C. 3.26. It has always troubled me that Horace should claim to have ended his love affairs, and report Venus's demand for surrender of his heart (1.19.1–4: *Mater saeva Cupidinum / Thebanaeque iubet Seme-lae puer / et lasciva Licentia / finitis animum reddere amoribus*) before inviting her into Glycera's house in the shorter cletic hymn 1.30: *O Venus regina Cnidi Paphique / sperne dilectam Cypron et vocantis / ture te multo Glycerae ... transfer in aedem* (O Venus, queen of Cnidus and Paphos, disdain your favorite Cyprus and move into the shrine of Glycera who invokes you with abundant incense). But as Denis Feeney reminds me, Horace was already claiming to be finished with love and escaped from its shipwreck in the Ode to Pyrrha (1.5). Certainly there is no doubt that Horace is recalling C. 1.19 here in C. 4.1 as he begs the goddess *desine dulcium / mater saeva Cupidinum ... flectere mol-libus / iam durum imperiis*. Venus may still be cruel but the cupids of 1.19 are now *dulces*, while Horace himself has stiffened with age like a horse too old to respond to the goddess's commands (cf. *Epistles* 1.1.9–10). And not only does he recall the earlier appeal, but his allusion to wars long abandoned (*intermissa ... bella*) reminds his reader of one of the last *Odes* in Book 3: *vixi*

¹ On which see Griffin in Millar 1984: 201 ff.

² See Becker 1962: 113 ff.

puellis nuper idoneus/et militavi non sine gloria; nunc arma defunctumque bello /barbiton hic paries habebit (3.26: I used to live a fit suitor for girls, and campaigned not without glory. But now this wall [of Venus' temple] will keep my weapons and lyre which have ended their warfare). Ovid will echo Horace's move when he evokes the wording of his renunciation in *Amores* 3.15.16, *aurea de campo vellite signa meo*, to reverse them in his invocation to Venus in *Fasti* 4.7: *saucius an sanus numquid tua signa reliqui?* Hearing or reading the old phrases of *Odes* 1.19 and 3.26, Horace's public will not believe that the disclaimer of love outlined in C. 4.1.1–7 is final, and will learn before this ode is ended that Horace cannot in fact drive longing from his breast. And though Horace dreams of the winsome young Ligurinus who eludes his clutch through the rolling waters of the Tiber, the waking poet has no illusions: C. 4.10 is little more than an epigram, which poignantly contrasts the youthful Narcissistic pride of Ligurinus with the body that has outgrown it. The beautiful boy has grown into a hairy man no longer able to provoke male desire.

This ode uses the same Aeolic metrical combination as C. 1.19, alternating glyconics and asclepiads, and Horace will return to the same combination for the very different lyric C. 4.3.³ There is no regular coincidence of psychological or thematic function and metrical form. But the reader who has taken up a book of lyrics has an expectation of love poetry, both third party and first person, and will be rewarded immediately by the portrait of the youthful lover Fabius, and after some delay by the poet's varying emotions not only as a lover of males in C. 4.10 but as a former lover of women in 4.11 and 13. The core of C. 4.1 sends Venus partying (*comissari* = *komazein* occurs here only in Horace) to the house of Paulus Fabius Maximus on her chariot drawn by brilliant swans (swans occur only here and as Venus's chariot team in 3.28.15.) In fact, Horace pulls out all the stops of assonant refinement on **na**-, **t**, **b**, **r**, and **c**, to suggest the luxury of Paulus's party: *illic plurima naribus/duces turalyraque et Berecynthia/delectabere tibia*. Paulus may not even have been a poet, but he is commended as both nobly born and handsome (*decens*), gifted with a hundred talents and an eloquent defending counsel. He would marry Augustus's stepsister, and become consul in 11 BC, but we cannot use this information to date the ode either to 11 or to the unknown year of the

³ The pattern for C. 4.1 and 4.3 is -/-~ ~ -/~ x followed by -/-~ ~ ~ -/-~ ~ ~ -/~ x. Ode 4.10, the epigrammatically short counterpart of C. 4.1, uses the exceptional greater asclepiads -/-~ ~ ~ -/-~ ~ ~ -/-~ ~ ~ -/~ x stichically. This meter has only been used before in C. 1.11 (also about love and unknown future change) and C. 1.18.

marriage. (Paulus would enjoy a long friendship with the emperor before he was driven to suicide in 14AD for his indiscretion over a possible reconciliation with Augustus's disowned heir, Agrippa Postumus.) Instead of chasing prosopography, I want to draw attention to the erotic and sensual world in which Horace has situated his candidate for love, as Venus's standard bearer, outdoing the extravagant gifts of his rival (18 *largi muneribus ... aemuli*: the rival is an elegiac touch). Horace employs each of the senses to convey the luxury Venus can expect: a marble temple with citrus wood ceiling, the fragrance of incense, and the delicious sounds of pipes, lyres, and songs accompanied by the shepherd's pipe, with twice daily hymns by a chorus of boys and girls dancing rhythmically on white feet. When I first read this ode I did not know Statius's *Silvae* 1.2, the epithalamium for Stella and Violentilla, a marriage of experienced elegiac lovers who have come together after rejecting nameless rivals; their wedding is a sumptuous occasion set in a luxury villa of costly materials. Here is the same world, a century earlier in Horace's *Odes*. And though Horace uses C. 4.1 and 4.2 to praise these princely noblemen, Paulus as a personality is quite distinct from the pindarizing Iullus of C. 4.2 (who would be his successor as consul in 10 BC).

In the pivotal stanza of C. 4.1 Horace speaks not just of a life unloving and unloved, *me nec femina nec puer; iam nec spes animi credula mutui*, but of shunning the wine and garlands of the symposium only to have his sleeping subconscious contradict him with tears and a sudden loss of eloquence (the symptoms of Callimachus's lover in denial). And as the unyielding (*dure*) Ligurinus escapes him, the last words *aquas ... volubilis* evoke the elusive flight of time.⁴

It will be helpful to approach C. 4.2, to Iullus Antonius, from three angles: first, through a bare translation, paraphrasing its content; second, by considering the addressee and historical context; and third, through formal features within the poem that associate it with its neighbors.

This second ode, composed in Sapphic stanzas, starts from the overreaching ambition of an unidentified poet (*quisquis*), to imitate the lyric sweep of Pindar. After a swift condemnation of this rash fellow, Horace devotes six stanzas to describing Pindar's achievement, and its preconditions: against the frail wax framework of wings and the death dive into the sea of this modern Icarus (though Icarus goes unnamed, and even Pindar's greater name is delayed to line 8). Raging like a mountain stream swollen over its banks,

⁴ Compare the ever-flowing river of *Epist.* 1.2.43 and *volventis* of the Pindaric torrent in C. 3.29.38.

rushing deep-voiced beyond measure, Pindar deserves the prize of Apollo's laurel, whether he sends new phrases rolling down (*devolvit*) in bold dithyrambs free of metrical bonds; hymns (*canit*) gods and the kings who are children of the gods, who felled centaurs and the chimaera in a death deserved; tells (*dicit*) of those whom the Olympic palm brings home as heavenly victors, boxers or horsemen, giving them a gift (*munere donat*) more precious than a hundred statues; or laments (*plorat*) a dead noble, raising (*educit*) to the stars his strength, spirit, and character, begrudging them to black doom (9–24). This vast panorama of dithyramb and epinicians of royal conquest or sporting victory and dirge has to be experienced in full to convey to us—and to Horace's Roman peers, who could hardly know and appreciate Pindar—why the great lyricist needs such a vast draught of air to soar to the lofty spread of clouds.

In contrast, Horace compresses his own laborious confection of honey from the sweet thyme of moist Tibur's glades into five lines (27–32). But this is a double contrast; Horace opposes his own *modest* composition to both mighty Pindar and Iullus's future hymning⁵ of Caesar in a greater strain than his (*maiore plectro*), when, handsome in well-earned garlands, Caesar will drag the fierce Sygambri up the Sacred Slope. The fates and generous gods have made no greater or finer gift, nor will they, though times return to the ancient golden age. In his pre-formed encomium, Horace sets out how Iullus will hymn days of rejoicing and the people's festival in the city for having won the return of gallant Augustus, and the forum free of lawsuits (*urbis/publicum ludum ... forum litibus orbum* are businesslike touches of realism).

Iullus' song and its occasion earn twelve lines (33–44), while Horace and the nation (*civitas omnis*) share eight lines, as he sings for his own modest part two phrases of a traditional triumphal song:⁶ "O glorious Sun, worthy of praise." Horace identifies himself as part of "[w]e, the people," happy at recovering Caesar as they together repeatedly sing "Ho triumph! Ho triumph," and give incense to the kindly gods. (This identification of poet and people will be a significant detail in both C. 4.5 and 4.15.) The last three stanzas divide, giving one line to Iullus's lavish offering of twenty cattle, but

⁵ This is the only instance of *concinere* in Horace, but to judge from its tragic setting in Cic. *Tusc.* 1.106 and bridal context in Cat. 61.12, the verb has a ritual flavor and colors the line with archaism. On *clarabit*, see also C. 4.3.4.

⁶ We do not know whether these elements of trochaic *versus quadratus* already existed as part of a triumphal song, or are Horace's own splendid invention; for Augustus as glorious Sun, see 4.5 below.

eleven to a loving description of the young calf, tawny brown with the snowy white crescent moon marking its brow, that Horace will sacrifice.

So what is the context and who the addressee? We do not know whether Iullus Antonius, whose names are separated between lines 2 and 26, himself aspired to compose Pindaric poetry (he was known only as the author of a twelve-book epic about Diomedes) or, as other scholars surmise, encouraged Horace to attempt it. As the younger child of Antony and Fulvia, Iullus had been brought up by Octavia along with her own children (by Antony and her previous husband, Marcellus); he had even been married to her daughter Marcella and had no doubt enjoyed her protection until her death in 11 BC. Consul in 10 BC, he had presumably been praetor in 13 BC, the most likely date for Augustus's triumphant return from Gaul after eradicating the memory of Rome's defeat by the Sygambri in 16 BC. But Iullus was the child of two enemies of Augustus Caesar, a potential rival to the Claudian stepsons Tiberius (consul 13) and Drusus (consul 9), and he would meet his death by execution after supposedly conspiring with the emperor's daughter Julia in 2 BC. Scholars who have observed the successive consulships of these nobles have suggested that C. 4.2 addressed Iullus in honor of his future office, but the ode that anticipates Augustus's return from Gaul has to belong to 14 or early 13 BC.

Now for the formal features. We saw that Pindar's name framed lines 1–8, but the address to Iullus was split between 2 and 26, and separated by a vast cumulative evocation of Pindar's seventeen books of lyric. Thus, the longer descriptions of Pindar's poetry and Iullus's potential hymn to Caesar alternate with the neat and understated accounts of Horace's miniature poetry and private voice, but even the anonymity of those twenty cattle contribute to the sense that quantity is incompatible with the delicate and refined quality of Horace's little offering. Another feature peculiar to this poem and its neighbors is the stress on the quality of offerings. Paulus's offerings, superior to the *munera* of his lavish rival (C. 4.1.18), are matched by Pindar's poetic gift, superior to a hundred honorific statues (C. 4.2.19–20), and by Melpomene's gift of song to Horace in C. 4.3.21. But these offerings are outclassed by Augustus Caesar, greatest gift of fate and the gods in the past, present, and future: the language of *quo nihil maius meliusve* matches the superlatives of *Odes* 1.12.17–18: *unde nil maius generatur ipso/nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum* (from whom nothing greater is begotten than himself, nor does anything like or close to him flourish). And this gift of the gods will recur in Rome's debt to the Nerones (C. 4.4.37) and every Roman citizen's gratitude to the good leader, Caesar, honored like a god in the libations of C. 4.5.25–40.

With this attempted analysis I have to admit my failure to understand a key aspect of Horace's triumphal narrative: In line 49, most manuscripts read *teque dum procedis* (some read *procedit*), but the next *te* in 53 will be Iullus as sacrificer. Are we to adjust *te* to read *tu*, and imagine Iullus advancing in Caesar Augustus's parade? Or do we conjecture *isque dum procedit* or *atque dum procedit* with Bentley or Meineke?⁷

Two poems in this collection, C. 4.3 and 4.6, are focused on Horace's poetic achievement in composing the *Carmen Saeculare*: the first, C. 4.3, to Melpomene, was probably composed after the second, C. 4.6, to Apollo, but it is best to consider them together and as contrasting counterparts.

The beauty of the liquid sounds in C. 4.3.1–2, *quem tu Melpomene semel / nascentem placido lumine videris* (Melpomene, whoever you have once beheld with kindly gaze at his birth), are worthy of the melodious muse's name, and the whole short ode compresses two sequences of thought. This muse gives her favorite neither the glory of a Greek athletic victor, nor of the Roman conqueror, bearing an Apolline garland as he hastens to the Capitol (both figures we met in the Pindaric table of contents in C. 4.2); instead, the waters flowing past Tibur and its dense and leafy woods will make him glorious for Aeolian song (note the vowel and consonant sequence of *-olio carmine nobilem*). Horace rewords the delicate language of C. 4.2.30–32, so that now Tibur is not the setting but the agent of the poet's glory: the modest but creative verb *fingent* ... *nobilem* contrasts with the ringing archaic *clarare*,⁸ giving grandeur to the Greek context.

The second half of the poem divides between pride that Rome's children think Horace worthy to join the bands of poets (these are surely the poets of Greek choral lyric such as Alcman and Pindar) and gratitude to the muse who tunes his golden lyre, the miracle worker who could give mute fishes the sounds of the swan. He is simple in his happiness at being pointed out in the street as the artist of the Roman lyre, recognizing that his inspiration (*spiro* used in this sense only here and of Sappho's artistry in C. 4.9, 10–12) and popularity is entirely her gift.

We should turn aside to confront the issue of music before moving on to C. 4.6. Greek poetry was set to the poet's own melodies, and the lyric poet really tuned his lyre as *fidicen*: but if the children of the boys' and

⁷ On textual issues, I have consulted Klingner 1959 and Shackleton Bailey 1995, but even the latter despairs, and obelizes the phrase.

⁸ This verb, too, occurs only here in Horace and his peers, but was used by Ennius and Cicero's poetry.

girls' choirs actually sang Horace's hymn to music, there is no argument to suggest that he or any of his peers composed their own setting. The contrast will be even more conspicuous in *C.* 4.6, addressed to *doctor argutae fidicen Thaliae, Phoebe* (*C.* 4.6.25: Shining Apollo, lyre-player and teacher of melodious Thalia.⁹) As Horace urges his choir to keep his rhythm and the beat of his thumb, scholars seem unanimous that Horace neither composed nor rehearsed a musical version of his text. But for modern readers, *C.* 4.6 introduces a different kind of clash—between the enlightened god of *mousike*, Apollo, and the vindictive killer.

If we go back to the first book of the *Iliad*, “the far shooting,” avenges the insult to his priest Chryses with a plague in the Greek camp. Mythology, too, celebrates Apollo's displaced vengeance on Niobe's children for the foolish queen's insult to his mother, a story quoted by Achilles himself to Priam in *Iliad* 24. If Horace's Apollo kills Niobe's children and the would-be rapist Tityos and Achilles, “almost victor over Troy,” how can the poet voice admiration for the god? In Horace's own generation it is myths of vengeance that honor Apollo on the ivory door of his new Palatine temple: the slaughter of Niobe's children and of the Gauls who threatened Delphi, not forgetting that Augustus and his poets glorified Apollo for his divine bowshot that drove off Antony at Actium. More to the point are Homer's description of Achilles after the death of Patroclus enraged as a lion, a consumer of raw flesh (20.164 f., 24.207), and the passage of Pindar's Delphic *Paeon VI*, when his Apollo denounces and will be revenged on the cruel Achilles.¹⁰

We have been conditioned not to believe that wicked actions justify cruel retaliation, but neither Homer nor Horace endorsed this idea. Let me isolate Horace's description of Achilles (5–20), which we now know owes much to Simonides.¹¹

Greater than other warriors but unequal to you Apollo, although as child of the sea-goddess Thetis he shook the Trojan towers, threatening with his terrifying spear—he, like a pine tree struck by the biting axe or a cypress, stricken by the East wind, fell stretched out afar and buried his neck in Trojan dust. Achilles would not have enclosed himself in the horse that masquerading as a ritual gift to Minerva deceived the Trojans in their ill-

⁹ *C.* 4.6 is the second ode in this book composed in alcaics; cf. *C.* 4.4 (described below), 4.9 and 4.14 and 15.

¹⁰ *Paeon VI*, strophe and antistrophe B, both badly damaged texts.

¹¹ See now Barchiesi 1995a. Particularly apt in both Simonides *Plataea* P.Oxy 2327 and Horace is the comparison of the warrior, who has been shot in the ankle, to the felling of a tall tree.

timed holiday and Priam's court happy with dancing, but openly hateful to those taken prisoner (alas, abomination! and again alas!) would have burned infant babes, even the embryo buried in its mother's womb (13–24).

Horace does not break off his Pindarically sweeping sentence, but piles on comparisons, concessive clauses, similes with fallen trees, and the potential brutalities of the cruel Achilles. But let us pause before following the counterfactual resolution in Zeus's consent to Apollo's intervention (21–24), not for his role in killing Achilles, but for saving Aeneas from him. Horace's expression of gratitude, because Apollo by his action saved Troy, converts what was originally part of a hymn to Achilles into a new song hymning Apollo.

As Syndikus has pointed out, the *Aeneid* has intervened between the early partisanship of Romans for the hero Achilles, and the years of the secular hymn. And even before Virgil began his great endorsement of Trojan piety, Catullus's Fates had foretold a career of brutal slaughter by Achilles, mowing down Trojan soldiers and craving the sacrifice of Polyxena to his ghost. Only in one other place does Horace interject exclamatory *heu nefas*—at *Odes* 3.24.30, where he deplores Roman loathing for true virtue.

We have seen that the poet's admiration for the archer god is in keeping with both Greek and Roman tradition. Two lines after naming Aeneas, Horace turns to Apollo as musician, the long-haired citharode bathing in Xanthus, and urges him to defend the honor of the poet's Italian muse (*Dauniae decus Camenae*, another phrase of intricate assonance). The stanza enclosing these two Italian names blossoms with exotic Greek words and ends in the unique epithet *Agyieus*—Smooth *Agyieus*, at that. What did Horace think it meant? In the next stanza Apollo is still creator of poetry: as Melpomene had enabled Horace to breathe inspiration, so Phoebus Apollo gave him *spiritus* and the art and name of poet. Now Horace is able to address his choir of noble children under the protection of Apollo's sister (for Diana as choirmistress, compare Catullus 42 and *Odes* 1.21) and urges them to follow his rhythm, singing of Latona's twins, as Diana moves on the seasons and Apollo sets aside his weapons (cf. *Carmen Saeculare*, 33–36). Only the last stanza leaves Apollo behind as Horace impersonates the now-married girl singer, proud that she had performed the hymn as the era brought back festive suns and moons: *saeculo festas referente luces*. The young chorister gives Horace the tribute he would like to claim. As she was skilled in its rhythm so this hymn was dear to the gods, and it was composed by “the bard Horace.” This is the only time Horace names himself in the *Odes*, and as Denis Feeney has pointed out to me, it echoes the presence of his name at the corresponding point in the official inscription. (But “Bard” fails to convey the

patriotic and inspiring function of the poet as Horace will claim it in C. 4.9.28 [*vate sacro*], or *Epistles* 2.1.133.)

With the alcaic *Ode* 4.4, we come to the apparent *raison d'être* of the poetry book, and it has an opening rich in liquid sounds of true magnificence: *qualem ministrum fulminis alitem*, "like the winged bearer of the thunderbolt," and continues on an immense and soaring scale. It may be useful at this point to go back to Horace's victory ode to Octavian's triumph over Cleopatra at Actium; there, too, he invokes the image of an overwhelming predator, in fact, there, too, he doubles up the images: compare 1.37.14–21:

*redegit in veros timores / Caesar ab Italia volentem/
remis adurgens accipiter velut / mollis columbas
aut leporem citus / venator in campis nivalis / Haemoniae,
daret ut catenis / fatale monstrum*

Caesar reduced her to a proper dread, pressing down on her with oars as a hawk pursues soft doves, or a swift hunter chases the hare on the plains of snowy Thrace, to cast the deadly monster in chains.

But C. 4.4 far surpasses its model. And in one way it is extraordinary, because the opening stanza treats Jove's eagle as a tried and mature agent, "to whom the lord of gods has given lordship over the wandering birds, having found him trustworthy over the blond Ganymede," but is followed by two stanzas that go back in time to follow the young eaglet through four stages as he matures:

- 5 *olim iuventas et patrius vigor / ... propulit*
but long past his youth and inherited strength ... propelled him
7 *vernique iam ... docuere ... venti*
and the spring winds taught him ...
9 *mox ... demisit ... vividus impetus*
and presently his vital onslaught launched him ...
11 *nunc ... / egit amor.*
now love has driven him on.

Then, with an equally surprising switch of perspective, Horace's launches a new parallel *qualemve* (13) to describe the young lion cub, *fulvae iam matris ab ubere / iam lacte depulsum*, newly weaned from its tawny mother's udder, as seen by the kid bent on glad pastures and destined to die under the lion's new teeth.

But now the subject is revealed as the Vindelici, Rome's enemies, as they see Drusus waging war beneath the Raetian alps. And even at this point, the poet defers his climax to insert a strange Pindaric disclaimer on explaining the mysterious adoption by the Vindelici of the Amazon battle axe: only

then in 22 do the Vindelici get their comeuppance as the hordes, so long and widely victorious, suffer defeat by the prince's strategy and realize the power (*quid ... posset*) of a mind and nature properly reared. From here the reader is carried onward to the focal point—not Drusus himself, but the power of Augustus's fatherly spirit over the young Neros (*quid Augusti paternus ... animus*, taking *posset* as common to both elements). The phrase will be a key to the transitions from Augustus to his subordinate commanders and back in the more elaborate C. 4.14, where *quid Marte posses* (4.14.9) leads into *milite nam tuo*, and back again at 33–34, *te copias, te consilium et tuos /praebente divos*. As, with C. 4.2, the poet has taken almost half the ode to reach his central figure of Augustus, so now he resumes his narrative, retracing the achievement of the princes from their ancestry, and chooses the most fundamental and simple language: Brave leaders are begotten from brave and good men, like the excellence of their fathers found in bullocks and stallions, and fierce eagles (the poet has finally returned to the point of departure) do not bring forth an unwarlike dove. And it is not just high birth but high theory (*doctrina*) that advances innate power, as upright breeding or training strengthens their breasts: whenever behavior falls short, guilt shames the well-born. In human terms, the princes (not Augustus's natural children but *Claudii Neronēs*) are produced by virtuous heroes through elevated theory and correct training.

Now, halfway through the poem, Horace turns to the more conventional aspect of encomium, but uses Rome's debt to the Neronēs to step back in history to the victory of Claudius Nero over Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal at the Metaurus in 207 BC, and that first day of nourishing glory (*alma adorea*, a mysterious and ancient word understood as renown) that dispelled darkness from Italy since the dread African had ridden like a fire over Italian timbers or the East wind over Sicilian waters. Again, one simile is not enough, but the disaster of Hannibal's invasion is rendered by two comparisons, one each for land and sea. This (*post hoc* 45) was the turning point as Rome's warrior youth grew strong and her shrines regained their proper gods.

It is left to Hannibal to read the situation as another image of predatory creatures: we Carthaginians are only stags, the prey of greedy wolves, and willfully pursuing creatures whom it is a mighty triumph just to evade and escape. His speech (52–72) is a powerful acknowledgment of Rome's endurance and renewal of strength from defeat, as she triumphs by trampling the unharmed victor. As Hannibal renounces sending news of success to Carthage the poet takes up his message and returns to the immediate future and insuperable achievement of the Claudii, defended by Jupiter (cf. C. 4) and guided by their own shrewd care through the sharp crises of war.

The ode manages an amazing balance between praise of the young prince and of his guiding stepfather, between faith in the protection of the father of gods and in the moral and intellectual upbringing that has brought heroism. And Tiberius the elder brother is not forgotten (*in pueros ... Neronēs*) as the narrative steps back into the ancestral triumphs of the princes, *Claudii* (73) *Neronēs* (37).

Supported by the projected victorious return of C. 4.2, the two *Odes*, 4.4 and 4.5, honoring Augustus form one strong gatepost of the book of *Odes*, to be answered by the other gatepost at C. 4.14 and 4.15. And as in C. 4.4.29 (*fortibus et bonis*), Horace uses the simplest language in C. 4.5.1–5 to hail Augustus as *dux bone* (5) and *optime custos/divis orte bonis* (1–2). This is a cletic hymn (in stanzas of three asclepiads rounded off by a glyconic) begging Rome's hero to return, bringing spring and sunshine to his country, which invokes him with vows and prayers as a mother longs for her absent son. The invocation is grounded in a recapitulation of the blessings brought about by the ritual of the *Carmen Saeculare*: rural prosperity, domestic chastity (four lines each), and confidence to stare down Rome's foreign foes. Best of all, this new era sees each Italian tending his fruitful vines in peace at home, calling on Augustus with prayer and libations, along with the gods of the homestead,¹² just as Greece honors the hero Hercules and the Dioscuri (both mortals who became gods). These private prayers end the ode with our loyal wishes (*dicimus*) at work and in wine at the day's end for long celebrations in Italy.

No reader of *Odes* 1–3 can approach *Ode* 4.7 without recalling *Ode* 1.4, and few English-speaking readers can forget that C. 4.7 was Housman's favorite, the one Horatian ode that he himself translated. But it is easier to relate the poem to C. 1.4 than to verbalize why it is seen as uniquely moving. So let me start with the simpler task. Both poems are in unusual epodic meters; where C. 1.4 alternates dactylic hexameters with iambic trimeters catalectic, C. 4.7 alternates the hexameters with the dactylic hemiepes (- u u / - u u / x). Both poems focus on *vices*, changing but ordered sequence. *Mutat terra vices* (Earth is changing its phases, C. 4.7.3), like *grata vice Veris et Favoni* (1.4.1), starts from the welcome transition from winter to spring. Both poems pass from thawing nature to the demigods dancing in honor of spring: *Gratia cum Nymphis geminisque sororibus audet/ducere nuda choros* (C. 4.7.5–6) rewords *iunctaeque nymphis Gratiae decentes* (1.4.6). Both poems

¹² We know that the *numen* of Augustus was now included with the lares in local prayers and hymns.

move through the notion of false hopes: in *C.* 4.7, the recurring year warns against them (*immortalia ne speres*) as in *C.* 1.4 the brevity of human life forbids them: *vitae summa brevis spem nos vetat incohare longam*. Only after the masterly sequence of seasons is restored by the returning moon/months does *C.* 4.7 come to humans and their deaths *nos ubi decidimus quo pius Aeneas* (14–15, echoed in *cum semel occideris* 21. As in *C.* 4.7, so *C.* 1.4.16–17 *nox fabulaeque Manes /et domus exilis Plutonia: quo simul mearis*), turns directly to the addressee, but the earlier poem's message to Sestius was only a hedonistic lament for the end of symposiastic pleasures. Again, while both poems stress the merciless indifference of death, *Ode* 4.7 thinks in moral terms of piety and loyalty; it is probably this new element that moved Housman, as *C.* 1.4 had not.

Does it help us to compare the poems if we think of occasion and addressee? The earlier poem, to Sestius (*Beate Sesti*, the suffect consul of 23 BC), implies an obvious occasion: encouragement to enjoy the symposiastic moment. Of Torquatus we know far less. Despite their nobility, the Manlii Torquati had fallen on evil times since the exile of Aulus in 70 BC and consulship of Titus in 65 BC, the year of Horace's birth. The unidentified Torquatus of *Epistle* 1.5 and *Ode* 4.7 was probably prevented by his family's misfortunes from pursuing a political career.¹³ He just may have been studying in Athens when he and Horace became friends—certainly they seem on more relaxed terms than one might have expected between a noble and a freedman's son. Horace speaks of Torquatus's *genus*, *facundia* and *pietas*, suggesting a loyal member of his family and a capable, but low-key orator. And where *C.* 1.4 spoke of rich and poor, *C.* 4.7 moves from Rome's heroic founder and early kings (Aeneas, Tullus, and Ancus) to the pious Hippolytus and loyal Theseus of Greek mythology—private virtues. Was Torquatus perhaps an Epicurean?

Two details in *C.* 4.7 may surprise: the allusion in 19–20 to gratifying oneself by spending what otherwise would fall into an heir's greedy hands (Torquatus was presumably childless), and the epithet *splendida* applied to Minos's last judgment. In the gloom of the underworld the brilliance of the royal judge is conspicuous, but the epithet may also hint at a worthy posthumous destiny for the virtuous Torquatus.

Gordon Williams noted, in his survey of 1972, that the addressees of *Ode* 4 included the consuls of 11 BC (Paulus Fabius Maximus), 10 BC (Iullus), and

¹³ See Eidinow 1995 and Syme 1986: 393–396. Denis Feeney points out that this would be particularly appropriate, if Horace's Torquatus was the son of the praetor of 49, who defends Epicureanism in *De Finibus*.

8 BC (Censorinus). There was no need to draw attention to the consuls of 13 and 9 BC, princes in their own right. *Odes* did not have to be timed to honor the incoming consul (as indeed C. 1.4 honored L. Sestius, consul in the year the *Odes* were published); C. 4.9, to Lollius, consul 21 BC, is a conspicuous exception. I hesitate to use this yardstick to date any ode, but inevitably there seems no other reason to have celebrated Censorinus in *Ode* 4.8. Was this indeed a very late ode, perhaps unfinished at Horace's death? Certainly, despite a splendid opening, the poem falls into trouble and confusion in lines 15–19, with further interpolations in 28 and 33. It is not just that the surviving text (in the stichic asclepiad of 1.1 and 3.30) violates Meineke's Law by refusing to fit into stanzas of four lines.¹⁴ A more serious problem stems from the disturbance of thought. This brief outline is based upon 1–15a, 19b–20, 21–27, 29–32, and 34. Reinterpreted as stanzas, the only anomalies are the strong enjambments at 20/21 and 29/30. But recent scholarly scrutiny has revealed that there is a literary historical reason for the odd juxtaposition of the two *Odes*, C. 4.8 and 9, sharing the common theme that heroes would have enjoyed no glory without poets and poetry, two odes addressed, furthermore, to uninteresting and secondary figures.¹⁵

The poet begins with the counterfactual compliment of rich works of art that Greeks would bestow on their friends (he names Parrhasius and Scopas, whose works adorned the Capitoline hill and Temple of Palatine Apollo), then amplifies his opulent gifts by dividing such tributes into polar categories: sacred dishes and tripods, items of marble or pigment, depicting gods and men alike. But he has two good reasons not to offer them: he does not possess them nor does Censorinus want such fancy luxuries (*animus egens*) or lack the wealth to own them (*res egens*). Instead, Censorinus's *animus* delights in poetry and Horace has an abundance (*vis*) of poems and critical powers to praise poetry. From here on I translate (omitting lines deleted by most editors as interpolated):

No marble inscribed with public records, means of conferring life and soul (*spiritus et vita*) on deceased heroes, display their glories more brilliantly than the Ennian muses of Calabria, and you will win no reward if your good deeds are left unspoken by verse (19–22). What would have become of Romulus himself, son of Ilia and Mars, if grudging silence had blocked his services (22–

¹⁴ On Meineke's Law, see Rosenmayer, Ostwald, and Halporn 1963: 100. The meter of C. 4.8 is stichic asclepiads (- /-u u - /- u u-/u x, like 1.1. and 3.30, the opening and closing *Odes* of the first collection).

¹⁵ I will return shortly to what is probably the most important study for *Odes IV* in the last twenty years: Barchiesi 1995b.

24)? When Aeacus was rescued from the Styx it was the excellence and favor and eloquence of powerful poets that dedicated him to the blessed isles (25–27). It is the Muse who blesses (men) with heaven. Just so unresting Hercules takes part in Jupiter's feasts and the brilliant constellation of the Dioscuri rescues shattered vessels, while Bacchus leads our prayers to a happy outcome (25–27, 29–32, 34).

Thus, 11/12 are the pivot around which Greek honorific practices are balanced with Roman, and Greek artists with the great Italian poet and Roman founder (whose life dominates the best-known first book of Ennius's *Annales*), to end in a suggestively bicultural list of deified heroes. Among these, Aeacus may surprise; he is not included in, for example, 3.3.9–16. The most likely explanation is the new influence of Pindar, who pays considerable attention to Aeacus and his family, especially in the *Nemeans* (3, 7, 8, etc.).¹⁶

Ode 4.9 starts from the same preoccupation with the lasting power of poetry to immortalize both itself and its subject. Now, with a neat reciprocity, the Calabrian Pierides of 5.8.20 (Greek muses from southern Italy) are balanced by the *Pindaricae ... Caeaeque ... Camenae* (4.9.6–8), the Italian goddesses of Pindar, Simonides, and others. Horace unashamedly claims for his lyric (*socianda chordis*) the same near parity with Homer as the great Greek lyricists: Pindar and Simonides of Ceos. Passing from choral lyric to solo songs he recalls his old models, the fierce muses of Alcaeus and Stesichorus: time has not obliterated the playful verse of Anacreon, while “the love of the Aeolian Sappho still breathes and her passion lives entrusted to her verse.”

There is another participant in this intertextual relay race: if Horace supports the lyricists' claim to match Homer, he is also recalling a much later poet, Theocritus, whose *Charites* (Theocr. 16. 44f.) affirmed that Homeric heroes would have remained unknown if Simonides had not praised them. The cavalcade of heroes naturally moves from the *Iliad*, or rather from Troy: Helen was not the only adulteress to marvel at her lover's locks, golden robes, and royal costume,¹⁷ nor was Teucer first to shoot his arrows or Troy assaulted only once. Lines 13–24 divide impartially between Greeks and Trojans, whose chaste families offer the greatest contrast with the unchaste Helen. All this precedes the climactic *vixere fortes ante Agamemnona/multi*,

¹⁶ See Gantz 1993: 126 for Aeacus's role as a judge in the underworld.

¹⁷ Is Horace echoing Stesichorus? It is rare before Ovid (*Heroides*.15–16) to give attention to Helen's desires.

and the bold proclamation that without a sacred poet to speak of them all such heroes remain unwept (*illacrimabiles*¹⁸) and oppressed by the long night (of death). The holy poet (28) is the high point of the ode, and many readers have felt that Horace did not escape anticlimax in his acknowledgment that virtue unrevealed is little different from buried failure (nothing else is strong enough; he has placed *inertia* and *virtus* [29–30] where the opposition dominates). Lollius, consul of 21 and Tiberius's mentor has gone down in history for a failure in Germany second only to the Varian disaster of 9 BC.¹⁹ Did Horace's readers see his prudence, financial integrity (34–38), and judicial austerity (40–42) as a metaphorical victory over hostile hordes? The last two stanzas make the best of whatever civic merits Lollius possessed (and the insistence suggests he had genuinely incurred discredit in this, also). To be truly blessed (*beatus* 46, 47), a man should know how to use well the gifts of the gods and endure harsh poverty (cf. 3.2.1: *angustam amice pauperiem pati*), fearing scandal worse than death, unafraid to die for friends and country. But had Lollius's efforts (*labores* 31) earned any of the overemphatic praise that occupies more than five alcaic stanzas or twenty lines? As with Censorinus, we are left wondering what these men had done to earn honor: are these poems merely an invitation to potential patrons to give him something to celebrate and cause for thanks?

We have taken brief notice of C. 4.10, reproaching Ligurinus (*Veneris muneribus potens*²⁰) and threatening him with rejection when his cheeks become hairy with manhood (but surely promising him a healthy career of appealing to the ladies). The poem exists chiefly for its relationship with C. 4.1, and, to a lesser extent, with Horace's vindictive jeering at poor, faded Lyce, once desired and disdainful but now unable to attract young clients. In the sequence of private *Odes* from C. 4.10 to 4.13, the second and third are positive and hospitable. C. 4.11, in Sapphic stanzas, is particularly cheerful and anticipatory and belongs to a tradition of verse about household preparations, which we can also trace in New Comedy, a tradition on which Horace relies for his deliberately simple impromptu *Ode* 1.38. Three stanzas depict the coming celebration: a jar of vintage Alban wine (if this is an attraction it must have been of better quality two millennia ago), a garden

¹⁸ Not the first instance in Horace, but in C. 2.4.16 *illacrimabiles* is used actively for "unweeping."

¹⁹ The chief source is hostile; Velleius, a competitor for Tiberius's favor, adds dishonesty with money to military incompetence in 2.97.

²⁰ We noted earlier Horace's stress on *munera*: here, as immediately above in 4.9, *Deorum/muneribus sapienter uti ... callet*, Horace reverts to the theme of divine gifts.

full of abundant (*vis multa*) parsley and ivy to bind her gleaming hair, and a house glittering with silverware, while the altar stands bound in sacred herbs and eager (*vincta verbenis avet*) to be sprinkled with the blood of a lamb sacrifice. As the household bustles, slave boys and girls running hither and thither, and the flames flicker, sending up spirals of smoke, the reader wonders what is the special occasion, and Phyllis, Horace's guest, is asking the same question (13). Horace's answer begins as a riddle—it is the Ides of April, month of the sea goddess Venus—then explains his purpose at the numerical heart of the poem. The sacrifice marks an event even more holy to Horace than his own birthday, because this date heralds the coming of new years for his dear Maecenas: *ex hac luce Maecenas meus adfluentis*²¹ / *ordinat annos* (18–20). This is the only mention of Maecenas (addressed by Horace in a dozen odes of books 1–3) and it does not explain why the poet is celebrating apart from his friend: nowhere in the ode is there any further allusion. Instead, the subject changes and there is a new surprise. Phyllis is actually in pursuit of another man, young Telephus: each word of lines 21–24 makes her rival more dangerous: she is wealthy, wanton, and holding him bound by reciprocal affection. Horace reinforces his advice by mythical exempla: the fates of Phaethon and Bellerophon, who were thrown by their team (or mount), warn her to keep to her peers. (The second line [30] elaborates the warning, turning the social climbing of 22 into abomination!) Does Horace really care? With a sudden increase in warmth he explains that she is the last woman he will love (*non enim posthac alia calebo/femina*, 31–33). So let her learn the music she is to perform with her lovely voice: black cares will be reduced by song.

The invitation of *C.* 4.12 is more ambiguous. In fact, the poem starts as a spring song in asclepiadic and glyconic stanzas, combining gladness at spring breezes with clashing songs: the swallow's lament over her son Itys, murdered to punish her lustful barbarian husband, and the shepherds' song as they guard plump sheep and delight the god of flocks. Neither reference is Roman; as Procne is daughter of Athenian Cecrops so the shepherds honor Arcadian Pan. Where is the poem going? Who is the addressee? Some man called Vergil(ius), but not Horace's dear poet Virgil, now dead for several years. This man is a dependent of noble youths (15) and Horace wants a quid pro quo for his hospitality. If Vergilius will bring a flask of ointment, it will serve as bait to bring out a cask. And strangely, this cask is not cooling

²¹ *Adfluere* has a positive ring, as if the years were so many birthday gifts, but Horace does not usually regard the addition of years as a positive feature; cf. *C.* 2.5.13–15.

in Horace's larder but (still unbought?) in the cellars of the Sulpicii. Surely, these are by the commercial quarters of the Tiber, and so Horace must be in town?

In any case, it is a magical draught to bestow hope and drive off bitter cares (note the poetic epexegetic infinitive *donare largus*, and neuter pl. substantive *amara curarum*). (Horace made even grander claims in *Ep.* 1.5.16–20 and *Odes* 3.21.13–20.) Still, in half-commercial jest, Horace urges on Vergilius to bring his fee (*merce*), since he will not dip scot-free in his cups as a rich man would in a lavish household.

There is one further change of mood with *Ode* 4.13, another reversion to Horace's youth. In *Ode* 3.10, Horace claimed to have lain as an excluded lover on the doorstep of the woman Lyce and warned her that the tide would turn and run against her: his last words declared that he would not always endure her stony threshold. (That protest was in stanzas of three asclepiads and a glyconic; now, Horace uses two asclepiads followed by the short pherecratean and a final glyconic.) The tone is triumphant, gloating repeatedly; "the gods have heard my prayers, Lyce," and his triumph is that she has grown old and is still trying to flirt, though she can no longer sing and her teeth are carious and her brow wrinkled and white haired. The instant reaction of any woman reader is anger—was Horace then still young, slim, handsome, and desirable? (or still paying plenty?) But this is false to Horace, who even as he gloats that Lyce's costly clothes and jewels will not bring back lost youth, cries out at the departure of charm and fresh complexion and graceful dance, and—with one of the most poignant hyperbata in his corpus of *Odes*—*illius/quae spirabat amores, quae me surpuerat mihi/felix post Cinaram notaque et atrium/gratarum facies*. English cannot render this suspense; we are forced to write "that face, which breathed out desire, which snatched me from myself, the happy one after Cinara and famous face of appealing arts." It is a paradox that when we turn back to look for Cinara in books 1–3 she is not there, although she opens *Ode* 4.1, and is recalled as wanton and or greedy in *Epistles* 1.7.28 and 14.33. But Horace contrasts Cinara, lucky that the fates gave her few years of life, with the old crow/crone Lyce, doomed to survive as a burned-out torch (*cornicis vetulae ... dilapsam in cineres facem*): *Ode* 4.13 is the realization of Horace's angry threats to Lydia in 1.25, but the poet has the humanity to grieve now for the vengeance he had once looked forward to.

With C. 4.14 and 15, Horace must meet the challenge he has set up for himself in C. 4.4 and 4.5. Again, he has to glorify both princely commanders and imperial commander-in-chief. And either the passage of time or diplomacy

has alerted him to shift the glory even further from the young warriors to the all-fathering Augustus. He splits the poem of thirteen stanzas into three sections. From the first stanza through to line 9, and in the long third section, 33–52, the focus is entirely on Augustus. The princes share only 9–32, from *milite nam tuo* to *sine clade victor*, and Drusus, who has already had one encomium in *C.* 4.4., is limited to four lines, from 10–13, sharing one verb *deiecit acer plus vice simplici*, “thrust them fiercely down in a multiple reversal,” among Genauni, Breuni, and their fortresses in the awe-inspiring Alps. Tiberius, despite the handicap of a name that defies most meters, gets a more elaborate treatment, turning the victories of the legionary commander into the *Aristeia* of a Homeric hero fighting solo. This starts with a narrative in prosaic order built on plain prosaic verbs (*commisit, pepulit*), *mox grave proelium commisit, immanisque Raetos/auspiciis pepulit secundis* (soon he engaged in full-scale battle and routed the monstrous Raeti under favoring auspices—but these are Augustus’s *auspicia*). Tiberius is worthy of admiring gaze (*spectandus*) in the battle, but this opens up into a relative clause: *Quantis fatigaret ruinis devota morti pectora liberae* then a simile *Indomitus prope qualis undas/exercet Auster, Pleiadem choro/scindente nubes* then back to the general: *Impiger hostium/vexare turmas et frementem mittere equum medios per ignes*.

With what destruction he wearied their breasts vowed to a death in freedom (as the untamable South wind harasses the waters, when the band of Pleiades pierces through the clouds), tireless in harrying the enemy squadrons and sending his champing horse through the heart of the flames.

Although this is a full sentence, it is still not enough: as in *C.* 4.5, Horace reverses the direction of his simile, making the natural phenomenon precede the hero and resuming the drastic verbs of a historical narrative (*diruit, stravit*) (25–32):

*Sic tauriformis volvitur Aufidus
qui regna Dauni praeffluit Apuli
Cum saevit horrendamque cultis
diluviem meditatatur agris,
ut barbarorum Claudius agmina
ferrata vasto diruit impetu
primosque et extremos metendo
stravit humum sine clade victor*

Just so the bull-like Aufidus rolls on as it flows past the kingdoms of Daunus when he rages and plans a dread inundation for the fields as Claudius scattered the columns of barbarians with savage onslaught and reaping first ranks and last spread hem on the earth, victorious without setback.

What has framed this battle scene? The question is what decree of Senate or people could immortalize Augustus's achievements for ever in titles and mindful records. The verb *aeternet* is unique, as is the address "Greatest of Leaders, wherever the sun cast its light on inhabited²² shores." The achievements? That the lawless Vindelici have learned how great his power is in war (*quid Marte posses*: cf. *C.* 4.4.25–28). The army is his (9), as are the forces, strategy, and presiding gods: *te copias, te consilium et tuos/praebeante divos*. For five stanzas Horace outlines the blessings of Fortune on Augustus for three whole lustra since his entry into Alexandria, object of marvel to Spanish Cantabrian, Mede, Indian, and Scythian: Augustus is the ever-present protector of Italy and Rome made mistress of the world (if Rome is *domina* it is because he is her protector). There is nowhere left outside empire: the poet lists the boundary rivers of empire, Nile, Danube, Tigris, and outer Ocean beating on the distant Britons. The conquered barbarians of Gaul, Spain, and finally the Sygambri, pure killers, have laid down their arms and worship Augustus. The accelerating litany of *te* (33 bis, *tibi* 34, *te* 41, 45, 46, 47, 49 finally ends with the poem itself in 51 *te ... compositis venerantur armis*).

For *C.* 4.15, designedly the last ode, giving closure to the book, Horace must both maintain the motif of worldwide empire and change the grandiose tone to a more personal finale. He maintains the alcaics of *C.* 4.14, because you cannot pull back after striking diapason, but his opening words, *Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui/captas et urbis increpuit lyra* (when I wanted to speak of battles and captured cities Phoebus rebuked me with his lyre), would surely take the reader by surprise, and carry the more informed poetry lover back to *Eclogue* 6. There, Virgil claimed to be singing of kings and battles when Cynthian Apollo plucked his ear and redirected him to a more slender poetic form: *cum canerem reges et proelia/Cynthius aurem/vellit*. This is the motif known to moderns as *recusatio*, the Callimachean device for crying off a too-demanding epic assignment. And it usually belongs at the opening of a poetry book, such as Propertius's third book (compare the seagoing imagery of Prop. 3.3.23f. or 3.9.3–4) or Ovid's *Amores* (*arma gravi numero violentaque bella parabam/edere*, 1.1.1–2), not at its close. After all, Horace has already pulled out all the stops to glorify these Alpine campaigns (which included neither Kings, as in *Eclogues* 6, nor cities, as here). What Horace clearly wants is to subordinate the (probably

²² *Habitabiles* is another grand coinage for the occasion.

fairly modest) military glory to an all-embracing praise of the new Augustan era inaugurated in 17 BC. And this is what he offers, starting before the first stanza has died out: "Your era, Caesar," ... *tua, Caesar, aetas*.

The encomium is accomplished in three massive sentences; lines 4–16 enumerate the many achievements of Caesar's age, which can be matched against the similar enumerations of the *Carmen Saeculare*. Renewed agricultural prosperity (1 = C. 4.5.17–18); Tiberius' restoration of the standards from the Parthians, elaborated beyond the other clauses; 2. *signa nostro restituit Iovi/derepta Parthorum superbis/postibus* = C. 4.5.25, further enhanced by the proud boast of closing the temple gateway of Janus; 3. the re-imposition of morality over license and *culpa* (9–11 = C. 4.5.21–24 or 3.6. 17–20); and finally, 4, a whole stanza (12–16) embracing the new vision of the growth of empire and its renown and majesty from sunrise to sunset.

Answering and continuing are the two stanzas predicated on Caesar's role as guardian (*custode rerum* = C. 4.5.1–2, *optime Romulae custos gentis*). The first of these claims is new and important; it boldly denies the possibility of civil war, *furor/civilis aut vis*, or anger between cities (surely Horace is recalling the war around Mutina and the Perusine War fought by cities whose lands had been confiscated for their support of Antony). Here, too, Horace creates a grand coinage, *inimicare*, another factitive verb like *aeternare* or *clarare*.

The tribes of the northeast, Danubians, Getae, and those living by the Tanais, are treated as subdued, although at best they may have made diplomatic overtures; as in Augustus's *Res Gestae*, even the remote *Seres* of China and Persians are now represented as obedient—not to Roman edicts but to the edicts of the Julians. What was a source of resentment against Julius Caesar as dictator has become a source of pride for his heir.

It remains for Horace to represent himself among the loyal subjects (*nos*, as in *Odes* C. 4.2.45–51, *non semel dicemus*, and C. 4.5.34–37, *dicimus integro sicci mane die, dicimus uvidi*). Now, the polar expression *profestis et sacris* echoes the complementary *sicci* and *uvidi* of 4.5 (expanded as *inter iocosi muner Liberi*). As families making proper libation and prayer to the gods, accompanied by Lydian pipes, we Romans will sing of heroic ancestral leaders, Troy, Anchises, and the descendants (Julians, or all Romans?) of motherly Venus. The last word of the book is *canemus*.

LYRIC, MUSIC, AND IMMORTALIZING POETRY

The exceptional concern of *Ode* 4 with music and song clearly springs from Horace's new inspiration in the encomiastic lyrics of Pindar and Simonides, but the equally prominent concern with immortality—conferred by muses and Apollo on the poet, then conferred by the poet himself on his honorand, goes back even beyond Pindar to Hesiod. The important prologue of the *Theogony* guarantees both the blessing of Zeus upon kings and the blessing of the Muses, nine daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, on those princes they honor; such princes will give wise judgments obeyed by the people who will honor them wherever they go (81–93). Just so do the Muses honor the poets/singers whose lays of heroes and gods bring comfort to men (*Theogony* 96–103) and immortality upon those kings.

Those of us who derive our assumptions about Horace's lyric models from the loyalty with which he speaks of the lyrics of Alcaeus and Sappho in *Ode* 2.13, and his love for the Lesbian *barbiton*, will find these models have all but disappeared from *Odes* IV (apart from *C.* 4.9.7–12²³). The reason is Horace's change of mode from private celebration and symposium to public panegyric; while panegyric or encomium itself practices a different level for emperors (*quo nihil maius meliusve terris/fata donavere bonique divi/nec dabunt*, "than whom the fates and the good gods have granted nothing greater or finer, nor will they ever" *C.* 4.2.37–39) and gods on the one hand, and commoner patrons like Censorinus or Lollius, on the other, so Horace ranges from the most exalted Greek choral models offered by Pindar and Simonides to echoing the more humble language of patronage: it has been suggested that *C.* 4.5 may have been composed for choral performance, but I remain skeptical of any real musical context for Horace's *Odes*. Certainly, *C.* 4.8 and 4.9 take their color from a more Hellenistic model of patronage, far from the mythical glories of Homer or even the faded glory of the Ptolemies, whose city and harbor the Romans had occupied (*quo die/portus Alexandria supplex/et vacuum patefecit aulam*). This is a more secular and materialist world.

²³ The best recent study of Horace's relationship with Alcaeus and Sappho is Feeney in *Horace at 2000: A Celebration* (Oxford, 1993).

THE SECOND BOOK OF LETTERS

Hans-Christian Günther

Abstract: The second book of *Epistles* speaks of poetological themes in two very long compositions, as does the *Ars Poetica*. The analysis of both letters (to Florus and Augustus) pays strict attention to the coherence of the train of thought and its relevance to the alleged epistolary situation and tries to show how Horace defines the role of poetry, of his poetry, in particular, in contemporary society.

Keywords: poetry and politics, poetological poetry

1. THE SECOND BOOK OF LETTERS AND HORACE'S 'SPÄTWERK'

As we know more about the real person of Horace than about any other great poet of classical antiquity we also know much more about his development as an artist, his artistic self-consciousness and self-awareness. No other poet of antiquity comments so much on his own work, no other poet bequeathed to us such a large corpus of self-interpretation. It seems trivial to insist on these facts again, yet, I feel I must do so, because well-known as it is, this aspect of Horace's work is far from being appreciated as poignantly as it should. On the contrary, it seems to me that this exceptional trait of Horace's poetry is not seen in proper perspective, because everything today is interpreted as metapoetry; thus, the reservoir that Horace's exceptionally explicit, detailed, and penetrating self-interpretation holds for understanding his poetry is far from being exploited. The awareness of his own self as a poet that Horace displays in his poetry is indivisible from the supreme self-awareness, evident in the autobiographical dimension of his work as sketched above in the introductory chapter on Horace's biography.¹ This Horatian self-awareness is of crucial importance for the understanding of Horace's late work; in fact, Horace is the first poet of European literature whose 'Spätwerk' we can isolate on the evidence of what the poet says himself about his poetic *iter*.²

¹ Above, pp. 2 ff.

² For the unity, character, and organic growth of Horace's 'Spätwerk,' see Becker's (1963) monograph.

Horace is, as far as we know, the only poet of classical antiquity who explicitly marks a caesura in his development as an artist within his work, and, in view of what has just been said, certainly not by chance. In the introductory letter of the first book of *Epistles*, Horace explains why he refuses to go on with writing poetry as he did before.³ In fact, he goes so far as to identify the most eminent type of poetry he composed hitherto, i.e., lyric poetry, with poetry *stricto sensu*, and announces that from now on he will no longer write poetry *stricto sensu* at all, but will embark instead on a new kind of semi-poetry, a poetry harking back to his poetic beginnings, a kind of very personal, 'prosaic' poetry, i.e., the *Satires*. By transforming them, with his first book of *Letters*, into a new poetic genre, the literary verse epistle,⁴ Horace could go right back to his Lucilian model.⁵ The reason Horace gives for being tired of composing lyric poetry and shifting his writing interests is that he feels too old to engage in light poetry on women and wine, which he identified as the prevalent topic of his *Carmina* in the *recusatio*; it is philosophy, the questions of the right way to live (*recte facere*),⁶ that is suited to his advanced age, to the immediate vicinity of death, a central element of Epicurean moral philosophy,⁷ but now felt more poignantly than ever. Thus, in the *Epistles*, Horace singles out the topic to which he gave a high profile in his lyric poetry, as perhaps no one had before him, by creating his philosophical 'Gedankenlyrik'.⁸ In form or genre, he returns to the 'philosophical' poetry of his beginnings, the *Satires*, but he frees himself from the self-imposed generic restriction, from philosophical poetry vested as invective. Thus, in a way the *Epistles* relate to the *Satires* as the *Odes* to the *Epodes*.⁹

However, the shift in creative interest, marked by the *Epistles*, is twofold. It entails an ambiguity: it is at the same time a transition to themes more serious than those of Horace's previous, lyric poetry. Nevertheless, the *Epis-*

³ Above, pp. 37 ff., with further references.

⁴ See Fatham, above, p. 408; also Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1913: 323; Fiske 1971: 76 ff., 426 ff.; Heinze 1960a: 295 ff.; Fraenkel 1957: 308 ff.; Becker 1963: 14 ff.; MacGann 1969: 89 ff., below, p. 483.

⁵ See Puelma Piwonka 1949: 138 f., 92; also Heinze 1960a: 296, 302 ff.

⁶ Above, p. 42.

⁷ Above, pp. 326 ff.

⁸ Above, pp. 240, 324.

⁹ Above, p. 171. Some *Epistles* treat more or less identical topics as the *Odes*. *Epist.* 1.5, for example, can be compared with the invitational poems and those on 'carpe diem' (pp. 266 ff., 273 ff., 326 ff.), *Epist.* 1.6 with C. 2.16 (pp. 323 ff.), *Epist.* 1.11 with C. 1.7 (pp. 266 ff.); cf. also Fraenkel 1957: 308 f.; Becker 1963: 48 f. On the difference between *sermones* and *epistulae*, cf. also Rudd 1994: 11 f.; Puelma Piwonka 1949: 138 f.; Knox, below, pp. 542 ff.

ties do not entail a more solemn poetic form. On the contrary, they explicitly mark a lower poetic register, lower in the sense that they represent an explicit renunciation of the claim to be poetry in the fullest sense. Horace's statement in *Epist.* 1.1 that he will employ a lower poetic register for more serious themes runs counter to a basic concept of ancient poetics: the congruency between form and content, the *πρέπον*, the *decorum*, 'the befitting'.¹⁰ This incongruence is only intelligible in the context of the renunciation of poetry in general, at least in the sense of poetry *stricto sensu*. The new, less poetic form is congruent first of all with the author's advanced stage of life: he is at an age when poetry is no longer a suitable occupation. Poetry, as something entailing an element of play, *ludus*, is unsuited to the 'seriousness' of the station of life in which the poet finds himself. Poetry is no longer suited to the themes that are of concern to the older poet. These topics require a new form if the poet wants to remain a poet: this new form is the Horatian verse epistle. The verse epistle, the poetic genre that is Horace's own invention, is an eminently personal form of poetry, personal in the sense that it represents the form in which the Horace felt he could continue to be a poet once he realized that poetry, as he had hitherto conceived it, no longer corresponded to his needs. Thus, the ambiguity inherent in the semi-poetic form of the Horatian verse epistle reflects the contradiction inherent in Horace's condition as a poet who has realized that poetry, which hitherto had been the prime and total concern of his life, no longer sufficed, was no longer the ultimate goal toward which his life was directed.

It seems to me, that, by reflecting, in *Epist.* 1.1, upon his situation as the poet who has become old, Horace, as far as our knowledge goes, for the first time in European literature formulates a concept that is a recurring theme in the 'Spätwerk' of great artists, the renunciation of art or the autarky of art, the renunciation of art as a supreme goal in itself.¹¹ Implicitly, we find the same renunciation at almost the same time in Virgil's *Aeneid*, in Anchises's famous words to his son (*Aen.* 6.847–853):

excudent alii spirantia mollius aera
(credo equidem), vivos ducent de marmore vultus,
orabunt causas melius caelique meatus
describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent:
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
(hae tibi erunt artes) pacique imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.

¹⁰ See Günther 2010a: 47 n. 2 for the relevant bibliography.

¹¹ See Günther 2010a: x with n. 3, 1ff., *passim*.

Others will hammer out bronzes that breathe in more lifelike and gentler
 Ways, I suspect, create truer expressions of life out of marble,
 Make better speeches, or plot, with the sweep of their compass, the heaven's
 Movements, predict the ascent of the sky's constellations. Well, let them!
 You, who are Roman, recall how to govern mankind with your power.
 These will be your special 'Arts': the enforcement of peace as a habit,
 Mercy for those cast down and relentless war upon proud men.

In these verses, the Roman poet Virgil acknowledges that for the Romans art is not the highest goal, and he enacts this acknowledgment by composing the *Aeneid* and thus renouncing the autonomy of the artist by putting his art to the service of the national task of the Roman people. By creating the Roman national epos and thus definitely taking back the claim of the Augustan *recusatio*, Virgil enacted the renunciation of his art in the most eminent sense; but all Augustan poets in their way reacted to the changing political circumstances by their anti-*recusationes* and by their personal form of patriotic poetry.¹² With the political poems of the first collection of *Odes* Horace stood up to his national task. He had assumed a meaningful role in public life as a national *vates*, the *vates* of the *Roman Odes*, above all.¹³ With the political poetry of *Odes* I–III Horace's life, his youthful aspirations of a meaningful role in Roman politics had come full circle.¹⁴ This role, which the poet now assumed was a new, surprising one, one that was imposed upon him by the specific circumstances of his historical situation. The national poetry of the Augustan poets was something completely new and unique, a poetry in the service of the state, of a very particular, new form of government, and at the same time a poetry whose aesthetic principles remained those laid down in pointed antithesis to submitting poetry to the service of any external power. The autonomy of art had never before been emphasized as sharply as it was by the Augustan poets when the Alexandrian concept of art pour l'art had developed into the concept of art as a counter-design to reality, to a reality conceived as the vulgarity of an everyday life, exposed to violence and destruction: art as an ideal life, unharmed and entire, vs. the triviality and vulnerability of the external world.¹⁵ That poetry, conceived in this manner, should become public poetry is the ultimate paradox. Never has the renunciation of art by the

¹² See Günther 2002: 43 f.; idem 2010b: 223 ff., 227; and idem (forthcoming and 2011).

¹³ See pp. 46, 209, 376 ff.

¹⁴ See pp. 26 ff., 35 f.

¹⁵ See De Gennaro and Günther 2009: xii; Günther 2010a: 16, 87 ff.; idem 2010b: 210 ff.; and idem (forthcoming).

artist been articulated more pointedly and paradoxically than in the late works of Virgil, Horace, and Propertius, and never has this renunciation been formulated more pointedly than by Horace in his two books of *Epistles*.

The second book of *Letters*—like the *Ars Poetica*—continues with the theme of *Epist.* 1.1: ‘renunciation of poetry’; most noticeably *Epist.* 2.2. However, between the publication of the first book of *Letters* and these works, at least before *Epist.* 2.1 and the *Ars Poetica*, comes the return to lyric and ‘official poetry’ with the *Carmen Saeculare* and the fourth book of *Odes*.¹⁶ The task of composing—with the *Carmen Saeculare*—a poem for a specific public occasion, was for Horace surely a golden opportunity to revive his role as national poet in a much more eminent sense than in the *Roman Odes*, and, in this sense, to crown his poetic achievement with a unique composition.¹⁷ Surely, this occasion gave a new impulse to his poetic inspiration and eventually led to the late lyric poetry in the fourth book of *Odes*, which he began to write soon after. Thus, *Epistles* II presuppose Horace’s return from retired semi-poet to the poet of grand poetry like the *Carmen Saeculare* and the fourth book of *Odes* (at least *in nuce*).

Epist. 1.1 announced his retirement from poetry in favor of moral philosophy, of the search for the right life. Yet, already there the search for the right life was the search of a poet whose choice of life regarded his dedication to poetry. If, explicitly, this search was the search of a poet for the way of life suited to his actual situation, it also was, implicitly, the search for the right kind of poetry suited to the moment. For Horace, the poet, the search for the right way of life and a suitable manner of poetry were always intrinsically linked. Thus, the transition from *Epistles* I to *Epistles* II does not mark a change of theme, but rather a shift of emphasis from the external to the inner life of the poet, from the *decorum* of ethics to that of poetics or, better, in the most eminent sense, the *decorum* of the poet as poet.

Becker,¹⁸ next to Brink the most perceptive interpreter of *Epist.* 2.2, has noticed that the latter quite closely resembles *Epist.* 1.1, but shifts the emphasis from philosophy to literary criticism. It takes nothing from Becker’s interpretation if one does not accept a date close to *Epistles* I, as most people did before Harrison’s convincing arguments for a later date.¹⁹ Still, the *Florus Epistle* appears to be earlier than *Epist.* 2.1 and it ‘genetically’ surely is; it is

¹⁶ Above, p. 45.

¹⁷ Above, pp. 431ff.

¹⁸ Becker 1963: 54 ff.

¹⁹ Above, p. 48.

therefore better to look at *Epist.* 2.2 first, before we turn to 2.1. The relevance of both texts for Horace's biography has already been explained above, and as both texts to a considerable extent deal with autobiographical matters, my remarks in the introduction on Horace's life²⁰ already go a considerable way to their interpretation. Thus, in what follows there is no need to dwell again on the concrete biographical context and we concentrate instead on an analysis of the train of thought for both texts.

2. *EPIST.* 2.2

The two epistles united to form the second book (270 ll. and 216 ll.) are about twice as long as the longest letters of Book I, or even the average length of a satire, except *Serm.* 2.3 (326 ll.). Both the *Augustus* and the *Florus Epistle*²¹ exhibit an extremely complex structure, covering a large variety of topics, and, at first sight, it is difficult to grasp the unity and coherence of the text: this key virtue of poetic composition, which Horace places at the head of the precepts he gives at the beginning of the *Ars Poetica*.²² However, as we have already seen, when treating poems like *C.* 1.9, the unity of a Horatian poem may not be as obvious as we would expect it to be, if we conceive organic 'Aristotelian' unity according to the rules of the French Classic. As regards rather early poems like *C.* 1.7 or 1.9 it was, at least hypothetically, possible to blame what seemed to be a lack of unity on the poet's immature technique, as some did, but this is surely impossible in late compositions like the second book of *Letters* or the *Ars Poetica*.²³ However, we have seen that, on closer inspection, poems like *C.* 1.7 and 9, far from being unsatisfactory verse exercises, display a carefully conceived, intentionally elusive unity.²⁴ *Ordo*, with a view to unity, is a prime concern of Horace's poetry, but it does not imply monotony: on the contrary, on the evidence of Horace's poetic technique in whatever genre, *ordo*, 'arrangement',²⁵ consists in the sophisticated disposition of a

²⁰ See pp. 2 ff.

²¹ For the addressee, Julius Florus, see Rudd 1994: 13; he is also the recipient of *Epist.* 1.3, see Fantham, pp. 410, 415.

²² See Reinhardt below, pp. 508 ff.

²³ For the development of Horace's concept of unity, see also p. 273 n. 226.

²⁴ See pp. 266 ff., 273 ff.

²⁵ Above, pp. 179 ff., 316 f., 510 ff. For Horace's concept of unity, quite different from that of Aristotle, let alone from that of a classicistic interpretation of the latter, cf. Brink 1971: 80 ff.

large variety of sometimes highly divergent items. Somehow these items are directed toward a central idea. The point of the reference to the overriding theme is not always immediately clear, but becomes apparent only as the text goes on. Often the unity of a seemingly loose string of examples, images, and anecdotes is unobtrusively emphasized by certain repetitive elements or motifs.²⁶ *Epist.* 2.2 is a prime example of this style of composition.

At first sight both poems, *Epist.* 2.1 and 2, offer such a potpourri of various topics or episodes. Thus, it is helpful to start with an overview of the organization of topics in the text. As a basis we can use Brink, who has provided an exhaustive and convincing analysis of the structure of both poems,²⁷ as well as Rudd (1994) and Shackleton Bailey. Their arrangements are more or less identical. Rudd (1994) also provides useful subtitles in his text: after a preamble (A: ll. 1–25), which introduces the situation that prompts the poet to write his letter (“Horace apologizes for being a bad correspondent and for not having sent Florus the poems he had promised him”), the main body of the text falls into two long parts of unequal length. almost two-thirds of the letter (B: ll. 26–140) deals with poetry, i.e., with the reasons why Horace is unwilling to comply with Florus’s request; a final part (C: ll. 140–216) is marked off from what precedes it by being characterized at its beginning (l. 145) as a soliloquy (*quocirca mecum loquor haec tacitusque recordor*, “and so in silence I repeat to myself what follows”) and offers a reflection on the right way of living.

It has often been remarked that, in contrast to Horace’s normal procedure in the first book of *Letters*, in the *Florus Epistle* he does not make immediately clear the situation that prompted his letter: he starts abruptly with a story about the sale of a slave, the application of which to the relationship between the poet and his correspondent becomes apparent only at the end.²⁸ This procedure can be paralleled from the *Odes*. In the *Odes*, too, normally the occasion for the poem is made explicit from the very start or, at least, relatively early. However, *C.* 1.7²⁹ is an example of an equally abrupt beginning, which arouses expectations quite different from what will be the theme of the poem: only in the postponed address to Plancus does the relevance of the initial priamel to the occasion that prompts Horace to write his poem become clear.³⁰ Moreover, we have seen in the *Odes* that Horace

²⁶ Above, pp. 266 ff., 273 ff., 323 ff.

²⁷ Slightly different, cf. Shackleton Bailey 2001.

²⁸ Brink 1982: 267; Rudd 1994: 13 f.

²⁹ Above, pp. 266 ff.

³⁰ P. 268 above.

often starts somewhere and refrains from making the relevance of a passage for the general theme explicit. In the *Odes* this manner echoes Pindar,³¹ but a similar technique can be observed in the *Satires*.³² Often the theme is approached by a series of loosely connected examples or anecdotes, and even afterward the topic is treated rather unsystematically: in *Serm.* 1.2, for example, perhaps among the earliest pieces,³³ the poem begins not, as *Serm.* 1.1 did, by defining what the text is about, but with a series of lively, rather extended episodes: step by step they lead closer to the topic under discussion; the topic is not treated systematically, however, even later. The *Letters* to Florus and to Augustus go back to this early technique of the *Satires*, but they employ it with much more skill, or certainly with a greater sense of direction and consistency.

The preamble (A) constructs a situation relevant to the theme of the following discourse: Horace the bad correspondent, the poet who is tired of writing poetry. The first paragraph of the main section (B) makes a new start with l. 26, and like A it starts *ex abrupto* with an anecdote about a soldier, who excelled in daring, incited by the loss of his purse (ll. 26–40). The relevance of the story for the text becomes evident in the little autobiographical excursus into Horace's stay at Athens, his experience at Philippi, and his return to Rome after defeat.³⁴ Horace compares his own situation to that of the soldier, pretending that formerly he wrote poetry only because of lack of money (ll. 41–54). In ll. 55–57, Horace explicitly supplies the crucial information for his idleness, the information that is fundamental for his reasoning on poetry and life in what follows: he has grown old. In *Epist.* 2.2 Horace assumes the role of the elderly poet who is both successful and thus well-off, no longer in need of exercising his art, but also for several reasons to be explained below, tired, lacking in poetic inspiration and intent on other pursuits of life, namely moral philosophy. Thus, B falls into a second preamble subdivided into three minor sections (Ba: ll. 26–40, Ba2: ll. 41–54, Ba3: ll. 55–57), which prepares the reader for a series of reasons why the old poet is unwilling to continue writing poetry: Bb (58–64): readers do not agree on the choice of genre; Bc (65–86): city life in Rome is unfavorable for poetic inspiration; Bd (87–105): Horace is tired of the relations with his fellow poets, their notorious vanity prompts

³¹ Pp. 268f.

³² See Becker 1963: 213f.; Hering 1979: 13, *passim*.

³³ See p. 24 n. 82.

³⁴ Above, pp. 27 ff.

an empty exchange of compliments not conducive to poetic quality. This last point prepares for the central argument of the B-section on poetry: the importance of proper self-criticism, in contrast to vanity and mutual compliments; the task of the poet; and the nature of the legitimate poem (Be: ll. 106–125). The precondition of success is that the poet is conscious of his task, that he ‘knows’ (*sapere*): Bf: ll. 126–140. This paragraph prepares for C (ll. 141–216) on the knowledge of the right way of life.

From now on the train of thought, which more or less systematically builds up to the crucial point in Be, is quite coherent: the alleged reason for the letter, “Horace overdue with sending poems,” is an apt starting point for an argument on the difficulties of writing good poetry, the prerequisite for doing so, and the latter’s special qualities.³⁵ The apparent looseness of the series of steps that lead from A to Be is the result of Horace’s particular way of presenting his argument. He does not give concise abstract reasoning, *explicitly* developing every step from the preceding one, but develops it in a seemingly loose series of entertaining stories, anecdotes, or examples; scenes vividly depicting various sorts of people. Each contributes a relevant aspect of the overriding theme, ‘the old poet excuses his idleness as a defect of his advanced age he cannot help’: a man who sells a slave pointing out to the buyer the latter’s fault; the soldier, daring when he is still in need of money because of his awkward situation—young Horace in a strictly parallel situation—various reasons why Horace is in an awkward situation now, a situation that prevents him from composing poetry. People with different tastes bother the poet; scenes from busy city life in Rome are contrasted with the quiet, secluded life of study in Athens; the coteries of competing orators and vain and ignorant poets are depicted, and, at the end, another anecdote: a psychopath who once suffered from illusions and is now unhappy to be cured from his defect. In these scenes the poet figured himself in an autobiographical retrospective: his pleasantly secluded life in Athens, dedicated to philosophy, but interrupted by war and peril vs. his busy present life in Rome.³⁶ When the final section (C) begins, the autobiographical excursus acquires a new significance, as Hans Peter Syndikus reminds me: it prepares for the old poet’s turning to moral philosophy. Horace’s philosophical studies were cut short by the civil war; now it seems that everything the poet has done up to now was only an interruption of his original intention of dedicating himself to philosophy.

³⁵ On the alleged occasion of the letter as a tag, cf. below, p. 483.

³⁶ For this style in Horace’s ‘didactic’ poetry, cf. Puelma Piwonka 1949: 92 ff.

This technique of splitting the train of thought into a series of images resembles that already observed in the 'Gedankenlyrik' of the *Odes*, namely C. 2.16.³⁷ In the *Odes*, the train of thought moves through a series of carefully conceived 'conceptual' images, sliding one over the other. In *Epist.* 2.2, we find vividly depicted scenes, which often start *ex abrupto* and simply stand side by side; only in l. 65 is the new paragraph explicitly related to the preceding by *praeter cetera*, 'besides.' We find, however, as we have observed in the *Odes*, consistency in a set of common traits that run through the imagery (money/property—legal affairs—war/strife—a troubled vs. a quiet life). They will reappear in C,³⁸ and there is a neat implicit, inner cohesion between the paragraphs. Money and the gain and loss of property unite the story in the sale of a slave, the anecdote on the brave soldier who lost his purse, mirrored by Horace, impelled once by lack of money to write verse, now rich enough to renounce it; the notion of loss of property extends even to the notion that old age 'steals' the joys of youth as well as poetic inspiration in ll. 55–57.

Bb (58–64) is linked to what precedes it by a double entendre of *quid faciam, vis*, "what do you want me to do?" (l. 57): at first the question seems to be rhetorical, suggesting the answer 'nothing.'³⁹ But then the text continues as if it were a real question, and complains about the poet's difficulty in satisfying the wishes of his clients, Horace's difficulty in satisfying Florus's predilection of *carmina*, 'lyric poetry,' in particular.⁴⁰ The notion of various people bothering the poet with a large number of different requests introduces a motif common to *Bb*, *Bc*, *Bd*: city life with its distractions and social obligations as contrasted to the secluded intellectual life in Athens. In fact, with Athens, Horace returns to the place of his studies mentioned in the autobiographical excursus in ll. 41 ff.; there we met with the contrast 'quiet life vs. upheavals and troubles.' The antagonism displayed in poetic recitations⁴¹ echoes the military example in *Ba*; implicitly, Horace, who lost his

³⁷ See p. 247, also p. 160.

³⁸ Below, pp. 479 ff.

³⁹ Rudd 1994: 130.

⁴⁰ Line 57 makes it clear that in l. 25, too, *carmina* bears the meaning 'lyric poetry,' not 'poems' in general; cf. also ll. 54 and 57, where Horace speaks of *versus* or *poemata* when he refers to poetry in general.

⁴¹ The identification of Horace's, the Roman Alcaeus's, counterpart, i.e., the Roman Calimachus or Mimnemos (ll. 99–101) with Propertius is beyond doubt. However, today it can be regarded as the *communis opinio* that Horace's (self)ironic remarks do not imply by any means a hostile relationship between him and Propertius, on the contrary; cf. now Syndikus 1998. For recitations, cf. Courtney, above, pp. 90, 95.

fortune after Philippi, mirrors the soldier, aggressive after he lost his purse, in his poetic production: the first verses he wrote—as he pretends—for the sake of money, were the *Satires*; and the *Epodes* were an invective genre, too.⁴²

The troublesome obligation to engage continuously in empty compliments for fellow poets contrasts with the seclusion needed for poetic inspiration in what precedes (ll. 81–86). Equally, a contrast is implied to what follows (Be): the business of indulging in vanity deprives the poet of due self-consciousness and self-criticism. In order to compose a *legitimum carmen*, ‘a song according to the rules,’ the poet has to assume something of the role of censor; the legal connotations of ll. 109f. hark back to the legal technicalities of the sale in A, and references to legal actions will return in ll. 158–174.⁴³ The *legitimum carmen*, presupposing supreme critical judgment, is in implicit contrast to the poet inspired by Bacchus in the seclusion of the ‘*Musenlandschaft*’ in ll. 77ff. The *legitimum carmen*, based on a careful and discerning choice of words,⁴⁴ as outlined in ll. 111–125, is a particularly strong version of the concept of poetic craftsmanship à la Callimachus vs. high-flown, inspired poetry, as often invoked by the Augustan poets.⁴⁵ The contrast is made explicit, and is even exaggerated in the following paragraph (Bf), where the inspired poet is replaced by the madman (*delirus*, l. 126).

While Bb-d spoke of the poet himself, bothered by the distractions of city life in Rome, Be, like the story of the salesman (in A) and the soldier (in Ba), tells an anecdote that relates to the poet’s situation. But how does it relate precisely to Horace’s position? The supremely self-conscious and self-critical poet, who ‘knows’ (l. 128), is compared to a man who has been cured of a mental illness: he enjoyed deluding himself by imagining actual performances of tragedies in an empty theater. Yet, cured of this illness, paradoxically, the former madman is unhappy; he is deprived of his greatest joy (ll. 138–140). Before he tells the story Horace confesses that he might prefer to be mad and lacking in craftsmanship, if he could only deceive himself

⁴² Rudd 1994: 128. The *Satires* are mentioned explicitly below, l. 60.

⁴³ Below, p. 479.

⁴⁴ Cf. the prime requisite for good poetry after *ordo*, cf. AP 45ff. (Reinhardt, pp. 510f. below); cf. also *Epist.* 2.1.69ff. In order to emphasize the pressing need for discerning judgment, Horace portrays the poet properly as carefully, pedantically having to choose every single word. Speaking of a *legitimum carmen* Horace presents the careful choice of the right word as the poet’s moral duty; he stresses the poet’s ‘responsibility for the language,’ almost in the sense of Karl Kraus.

⁴⁵ Cf. especially AP 285–307; Günther 1999; above, pp. 283f. and 389ff.; on *ars* vs. *ingenium*, cf. also Puelma Piwonka 1949: 122ff.

and rejoice in his own errors: this would be preferable to being distressed, knowing that making good poems is an almost superhuman task (ll. 126–128). The same contrast between creative madness and sober craftsmanship is implied in *AP* 285–308 (the prime concept of the paragraph is summed up at the beginning of the following paragraph, l. 309, by stating that *sapere*, ‘to know,’ is the alpha and omega of good poetry). In the *Ars Poetica*, the poet, who unequivocally advocated the sober approach, has climbed the peak of craftsmanship; therefore he renounces composing poetry altogether and is satisfied with playing the role of the critic (ll. 303–308). The attitude in the *Letter to Florus* is different: Horace wishes he could deceive himself and continue to write poetry as confidently as before, yet, unfortunately, he cannot. The paradoxical state of mind to which he confesses in *Epist.* 2.2.126–140 mirrors the paradoxical situation of the poet of the *Epistles*, that of the poet renounces poetry *stricto sensu*, yet, in this renunciation remains a poet, albeit one who writes a kind of semi-poetry only. It is important to understand the paradox inherent in the statement of ll. 126 ff.; to regard the lines simply as ironical, as the ps.-Acronic scholia (approved by Brink⁴⁶) interpreted the passage, and to identify the attitude of *Epist.* 2.2 with that of the *Ars Poetica*, is too narrow an interpretation, one that fails to do full justice to the text or to explain the function of what would be a strange digression after *Be*, as Brink concedes himself. The transition to the final part (C) is awkward as well.

Lines 126–140 run: “I would prefer to be a bad poet to being tormented by knowing (namely knowing how difficult it is to write a professional poem; but unfortunately I know and thus I am tormented). There was once a poor fellow who was angry when he was cured of his madness because the ignorance (i.e., the fact that he did not know) this madness implied gave him a lot of pleasure.” Horace does not say, “I am not like this man.” He says exactly the opposite: I am like this man. This man ‘knows,’ he cannot return to his old state of mind, and he regrets this. Horace regrets it as well. Of course, he knows he cannot go on writing poetry as before and ignore professional standards. His statement implies only that he has to cope with a state of mind where he regrets that his requests on good poetry are too stringent for himself to meet, i.e., he regrets his ‘knowledge.’ What follows (C) is motivated by the desire to cope with this regret of ‘knowing,’ i.e., to come to terms with what this knowledge implies. Horace’s poet who knows

⁴⁶ Brink 1982: 348f.

is like a censor; his knowledge is normative and implies a moral obligation to no longer write poetry inspired by poetic madness and to leave this play to the young (who are excused by not knowing). Thus, the proper knowledge of the real laws of poetic composition is a part of moral philosophy; by reasoning about the laws of poetic composition, the poet becomes aware that he is reasoning about the right way of life for him, the poet. Obviously, this has a wider appeal, it implies not only knowing how to write good poetry but also whether one is capable of writing or not. The poet who asks himself about the laws of his art is led to question what the laws of his life are: he must *verae numeros modosque ediscere vitae*, “practice setting one’s life to the tunes and rhythms of truth” (l. 144).

The unity of the third and final section (C: ll. 141–216) is much more apparent than that of B: a first paragraph (Ca: ll. 141–157) states the necessity of renouncing striving for the right kind of poetry in favor of searching for the right kind of life. Moral errors, the key defect avarice, in particular, are much more serious than ignorance in matters of poetry. Thus the medical connotations of the anecdote about the cured madman are applied to philosophy as a cure for moral defects. The following two paragraphs (Cb: ll. 158–174 and Cc: ll. 175–204) each demonstrate the delusiveness of the very concept of material property; Cb again employs legal terminology to this effect. In ll. 190–204 (Cd) Horace claims to be free from the vice of avarice, but in the coda (Ce: ll. 205–216) he is weary and wonders whether, immune from avarice as he is, he is not, in fact, still possessed by many other vices, in accord with the flawed image Horace consistently projects about himself in his moral poetry, *Epistles* I, in particular.⁴⁷ Here, too, he is far from presenting himself as the ideal sage, but rather as the imperfect human fellow being, who has to struggle—as the poet’s addressee—to come at least a little closer to his ultimate goal (cf. *Epist.* 1.1.32).

When Horace at the end of the text makes this self-weariness explicit, we come closer to grasping a further aspect of the coherence between C and the end of B: Horace is far from having reached perfection, both as a poet and as a human being. As the latter is the more general and important task, he must first strive for moral progress and renounce aspiring to poetic perfection. In *AP* 303–308, Horace is the perfect poet, who renounces his art proper, because, being the master he is, he is able to assume the mantle of the critic. In *Epist.* 2.2, Horace does not dwell on his mastery, on the contrary: he says

⁴⁷ See Günther 2010a: 47 ff.

he is not pleased by knowing the difficulties of good poetry. The accent is on his state of mind: he illustrates his frustration with an anecdote, not his unwillingness to write poetry. The poet who regrets that he knows he cannot go on like before still has something of the 'dilettante' poet of *Epist.* 2.1.103–117,⁴⁸ who cannot wholly renounce his madness, but who as a poet, dedicated to this harmless passion, is at least immune to more serious vices, avarice, in particular.⁴⁹ In *Epist.* 2.2, Horace does not pose, as—ironically—he does in *Epist.* 2.1, as a mad dilettante poet: he speaks of the anxiety it means for him to give up poetry. He has difficulties coping with it. That is the point.

To the paragraph on the transience of material wealth, passing from one generation to the other (ll. 171–179), Horace appends a curious excursus on the unalterable differences between one man's character and attitudes and those of another (ll. 180–189).⁵⁰ The significance of this section becomes clear with ll. 199–204: Horace shows himself prepared to accept adverse fortunes, drawing back into his own self. He defines the degree of autarky he possesses as similar to what he says in *C.* 2.3 or 3.29.⁵¹ Modest as his material aspirations are, he opts for a certain degree of material well-being in contrast to 'filthy poverty'.⁵² However, even if this is denied to him he is prepared to accept this adversity with the dignity of the man of character who knows his own inalienable value. Lines 180–189 speak of man's character as it shows itself in his attitude toward material wealth, and this character, this attitude is not in a man's own power, but is determined by a man's genius. This adds a new taste to Horace's acceptance of adverse circumstances: Horace not only accepts life as it is with all its adversities, regrettable and painful as they are, he also accepts himself as he is, with all his imperfections, proudly and humbly, without self-indulgence or self-pity.

If we fully appreciate this attitude then we are prepared to understand the enigmatic conclusion (ll. 213–216):

⁴⁸ See below, p. 488.

⁴⁹ See Günther 2010a: 54f.

⁵⁰ Rudd (1994: 145) denies that Horace believes a man's life to be determined by the stars, ascribing *C.* 2.17.13 ff. to Maecenas's interest, and refers to *C.* 1.11. However, to believe in a certain degree of determination caused by the date of birth and to believe that one can foretell the future is another matter, and *C.* 1.13 does not even address this problem, it simply rejects fortunetelling as useless. Moreover, *Epist.* 2.2.187 ff. speak of a man's character rather than of a his life. To deny that the 'rationalist' Horace, as did Maecenas and Augustus, believed in astrology is wishful thinking on the part of modern 'rationalists.'

⁵¹ Above, pp. 326 ff. and 300 ff.

⁵² *Pauperies immunda* (l. 199); cf. *C.* 2.10.7; *C.* 3.29.55f.; for *pauperies/paupertas* in the positive sense ('modest means') in Horace and Tibullus, cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 288f.; Maltby 2002: 120f.

*vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis.
 lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti:
 tempus abire tibi est, ne potum largius aequo
 rideat et pulset lasciva decentius aetas.*

If you can't live as you ought, give way to those who can.
 You've eaten and drunk, you've had your fun; it's time to be going.
 Or else, when you've drunk too much, you may be pushed aside
 and mocked by youngsters, whose wild behavior is less out of place.

Horace distinctly recalls a Lucretian model (3.938, 959 f., 962) that speaks of leaving the banquet of life. However, *lusisti*, 'you played,' and ll. 215 f. suggest the common topic of youngsters ridiculing an old man who is engaging in erotic activities unsuited to his age, and pushing him out of the door, away from the banquet of youth. Understood in this way, the double meaning of *ludere*, 'to engage in sexual pleasures—to write light poetry,' conveniently refers the lines back to Horace's initial refusal to write lyric poetry; thus, Brink decidedly advocated this view.⁵³ There is no problem in assuming that Horace transforms Lucretius's words about resignation to death into a text about leaving the banquet of youth, yet, this interpretation does not do justice to *decede peritis*. *Peritis*, 'the experienced, the experts,' cannot refer to the young, nor can *decede peritis* mean 'attend to those who know to live properly, i.e., to the philosophers.'⁵⁴

Horace speaks of both the banquet of life and the banquet of youth: the banquet of life *is* the banquet of youth. Horace is too old for it, he retires from the pleasures of life, which are the pleasures of youth, not those of an old man. He leaves life to the 'experts (of life),' to those who know how to live, or think they do. He knows that he, the old man, is at a loss as to how to live properly, and he accepts it. He accepts that there is nothing left for him but to try to cope as well as he can with his imperfect existence. He retires from life into his own self, into his pursuit of self-perfection through the study of philosophy, and he abandons everything that goes with life, even the pleasures of poetry, or rather poetry as a pleasure. Being the poet he is, his philosophy is still a poet's philosophy, a philosophical poetry. Yet, as such it cannot be poetry in the full, or rather, the ordinary sense of the word. In this poetry, Horace can still be a poet without being a dilettante, but also without aspiring for a poetic ideal he cannot reach. When Horace retires from the distractions of the world into the philosophical semi-poetry of his *Epistles*, what he says seems not to be so different from Rückert's "Ich bin der

⁵³ Brink 1982: 408 ff.

⁵⁴ Rudd 1994: 149.

Welt abhanden gekommen,” but in the space where Horace, the old poet of *Epist.* 2.2, dwells, there is no heaven, no love, not even song, but only a sort of ‘poetry,’ which in the poet’s own perception has almost degenerated into prose. The poetry of the *Epistles* is not a cure for the poet who seeks to retire from the world into his poetry; the *Letter to Florus* is the poetic expression of the sadness of the old poet who renounces his art.

A great twentieth-century poet who in his poetry and in a highly perceptive essay reflected much on poetry,⁵⁵ transience, old age, and death was Gottfried Benn: in one of his best poems (“Der Dunkle”) he too speaks of the ‘Trauer’ of the old poet whose approach to his art is transformed by the immediacy of death:

*Ach gäb er mir zurück die alte Trauer,
die einst mein Herz so zauberschwer umfing,
da gab es Jahre, wo von jeder Mauer
ein Tränenflor aus Tristanblicken hing.*

*Da littest du, doch es war Auferstehung,
da starbst du hin, doch es war Liebestod,
doch jetzt bei jedem Schritt und jeder Drehung
liegen die Fluren leer und ausgelobt.*

*Die Leere ist wohl auch von jenen Gaben,
in denen sich der Dunkle offenbart,
er gibt sie dir, du musst sie trauernd haben,
doch diese Trauer ist von andrer Art.*

Horace could not look back to tristanesque ‘Weltschmerz’ in the poetry of his youth; there was no magic, no resurrection, no ‘Liebestod.’ Yet, in the lyrics of this poet, always older than his years, there was the renunciation of the mature, the elderly lover, even a hint of—almost—sentimental regret in *C.* 2.5. In the *Epistles*, there is almost a hint of *tristesse* when, in *Epist.* 2.55 ff., he looks ruefully back to the bygone joys of love, wine, and poetry, to play and fun, and, in *Epist.* 1.7.227 f., even to the ‘Liebesschmerz’ of the elegiac lover. As Gottfried Benn’s ‘Trauer’ has changed, the renunciation, the regret of Horace’s later poetry is different from that of the earlier one. Horace’s late lyric poetry in the fourth book of *Odes* is as different from and as parallel to Gottfried Benn’s late lyric poetry as Horace’s earlier poetry is different from the earlier poetry of the latter. And Horace’s *Epistles* perhaps find their counterpart in Gottfried Benn’s late improvisations in his prose-like, parlando style such as “Teil-teils,” “Restaurant,” or “Satzbau.”

⁵⁵ Benn 2006.

There has been much controversy about the question of whether Horace's verse epistles should be regarded as real letters, as Fraenkel thought, or as a 'systematic' poetic autobiography in the sense of Heinze.⁵⁶ Fraenkel is certainly right when he states that in returning to the philosophical poetry of the *Satires*, Horace exchanged the fictive vis-à-vis of the *Satires* with persons from his real life.⁵⁷ Becker and McGann⁵⁸ have shown that for some of Horace's letters in Book I it is implausible to assume a real-life situation, though one need not exclude it for others. What is important is not whether the alleged situation is real or not, but rather, the relevance of an epistolary situation for Horace's poetic technique. As with the *Odes*, which, except for the amatory ones, are addressed to real persons from the poet's surroundings, the situation is a tag to which the following discourse is attached.⁵⁹ The alleged situation, however, is always one that suits the person addressed and his relationship with the poet. Thus, even if Heinze exaggerates when he perceives a more or less systematic approach when Horace depicts his own life and person, he correctly describes Horace's procedure from a formalistic point of view, as he did in regard to the *Odes*.⁶⁰ In the *Epistles*, Horace chooses, as in the *Odes*, to construct a situation that can serve as a basis upon which a generally relevant discourse can plausibly be presented as an address to another person, and not just as a monologue. In contrast to the *Satires*, in the *Epistles* the vis-à-vis can always be identified with a real person from Horace's surroundings and thus the alleged situation always relates in some way to the realities of the poet's life.

We have now seen that on closer inspection even a long and at first sight quite confusing text like *Epist.* 2.2 is firmly constructed around such an epistolary situation. Excusing himself to Florus for being slow to send him the promised lyric verses, Horace explains the difficulties of writing good poetry in general and his difficulties with poetry in his particular situation of life. The alleged occasion for the letter served as a tag for Horace to speak both on the difficulty of writing good poetry and on his present situation, a situation in which he felt this difficulty as poignantly as never before, in which he decided that he could not be the poet he was before.

However, as I have already said above,⁶¹ the final part on the right way to live is explicitly marked off as a soliloquy. Of course, in a real letter I can

⁵⁶ McGann 1969: 89 ff.

⁵⁷ Fraenkel 1957: 309.

⁵⁸ Above, n. 56.

⁵⁹ Above, pp. 239 ff., 313 ff.

⁶⁰ Above, pp. 313 ff.

⁶¹ See p. 473.

do as I wish; I can choose to stray away from the main topic, if my letter has one. My letter need not be prompted by a specific need or request of the recipient, I can choose to address somebody with any concern I may have on my own initiative. Yet, a characteristic trait of Horace's *Letters* is that he normally constructs a situation that makes the letter a response to a certain need or action of the recipient: here, Florus's complaint about Horace's delay. The final part of *Epist.* 2.2 (ll. 145 ff.) breaks this rule, when it presents the poet explicitly talking to himself. Again, of course, this does not break the illusion of a real letter; in a real letter I can even choose to tell the recipient about my soliloquies. What matters is that Horace here ostentatiously breaks the self-imposed rule that his poetry normally is an address to a vis-à-vis, relating the speaker's persona to the persona of the addressed, and not a monologue or a soliloquy. This self-imposed rule does not exclude exceptions; in the *Odes* an exception was *C.* 2.5.⁶² As such exceptions show, the dialogic nature of Horace's poetry is not an externally imposed generic rule, which prevents the poet from expressing something he could otherwise express; the rule is self-imposed because Horace thought that normally he could express best what he wished to express within the compass of poetry as an address to a vis-à-vis.⁶³ Horace's poetry is dialogic because implicitly it always entails a paraenetic element; therefore, the poet's interest is never the merely individual, but the general, or what at least can lead to general applications. Thus, the final part of *Epist.* 2.2 is still a 'Selbstgespräch,' not a monologue; it is still a paraenesis, aimed at the poet's own self.⁶⁴ But with the explicit soliloquy at the end of *Epist.* 2.2, Horace renounces a fundamental trait of his previous poetry; the soliloquy marks the ultimate retirement of the poet into his own self. The philosophical semi-poetry of the *Epistles* is the poet's attempt to cope with his own life; in this poetry he enacts his aspiration toward the right way to live, the *recte vivere*. Thus, life and poetry, the moral character of the man and of the poet, the knowledge (*sapere*) of how to live and how to write good poetry, the *vir bonus*, the 'good man,' and the good poet become one. *Epist.* 2.2 is the supreme expression of the identity of ethical and poetological concerns in Horace's second book of *Epistles*. Of course, the main reason for placing *Epist.* 2.1 before the *Letter to Florus* was the former's addressee, yet that the soliloquy of *Epist.* 2.2 should stand at the end of the book is fitting as well.

⁶² Above, pp. 319, 343 ff.

⁶³ Above, pp. 313 ff.; for the dialogic element in Horace's and Lucilius's poetry, cf. also Puelma Piwonka 1949: 61 f.

⁶⁴ For the paraenetic character of self-address, see Schadewaldt 1926: 207 f.

3. *EPIST.* 2.1

The *Letter to Augustus*, even longer than *Epist.* 2.2, displays an even more puzzling variety of topics than the latter; however, the unity of the poem, its reference to the epistolary situation, is much neater than appears at first sight, neater even than in *Epist.* 2.2. However, this can only be appreciated if one properly understands what the poem itself purports to be the occasion that prompted the letter. In fact, it seems to me that scholars have regularly failed to see how neat the unity of the text is, because they failed to strictly separate the real external situation, which prompted Horace's letter, as reported by Suetonius, from the situation alleged in the poem itself.⁶⁵ And the latter is quite different from the former. Horace's text does not mention any request from Augustus that he should write a poem dedicated to him; Horace's text pretends that it is the poet who is eager to present a concern of his own to the ruler and wonders whether he may bother a man as important and busy with serious affairs of state as Augustus with matters of his own private concern. In the preamble of four lines ((I): ll. 1–4) Horace depicts himself as the same man as in *Epist.* 1.13, the poet anxious to present his work to the ruler when the moment and circumstances are right.⁶⁶

However, the epistolary situation of *Epist.* 2.1—the writer of the letter anxious to address the recipient on his own initiative—is rather untypical of a Horatian letter. Normally, the Horatian letter pretends to be a response to a concern of the addressee or to a certain situation in which the recipient of the letter finds himself. A Horatian letter does not normally pretend that the sender is eager to deliver a message on his own initiative. Obviously, the difference is caused by the particular status of the recipient of *Epist.* 2.1. It would be awkward to depict the princeps as someone descending to make a request of the poet rather than vice versa.⁶⁷ But what then is the poet's concern, which prompts him to address his letter to the princeps?

In *Epist.* 2.2, the occasion that induced the poet to write his letter was not revealed immediately, but became clear only later.⁶⁸ In *Epist.* 2.1, the preamble at least makes it explicit from the start that Horace is eager to address the princeps. What his concern is, however, remains an open question for a long time.

⁶⁵ See above, p. 44.

⁶⁶ See Fantham, above, p. 423.

⁶⁷ See above, pp. 256 ff.

⁶⁸ Above, pp. 473 ff.

Epist. 2.1 is organized in a manner quite similar to that of *Epist.* 2.2: the main body of the text begins *ex abrupto*, and only in the final part does the significance of the whole discourse for an overriding theme become fully apparent. As regards the overall structure of the text, Fraenkel pointed out that the parallel asyndetic new beginnings with the subject of the clause preceding in ll. 5, 39, and 139 mark major caesuras:⁶⁹ with l. 5 the main body of the text begins after the just-mentioned preamble ((I)). The whole first half of the main body of text ((II): ll. 39–138) is concerned in some way with the obsession of Horace's contemporaries with everything antiquarian; it is difficult to define precisely the topic of the second part ((III): ll. 139–270): it deals with the contemporary situation of poetry in Rome, the role poetry of high artistic standard can play in the cultural life of society, and what service the poetry of Horace in particular can render to the ruler. Both themes are developed in recursion to the parallel or contrasting situation in the Greek world.

After the short preamble, Horace begins (II) with a set piece that allows him to slide from the preamble to his attack on exaggerated veneration for the old ((II) *Aa*: ll. 5–17) when he begins to talk about Romulus, Bacchus, and the Dioscuri, i.e. the deified heroes in whose company he regularly names the deified emperor.⁷⁰ This, of course, arouses certain expectations. One of the merits, which according to the text earned those heroes a place in heaven (*agros assignant*, 'they assign lands,' l. 8⁷¹), does not really fit any of them, but points forward to the company of Augustus to whom they are compared explicitly in ll. 15–17. There, however, the argument takes a surprising turn; the key point of comparison is the contrast between the common lot of great men—who normally suffer from the envy of detractors and fail to gain during their lifetime due recognition from their fellow men, so that they can earn the fruits of their labor—and Augustus's exceptional position. He is a man whose merits are recognized while he is still alive; he is honored like a god already in the present.⁷² At first sight, this seems a fit motif to introduce a panegyric poem, but in ll. 18–27 (II) *Ab*) the text takes a different line and moves away from panegyrics. Horace reaffirms that the just treatment of Augustus during his lifetime is indeed a great exception even among the Roman people and then states the topic of his following

⁶⁹ Fraenkel 1957: 384.

⁷⁰ Above, pp. 366 n. 557, 386.

⁷¹ Cf. Fraenkel 1957: 385.

⁷² On ll. 15–17, see Rudd 1989: 8f.

discourse: in every other respect the Romans, like all other people, cannot resist the temptation to venerate what is far removed in place or time, and they do this to the extent that even when it comes to literature they regard legal documents as major poetic achievements, if they only date back to the good old days.

With the next paragraph ((II) Ac: 28–33) it becomes clear that the train of thought has reached its first goal: the argument is indeed about the value of old and new in Greek and Roman literature. However, before Horace discusses literary quality in more detail, he inserts a satiric general reflection on the absurdity of associating literary quality with age ((II) Ad: 34–49). Thus, the first section of the main body of text ((II) A: ll. 5–49) establishes criticism of wrong literary judgment based on the criterion ‘old vs. new.’ The asyndetic start at l. 50 comes back to poetry in Rome, and the whole central part of the poem ((II) B: ll. 50–138) is dedicated to the development of poetry in Rome in comparison with Greece. Lines 50–62 ((II) B1a) list the pompous judgments of what he calls the critics (*critici*, l. 51⁷³) of several archaic Roman poets (Ennius, Naevius, Pacuvius, Accius, Afranius, Plautus, Caecilius, Terence), admired without qualification in present-day Rome, despite the evident shortcomings of their style. In contrast to this unqualified admiration, Horace’s own stance is not unqualified condemnation ((II) B1b: ll. 63–75): he requires that literary judgment be based solely on artistic merit, not on any external factor like age ((II) B1c: 76–89), and he suggests that his contemporaries’ unqualified admiration of the old and condemnation of the new is dictated by envy (l. 89). Then (ll. 90–92), the rhetorical question is asked how in Greece poetry could ever have developed had there been an aversion toward the new such as exists in Rome. The following two sections contrast the Greek and Roman way of life and attitude toward poetry: as soon as Greece no longer had to engage any war, the Greeks, far from being hostile to innovation, had an enormous, even vicious appetite for all kinds of amusements and arts ((II) B2a: ll. 88–102).⁷⁴ In contrast, the ancient Romans were dedicated to a much more serious lifestyle, to their public duties and sober management of their own property. However, recently people, old and young, educated or not, had discovered an

⁷³ Presumably it is Varro who hides under the anonymous *critici*; the pompous, mannered, and contorted expression implicitly ridicules the positive judgments. ‘Recent’ high regard for ‘old’ Naevius sounds particularly absurd—after negative judgment has been passed on Ennius (who already despised him).

⁷⁴ The passage plays on the ambivalent Roman attitude toward the Greeks; see Fraenkel 1957: 389 ff.

inexplicable infatuation with writing poetry, from which not even Horace himself can remain immune, although he had only recently—i.e., in *Epistles* I—said farewell to poetry ((II) B2b: ll. 103–117). With the concluding remarks on amateur poetry (ll. 114–117) the text jokingly and imperceptibly slides back to the quality of poetry in Rome. Yet, the text does not take exactly the turn one might expect.

As Roman literature can never be considered independently from its Greek model, it is natural that Horace should compare the attitude of the Roman public to that of Greece. Moreover, the comparison with the development of poetry in Greece—which dominates the argument from now on—allows Horace to focus on why old-fashioned rustic manners prevailed in Rome. In the following discourse, the double-edged attitude toward the contrast ‘Greek refinement vs. Roman rustic simplicity’ is exploited in both directions: Roman poetry and literary taste still lags behind and needs to strive for greater craftsmanship and sophistication. But the probity that goes with pristine simplicity distinguishes the Roman national character. In this context, the pedagogic role of poetry, which Horace will highlight later (ll. 118–137), assumes particular importance for the value of poetry in Rome.

When Horace speaks of the madness of people who, when it comes to poetry, renounce the rule to leave arts like navigation, medicine, or similar crafts to the expert, one expects him to advocate, as he does elsewhere, sound poetic craftsmanship: in ll. 50ff. he had already criticized archaic Latin poetry for its lack of polish. However, already there Horace significantly shifted the focus, emphasizing the wrong opinions of the recipients of poetry rather than criticizing the poets themselves: that their work is imperfect is assumed as a matter of course. Rather than criticizing the older poets for their faults, Horace in (II) B1 argues against unsound critical judgment of the work of the older poets. In the long paragraph that follows upon (II) B2b, i.e. ll. 118–137 ((II) B2c), Horace, who included himself among the crowd incurably mad for poetry, excuses this madness as a rather harmless fault in comparison to others: a man who is mad for poetry is not intent at least on material values and is thus immune to avarice, the cardinal vice, of which Horace claims to be free in *Epist.* 2.2.⁷⁵ Thus, he can twist the argument around and, what at first appeared to be an excuse for unreasonable behavior unexpectedly turns out to be a considerable merit. A man who, as a poet does, despises material wealth, i.e., possesses due moral integrity, even if he

⁷⁵ Above, p. 479.

is not necessarily the best soldier, may nevertheless be of considerable value to the community as a teacher and educator. Here, Horace even drops a hint at his *Carmen Saeculare*, performed a couple of years earlier at an important public festival by a chorus of 'chaste boys and girls' (l. 132).⁷⁶

At this point the train of thought has strayed considerably from its starting point: (II) A had advocated sound poetic judgment, mindless veneration for everything old, and thus affirmed the merits of recent poetry. Unexpectedly, the argument led to a vindication of the value of poetry in general for the public good. The third asyndetic beginning in l. 139 marks the beginning of the final part ((III): ll. 139–270), which is no longer concerned with the opposition 'old vs. new poetry.' However, the sudden transition to a new subject is concealed by the fact that with *agricolae prisci*, 'farmers of old' (l. 139), Horace returns to the rustic manners of ancient Rome; the first part of (III) (A: ll. 139–213) indeed resumes the topic 'poetry in ancient Rome,' but now the focus shifts to a particular genre, drama. Roman drama has its origins in the so-called Fescennine verse, interpreted as early obscene verse exchanges:⁷⁷ when the usage degenerated into violent attack, excesses had to be curbed by law ((III) Aa: ll. 139–155). The influence of Greek poetry allowed for the development of tragedy and comedy in Rome. The Greek model exercised a positive influence on poetic form (meter, in particular), too ((III) Ab1: ll. 156–167), though unfortunately Roman poets, Plautus the comedian, in particular, had hitherto been too lazy to actually respond to the highest requirements of craftsmanship as they should have learned them from their Greek predecessors ((III) Ab2: ll. 168–176). The development from obscene beginnings toward more serious poetic forms of higher quality (in analogy with Aristotle's view of the development of tragedy from Satyr play)⁷⁸ can be exploited for Horace's two overriding concerns: his plea for sound poetic craftsmanship and his claim that the poet can be a public educator. However, as in (II), the reproach of sinning against the requirements of true art fell on the critics rather than the poets. In the following paragraph ((III) Ac: ll. 177–213), the ultimate reason for the faults of dramatic poetry in Rome lies with the undiscerning public, which hails poets who satisfy their desire for cheap spectacle.

As in (II), Horace arrives at the topic in question (Roman drama and poetic standards) step by step, and at the end of (III) A (ll. 208–213) he is

⁷⁶ Above, p. 436.

⁷⁷ Cf. Becker 1963: 208 ff.; Brink 1982: 179 ff.

⁷⁸ Cf. *AP* 220 ff.; Reinhardt, below, pp. 551 ff.

back to his own personal judgment: he states that he is by no means hostile to dramatic poetry per se, but he requires due respect for the rules of art, thus reaffirming his stance from section (II) A in regard to old vs. new poetry. However, (III) A also implicitly refers to (II) B: the sloppy poet of (III) A, seduced by his greed for money, stands in contrast to the moral advisor of (II) B, a role Horace implicitly claims for himself. Thus, when Horace introduces his reproach of the undiscerning Roman public with a remark on poets who are seduced by greed for public acclaim, by their *animus laudis avarus* ('heart set on glory, i.e., applause of the crowd,' l. 179), his criticism is also directed against the poets who descend to vulgar taste, from whom he implicitly distances himself.⁷⁹ By blaming sloppy writing on greed for glory and money, Horace intrinsically links the moral character of the man and the degree of craftsmanship of the poet, as he did in *Epist.* 2.1.⁸⁰

After 73 ll. on Roman drama the reader may wonder about the particular relevance of this genre in the context of Horace's discourse, and the more than 200 ll. of argument on poetic technique, literary history, and the poet's duties, the tirades against an undiscerning public taste have made one forget the initial address to Augustus. We have forgotten that after all this talk we still do not know why Horace thinks fit to bother the emperor with these concerns: the long lecture on the value of quality poetry seems to have lost sight of the princeps as its vis-à-vis. With the indignant questions in ll. 55 ff., aimed at the undiscerning Roman public, the addressee of the discourse appears increasingly to be the general reader, not the princeps: of course, the charges of incompetent literary judgment cannot be aimed at him, but must be aimed at the general public. In l. 125, in the central passage on the poet's value to the community, we read a generic second person. However, the imperatives *verum age*, etc. ('come on, etc.,' l. 214), addressing Augustus, bring us firmly back to the initial situation for the concluding part ((III) B: ll. 214–270): Augustus is asked to turn his attention to poetry that is destined for a reading public as well ((III) Ba: ll. 214–218). And in what follows ((III) Bb: 219–228) we are projected back into the situation of (I): 'a poet eager to address the emperor, but hesitant whether he should bother him.' Now, Horace criticizes poets, who are too touchy to take criticism from fellow poets, but are eager to present their work to the emperor, even at the wrong moment, in order to gain his encouragement for

⁷⁹ Horace regularly portrays himself as disinterested in public acclaim and independent of the opinions of the crowd, as he is not a slave of external circumstances in general; see above, pp. 38 ff.

⁸⁰ Above, pp. 471 ff.

continuing to write poetry of low quality: they represent the precise opposite of Horace's attitude in *Epist.* 1.13.⁸¹

At this point, the various strands of argument of the preceding text fall into place: Horace recommends that Augustus, widely known as a great admirer of Roman comedy,⁸² lend a favorable ear to poetry aimed at a reading public, and also reminds him of the library in the Palatine temple of Apollo. Now, the alleged reason for Horace's eagerness, yet hesitation to address the emperor becomes apparent: Horace recommends to the emperor his poetry or, better, poetry that lives up to the standards he demands of himself and others who are able to rise to the task of present-day poetry in Rome, as outlined implicitly in (II). Of course, Horace would not, in the situation into which he projects himself, directly heap praises upon himself and his poetry—and, indeed, nobody with the slightest feeling for propriety and tact would do so. For a long time the poet avoids getting to his request by talking about related matters, and along the way he enhances the importance of the subject for which he dares to take the time of the important man of state. And when he does get to his request, he phrases it in a rather oblique way. If one puts oneself into the epistolary situation, with its particular psychology, this looseness of thought and contorted way of getting from A to B perfectly suit the situation of a man cautious not to annoy his important vis-à-vis with an unworthy request.

Horace starts with a general invective against a prevailing trend of public literary taste⁸³ and then goes a long way back to develop his concept of the merits and tasks of good poetry in the specific circumstances in which poetry established itself in Roman society. He develops this concept in regard to his addressee and his own poetic persona. Augustus is above all the first man of state. What matters to him is the service poetry can render to the community. However, Augustus is a man of letters, too, a discerning patron of the arts, with a distinct personal taste. As in *Epist.* 2.2,⁸⁴ we find in this letter the blending of moral and literary qualities as two sides of what is essentially the same coin, and these two aspects are fittingly related to the persona of the addressee being both a statesman who cares about the moral advancement of the Roman citizens and a discerning patron of arts who wants to promote poets of literary merit.

⁸¹ Above, p. 485 with n. 66.

⁸² *Delectabatur etiam comoedia veteri et saepe eam exhibuit spectaculis publicis*, (he also enjoyed old comedy and often arranged public performances), Suet. *Aug.* 89.1.

⁸³ Cf. Rudd 1989: 4 f.

⁸⁴ Above, pp. 471 ff.

The prominence drama holds in Horace's poem pays respect to Augustus's personal predilection; Horace is not a dramatic poet. Thus, speaking about dramatic poetry, Augustus's beloved comedy, in particular, allows him to claim some attention for his non-dramatic poetry as well. If Horace, in his rather uncomplimentary references to the state of dramatic poetry in Rome, to some extent challenges Augustus's personal infatuation with Roman drama, he is quite frank, and this frankness reveals the intimacy between him and the emperor. The poet's cutting remarks on the lack of quality of Roman drama are the counterpart to Augustus's teasing letters, cited by Suetonius.⁸⁵ That is how far Horace could go in his poetry with his patron without overstepping the limits of tact and propriety. Overtly, he criticizes public opinion, never implying directly that Augustus shares such crude views, and, before turning to the emperor directly, he explicitly states his own admiration for dramatic poetry, if it meets his standards. Thus, Horace takes a position that he can assume the emperor, as a man with a sense for excellent poetry, will share. In what follows, he explicitly pays homage to Augustus's good sense and sound literary judgment and, at the same time, implicitly exalts the value of his own poetry.

Already (III) Bb tacitly implied Augustus's competence as a critic. In what follows, Horace explicitly pays respect to the emperor's discerning judgment: one should not do like the great Alexander, who for all his good taste in the figurative arts, employed a notoriously bad poet, Choerilus, to praise his deeds in epic verse ((III) Bc: ll. 229–244), and, of course, Augustus does not. Quite the opposite, he knows to choose his poets well: Virgil and Varius attest to that (cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 89.3). Unfortunately, Horace cannot stand up to their talent, but as they already did their job so well, it is quite easy for him to retire. Of course, if he could live up to the task he would not compose *sermones* but praise the ruler's achievements in war ((III) Bd: ll. 245–270). We are back at the topic of the *recusatio* of C. 1.6,⁸⁶ only Horace is now in the enviable position of not needing to point to a fellow poet who may in the future praise the emperor's deeds in epic verse: since Virgil wrote the *Aeneid* he can point to somebody who already has. But there is something Horace can do. The section in which he states that he cannot praise Augustus's glorious deeds in epic verse (ll. 251–256), he arrives—in hexametrical poetry—at a stylistic level considerably above that of the *Epistles*: it highlights the *praeteritio*, the place the *recusatio* reserves for panegyrics en passant.

⁸⁵ Above, p. 44.

⁸⁶ Above, pp. 256 ff.

Epist. 2.1 is, in its way, a real letter: it is Horace's response to an explicit, if gently teasing request by Augustus to write a poem in his honor; yet, the emperor did not ask for the poem one would expect him to ask for: an epos, a Pindaric ode. Augustus had poems of this kind already. Now, the emperor, ironically, asks to be part of Horace's most private and humble poetry. This is the sort of 'paradoxical' request Maecenas is alleged, in *Epist.* 1.1, to have made of Horace: to compose light lyric poetry on love and wine, poetry, described as *ludus*. Maecenas's request is turned down; the emperor's cannot be. We read Horace's answer in *Epist.* 2.1: it is a masterpiece of tact and rhetorical psychology.

Horace presents himself as someone eager to address the emperor in a *sermo*, in this case in a verse epistle, asking his encouragement and support for his very particular kind of poetry, not necessarily the kind of poetry the emperor—with his well-known predilection for comedy—is known to like or would be presumed to like, i.e., epic or panegyric poetry. In lecturing him on the task and condition of contemporary Roman poetry, as seen in a historical and comparative perspective, Horace takes Augustus seriously as a literary connoisseur and critic. He assumes that Augustus is discerning enough to share the poet's views on good and bad poetry, even when it runs counter to his long-established views and habits. But how could the emperor not agree with the basic principles of sound literary judgment laid down by his poet laureate and descend instead to the primitive notions of the crowd? There is a good dose of gentle irony in Horace's attack on bad habits of the Roman stage and the bad taste of Roman audiences, when addressed to the theater lover Augustus. It is, however, the irony of the poet who is on intimate terms with the ruler, of the poet who knows that his high-ranking friend will appreciate exactly that. In fact, he can be sure of that, because Augustus has asked him for precisely that, a *sermo* addressed to him, not a panegyric poem, but a verse epistle that focuses on human, and thus on the recipient's, shortcomings rather than on his merits. What else could Augustus have expected of a *sermo* by a poet like Horace, the Horace he knew so well. There could be no stronger indication of Augustus's respect for Horace's artistic integrity and the very particular quality of his poetry than such a request, and Horace could do Augustus no greater honor than to write a poem like *Epist.* 2.1, a poem in which Horace shows that he takes the ruler seriously as a literary critic, just as Augustus, by his special request, showed that he took Horace seriously as an artist.

With *Epist.* 2.1, Horace wrote a poem in which he explained his vision of the artistic and social task of Roman poetry in his time, while adhering strictly to the epistolary situation. In an immensely dense text he alludes

constantly to the concepts, explained in the *Ars Poetica*, but adapts them to the specific purpose of the letter.⁸⁷ Even more than the *Ars*, which is, of course, not a versified systematic treatise either, the *Letter to Augustus* both instructs and entertains, if we are sensitive to amicable irony, the extraordinary intimacy between these two men of such different standing. The reader must feel the attitudes of the poet and the emperor toward each other behind Horace's words, and this appears to be extremely difficult. We are lucky to possess Augustus's letter, and thus to know that the emperor made such a request, which Horace does not mention in his poem, and we are lucky that we know what kind of request it was. But even knowing about this letter many, starting with Suetonius, who reports it, seriously misunderstood Augustus and Horace. To describe what Augustus wrote in the letter, quoted by Suetonius, as *expressit*, 'he pressed,' is almost as absurd as to think that Horace was 'forced' by Augustus to compose a further book of *Carmina* that included C. 4.10 or 11, only because it included C. 4.4 and 14 as well. Suetonius mindlessly reads into the emperor's words the situation of his own day, and so did all those who believed him, including one of Horace's most perceptive admirers, Christoph Martin Wieland,⁸⁸ who imagined Horace in the situation of Mandelstam, forced to write an ode on Stalin in order to avoid the Gulag. And in fact, the comparison is much less forced than would appear at first sight. Stalin was, in his way, a man of letters⁸⁹—I am afraid much more than most European politicians today. He was keen on being taken seriously as 'one of them' by artists and intellectuals; however, he had not the slightest sense of modern poetry, nor respect for the autonomy of the arts. He had to force writers into taking him seriously, and Mandelstam went to the Gulag despite the poem he wrote.

There is a lesson to be learned here for the concrete background of the Augustan *recusatio*.⁹⁰ Where we can be certain that a specific request was made, as in the case of *Epist.* 2.2, the poem does not mention this request. No Augustan poet would have been as tactless as to put a man like Augustus into a situation in a poem where he has to descend to ask a favor of a poet. I doubt that Maecenas or Augustus would have cared to waste time and money on poets who understood the elementary rules of conduct between men of entirely different social standing and the business of a poet laureate as badly

⁸⁷ For a comparison of *Epist.* 2.2 with the *Ars Poetica*, see Becker 1963: 200 ff., 232 ff.; his analysis remains valid even if one does not share his chronological conclusions.

⁸⁸ See Günther 2010a: 3 n. 8.

⁸⁹ See Günther 2010a: 164 f., with references.

⁹⁰ Cf. above, pp. 256 ff.

as that. To assume that the ordinary *recusatio* poems, like C. 1.6 or Propertius 2.1, responded to a specific request to compose epic poetry on the ruler and that the poets turned it down would degrade the poets to children who thought they could play games with their mighty patrons by treating them in public like puppets. Maecenas and Augustus would have been incredibly stupid to agree to play this game (mutatis mutandis the same is true for *Epist.* 1.7⁹¹) and expose themselves to ridicule. The precise opposite is true: with their *recusatio* poems the Augustan poets responded to the generally felt obligation that, as a matter of course, they should write panegyric poetry on Augustus and his surroundings in exchange for the favors bestowed on them. The *recusatio* poems are exactly the type of panegyric poetry Maecenas and Augustus appreciated and expected. They obviously reveled at being portrayed as refined men of letters and generous patrons, who attracted poets of real talent, keen on praising their deeds in whatever way they could, without compromising their art.

The poet plays on the trick of recurring to the common, 'vulgar' expectation that panegyrics consisted in epic poetry only to be rejected as incompatible with high poetic standards. The object of the poets' praise is supposed to relish this tacitly or explicitly because he is a connoisseur with enough taste to appreciate quality, not something that could only be inferior to his own real worth.

But there is something else: The *Ars Poetica*—very much present in the *Letter to Augustus*, whatever the chronology is—can surely be labeled a classicistic manifesto. However, as Rudd⁹² says, it is not a theoretical defense of Horace's own tastes and achievement, but a very personal one; it is also, in its very form a manifesto of Horace's personal poetry. On closer examination, both *Epist.* 2.1 and *Epist.* 2.2 prove to be carefully organized and coherent, yet, both works are far from what one would normally expect from a classicistic poem; the same is true not only of Horace's earlier hexametric poetry, but of much in the *Odes* as well. We should remember that what we, in retrospect, may call classicism, for Horace and his contemporaries was something entirely new; the *Letter to Augustus* is a defense of modern poetry. As I have said above, Hellenistic poetry for the first time in the ancient world developed an aesthetic concept that was based on an acute awareness of the distance of the present from the past. The 'classicistic' aesthetics of the Augustans defined itself, as far as it was classicistic in our sense of the

⁹¹ See pp. 40f.

⁹² Rudd 1989: 36.

word, in contrast to the entirely non-classicistic aesthetics of Alexandrian poetry. As such, the classicism of Augustan poetry is something entirely unique. As Rudd,⁹³ at the end of his discussion of Horace's *Ars*, duly notes, to appreciate the qualities of Horace's poem on poetry it is imperative to question his premises, and Rudd's list of challenging questions is very much to the point. Of course, nobody will claim that Horace would—or could—have anticipated any concept of the relationship between art and nature as, e.g., that of the painters of Byzantium or Kandinsky and Mondrian.⁹⁴ And, of course, it is good to recall that medieval stonemasonry, and much of Browning's, Wordsworth's, Coleridge's, let alone Joyce's artistic intentions are incompatible with Horace's concept of good poetry or art. However, if one looks at Horace's poems with an eye both to Horace's precepts in the *Ars* and to these or other modern works of art, which appear to be in open contrast to them, one realizes that Horace is not lacking in poetic means, which go a long way to expressing what other poets expressed by overtly breaking the rules the *Ars Poetica* lays down. It appears that these 'rules,' as Horace understood them, can be applied much more flexibly and ingeniously than will appear to a modern classicistic taste. A close look at Horace's poetry will encourage us to take Horace's acceptance of the objection *pictoribus atque poetis/ quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas*, "painters and poets alike/have always enjoyed the right to take what risks they please," very seriously.

Of course, to question the premises of Horace's aesthetics one need not think of modern poetry: Horace's negative judgments on archaic Latin poetry, qualified as they are, can be, and indeed have been, severely criticized by Kevin Newman in his recent book.⁹⁵ Such criticism can be rewarding if we bear in mind that a great poet with his own artistic program can never be an entirely impartial judge of the past. His relationship with the past will always show traces at least of creative distortion, either benign or malign.⁹⁶ Even Goethe, with his perhaps unparalleled sensitivity for the 'other,' which embraced an incredibly subtle appreciation of non-European cultures (his fine sense for Persian or Chinese poetry, poetry he knew only in

⁹³ Loc. cit.

⁹⁴ A better example than Matisse and Picasso, adduced by Rudd.

⁹⁵ Newman 2011: 104 ff.

⁹⁶ Sometimes an artist can only develop his personal style in opposition to another: Prokofiev could probably create his entirely unique musical style only by hating Scriabin; Ravel despised Beethoven and loved Chabrier.

miserable translations⁹⁷), did not do justice either to Horace or to Corneille or Racine. Not even Goethe could have done so without betraying his own artistic personality: the ideal that was the essence of Goethe's particular concept of the 'classic': 'der schöne Mensch' of Greek antiquity, as he conceived it. Literary criticism by great poets and writers is often (though not always) highly perceptive—and Horace's is. But the literary critic who is not a great poet or writer himself can only make good use of it if he bears in mind that an artist's relationship with the past is different from that of the mere critical observer.

4. POETRY ON POETRY

Augustan poetry entails a particularly strong self-awareness of the poet and implicit and explicit reflection of the poet upon his art. This is so because Augustan poetry inherited a tradition of a highly self-conscious poetry from its Alexandrian model. In addition, the mere fact that poetry was not a genuinely Roman tradition, but was felt as a cultural import from abroad, endows Roman poetry from its very start with a particularly acute awareness of the own self vs. the other. As soon as one realizes this trivial, yet highly significant aspect of the derivative character of Roman literature,⁹⁸ this derivative character appears not as a defect: but as a specific virtue of Roman poetry. In Augustan poetry Roman culture reaches a peak precisely because the historical circumstances prompted this particular virtue of Roman culture, the supreme self-awareness of the artist, to reach an unprecedented peak. These circumstances placed the poet where the autonomy of art, a concept prepared by the particularly sharp focus on art as such that could arise in circumstances as favorable as those at the court of the Ptolemaean rulers,⁹⁹ came in conflict with the poet's living environment. At a time of violent transformation of the Roman political order and society artistic autonomy became a concept to be defended against eternal odds as the *raison d'être*, the very essence of the poet's existence. Later, as a new order established itself that put poets at the service of a political regime, artistic autonomy became the touchstone of the poet's struggle to find a role in the new social and political circumstances that the dramatic upheavals at the end of the Roman republic brought about.

⁹⁷ Goethe's "Dämmerung senkte sich von oben" was regarded as a translation of a lost poem of Li Bai by a modern Chinese literary critic.

⁹⁸ See Günther 2010a: 181 n. 22, with reference to Puelma Piwonka 1980: 139.

⁹⁹ Cf. Kerkhecker 1997.

Horace's late poetry, *Epistles* II and the *Ars Poetica*, are the supreme expression of a poet's reflection on his craft and on his position in society at a highly dramatic point of political and literary history, at the sunset of a dying era and the dawn of a new one. With *Epistles* I, Horace had created a new literary genre; with the second book and the *Ars* he once again introduced a novelty to European literature: poetry on poetry, literary criticism in the form of poetry.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ A forerunner of the poetological discourse of *Epistles* II and the *Ars Poetica* is *Serm.* 1.4; see Becker 1963: 238; cf. also Heinze 1960a: 296 and Puelma Piwonka 1949: 92 on Lucilius.

THE *ARS POETICA**

Tobias Reinhardt

Abstract: This chapter aims to introduce the *Ars Poetica* as a work in its own right, as well as to situate it within Horace's oeuvre as a whole and within the tradition of ancient literary criticism. The following questions are addressed: What makes the poem a uniquely original literary creation? How did Horace, in composing the *Ars Poetica*, appropriate the source material that he used? To what extent do his instructions and critical observations replicate and modify critical approaches that were already available? And to which literary genres does he owe his techniques of reader engagement and reader guidance?

Keywords: literary criticism, rhetoric, literary history

On the face of it, the *Ars Poetica* (*AP*) is a poem of 476 hexameters in which a narrator provides instruction on the principles of poetic composition, primarily regarding drama, especially tragedy, and epic, although other genres are at least acknowledged.¹ He indicates that he wrote poetry himself, and perhaps more specifically lyric poetry, in the past, and thus speaks not just with authority but from experience; he also indicates that he might write more poetry in the future. The implied first readership are the *Pisones*, a father and two sons of a Roman aristocratic family.² Reasons why one might wish to call the narrator-teacher 'Horace' include the way in which the activity of writing poetry is referred to,³ the degree to which the speaker's statements on his own work fit with what we know of Horace's biography and the chronology of his works (although there is a danger of circularity), the poetic

* I am very grateful to the participants of my graduate seminar on the *Ars Poetica* in Hilary Term 2010 at Oxford, notably Rob Colborn, Glenn Lacki, Fiachra Mac Góráin, Ben Lay, Sarah Harden, Barnaby Taylor, and Emma Park. It was a pleasure to discuss some of the problems raised by the text with them.

¹ Apart from the commentaries by Brink 1971 and Rudd 1989, useful introductions on *AP* include Immisch 1932, Williams 1964, Steidle 1967, Innes 1989, Fuhrmann 1992, Russell 2006, Laird 2007.

² On the likely identification of the father—L. Calpurnius Piso Pontifex—see Rudd 1989: 19–21.

³ Below, p. 520 n. 29.

and stylistic preferences which the narrator reveals, and the way in which the Pisones are engaged.⁴ The poem is dated by some between the first book of the *Epistles* (published in 20 BC) and the *Carmen Saeculare* (17 BC), by others later than 13 BC; not infrequently it is regarded as Horace's last work. The title '*Ars Poetica*' is first used by Quintilian at the end of the first century AD (*Inst. Or.* 8.3.60); the fourth-century grammarian Charisius cites it by the phrase *Horatius in Epistularum* (p. 263.9, 265.1 Barwick). A main structural division is widely held to be in line 295. Before that point, the poetic work and its production can be discerned as the main theme; after that, the figure of the poet is. The internal structure of the two parts thus distinguished is a matter of contention. Described in those terms, *AP* appears to be a straightforward enough work, but in a number of ways it is puzzling.

Many of the instructions it offers appear to derive from a Greek 5th century BC context; some even apply to that context only. Thus they seem of antiquarian interest at best to a Roman audience of the 1st century BC, which has been conditioned by the neoteric poets and Augustan poetry *inter alia*. It is not just that the major genres of the time are different from those to which the instructions in Horace's source material relate, but also that tastes and expectations are different in the first century with respect to the genres that are discussed. This puzzle is reinforced by the following consideration. One of the perceived dissatisfactions of much of ancient literary theory, with Aristotle as the exception that confirms the rule, is that the actual poetic practice in all its depth, nuance, and color seems to be underdetermined by the ultimately rather anodyne rules and precepts that contemporary literary criticism had to offer. It is a corollary of this fact that what we might call immanent theorizing, which includes poetological reflection, often seems more insightful and thus appropriate to the subject if less systematic. (Readers have also found that immanent theorizing is more readily translatable into modern critical concepts.) Horace's poetry is full of instances of such immanent theorizing. Why, then, write a didactic poem on literary theory that is both obsolete and *qua* theory less sophisticated than the reflections embedded in, say, his lyric poetry?

We should begin by bringing literary criticism as it features in Horace's other works into view. A concern with *ars poetica* with a small 'a' is there almost from the beginning. In the *Satires*, especially 1.4 and 1.10, Horace offers his history for the genre, relating his conception of satire to the

⁴ Below, pp. 509 and 522.

founder Lucilius and to comedy as a more distant influence and point of comparison, and justifies its existence. In doing so, he contributes to the Roman tradition of immanent literary history.⁵

The *Odes* can be viewed as the source of the speaker's confidence in the second book of *Epistles* and *AP*. They are also a place where the generic status of lyric, as reconfigured by Horace, also with a view to other genres, becomes a subject of the poetry itself.⁶ In the *Odes* the poet's role in society is articulated, an aspect that is again not very prominent in *AP*, but that does become a topic in the letter to Augustus (*Epist.* 2.1.126 ff.; see below). The notion of the *uates* is formed (see esp. the end of *C.* 4.6), who speaks on behalf of the community, advises it, and guides it. Again, this is something to look out for in *AP*, in that the conception of poetic craft that is embedded in Horace's source material, i.e., that of technical expertise, would not integrate well with the *uates* motif. That being so, it is not surprising that concerning the conception of the poet the *Odes* complement *AP* and indeed deviate from it in two other respects: the poet of the *Odes* has a particular connection with Dionysos/Bacchus, an association that was not without problems in its historical context, and credits Bacchus with poetic inspiration and with facilitating his empathic connection with nature and the countryside (*C.* 2.19.1 ff. "I have seen Bacchus teaching songs on a distant crag (believe me, my future readers!), and the Nymphs learning them and goat-footed Satyrs with their pointed ears pricked," and 3.25.1 ff.). It is passages like these that one will want to compare with the caricatures of poetic genius and the madness of poets in *AP* (*C.* 2.19, just quoted, continues in line 5: "My mind is in confused ecstasy, still trembling with the fear that just now came over me; my soul is possessed with Bacchus. Have mercy on me, oh god of freedom!"). Another piece of archaic poetology that is used in the *Odes* is the idea that the poet enjoys protection provided by divine powers (*C.* 1.17 *uelox amoenum*: Faunus comes from Arcadia to Horace's Sabine farm and protects his herds and, by extension, him). This goes hand in hand with the creation of a mythical Italian landscape. And even where no landscape is created, it often features as a theme (e.g., *C.* 3.4). This is arguably another area of discontinuity with *AP*.

With Book 1 of the *Epistles*, Horace invented a new genre, the verse epistle. Each one is stylized so as to be relevant to the addressee in question. The entire book engages closely with Lucretius and develops its speaker's

⁵ See Schmidt 2001.

⁶ See Davies 1991, Harrison 2007c.

persona with reference to him.⁷ This sense of dialogue with a didactic text thus gives an idea of how Horace might have taught other subjects. One of the frustrations scholars have experienced when working on *AP* is that for them it does not seem to live up to the label ‘*ars*,’ formally and structurally. The didacticism of the poems of *Epist.* 1, their techniques of reader engagement, provide a better reference point. *Epist.* 1.19 is concerned with the notions of *imitatio* and originality. As I will explain later, much of the ‘source material’ of *AP* is ultimately of Peripatetic origin, and in Aristotle’s *Poetics* the notion of *mimesis* is of course a central one, although its meaning is different from *imitatio* as it is usually understood. *Epist.* 1.19 supplements what *AP* has to say on the matter. A truism about the *Satires* is that they are, on the whole, urban in tone and setting, while *Epistles* I tends to look beyond the city, to the countryside, a more suitable setting for philosophical contemplation. We can ask whether *AP* aligns with this trajectory.

The two literary epistles, to Augustus (2.1) and to Florus (2.2), complement *AP* irrespective of whether we regard the latter as an epistle, too, and it is useful to ask what these three rather different works bring to the table and how they fit together. The earlier one, to Florus, is more personal in tone than the letter to Augustus and is cast as a farewell to poetry (*Epist.* 2.2.55 ff.), or at least lyric poetry (when the speaker says in *AP* that he does not write poetry and instead acts as a critic of the work of others, it is tempting to read this as continuous with the letter to Florus). But there are also glimpses of the sociology of being a poet in Rome, of the rewards of pursuing philosophical wisdom, and of some principles of poetic composition—the latter tie up with passages in *AP* and can plausibly be connected with Horace’s technique. Florus, who is also the recipient of *Epist.* 1.3, is an aristocrat on campaign with Tiberius Claudius Nero in Armenia. Lines 20–25 of *Epist.* 2.2 suggest that Florus had requested some lyric poems from Horace and receives an epistle in hexametrical verse instead. Formally, the letter represents a series of excuses why Horace cannot oblige Florus. As he develops these excuses, various aspects of Horace’s own existence (as constructed in the letters) and of Roman life come into view: thus, if you bought a slave from someone who tells you that the slave had once been found slacking, would you have grounds for complaint if you have been warned? From l. 26 we hear about a soldier who had his savings taken from him, was furious, then led a successful charge against an enemy position, and received a reward. When asked to do the same thing again, he said he would not, as he had

⁷ See Ferri 1993.

money now. So Horace implies he no longer needs the money as badly as he did after the battle of Philippi when he found himself on the losing side. Otherwise, he argues (l. 55–57) that he is getting old and (from l. 87) that like other professions poets in Rome engage in endless mutual congratulation. This is then exemplified by two writers, one of elegies and one of lyric poetry. The letter is remarkable for easy gliding transitions between flippant passages like this one and others that are on the face of it devoid of irony and apparently intent on communicating information that, for us, squares with Horace's own poetic approach (109 f. on being like a censor of oneself, 111–125 on choice and connection of words).

According to Suetonius's *Life of Horace*, Augustus sent the following complaint to the poet (*De Poetis*, frg. 40 Reifferscheid): "You should know I am angry with you for not talking to me rather than to others in your numerous writings of that kind; are you afraid that if you are seen to be a friend of mine it will tarnish your reputation with posterity?" (*irasci me tibi scito, quod non in plerisque eius modi scriptis mecum potissimum loquaris; an ueris ne apud posteros infame tibi sit quod uidearis familiaris nobis esse?*). *Epist.* 2.1 is Horace's response. It explores and compares modes of evaluating and categorizing poetry, rejecting some conventional ones like canonization and instead offering others that are, from a modern point of view, more enlightened. The latter include the positing of a link between political regulation and restriction and the course that the development of poetry takes (*Epist.* 2.1.145–155). We may compare here Tacitus's rather unconventional, as works of criticism go, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, which was written at the end of the first century AD and also posits a link between political freedom and cultural achievement (in this case oratory, see esp. *Dial.* 36.1), even though the conclusion drawn is rather different—and we may contrast *AP*. Horace's question of how useful a critical approach a comparison of Greek and Roman writers is ("Ennius is like Homer") gives rise to another topic: what the poet can contribute to the *res publica*. This has long been recognized, but different models have been proposed for how exactly the connection is made.

Fraenkel (1957: 392) on *Epist.* 2.1 writes:

Greek poetry, Horace has asserted, with all its perfection, was the product and outcome of an unmanly, morally inferior kind of life. Early Roman life, on the other hand, sound, virile, and full of a sense of responsibility, was averse to poetry. Yet it is possible to have the best of both of these worlds and to combine the moral and political virtues of a Roman with the best gifts of the Greek muse. A poet, a Roman poet, can become his fellow citizens' guide and teacher, can instruct, comfort, and elevate their minds without pampering and enfeebling them. That is his noblest task; that is what had been recently achieved by men whom Augustus encouraged and honoured with

his confidence. Poetry conceived in this way, so far from being a plaything for idle hours, is eminently *politikon, utile urbi*. Therefore contemporary poetry is entitled to the attention of the first citizen of Rome, to whom *res Italas moribus ornare* is one of the foremost duties. He may even be expected to give some thought to the difficulties with which the poetry of the new era has still to struggle.

This would suggest straightforward, uncomplicated assistance. Roman discipline tampers Greek exuberance and receives some imagination in return. If the message is right, poetry has a contribution to make.

By contrast, Feeney⁸ characterizes the letter in the following terms, almost as if he was elaborating on the last sentence of the quotation from Fraenkel:

Horace's Epistle to the *Princeps* simultaneously analyses and enacts the interplay between the new poetry and the new Principate, and my purpose in this chapter is to chart the strong 'gravitational pull' exerted by the pair's bonding ... Horace needs to construct for himself some kind of critically informed sense of the social conditions for poetry at Rome—a quite novel political and poetical power and pre-eminence, implicated in and defining each other, and joined together in the immortality of posterity as they both knew they would be.

Both the letter to Florus and the one to Augustus present poetry as growing and evolving in a complex interplay of forces, which include artistic skill, the tastes of the audience as they evolve, the role and status of poets in society, and an increasingly centralized Roman culture. We will want to bear this background in mind when we look more closely at passages from *AP*.

A very significant amount of earlier work has been devoted to the sources of *AP*.⁹ However, the authors of recent surveys or introductory commentaries are in agreement that the results are less than satisfactory. In particular, the third-century BC theoretician Neoptolemus of Parium is deemed to have played an unhelpful role in the debate.¹⁰ Porphyrio, a commentator on Horace, including the *AP*, of the third century AD, tells us that Horace incorporates the main precepts of Neoptolemus,¹¹ and a fragmentary text of the first-century BC Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara has supplied us with additional, rather sparse information on particular tenets of Neoptolemus (*De poematis* col. 10.32–13.21 Jensen), which are briefly mentioned only to

⁸ In Woodman and Feeney 2002: 172 f.

⁹ See esp. Brink 1963.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Rudd 1989: 23–25.

¹¹ *Comm. in Horatium Flaccum*, on *AP* l. 1, p. 162, Holder; on the nature of the commentary, see Zetzel 2009.

be polemically dismissed by Philodemus. Some of these tenets can be connected with sections of *AP* with varying plausibility, but on the whole one encounters a problem: the more specific fragments seem to add little to what can be derived from a given *AP* passage without recourse to Neoptolemus, while the pieces of information on Neoptolemus's general stance cannot be mapped onto *AP* in a way that commands assent of more than a minority of scholars.¹² Nonetheless, a doxography of scholarly opinion could be drawn up: statements to the effect that 'there is no original thought in *AP*' vs. 'this is Horace's most imaginative, adventurous work.' When scholars say the former, they mean the content; when they say the latter, they mean the execution. Where this is acknowledged, it is sometimes accompanied by a knowing verbal gesture about how easy it would be to deconstruct the opposition between form and content, or by an obfuscating image of the Horatian poetic genius welding together one and the other, yet it is hard to get away from this distinction in the case of *AP*. Trivially, any attempt to describe and understand the content needs to start from a view, as articulate as possible, of how it looked before Horace got to work on it. This holds true even for readings that posit that in *AP* Horace caricatures theory or merely toys with it.

Much of what Horace teaches ultimately goes back to Aristotle's *Poetics*, although Horace is unlikely to have known that text and will have used material that is at many removes from Aristotle (there was an extensive handbook culture in the Hellenistic period). However, the comparison with the *Poetics* is still worthwhile because it brings us up against fundamental differences in outlook and compositional technique between the two works. Often, what then seems distinctive of *AP* can plausibly be aligned with or even explained in terms of known concerns of the Hellenistic era. These can on occasion be connected with Neoptolemus of Parium, but more likely they will have to be reconstructed from what we know about the period in general. (Rhetorical handbooks are rarely uniquely original creations of their respective authors, but rather represent small variations of a fairly stable tradition.) Eventually, by an admittedly crude technique of subtraction, one can sometimes pin down with surprising precision what is Horatian in a given passage. There will be ample opportunity, when I move to the discussion of passages below, to draw attention to similarities between the *Poetics* and *AP*. Here, I would like to record some important differences, so as to indicate the direction of the development of literary criticism from the time of Plato and Aristotle.

¹² An interesting attempt to make sense of the fragmentary evidence we have on Neoptolemus, without reference to *AP*, is Asmis 1992.

A feature of Aristotle's engagement with literature is that, in developing a certain conception of literature and literary production, it is essentially directed at an alternative. This directedness is a more pervasive feature of ancient literary criticism generally and manifests itself, for example, in Tacitus's *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, too, in which the interlocutors set out their views on old and new oratory and styles of speaking dialectically. Callimachus and Callimachean aesthetics is of course another case, and it yields the additional point that the alternative position may either exist in reality and be represented by historical individuals or may be one that the writer constructs as a foil. One of the features of *AP* that arguably lends it a 'classical' feel is that, while showing some awareness of the history of the material it communicates, including the existence of alternative views, it codifies and sets out rather than argues for certain positions in contradistinction to alternatives. (Below I will also discuss a passage that represents the exception to this rule.)

The *Poetics* denies that one needs poetic genius or some other rare gift to write a tragedy, as conventional theorization of poetry, with its notion of divine inspiration and poetic madness, would have it. Rather, one needs to be smart, though not, it appears, improbably so, and one needs to know how it is done, which the book itself explains. The knowledge that is presupposed in the *Poetics* is rather different from the expertise *AP* aims to teach. The former is more discursive, more readily verifiable due to the very articulate theoretical framework presupposed by the *Poetics*. The expertise *AP* envisages more readily lends itself to a sociological interpretation through the way in which it relies on the notion of appropriateness (on which more below).

The *Poetics* also denies implicitly that tragedy and epic poetry interfere with one's soul individually or with the souls of the collective, the people of the polis, as Plato thought (these concerns guide his instructions on the education of the guardians in the central books of the *Republic*); it prompts an emotional response, to be sure, and possibly has a cathartic effect of some sort on the individual, but there is no suggestion that it affects its audience in a fundamentally negative way or in one that modifies the fabric of one's being permanently. *AP* seems to show no overt concern for this significant question—the passage that arguably comes closest to addressing this matter is the famous section on *delectare* and *prodesse*. I discuss it below.

Mimesis or *imitatio* is a notion that acts as a reference point for much of ancient literary criticism, but it is a term that can mean a number of different things. The transformation that it undergoes from the works of Plato to Aristotle's *Poetics* is comparatively straightforward. The *Poetics* implic-

itly denies the metaphysical objections against poetry as *mimesis* that Plato formulates in *Rep.* 10. Since the *Poetics* looks at tragedy from the viewpoint either of the audience or of the poet, i.e., not from that of the performer, the concerns expressed in the central books of Plato's *Republic*—that readers might become like undesirable characters in texts that they read aloud—do not come into view. For Aristotle, *mimesis* ('representation') is a core feature of (the types of) poetry (that matter to him), but not a metaphysical one. That human beings enjoy and produce representations (*mimeseis*) of objects and events in the 'real world' is an anthropological fact, and representational poetry is ultimately fuelled by this human inclination. Representational poetry represents not reality, but a world that is in important respects like reality (there is no reality of which Sophocles's *Oedipus Rex* is a representation).¹³ In this case it is less straightforward to say how the theoretical background matters to *AP*. That is so because all the senses just discussed continued to exist in the Hellenistic period, and indeed were supplemented by others, notably by *imitatio* in the sense of imitating notable models in one's chosen genre.¹⁴ Debate about the nature of *imitatio* in the Aristotelian sense continued in Rome in the first century BC, e.g., over the question whether accurate representation was wanted or whether representation had to sublimate what it represents in some form.¹⁵ It thus seems likely that *AP* would have resonated with its original audience on this particular issue in ways that are different from the response of modern readers, whose grasp of the debates in question is necessarily fragmentary. Needless to say, *imitatio* and its underlying rules may be a concern of the text even in cases where a lexical marker is absent (the opening of the poem is a case in point, on which see p. 509). A passage where two conceptions of *imitatio* run together is 317–318, discussed on pp. 518–522.¹⁶

Another important difference is the role assigned to plot (μῦθος). The concept of plot forms the backbone of Aristotle's entire conception of tragedy. When Aristotle comes to list the six defining elements of tragedy, he assigns a primary role to plot, on the grounds that "plot amounts to the organizing principle of the actions (of characters) in the play (πραγμάτων σύστασις);

¹³ Cf. Barnes 1995: 272–276.

¹⁴ An important source is the partly surviving *De imitatione* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus; on this text, see Weaire 2002.

¹⁵ See the material collected and discussed in Chalkomatas 2007: 209–226.

¹⁶ See also Laird 2007: 140.

for a tragedy is representation not of people, but of actions and of life.” (An implicit contrast is set up here with a conception of tragedy that assigned a primary role to character.) His main argument for this view is that those aspects of a tragedy that make the strongest emotional impact on an audience—recognitions and reversals—can only be seen as features or functions of the plot (1450a, 33–35). *AP* has nothing like the rigorous substructure of the *Poetics*, and, as indicated earlier, has a conception of poetic expertise that is different from that of the *Poetics*, but more to the point, it arguably assigns a comparable systematic role to the notion of appropriateness. Appropriateness as a stylistic category is already used by Aristotle, and there is a debate as to whether or not Theophrastus assigned it greater prominence than his teacher, but it is certainly the case that it becomes a key term in Hellenistic literary criticism. By that time it is no longer purely stylistic, but turns into a tool used to determine a text’s place relative to reality as well as literary history; appropriateness is then construed with reference to generic conventions, real-life behavior of characters represented, the audience’s state of knowledge and receptiveness, to name a few parameters. This makes appropriateness precarious and fragile as a category, but it also creates scope for games turning on inclusion and exclusion, on granting and withholding group membership—one either understands what is appropriate or one does not, and ‘those who understand’ may be taken to constitute a group. Again there will be opportunities to illustrate this further below.

I will now discuss a number of passages, hoping to give an impression, incrementally, of what kind of poem *AP* is. It begins with a comparison (1–10):

*Humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam
iungere si uelit et uarias inducere plumas,
undique collatis membris ut turpiter atrum
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?
credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
persimilem cuius, uelut aegri somnia, uanae
fingentur species, ut nec pes nec caput uni
reddatur formae. ‘pictoribus atque poetis
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.’*

If a painter wanted to join the neck of a horse to a human head and added feathers in different colors, in such a way that the limbs thus randomly assembled make what is the upper body of a beautiful woman lead into a dark fishtail loathsomely, could you contain your laughter if you were invited to take part in a viewing, my friends? Believe me, members of the Piso family, most similar to such a painting is a book, which, like the dreams of a sick man,

presents empty apparitions, so that neither foot nor head is shaped into one form. "Painters and poets have always had the same license to do something daring."

Approaching a work entitled *Ars Poetica*, whether we take the title to be original or a label assigned by later readers, we might have certain expectations as to how such a work would begin. The way in which the opening of *AP* both frustrates and meets these expectations is telling. A technical handbook, like Aristotle's *Rhet.*, or a didactic poem, which in some respects resembles the format of a handbook, like Virgil's *Georgics*, might be expected to begin with an indication of the contents that are to be covered in what follows. That usually goes hand in hand with an initial characterization of the narrator, whose claims to competence come into view, e.g., through the self-evident air with which authority is assumed for the narrative that has just begun or through the immediate and striking imposition of a methodology on a subject matter that could conceivably be treated differently. By contrast, *AP* approaches poetry through a different medium—painting—and it does so in a way that implies a situational setting. The speaker invites his audience—the Pisones—to join him in the consideration of a misconceived painting, to share his disapproval of the painting, and to extend this disapproval to poetry that is relevantly similar in quality. Disapproval of the painting is then assumed¹⁷—the analogy with a poem showing similar flaws takes the form of an (albeit confident) assurance (*credite*). The latter hints at an inferior position of the speaker, the former reveals his poetic self-confidence, thus setting the scene for the particular way in which *AP* constructs its speaker and first audience. It is also, when looked at in this way, functionally comparable to the matter-of-fact introduction we might expect at the beginning of a handbook, in that the subject matter is introduced and the narrator's persona provisionally delineated.¹⁸

Russell (2006: 329) observes that the comparison implicitly makes another point: that both poetry and painting are forms of 'imitation', i.e.,

¹⁷ It is not completely obvious why the painting would be deemed offensive. In *Vitr.* 7.5, the author implies that depictions of buildings that do not look realistic due to features that are structurally not viable or simply fantastic would give offence, and the way in which Horace takes disapproval on the part of the audience for granted would be consistent with that. Alternatively, we have to read the passage against what Horace will say shortly, that an artist's ineptitude shows when he is unable to execute a conception properly and thus makes things up as he goes along.

¹⁸ When Brink (1971: 75) says that this beginning of *AP* is theory turned into an image, he ignores that one would not start a treatise by launching straight into theorizing.

representation. Yet of the genres of ancient poetry that modern readers would distinguish only a subset is representational. Notably, the genres to which Horace devoted himself are not naturally representational; so from the beginning there appear limits to the degree to which *AP* can be used to illuminate Horace's own work. Thus, early on we encounter the question of whether precepts that are strictly applicable to one genre might illuminate another one. In principle, it is not unusual for a Roman didactic poet to write about one thing while addressing another. Virgil's *Georgics* is overtly concerned with agriculture, but in turning agriculture into a symbol the poem is also concerned with the human condition (to put it very schematically). Williams (1968: 329–357) suggests that in a similar way *AP* is indirectly commenting on (in a first century context) 'relevant' genres, stylistic matters, and production conditions through the image of less relevant analogues as they feature in the sources used by Horace.

A little later we receive instruction on *ordo*, arrangement (l. 38–44):

*Sumite materiam uestris, qui scribitis, aequam
uiribus et uersate diu quid ferre recusent,
quid ualeant umeri. cui lecta potenter erit res,
nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo.
ordinis haec uirtus erit et uenus, aut ego fallor,
ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici,
pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat.*

You who want to write, seize a subject matter that is suited to your powers and consider for a long time what your shoulders refuse to bear and what they can carry. Who has chosen the subject matter wisely will have eloquence and arrangement full of light. An arrangement will be marked out as good and beautiful, if I am not mistaken, where the poet says only what is to be said at a given time, and postpones many things and leaves them out for the moment.

In the section immediately preceding the extract Horace seems to round off the topic with which he started at the beginning of *AP*, by giving the example of a bronze founder in his workshop who can create in bronze details of a human shape to perfection but is unable to produce a unified representation of the whole. From line 46 Horace then discusses diction. The passage given above serves as a link, and it brings a number of new issues into view. It seems to shift to a new topic (*materia*), and leaves the reader to determine what the connection with the previous topic of unity is and, before that, how the image of the bronze founder in his workshop is to be applied to poetry, for that connection was left undetermined. One could take the view that subject matter is a separate issue from unity, or one could assume that unsuitable subject matter is characterized by having too many parts,

or too complex parts to be handled by a particular individual. This kind of question seems to be naturally prompted by the ambiguity of Horace's formulation, and it can be seen as a theoretical one in that it conceptualizes *materia*. Crucially, this conceptualization has to be provided by the reader who engages with the text, as opposed to it being 'there' and being versified by Horace. In short, this is one attitude the text takes to literary theory: it dares the reader to devise it himself.

What facilitates this kind of reflection is that for someone with an expectation of how didactic poetry achieves changes of subject and structural shifts, the passage is ambiguous on another level, too. When we study Lucretius, the *Georgics*, or Manilius, we can draw up substantial lists of structural devices, small function words that mark the beginning or the end of a section, or individual steps within it.¹⁹ In *AP*, Horace famously forgoes such devices; instead he often allows two topics to stand side by side or, as here, deploys other, less clear-cut devices, on which my discussions will touch *passim*. What may instead be taken to introduce a sense break here is the narrator's turn toward an audience through a command and a characterization of the audience as writers (*qui scribitis*), but then this does not mark a sufficiently strong sense break as to prevent the reader from looking backward. Thus, along with the alternative structuring comes a reconditioning of the reader as to how to deal with this particular didactic text.

The 'audience as writers' (*qui scribitis*) poses another question: are we supposed to read it so as to be continuous with the address of the Pisones in line 6, where they feature as an initial audience and possibly critics of the painting with which the poem opens? In other words, are the Pisones now envisaged as (potential) poets or is Horace introducing a secondary audience, the wider public of potential poets? We will be told later that the older of the two sons aspires to be a poet. The question is reminiscent of similar ambiguities of the way in which the readership in Lucretius's *De rerum natura* is referred to.²⁰

Horace will later on in the poem ridicule the self-styled genius poet (l. 295–303); it is consistent with this rejection of one conception of poetry that the undertaking of writing a poem is here phrased in terms of physical labor (*quid ferre recusent, quid valeant umeri*). *AP* builds a picture of how writing poetry is to be conceived of from passages like this one.

¹⁹ A useful collection of such function words in Lucretius is provided by Minyard 1978.

²⁰ See Townend 1978.

If the subject matter is appropriately chosen, *facundia* and *ordo* will ensue (39–40). On the first point, Rudd (1989: 155) cites Cato's famous saying *rem tene, uerba sequuntur*, which may serve to bring out what is different in our passage: *facundia* is predicated on appropriately chosen subject matter, not on concentration on 'the issues' as opposed to the words the issues are dressed in. *Ordo*, 'arrangement,' is a major topic in rhetorical manuals,²¹ but here it is swiftly dealt with in a few lines. Instead of actual instructions we get not much more than an assurance that *ordo* is achieved when what is to be said is said at the right places. *AP* can switch between detailed and at times overly careful exposition of theory and the barest gesturing toward it, clearly assuming familiarity on the part of the audience, thus varying narrative speed at will.

The parenthesis *aut ego fallor*, as the commentators point out, does not convey diffidence on the part of the speaker, but amounts to an insistence that he is right. Still, it seems an oddly self-conscious and also slightly informal thing to say for a didactic narrator—it puts him closer to the speakers known from Horatian *sermones*.

We continue with lines 45–72 on diction:

*In uerbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis
dixeris egregie, notum si callida uerbum²²
reddiderit iunctura nouum. si forte necesse est
indiciis monstrare recentibus abdita rerum,
et fingere cinctutis non exaudita Cethegis
continget, dabiturque licentia sumpta pudenter;
et noua fictaque nuper habebunt uerba fidem, si
Graeco fonte cadent parce detorta. quid autem
Caecilio Plautoque dabit Romanus ademptum
Vergilio Varioque? ego cur, acquirere pauca
si possum, inuideor, cum lingua Catonis et Enni
sermonem patrium ditauerit et noua rerum
nomina protulerit? licuit semperque licebit
signatum praesente nota producere nomen.
Vt siluae foliis priuos mutantur in annos,
ut noua succrescunt nouus et decor enitet illis,²³
prima cadunt, ita uerborum uetus interit aetas,*

²¹ See Martin 1974: 213–243.

²² I invert the transmitted order of l. 45–46; see Brink 1971: 134–135 on the problem.

²³ A lacuna has been suspected after l. 60 ... *mutantur in annos*, and the following line is a supplement suggested by Lehrs; see Rudd 1989: 160–161 for a concise summary of the problem.

*et iuuenum ritu florent modo nata uigentque.
debemur morti nos nostraque; siue receptus
terra Neptunus classes Aquilonibus arcet,
regium opus, sterilisue palus prius aptaque remis
uicinas urbes alit et graue sentit aratrum,
seu cursum mutauit iniquum frugibus amnis,
doctus iter melius, mortalia facta peribunt,
nedum sermonum stet honos et gratia uiuax.
multa renascentur quae iam cecidere, cadentque
quae nunc sunt in honore uocabula, si uolet usus,
quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi.*

Regarding words, if you are delicate and considerate in arranging them, you will have spoken exquisitely if a clever combination makes a well-known word new. If it is really necessary to point out things that are hidden with new designations, then the writer will enjoy success in making up words not previously heard by Cethegi in their loincloths, and there will be scope for boldness exercised in moderation, and new and recently invented words will enjoy credibility, if they are sparingly derived from a Greek source. How can a Roman grant to Caecilius and Plautus what is withheld from Virgil and Varius? Why am I looked at askance if I can make a few acquisitions, when the language of Cato and Ennius enriched the mother tongue and brought forth new names for things? It has been and will always be allowed to the poet to produce a word that has been coined with the stamp of the day. As the forest changes its foliage in the quick course of the years, so that new leaves grow after and shine in new splendor, so an earlier generation of words dies and falls away, and like young people words flourish that have just been born and enjoy their strength. We and our affairs are subject to death: whether a sea surrounded by land shields entire fleets from the North wind, a construction worthy of a king, or a swamp, long infertile and accessible by rowing boat, provides nearby cities with water and feels the heavy plough, or a river has changed its course, which was inimical to crops, after it has been taught to use a better path. The works of mortals will perish, nor does the renown and charm of words endure for a long life. Many things will be reborn that have died already, and words that enjoy high standing now will fall, if current usage so wants it, which determines, decides over, and rules the way we speak.

It could be shown that for every major interpreter of *AP* of the recent past this passage is a key exhibit, in that it is argued to exemplify the overall conception a given scholar has of the text. While it is plausible that this passage can be more readily connected with Horace's own poetic practice in its context than others, as well as provide a display of poetic imagination, I think it can also be read as substantial contribution to the 'theory on the basis of pre-existing theory' that Horace devises in *AP*. As such, it oddly co-exists with passages in *AP* where it is difficult to take the speaker's

persona seriously.²⁴ Horace can slide in and out of this satirical mode just as he can move seamlessly from substantial theoretical exposition to taking handbook lore casually as read.

If we look back briefly, in lines 42–45 the *aptum* or *πρέπον* is invoked in connection with *ordo* (see above, p. 507, for the conceptual void left by the removal of a strong notion of ‘plot’ from the Aristotelian framework and for the role of the *aptum* in filling that void). Before that, the *aptum* featured in connection with the selection of subject matter—Horace had explained, suggestively, how he would proceed as a bronze founder if he had to (l. 35), inviting the audience to react by asking themselves the same question and finding themselves in agreement with him. The speaker thus gives the impression that he feels the need to persuade, which is a different stance from that of the omniscient instructor who expects the audience to be interested and to be willing to absorb his teachings without question. By broadening the discussion in the direction of *ordo* (41–44), Horace makes it clear that the demands of the *aptum*, met through wise selection (40), govern not just content, but also form. In the absence of genre-specific markers, there is a sense that general poetic principles are at issue. In that respect, this section balances later instruction on genres that are largely irrelevant to the Augustan period and where there is thus a temptation to take the precepts not at face value but as illustrative analogies, as distorting mirrors in which more relevant genres are reflected.

In 46–45, through *etiam*, this concern with selectivity in the area of poetic form is then broadened further so as to extend to the words that are used. Again, it is noticeable that Horace does not seem to proceed by confident exposition, but rather as if he had to win over his readership. The creation of new words, which is presented as a contentious issue,²⁵ is introduced in a defensive way: first the option of using known words in clever combination is raised as a possibility, then the creation of new words is only acknowledged as an option after the reason for neologisms—the absence of suitable words for things—is presented as an unavoidable constraint (l. 48 *si forte*). This is psychologically effective, but a far cry from

²⁴ See Watson 2007 on mock didactic, who argues from texts other than *AP*; Frischer 1991: 87–100, who holds that the speaker of *AP* is not Horace, but a parodic poet-critic whose absurdity is manifest to the audience.

²⁵ If Horace is here engaging with contemporary purist critics of certain poetic practices (neologisms, unusual combination of ordinary words), which is likely here as well as in *Epist.* 2.2.115 ff., then the passage represents a localized exception to the rule formulated above that *AP* is not set against a position in the way Aristotle's *Poetics* is.

the didactic narrator for whom resistance is not a conceivable option. And the note of defensiveness persists. New and recently coined words will 'enjoy credibility' (l. 52), which seems to elevate them above merely aesthetic criticism; moreover, the hostile stance toward neologisms is represented as a recent innovation that did not apply to the greats of the past (l. 54 *dabit*; 55–58) and that is now unfairly turned into a misguided standard to which contemporary poets, here represented by Virgil and Varius, are held. It is only from l. 58 that the speaker exhibits full confidence in what he has to say, as he lays out a principle of word selection. This principle, we recall, is predicated on and thus constrained by the notion of appropriateness that introduces the passage, but appropriateness in the selection of words, it might be argued, is still highly subjective, partly due to the fact that appropriateness is meant to comprise appropriateness to the subject matter, to the audience, as well as to the conventions of a genre, including the characterization of any narrators featuring in them. The principle is *usus*, 'usage.' If a word is current, it will in principle be eligible. Words have natural life cycles, which determine usage. The simile of the leaves on a tree and the way it develops into a statement about the human condition adds, of course, poetic flourish, but more importantly it aligns events in nature with those in poetic practice and thereby grounds them. When Brink cites Varro's *De lingua Latina* for a similar statement about the lives of words, this is illuminating not just because it shows how Horace transforms these ideas into a principle of naturalistic poetic practice, but also because the grounds for assuming an influence of Hellenistic literary theory are here at their weakest.²⁶ Together with the consideration of necessity (l. 48), the section introduces two important objective considerations that restrict the scope of appropriateness.

We pass over sections on meter, the handling of emotion and character, myth, and the development of tragedy, and proceed to the famous section on satyr play (220–250):

*Carmine qui tragico uilem certauit ob hircum,
mox etiam agrestis Satyros nudauit et asper
incolumi grauitate iocum temptauit eo quod
illecebris erat et grata nouitate morandus*

²⁶ Brink 1971: 147: "Varro, *LL* IX.17 says *consuetudo loquendi est in motu*. So was the comparison of language with human generations," *ibid.* v. 3 ... *neque omnis impositio uerborum extat quod uetustas quasdam deleuit*. (5) *uetustas pauca non deprauat, multa tollit; quem puerum uidisti formosum, hunc uides deformem in senecta. tertium saeculum non uidet eum hominem quem uidit primum*.

*spectator functusque sacris et potus et exlex.
 uerum ita risores, ita commendare dicaces
 conueniet Satyros, ita uertere seria ludo,
 ne quicumque deus, quicumque adhibebitur heros,
 regali conspectus in auro nuper et ostro,
 migret in obscuras humili sermone tabernas,
 aut, dum uitat humum, nubes et inania captet.
 effutire leuis indigna tragoedia uersus,
 ut festis matrona moueri iussa diebus,
 intererit Satyris paulum pudibunda proteruis.
 non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum
 uerbaque, Pisones, Satyrorum scriptor amabo;
 nec sic enitar tragico differre colori,
 ut nihil intersit Dauusne loquatur et audax
 Pythias, emuncto lucrata Simone talentum,
 an custos famulusque dei Silenus alumni.
 ex noto fictum carmen sequar, ut sibi quiuis
 speret idem, sudet multum frustraue laboret
 ausus idem; tantum series iuncturaque pollet,
 tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris.
 siluis deducti caueant me iudice Fauni
 ne, uelut innati triuiis ac paene forenses,
 aut nimium teneris iuuenentur uersibus umquam,
 aut immunda crepent ignominiosaue dicta.
 offenduntur enim quibus est equos et pater et res,
 nec, siquid fricti ciceris probat et nucis emptor,
 aequis accipiunt animis donantue corona.*

The tragic poet, who entered competition for a lowly goat, soon undressed also rustic satyrs and attempted a rough joke without sacrificing seriousness because the audience, drunk and unruly after the festive celebrations, had to be prevented from leaving through enticements and pleasant innovations. It will be suitable for the poet to introduce the jokers, the chatty satyrs, and to turn seriousness into relaxed play in such a way that whatever god, whatever hero features—who just now appeared in regal gold and purple—does not descend into lowly bars where the conversation is humble, or, in an attempt to avoid lowliness, tries to seize clouds and void. Tragedy herself should not splutter out lowly verses, like a Roman matron, asked to join the dance on a festive day, so tragedy will spend time among the loose satyrs, decorously. As a writer of satyr plays, members of the Piso family, I will not select the plain and current terms and words only, nor will I strive to create a tone so different from the tone of tragedy that there is no difference between Davus talking and bold Pythias, who just now extracted a talent from old Simo, or whether a Silen talks, the guardian and servant of the divine charge. I will pursue a song fashioned from known words, so that everyone hopes he can achieve the same, but loses much sweat and works in vain when attempting the same. Such a force has sequence and combination, such reputation can

accrue to things of common origin. Fauns, who come from the woods, should in my view not behave as if they were born on the street corner or like men of the forum; never should they behave like young fops, spouting delicate lines, or sound out dirty and shameful jokes. For this will cause offence to knights, freeborn and wealthy people, and if something is accepted by those who purchase fried peas and nuts, those others will not hear it with approval or award a crown.

This is perhaps the section in *AP* that has been most extensively discussed in recent years. The initial point of contention was whether precepts on satyr play represent another instance of fossilized fourth-century lore, transmitted and preserved in the highly stable rhetorical tradition, or whether satyr play existed as a living genre in Rome. Peter Wiseman has argued in several highly stimulating publications that there is credible evidence for a Roman tradition of satyr play, but has also made it plausible that despite their associations with behavior and practices that seem at odds with Roman *decorum* in private and public contexts they had a demonstrable place in Roman culture, if one that is hard to describe with any precision.²⁷ But does that mean that Horace, on the evidence of l. 235, was really planning to promote the genre of satyr play in Rome and write satyr plays himself? Perhaps a naive question. Rather, the stylization gains in subtlety and depth if what Horace says here is neither unrelated to Roman reality nor depicts it in any straightforward sense.

It does seem manifest that, for all the obvious Roman touches in the passage, there are elements to the stylization that testify to its constructedness. Even if one accepts the existence of a tradition of satyr play at Rome, one must acknowledge that Horace envisages the 5th century BC variety where the satyr play features as the fourth play after a trilogy of tragedies and where all four plays are thematically linked, so that characters featuring in the tragedies reappear in the satyr play (see Williams 1968: 343–344 on this point, as well as Brink and Rudd on l. 228 *nuper*). The way in which the treatment of satyr play follows from the previous section on tragedy without any structuring devices can also be seen as a marker that it is *this* relationship between satyr play and tragedy that is envisaged; but as indicated earlier, the absence of conventional didactic structuring devices is a pervasive feature in *AP*, used to a wide variety of different effects. The reference

²⁷ Wiseman 2008: 218–219: “But if that were the case one would hardly expect dignified senatorial families to claim descent (as they did) from Pan, Silenus and Marsyas, or Suetonius to include in his narrative of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon (as he does) a supernatural figure piping to shepherds like Pan.” See also Wiseman 1988.

to a crown given to the successful performer (l. 250 *corona*) is surprising, too, given that convention in the Roman theater was for actors and poets to receive a *palma*;²⁸ the role of the *equites* in the award of the prize seems to be overstated (Brink 1971: 294–295). Roman stylization in another sense is to be found in l. 229, where the tragic heroes are said to descend *in obscuras tabernas* in the course of the satyr play; that phrase, which “joins in one pregnant locution two different concepts: ‘uses language befitting the cottage’ and ‘behaves as though he had moved from a palace to a cottage’” (Brink 1971: 282), is also widely seen as an allusion to the title of *fabula tabernaria*, a pejorative term for the *comoedia togata* (ibid.).

Moreover, the passage pursues further some of the theoretical concerns we have encountered earlier. Satyr plays that follow after a trilogy of tragedies and in which characters from those tragedies recur suit those concerns particularly well because they allow Horace to bring into view the problem of dealing with variations in stylistic level. These variations, in turn, are in part dictated by the consideration of appropriateness: by what is appropriate to the characters in a series of plays, and also by what is appropriate to the audience. Reflection on generic conventions of stylistic level is further prompted by the suggestion that the register of satyr play is situated between tragedy and comedy.

It seems no coincidence that in this passage, in which Horace assumes a more prominent if enigmatic role, we also find general statements about poetic composition that cohere with the earlier passage on the use of words. This invites us to look beyond the rather narrow issue of one small genre.

After passages on the need for metrical perfection in the production of poetry, and on the inventiveness of Greeks and Romans, there is a marked structural break (306–345):

*munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo,
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam,
quid deceat, quid non, quo uirtus, quo ferat error.
scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.
rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae,
uerbaque prouisam rem non inuita sequentur.
qui didicit, patriae quid debeat et quid amicis,
quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes,
quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae
partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto
reddere personae scit conuenientia cuique.*

²⁸ See Steidle 1967: 124–125, with further references, as well as Rudd 1989 ad loc.

*respicere exemplar uitae morumque iubebo
 doctum imitatore et uiuas hinc ducere uoces.
 interdum speciosa locis morataque recte
 fabula nullius ueneris, sine pondere et arte,
 ualdius oblectat populum meliusque moratur
 quam uersus inopes rerum nugaeque canorae.
 Grais ingenium, Grais dedit ore rotundo
 Musa loqui, praeter laudem nullius auaris.
 Romani pueri longis rationibus assem
 discunt in partis centum diducere. 'dicat
 filius Albini: si de quincunce remota est
 uncia, quid superat? poteras dixisse.' 'triens.' 'eu.
 rem poteris seruare tuam. redit uncia, quid fit?'
 'Semis.' an haec animos aerugo et cura peculi
 cum semel imbuerit, speremus carmina fingi
 posse linenda cedro et leui seruanda cupresso?
 aut prodesse uolunt aut delectare poetae
 aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere uitae.
 quicquid praecipies, esto breuis, ut cito dicta
 percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles;
 omne superuacuum pleno de pectore manat.
 ficta uoluptatis causa sint proxima ueris,
 ne quodcumque uolet poscat sibi fabula credi,
 neu pransae Lamiae uiuum puerum extrahat aluo.
 centuriae seniorum agitant expertia frugis,
 celsi praetereunt austera poemata Ramnes;
 omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci,
 lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
 hic meret aera liber Sostiis, hic et mare transit
 et longum noto scriptori prorogat aeuum.*

Without writing myself, I will teach what the job and the duty of a poet is, where his powers derive from, what nourishes and forms the poet, what is appropriate, what not, where successful artistry and error will get us. Knowing something is the beginning and the source of writing correctly. What to write about Socratic scrolls will be able to show you, and words will willingly follow on a subject that has been thought out. Who has learned what is owed to country and one's friends, what kind of affection a father, a brother and a guest deserves, what the task of a magistrate or of a judge is, what the role of a commander sent into war is, that man will indeed be able to give to each character what is appropriate to it. I will direct the learned imitator to look at the model of real life and its habits, and to draw life-like voices from there. Sometimes a story that is full of good lines and reveals a good attitude but that has no elegance will please the audience more and detain them more successfully than verses without content and inane trifle. To the Greeks the Muse gave talent, to the Greeks, who know no greed other than greed for reputation, she gave the ability to orate sonorously. Rome's youth

learns to break the as into a hundred fractions through long calculations. "The son of Albinus shall tell me: if from a quincunx one uncia is removed, what remains? You could already have told me" "A triens." "Very good! You will be able to look after your affairs. If one adds one uncia, what is the sum?" "Half an as." Once this evil condition and concern for money has taken hold, are we to hope for poems that are worthy of being preserved with cedar oil in a container made of smooth cypress? Poets want to be beneficial or provide enjoyment or say things that are at the same time delightful and serviceable to life. Whatever you prescribe be brief, so that receptive souls pick up what has been uttered quickly and retain it faithfully. Everything that is too much overflows when the mind is full. Fiction composed for enjoyment should be as close to the truth as possible: there should not be an expectation that *any* kind of plot would be accepted, and that the boy who has been eaten by the Lamia can be extracted from her belly alive. Elder citizens reject what serves no purpose, young sophisticates will reject austere poetry; applause is secure for the man who blends what is useful with what is pleasant and thereby delights the reader and advises him. Such a book will earn money for the brothers Sosius, and it will also cross the sea and secure immortality for its famous author.

The excerpt begins with a striking *diuisio*, which seems to announce headings for passages that are to follow. It can readily be paralleled with divisions in scientific works and didactic poems, but more importantly it throws into relief the absence of similar signposts elsewhere in the poem. This might discourage us from imposing Procrustean structures on other parts of the poem, or it might encourage us to look for alternative organizing principles. In a classic article, which fuelled much of the lengthy debate about the poem's structure, Norden took l. 307, *unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam*, to refer to ll. 309–332, l. 308, *quid deceat, quid non ...*, to ll. 333–346, and l. 308, *quo uirtus, quo ferat error*, to ll. 347–end, and it is probably the formal structural observation about *AP* that has found the largest number of followers over time. Another interesting question is raised by the phrase *nil scribens ipse* in l. 306.²⁹ How does this cohere with the speaker's declared intention to write satyr plays? Perhaps there is no material inconsistency—Horace is not writing lyric poetry now, while he is giving instructions, and intends to write satyr plays later. Or is Horace slipping in and out of different writer personae in the course of the poem so that it is futile to attempt such harmonizing interpretations?

²⁹ On the use of *scribere*, cf. Brink 1963: 242: "In the letter to the Pisos, Horace describes himself as teaching but not writing, *nil scribens ipse*. In accordance with the nomenclature of his literary criticism Horace's 'writing' applies to poetry but not to the quasi-poetry of his satires and epistles. So far as Horace is concerned (not so far as others are concerned) *scribere* then applies to his lyric verse, his incursion into poetry proper."

The epigram in l. 309 (*scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons*) can be read as functioning as a heading that picks up on l. 307. Through another nod to Cato's famous saying, *rem tene uerba sequentur* (see p. 512, above), the speaker states that 'the subject matter' (*res*) can be learned from *Socraticae chartae*. The following lines then state discursively what the reader is supposed to learn from works of moral philosophy: rules and principles of behavior that befit certain types of character in a play (l. 316). But another component needs to be present, namely familiarity with real people who embody such principles; otherwise, *uiuae uoces* of characters are not to be achieved (l. 318). The two components are then combined in l. 319: they make a play rich in commonplaces and equipped "with properly drawn characters" (Rudd's phrase). If a play has these two qualities, weaknesses of technique and stylization will appear negligible. From there, Horace moves on to a sketch of Greek artistic achievement and desire for fame as the only type of greed Greeks are capable of, contrasted with an enactment of the Roman preoccupation with money. Another famous epigram (l. 333) introduces the notion that what poets want is *delectare*, *prodesse*, or both. Instruction must be short and crisp, or else its impact on the soul will be like that of water that someone tries to pour into a vessel that is already filled. Russell (2006: 337) has drawn attention to the neat construction of the passage. The passage ends in a flippant description of what literary success amounts to—revenue for the bookseller, and even a great reputation for the author forever after.

The irony of this last point is hard to miss after the earlier passage on Rome's obsession with money. But other than that, the initial impression is one of unobjectionable elegance, interrupted for *uariatio* only by the classroom scene. However, if we assume, as I think we have to, that *Socraticae chartae* do at least include Platonic dialogues, we cannot but be struck by the way in which reading them is supposed to inform the production of good drama, notably tragedy. Surely the *Socraticae chartae* themselves militate against a form of moral instruction that consists essentially in the passing on of information, in such a way that tenets or precepts can be readily extracted (l. 312–316), that the result of the process amounts to fitting out a play with commonplaces (l. 319 *speciosa locis*), and that the process of *prodesse* can be likened to the filling of a vessel (l. 337). And if we are, as many scholars have thought, to think of drama and the rules and precepts relating to it as an analogue to Horace's own poetry, then it will be clear that especially his lyric poetry reflects an engagement with moral thought that is resistant to the simplistic mechanisms of poetic production that our passage seems to envisage. Horace does not versify moral tenets; rather, he explores, probes,

holds up for consideration, and sometimes withdraws. However, to posit that the speaker is trying to prompt critical reflection on what is said in our passage is entirely compatible with observing that the development of tragedy over the course of the Hellenistic period is likely to have been one that made the model under consideration of how a poet comes by useful content and works it into his plays increasingly less simplistic. After all, the model of how reading moral treatises might inform moral practice seems to have better applicability in the case of, e.g., a Senecean tragedy.

It has been suggested that the passage requires work on the part of the reader in other ways, too. Russell (2006: 336–337) writes:

[One of three interconnected themes in l. 309–332 is] ... the supporting instance of Greece, whose immortal literature is grounded on a moral character free from all greed save greed for fame. This, I think, is the point of the brilliant classroom scene of l. 325 ff.; Horace is answering an objection which he imagines, but does not spell out: the objection that the emphasis on *mores* in l. 319–322 seems to conflict with the admiration for Greek technique which is axiomatic in the poem. His answer is that what has been said needs some supplementing: the Greek miracle did not really depend solely on technique, but also on moral qualities, on a generosity and unwordliness not natural to dour, money-grubbing Rome.

Ironically, given the history of scholarly engagement with *AP*, especially in the past century, there is an unusually close correspondence between the *delectare/prodesse* bon mot and a piece of Neoptolemean teaching preserved by Philodemus (*De poematis* col. 13.8 ff.). To my knowledge, no scholar has been able to use it in a way that has enhanced our understanding of Horace.

The study of Latin didactic poetry has been booming over the last twenty years or so, and even so-called lesser writers in that genre have had edited volumes and monographs devoted to them. Horace's work generally has been as popular as ever, and some of the lasting contributions in the field of Latin poetry generally have been on this author. Poetry that is in some sense 'about poetry' has been closely studied. This makes it surprising that the study of *AP*, judged by the volume of recent contributions devoted to it, has not benefitted from what would appear to be a benign climate. Perhaps *AP* does not speak as readily to the concerns that fuel the interest in other didactic texts.

In his translation of the Horatian epistles (1782), Christoph Martin Wieland construed a situational setting for the poem from the various addresses of and references to the Pisones: Piso the father has two sons, the older of whom is an aspiring poet, and the father seeks to recruit Horace to

dissuade the son.³⁰ So Horace, in setting out the art of poetry, allows it to emerge how difficult and complex the task of a poet is. In many ways, Wieland's approach, suitably updated, has the potential to align *AP* with other, seemingly more accessible texts, and indeed some stimulating recent contributions on *AP* represent versions of Wieland's approach.³¹

One insight that cumulatively emerges from the commentaries on Horace's odes by Nisbet, Hubbard, and Rudd, is just how integral the addressees of Horatian odes are to the understanding of these poems. It is a reasonable assumption that the same is true of the addressees and first readers of *AP*, the Pisones.³² That the Pisones are of superior social status compared to Horace while relevant competence, i.e., creative power and a sophisticated ability to evaluate poetry and theoretical lore on poetry, resides with him, creates a tension on which *AP* can be seen to play, whether or not we make the additional assumption that the text also has a persuasive goal like dissuading Piso the son from the poetic profession.

According to this view, what is it that *AP* does? On the most basic model, the one closest to Wieland's original assumption, it just teaches the art of poetry without adapting it or playing to the audience, as described above. Alternatively, it allows the theoretical lore to assume a metaphorical quality, to be about something other than how to write poetry, namely about how to be a Roman aristocrat. This requires that at least some of the theoretical teachings are open to an ethical interpretation, either in themselves or by prompting a response on the part of the reader, including resistance and disagreement, which itself has an ethical dimension. An undeniable virtue of this line of interpretation is that the Roman stylization that is sometimes applied to the theoretical precepts becomes functional even where the precepts have not been updated, in that it facilitates the metaphorical interpretation. Moreover, the narrator's shifts between earnest didaxis and biting satire are easily accommodated in this picture. It would remain unnecessary to deny the narrative a genuine engagement with its primary theoretical subject matter, just as Virgil's *Georgics* does not merely use agricultural teachings to 'make points' about the human condition even in the eyes of those who do not regard it as a serious manual.

³⁰ See Wieland 1968: 591.

³¹ See Armstrong 1993, Seeck 1995, and Oliensis 1998: 451–479.

³² The alternative view is that there is a 'fading' of the first readers and a slide towards an address of a general readership in between the specific references; this could be paralleled from other didactic poetry.

One of the problems of this approach is that direct engagement with the Pisones is very limited in the poem. For large stretches, the implied audience feels rather generic. So for this line of interpretation to command more assent than it has done so far, strategies would need to be devised that address this problem. In the spirit of inquiry and in place of a conclusion, I suggest one such strategy: to look for passages that are not formally addressed to the Pisones but that stand in a marked intra-textual relationship with passages that are.

AP 366–390 is the closest engagement with the Pisones in the whole text:

*O maior iuuenum, quamuis et uoce paterna
fingeris ad rectum et per te sapis, hoc tibi dictum
tolle memor, certis medium et tolerabile rebus
recte concedi; consultus iuris et actor
causarum mediocris abest uirtute diserti
Messallae nec scit quantum Cascellius Aulus,
sed tamen in pretio est; mediocribus esse poetis
non homines, non di, non concessere columnae.
ut gratas inter mensas symphonia discors
et crassum unguentum et Sardo cum melle papauer
offendunt, poterat duci quia cena sine istis,
sic animis natum inuentumque poema iuuandis,
si paulum summo decessit, uergit ad inum.
Ludere qui nescit, campestribus abstinet armis,
indoctusque pilae disciue trochiue quiescit,
ne spissae risum tollant impune coronae:
qui nescit, uersus tamen audet fingere. quidni?
liber et ingenuus, praesertim census equestrem
summam nummorum uitioque remotus ab omni.
tu nihil inuita dices faciesue Minerua;
id tibi iudicium est, ea mens. Siquid tamen olim
scripseris, in Maeci descendat iudicis auris
et patris et nostras, nonumque prematur in annum
membranis intus positis; delere licebit
quod non edideris; nescit uox missa reuerti.*

Dear elder son of Piso, though your father's words are already guiding you to what is right and you yourself have the required wisdom, the following tenet hold in your memory, that in some areas what is merely so-so and acceptable is rightly allowed: a jurisconsult and advocate of average ability falls short of the speaking prowess of Messalla and does not know as much as Cascellius Aulus, but is worth something nonetheless: poets of average quality, however, find acceptance neither among people in general, nor the gods, nor the booksellers. Just as music that is out of tune, thick ointment, or a poppy dish served with Sardinian honey give offence during an enjoyable dinner, because the meal could take place without them, so a poem, which

was invented to give joy to human souls, falls completely short if it misses the highest standard only by a little. If someone is no good at sports, he keeps away from weapons, if someone has no experience with the ball, the discus, or hoops, he keeps quiet, so as to avoid that the crowd of spectators gets a laugh. And why not? He is free, of free birth, through his property ranked as a knight, and completely without fault.

That the young man in his capacity as a young Roman aristocrat is addressed here is plausible. His relationship to his father—dependent, though being who he is he simultaneously knows things for himself—(366–367), and the reference to possible career paths (369–371), point in that direction. At the same time, there are footholds for a reading that assumes that the young man is to be discouraged from his poetic inclinations—poetry is to be perfect, or else it is not worth doing (in 319 ff. we were told that it is valuable content that mattered more than anything else). The way in which the idea that being a decent advocate or legal expert is enough is presented would probably not appeal to a young man in his teens. The simile about food and poetry (374–378), formally a nod to the didactic tradition, makes the point that food, which nourishes the body, should not cause displeasure; a fortiori poetry, which appeals to the soul, should be completely free of blame. In other areas that require expertise, like sports and games (379–382), practitioners who are not masters refrain from appearing in public. Rudd, ad loc., refers to C. 3.24, where ‘a well-born lad’ is cited as showing no interest in ‘Roman’ pastimes like hunting and riding, and instead prefers Greek games like the hoops (see also S. 2.2.10–13). There is no disparagement of the activities here, and it does seem safe to view them as ones in which young Roman noblemen would engage. The last lines of the extract ridicule someone who is a knight and wealthy and *therefore* thinks he should write poetry. After another address to the young man (385–390), the focus moves away from him, and we read a sketch of a history of civilization and literature (391–407).

Lines 408–418 then seem to bring up a topic that has featured several times before—the question whether a poem becomes praiseworthy because of the innate talent of its author or because of the skill he has acquired through training and practice. The relative importance of *natura* (*ingenium*) and *ars* are a well-worn topic of rhetorical handbooks, and here as elsewhere Horace uses a deeply familiar, indeed trite problem of technical lore to set up a novel and non-trivial point. For out of this topic he creates a number of significant correspondences with the earlier passage (l. 366–390) that arguably sustain the issues raised there and the relevance to the younger son of Piso. (One can observe here, incidentally, how the questions about the internal structuring principles of *AP*, which have been so

extensively discussed by scholars, are hard to get away from.) Horace complains that in the past it was taken as a given that effort and time had to be invested to be able to write a good poem, just as success in a running competition requires effort and hardship (ll. 412–414, cf. the earlier sporting comparison, ll. 379–381). Those who wanted to be good musicians had to learn first and listen to their teacher (cf. the appeal to the elder son of Piso to listen to his teacher Horace in ll. 367–368, and the reference to music in l. 374). Then, in direct speech (ll. 416–418), a self-satisfied statement of the poet who refuses to invest time and effort, just because he does not need to (mirroring the attitude ridiculed in ll. 383–384). Horace's formulation in l. 417 (*occupet extremum scabies*, 'the mange shall take the hindmost') sustains the image used in connection with running a few lines earlier (l. 412 *qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam*, 'who aims to reach the hoped-for finish in the run'), and looks back to the references to competitive games in ll. 379–382: writing poetry without effort and proper submission to scrutiny is cheating.

LANGUAGE, STYLE, AND METER IN HORACE

Peter E. Knox

Abstract: Unlike most of his contemporaries, Horace composed in a wide variety of genres and metrical forms. It is therefore advisable to consider in detail at the levels of language, rhythm, and forms of expression how he adapted his manner to each particular genre. Horace was not unaffected by the stylistic trends in Latin poetry that began with the generation of Catullus, but he adapted those aesthetic principles to modes not attempted by them, with corresponding innovations in technique.

Keywords: style, diction, meter

Horace ‘of the many rhythms,’ as Ovid styled him (*Tr.* 4.10.49, *numerosus Horatius*), was widely recognized in antiquity as a virtuoso metrist. This reputation was won largely through the publication of the *Odes*, which, thanks in large part to testimonies like Ovid’s, tend to overshadow Horace’s other verse collections, even though they also have their part in this legacy. About a century after his death, Quintilian observed that Horace was practically the only lyric poet worth reading (*Inst.* 10.1.96, *at lyricorum idem Horatius fere solus legi dignus*). As a sophisticated stylist, Horace earned a place in the curriculum of the schools as well, and already in the century after his death, his works became case studies in the metrical treatise compiled by Caesius Bassus.¹ But, uniquely among the surviving Augustan poets, Horace composed in several genres and a wide variety of meters, not only in the polymetric *Odes*, but the epodic meters of the *Iambi*, and the satiric and epistolary hexameters of the *Sermones* and *Epistles*. With Horace it is better to speak of the evolution of his many styles than to consider the body of his work as a monolithic whole.

¹ On Caesius Bassus, cf. Skutsch in *RE* 3.1312–1313. The fragments of a late treatise transmitted under the name of Atilius Fortunatianus probably derive from Bassus, as Keil (*GL* 6.245–254) showed and examples from Horace feature prominently in the surviving fragments (*GL* 255–272). This Bassus was probably identical with the person who is mentioned by Quintilian (*Inst.* 10.1.96) as the only Latin lyric poet worth reading after Horace; cf. Courtney 2003: 351.

1. THE CALLIMACHEAN STYLE OF DISCOURSE

In the first book of the *Sermones*, the earliest collection that he released to the public, Horace participates in the stylistic revolution that began with Catullus and the neoterics and was being prosecuted in the Triumviral period by Virgil in his *Eclogues* and, we must assume, Cornelius Gallus in his elegies.² Virgil declares the stylistic affiliations of his first collection by recasting the moment of inspiration depicted in Callimachus's Prologue to the *Aetia* (fr. 1.21–24 Pf):

καὶ γὰρ ὅτε πρῶτιστον ἐμοῖς ἐπὶ δέλτον ἔθηκα
 γούνασιν, Ἄ[πό]λλων εἶπεν ὁ μοι Λύκιος·
 ... ἀοιδέ, τὸ μὲν θύος ὅτι πάχιστον
 θρέψαι, τῇ]ν Μοῦσαν δ' ὠγαθέ λεπταλέην.

And when first I put a writing tablet on my knees, Lycian Apollo said to me, '... poet, feed your sacrificial victim as fat as possible, but, my friend, keep your Muse thin.'

The scene is depicted by Callimachus with a light touch and in a familiar, conversational tone (4 ὠγαθέ, 'my friend') that is captured by Virgil, when he recasts it to incorporate Roman pastoral into Callimachean aesthetics (*Ecl.* 4.3–5):

*cum canerem reges et proelia Cynthius aurem
 uellit et admonuit, 'pastorem, Tityre, pinguis
 pascere oportet ouis, deductum dicere carmen.'*

When I started to sing of kings and battles, the Cynthian tweaked my ear and upbraided me, saying 'Tityrus, it behooves a shepherd to fatten up his sheep, but to tell a fine-spun poem.'

Virgil appropriates the scene to a familiar Roman context by representing Apollo tweaking Tityrus's ear, a proverbial expression for a quintessentially Roman gesture,³ and having him speak in an everyday, neutral tone.⁴

² On Callimachean influences in the *Sermones*, see most recently Scodel 1987, Freudenburg 1993: 185–235.

³ Cf. Otto 1890: 48.

⁴ In terms of lexis this is most evident in *oportet*. Axelson (1945: 13–14) began his seminal study of poetic and non-poetic diction with this word, on which see also Clausen 1994: 180. This word, which is common in prose, occurs only four times in Horace, all in the *Satires* and *Epistles*. For Axelson and subsequent commentators such words are 'prosaic,' but a better term for the register to which they belong is 'neutral'; cf. Adams and Mayer 1999: 3–4.

This important programmatic statement, which preceded the release of the *Sermones*, probably by at least three years,⁵ informs Horace's reconfiguration in the strategically placed final poem of the first book (*Serm.* 1.10.31–35):⁶

*atque ego cum Graecos facerem, natus mare citra,
uersiculos, uetuit me tali uoce Quirinus,
post mediam noctem uisus, cum somnia uera:
'in siluam non ligna feras insanius ac si
magnas Graecorum malis implere cateruas.'*

And when I tried to make Hellenizing verse trifles, though born on this side of the sea, Quirinus appeared to me after midnight, when dreams are true, and prevented me with the following words: 'You wouldn't be any more out of your mind bringing firewood to the forest than if you should choose to fill out the large swarms of Greeks.'

Horace reformulates the divine epiphany as a dream, introducing another element from Callimachus's Prologue, the appearance of the Muses to him in a dream (fr. 2 Pf.), and invoking also in this Roman context the opening of Ennius's great national epic, the *Annales* (fr. 1 Sk.). Here, a Roman divinity, Quirinus not Apollo, warns the poet off from Hellenizing poetry in the neoteric tradition, the kind practiced by an unnamed poet, mentioned in the preceding lines, who apes the two greatest neoterics of the previous generation (*Serm.* 1.10.18–19): *simius iste / nil praeter Caluum et doctus cantare Catullum*, 'that ape who's been taught to repeat nothing besides Calvus and Catullus.'⁷ But even as he declines to compose *Graecos uersiculos*, characterized by the diminutive familiar in neoteric verse, Horace aligns himself in that tradition, employing the same preciousness of style in detail. He locates himself in Italy (*natus mare citra*) with an artificial inversion of the preposition *citra*,⁸ and, like Virgil's Apollo, his Quirinus speaks in homely and

⁵ Even if one accepts the later date of 35 BC for the release of the *Eclogues* (Clausen 1994: xxii), the relative chronology is unlikely to change.

⁶ Curiously, most recent critics are silent on the clear Callimachean associations of this passage, noted first, it would seem, by Kiessling 1921: ad loc., who is followed by other commentators, e.g., Lejay 1911: ad loc.; cf. Wimmel 1960: 137–138. The implications are highlighted by Zetzel 2002: 38–40.

⁷ It is not possible to attach a name to this Catullan ape, but it is perhaps worth noting that the most prominent imitator of Catullus in this period was none other than Maecenas himself; cf. Courtney 2003: 276–281. Horace was probably being humorous, not tactless.

⁸ Attested only in Horace, here and at *Serm.* 1.1.107 and then in Statius; cf. Neue 1902: II 946.

proverbial tones, urging him not to join the swarms of derivative, Hellenizing poets, which would rather be like bringing 'coals to Newcastle'.⁹

In the same satire Horace asserts the aesthetics of Callimachean and neoteric style—concision and variation—in a more positive formulation (*Serm.* 1.10.9–14):

*est breuitate opus, ut currat sententia, neu se
impediat uerbis lassas onerantibus auris;
et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso,
defendente uicem modo rhetoris atque poetae,
interdum urbani parentis uiribus atque
extenuantis eas consulto.*

Brevity is essential, so that the thought flows and doesn't impede itself by loading words onto tired ears. And the language must sometimes be serious, sometimes playful, occasionally it must support the role of the orator and poet, and sometime that of a wit who purposefully spares his talents and weakens them.

Horace stakes out this position in opposition to the more prolix style of his most prominent predecessor in satire, Lucilius: in many respects he positions himself as practitioner of more concise and polished version of the genre.¹⁰ This was conceded even by Quintilian, who did not subscribe to Horace's criticisms of Lucilius, but found the Augustan poet 'much more polished and clear' (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.94, *multum est tersior ac purus magis*). This judgment, too, reflects Horace's own view of the need for a more refined style in the genre of satire. Again, in the programmatic tenth satire, Horace formulates the stylistic requirements of the genre (*Serm.* 1.10.72–77):

*saepe stilum uertas, iterum quae digna legi sint
scripturus, neque te ut miretur turba labores,
contentus paucis lectoribus. an tua demens
uilibus in ludis dictari carmina malis?
non ego; nam satis est equitem mihi plaudere ...*

You should use the eraser frequently, if you intend to write something that deserves to be read more than once; and you should take no pains to make the crowd admire you, remaining content with just a few readers. What, are you so crazy as to be prefer that your poems should be taught in petty schools? Not I: it is enough for me if a knight applauds me ...

⁹ The expression *ligna in siluam ferre* plays on a familiar proverb; cf. Otto 1890: 323.

¹⁰ Cf. Cucchiarelli 2001: 146.

The knight whose applause sufficed for Horace was Maecenas, who appreciated the refinement of style that came from what Horace would later call 'time-consuming and laborious polishing' (*AP* 291, *limae labor et mora*).

In style and language, the *Sermones* draw on much the same resources as hexametrical poetry in other genres, participating in what might be considered the standard language of Latin poetry. That said, in order to impart a tone appropriate to the moralizing content of satire, Horace varies standard poetic diction with language drawn from non-poetic registers (*Serm.* 1.4.39–42).¹¹

*primum ego me illorum, dederim quibus esse poetis,
excerpam numero: neque enim concludere versum
dixeris esse satis neque, siqui scribat uti nos
sermoni propiora, putes hunc esse poetam.*

In the first place, I will remove myself from the count of those whom I would grant to be poets. For you would not say that it is sufficient to round out a verse, nor would you thing a man a poet who, like me, writes in a style bordering on the conversational.

Horace effects this mixture of stylistic levels through the language that he deploys and his application of the hexameter. For example, Latin poets in the higher genres were relatively chary of employing the ordinary inferential particles of normal discourse. For instance, *idcirco* is quite common in prose authors, occurring dozens of times in Cicero's works, but is relatively rare in poetry.¹² It is not even used by Lucretius, who is otherwise fairly liberal in employing such vocabulary, but Horace uses it when making the argument that he is not a real poet in the *Sermones* and goes on to question whether comedy can be poetry (*Serm.* 1.4. 45–46): *idcirco quidam comoedia necne poema / esset, quaesiuiere*.¹³ Similar observations can be made about Horace's use of other neutral words in the *Sermones* to create the effect of discourse, e.g., *alioqui*, *dumtaxat*, *nedum*, *quocirca*, or *utpote*.¹⁴ Such language has sometimes been characterized as 'colloquial' or 'prosaic,' but a more

¹¹ This is well put by Brink 1971: 446: "*Sermo* is a highly poetic genre, but a mixed one. Occasionally it rises to poetry in the exclusive sense of the great genres—and that applies to its vocabulary, style and tone ... On the whole it observes that middle level ... which ... is a refinement of poetic qualities (in the Roman sense), not of prosaic."

¹² Axelson 1945: 80 n. 67.

¹³ This is the only instance in the *Sermones*; *idcirco* is found twice in the *Epistulae* and once in the *Ars*.

¹⁴ Cf. Axelson 1945: 96; Muecke 1997: 783.

appropriate term would be 'neutral,' as these terms are characteristic of neither high nor low literary genres, but rather import no generic color when used.¹⁵

Actual colloquialisms are liberally interspersed to impart a veneer of conversational tone. In recounting his father's admonitions to steer clear of prostitutes, the poet quotes his actual words (1.4.113–115):

*ne sequerer moechas, concessa cum uenere uti
possem: 'deprepsi non bella est fama Treboni'
aiebat.*

To stop me from pursuing adulterous affairs, when I could get allowable sex, he used to say, 'Trebonius's reputation wasn't pretty when he was caught.'

The vocabulary is suggestive of a real conversation. The Greek loan word *moechus*, which is commonly attested in comedy and other colloquial contexts, is generally avoided in poetry in favor of the more decorous *adulter*.¹⁶ The context suggests that this was the word his father actually used when advising his son, for his quoted words also have a ring of the quotidian: the adjective *bellus*, in origin an affectionate diminutive of *bonus*, is generally avoided in poetry because of its everyday tone.¹⁷ In the *Sermones*, Horace intersperses other words characteristic of colloquial Latin, such as *ambulo* (1.2.25, 1.4.51, 1.4.66), *ausculto* (2.7.1), *belle* (1.4.136, 1.7.45), *bucca* (1.1.21), *caballus* (1.6.59, 1.6.103), *casa* (2.3.247, 2.3.275), *delasso* (1.1.14), *lassus* (1.5.37, 1.10.10, 2.2.10, 2.7.94, 2.8.8), *nasutus* (1.2.93).¹⁸

In another respect as well Horace imitates everyday speech by employing obscenities and scatological terminology generally avoided in the literary language and especially in the higher genres. Horace uses explicit sexual terminology only occasionally for graphic effects. The basic obscenity for the female genitalia, *cunnus*, occurs three times in the first book of *Sermones*, most startlingly in the third poem, juxtaposed with the name of a famous heroine (107–108):¹⁹

*nam fuit ante Helenam cunnus taeterrima belli
causa*

Even before there was a Helen, a cunt had been the most disgusting reason for war.

¹⁵ Above, n. 4.

¹⁶ Cf. Kiessling and Heinze on *Serm.* 1.2.38.

¹⁷ Cf. Hofmann 1951: 142–143.

¹⁸ Bonfante 1994; Ricottilli 1997.

¹⁹ The other occurrences are at 1.2.36 and 1.2.70. On the distribution of the word in surviving Latin and its tone, cf. Adams 1982: 80–81.

Other obscenities are found only in the first book, as Horace appears to have relinquished this tactic in the second; e.g., *futuere* occurs only in 1.2.127 in creating a vignette redolent of a familiar scene in mime.²⁰ It is likely that Horace is evoking the precedent of Lucilius, as for example in his use of the rare *mutto* for *mentula* in 1.2.68, since it is elsewhere attested only in Lucilius and had probably gone out of use by the Augustan period.²¹ This is also the most likely explanation for the higher concentration of scatological vocabulary in the first book, e.g., *cacare* (1.8.38), *merda* (1.8.37), *meiere* (2.7.52), *permeiere* (1.2.44), *pedere* (1.8.46), *oppedere* (1.9.70), and *puga* (1.2.33).²²

Diminutives, a common feature of the spoken language,²³ are deployed by Horace with far greater frequency in the *Sermones* and *Epistulae* than in lyric and iambic poetry.²⁴ The affective tone of diminutive forms suits the tenor of the *Sermones*: the ant is not only little, it is diminutively little (*paruola* ... *formica*, *Serm.* 1.1.33), the family farm is a scraggy bit of land (*macro* ... *agello*, *Serm.* 1.6.71), his earliest efforts at poetry are verse trifles (*uersiculos*, *Serm.* 1.10.32). It is not always easy to pinpoint whether the archaisms found in the *Sermones* are employed to impart the flavor of earlier Latin literature, or represent forms still employed in the spoken language.²⁵ In the opening satire of the second book, the future imperatives *transnanto* (2.1.8) and *habento* (2.1.9) contribute to the characterization of the interlocutor Trebatius, a prominent jurisconsult. The passive infinitives in *-ier*, which recur five times in the *Sermones* (*laudarier*, 1.2.35; *sectarier*, 1.2.78; *auellier*, 1.2.104; *mercarier*, 2.3.24; and *torquerier*, 2.8.67), are probably not employed for metrical convenience,²⁶ nor to convey a formal tone. The three occurrences in *Serm.* 1.2 seem rather to mimic forms of speech, with the character Cupiennius asserting '*nolim laudarier* ... / *sic me*' (1.2.35–36), while the poet later enjoins *desine matronas sectarier* (1.2.78). The third occurrence has the ring of a proverbial expression: *an tibi mauis* / ... *pretiumque auellier ante / quam mercem ostendi*?

²⁰ On *futuo*, cf. Adams 1982: 118–122. On the adultery mime, cf. Reynolds 1946.

²¹ Cf. Adams 1982: 62–63.

²² On all of these, see Bonfante 1994: ss.vv.

²³ Cf. Hofmann 1945: 139–141.

²⁴ By one recent count, Horace employs 47 diminutive forms for a total of 81 occurrences in the *Sermones* and *Epistulae*, compared with only 9 for a total of 11 occurrences in the *Odes*; cf. Traina 1997: 816. The overall picture is not significantly altered if one accepts the more restricted definition of diminutives by Axelson 1945: 39–40.

²⁵ Lists can be found in Waltz 1881: 41–59 and Bo 1960: 355–359.

²⁶ Thus Leumann 1977: 581, but cf. Kiessling and Heinze on *Serm.* 1.2.78.

Horace reinforces the conversational tone of the *Sermones* by his configuration of the hexameter. In its most fundamental aspects, such as the treatment of caesurae in the third foot or in the disposition of dactyls and spondees, the hexameter in the *Sermones* conforms to the norms familiar in epic and didactic. But in many respects Horace diminishes the resemblance to epic by word placement and the location of sense pauses. This is particularly evident in his treatment of the end of the line. Enjambment of a type that has been called 'prosaic' is far more frequent in the *Sermones* than in epic hexameter.²⁷ This is characterized by a sense pause occurring in the fifth or sixth foot, with a new clause beginning with an unemphatic word such as a conjunction, a particle, or a pronoun. In the first satire alone, nine hexameters are cut short, so to speak, by a strong sense pause after the fifth foot (7, 17, 18, 33, 46, 56, 78, 84, 95). At line end to begin the new clause we find combinations of monosyllables (*hinc uos, ut si*), a conjunction (*sicut*), an interjection (*eia*), and a demonstrative (*horum*). Horace's treatment of the end of the line creates a deliberate gap between the articulation of the phrase and the rhythm. Over 11% of the hexameters in Book I of the *Sermones* end in a monosyllable or a pair of monosyllables, contrasted with a figure of about 1% of Virgilian hexameters.²⁸ In the two books of *Sermones*, Horace ends 29 lines with the conjunction *atque*, something that Virgil does only twice in all of his works.²⁹ Caesurae in the fifth foot following the *longum* is another characteristic device that Horace employs to avoid an epic ring to the line end. In a brief section of *Serm.* 1.9, the effect is displayed in a snippet of dialogue (26–28):

*interpellandi locus hic erat: 'est tibi mater,
cognati, quis te saluo est opus?' 'haud mihi quisquam.
omnis composui.' 'felices! nunc ego resto.'*

Here was an opportunity to interrupt him. 'Do you have a mother or any relations who depend upon your welfare?' 'Not a one. I've buried them all.' 'Lucky them! Now there's just me.'

Three consecutive lines, representing an animated conversation, display this same pattern, with a caesura following a monosyllable in the fifth foot.³⁰ Horace more consistently aims at evoking the rhythms and language of everyday speech in the *Sermones* than in any of his other works, while at the same time adapting the aesthetics of contemporary Latin poetic style.

²⁷ Nilsson 1952: 142–157; cf. also Norden 1995: 400–402.

²⁸ Nilsson 1952: 105–109.

²⁹ *Aen.* 12.355, 616; cf. Norden 1995: 401–402.

³⁰ Cf. Kiessling and Heinze 1968: xli–xlii.

2. HORACE'S NEOTERIC IAMBS

Ancient critics would eventually class Horace with two neoteric predecessors, Catullus and Furius Bibaculus, as the chief representatives of the genre of *iambos* at Rome,³¹ but Horace himself deflects attention from any antecedents in his own language, when he reflects on this stage of his career in the *Epistles* (1.19.23–25):

*Parios ego primus iambos
ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
Archilochi, non res et agentia uerba Lycamben.*

I was the first to show iambic poetry to Latium, following the meters and the spirit of Archilochus, but not the subject matter and the language that persecuted Lycambes.

The claim to primacy is justified. Even though a note of caution on the possible importance of Furius Bibaculus is warranted because of the loss of his iambic poetry, it seems unlikely that his work will have differed much from Catullus's *iambi*. For ancient critics, including even the metrist Diomedes, the genre was defined as much by content as it was by meter (*GLK* 1.485.11): *iambus est carmen maledicum* ('the iamb is a poem of invective'). Thus, when Catullus characterizes his own *iambi*, the element of invective is primary.³² But Horace specifically rejects this aspect of the genre. Even so, the ancient critics who associate him with these neoteric predecessors are on the right track, for the novel aspect of Horace's treatment of the genre is in a direct line of descent from their engagement with archaic iambus as mediated by Callimachus.

The chief organizing principle in Horace's collection of seventeen iambs—the number is an obvious gesture to the seventeen poems that he read in Callimachus's *Iambs*³³—is meter. The first ten poems are couplets consisting of an iambic trimeter and dimeter, while five different rhythms

³¹ Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.96: *Iambus non sane a Romanis celebratus est ut proprium opus, †quibusdam interpositus†: cuius acerbitas in Catullo, Bibaculo, Horatio (quamquam illi epodos interuenit) reperiatur.* Cf. Diomedes, *GLK* 1.485.11 *praecipui scriptores apud Graecos Archilochus et Hipponax, apud Romanos Lucilius et Catullus et Horatius et Bibaculus.*

³² It exceeds in importance even meter for Catullus, cf. Fordyce on Cat. 36.5, Heyworth 2001.

³³ As argued by Cameron 1995: 163–173. Against this interpretation, see Kerkhecker 1999: 271–282, arguing for a collection of only 13 iambs by Callimachus. See Lyne 2005b for suggestions that Horace acknowledges a book of 13 iambs by Callimachus in the organization of his own book.

are deployed in the final seven poems.³⁴ This display of metrical diversity is the basis for Horace's claims to have imported the rhythms of archaic Greek lyric into Latin, for the *Epodes* show little influence from early Latin or Hellenistic iambs. The dominant metrical system of the first ten poems in the main follows Archilochean norms,³⁵ a method of establishing a signature that Horace redeploys in the *Odes*, where his primary model is Alcaeus. The stichic iambs of the final poem in the collection, which also reflect archaic Greek norms, re-establish this metrical signature. Of the metrical systems in the six remaining poems, those in *Epodes* 11, 14, and 15 are securely attested in the surviving fragments of Archilochus; and it is highly likely that the 'First Archilochean' of *Epode* 12, consisting of a dactylic hexameter followed by a dactylic tetrameter catalectic, was also used by Archilochus.³⁶

Horace works within a variety of linguistic registers across the poems in the collection. Not surprisingly, the two poems that show the most affinity with the violent diction typically associated with archaic Greek iambus are the invectives against the anonymous *uetula* of *Epodes* 8 and 12. The physical description in the first of these poems is worthy of Catullan invective (*Epod.* 8.1–10):

*Rogare longo putidam te saeculo
uiris quid eneruet meas,
cum sit tibi dens ater et rugis uetus
frontem senectus exaret
hietque turpis inter aridas natis
podex uelut crudae bouis!
sed incitat me pectus et mammae putres,
equina quales ubera,
uenterque mollis et femur tumentibus
exile suris additum.*

To think that you, repugnant after long years, should ask what unstrings my manhood, when you have black teeth and advanced old age ploughs wrinkles on your brow, and your disgusting asshole gapes between your wizened buttocks like that of a cow with diarrhea! It's your bosom, I suppose, and your dugs sagging like a mare's udders that arouse me, your flabby paunch and scrawny thighs on top of your swollen calves.

³⁴ Detailed discussion of Horace's meters in the *Epodes* in Mankin 1995: 14–22.

³⁵ Cf. Mankin 1995: 18–19.

³⁶ Horace redeploys the meter in *Carm.* 1.7 and 28. Fr. 195 West is a lone dactylic tetrameter catalectic, preserved by Hephaestion, that probably comes from a poem in this same system.

Certainly the choice of language contributes to the tone of Horace's invective. *Putidus* is probably a colloquialism,³⁷ and would be particularly likely to strike the ear as such in the context of the conversational idiom of the exclamatory infinitive *rogare*.³⁸ The euphemisms in *uiris* for 'virility'³⁹ and *eneruo* for impotence⁴⁰ set the tone for the somewhat surprising explicitness of the imagery that follows. *Podex* catches the reader by surprise more by its clinical precision than by its coarseness;⁴¹ *natis* and *mammae* belong to roughly the same stylistic register.⁴² The rest of the language in this passage may better be categorized as neutral in tone, and the effect is achieved by the combinatory effects and the resulting imagery.

These two epodes form a group within the collection, but they illustrate the principle of variety in language and expression that operates throughout. The epodic verse form encourages coincidence of sense and the two-line metrical unit, so that enjambment does not play a significant role in Horace's iambic style, although the disposition of word order within the line is often used to evocative effect. Word patterning, for example, with interlacing pairs of nouns and epithets is found at 2.15: *aut pressa puris mella condit amphoris*; 2.43: *sacrum uetustis exstruat lignis focum*; 2.47: *et horna dulci uina promens dolio*; 6.13: *qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener*; 16.7: *nec fera caerulea domuit Germania pube*; 16.33: *credula nec rauos timeant armenta leones*; and 16.55: *pinguia nec siccis urantur semina glaebis*.⁴³

In the fifteenth poem, Horace exploits the metrical form to toy with the reader's generic expectations. It opens with a formula familiar in hexametrical verse and amatory elegy, *nox erat*,⁴⁴ and the reader familiar with the elegies of Cornelius Gallus⁴⁵ or the early work of Tibullus might be momentarily misled into expecting an elegy before the rhythm slips in iambic dimeter in the epodic line. But while the themes that Horace treats in this poem coincide with the preoccupations of love elegy—the falsely sworn girl, the wealthy rival, the lover's unconvincing determination to leave her⁴⁶—its

³⁷ Cf. Bonfante 1994: 128; Grassman 1966: 49–50.

³⁸ Cf. Mankin 1995: ad loc.

³⁹ Cf. McKeown 1989: 226–227 on Ovid, *Am.* 1.8.47.

⁴⁰ Cf. Adams 1982: 38.

⁴¹ As Adams 1982: 112 notes, it is not particularly 'gross in tone,' and it is used by medical writers.

⁴² Cf. Watson 2003: ad loc.

⁴³ Cf. Nisbet 1999: 138.

⁴⁴ Cf. McKeown 1989: 105 on Ov. *Am.* 1.5.1.

⁴⁵ Cf. Tränkle 1960: 24 for the conjecture that Horace is indeed evoking Gallus here.

⁴⁶ For the epode's affinities with amatory elegy, cf. Watson 2003: 458–459.

language is largely devoid of most of the affectations of the style of neoteric poetry and amatory elegy. Indeed, this is true of the entire collection,⁴⁷ in which we find, for example, very few true diminutives,⁴⁸ postposition of non-enclitic particles,⁴⁹ or neologisms.⁵⁰ By carefully constructing a lexicon that eschews the most obvious mannerisms of his Callimachean and neoteric heritage, Horace establishes the dynamic tension that makes Archilochean iambus a viable form for expressing the themes of the triumviral period.

3. HORACE'S LYRIC STYLE: CHARGING LANGUAGE WITH MEANING

The collection of *Odes*—*carmina* ('songs') as Horace calls them⁵¹—exemplifies the qualities of metrical diversity that he found in the editions of the archaic Greek lyric poets, Sappho and, especially, Alcaeus.⁵² In the first nine poems of the opening book, known as the 'Parade Odes,'⁵³ Horace presents the reader with a new meter in each poem. The opening poem in asclepiads, a meter used by Alcaeus though not among his most characteristic, is followed by the second in sapphic stanzas, and each of the six following poems is composed in a dazzling array of rhythms.⁵⁴ A pattern is not established until the ninth poem in the sequence, 'an ode written in Alcaeus' blazon meter and alluding to an Alcaean text.'⁵⁵ The meter of this ode, the alcaic stanza, mirrors the opening poem in the ancient edition of Alcaeus used by Horace, and the following two poems likewise employ the meters of the second and third poems in his edition of Alcaeus, with 1.10 in sapphics, and 1.11 in the greater asclepiad.⁵⁶

⁴⁷ A point stressed, perhaps too emphatically, by Mankin 1995: 14.

⁴⁸ They occur only in two poems (8 and 11), which suggests that he intends to give them a particular color: *libellus* (8.15), *muliercula* (11.23), *puluillus* (8.16), *uersiculus* (11.2).

⁴⁹ These are also generally of the easiest sort: *atque* (8.11), *et* (1.12, 3.22, 10.18, 16.2, 16.40, 17.2), *inter* (2.38), *nam* (14.6), *nec* (10.11), *ut* (6.16).

⁵⁰ Cf. Mankin 1995: 13 for lists of coinages.

⁵¹ E.g., *Epist.* 1.13.17, 2.2.25, 2.2.59, 2.2.91; *Carm.* 4.2.32, 4.8.11; cf. *Epist.* 2.1.138, 2.1.227; *Carm.* 2.19.1, 3.1.2.

⁵² The term *ἐτερομετρία* is used by Hephaestion (*De Signis* 2 Consbruch) to characterize transitions within Alcaeus's books to poems in different metermeters. Unlike the standard edition of Sappho's works, Alcaeus's poems were not organized by meter.

⁵³ An approach to the poems that dates back to Christ 1868.

⁵⁴ For a survey of the meters of the *Odes*, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: xxviii–xlvi; Rosellini 1997.

⁵⁵ Lyne 2005a: 300.

⁵⁶ Cf. Lyne 2005a: 300–301, although Lyne's entire argument deserves to be studied in detail.

When Quintilian singles out Horace as practically the only Latin lyric poet worth reading, his explanation is that 'he sometimes soars and is full of charm and grace, varied in his application of rhetorical figures and quite felicitous in expression.'⁵⁷ What is meant by this felicitousness is probably best explained by Horace himself (*Ars* 46–48):

*in uerbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis
dixeris egregie, notum si callida uerbum
reddiderit iunctura nouum.*

in stringing together words, too, if you are discriminating and circumspect you will have spoken excellently if by a skilful conjunction (*callida ... iunctura*) you have made a familiar expression new.

In the *Odes* this is one of the hallmarks of Horatian style, with celebrated phrases such as *simplex munditiis* (1.5.5, 'simple in refinements'), *splendide mendax* (3.11.35, 'nobly mendacious'), *insanientis sapientiae consultus* (1.34.3–4, 'expert in insane wisdom'). The effect is what Petronius famously characterized as Horace's 'painstaking felicity' in expression.⁵⁸

The artful manipulation of word order within the technical constraints of the complex metrical schemes of the *Odes* is another aspect of this felicity. The strategic placement of nouns and epithets, which Horace repeatedly separates to convey a variety of subtle shifts in meaning, is perhaps the most characteristic weapon in his stylistic arsenal.⁵⁹ The famous ode to Pyrrha (1.5) may illustrate:

*Quis multa gracilis te puer in rosa
perfusus liquidis urget odoribus
grato, Pyrrha, sub antro?
cui flauam religas comam,

simplex munditiis? heu, quotiens fidem
mutatosque deos flebit! ut aspera
nigris aequora uentis
emirabitur insolens,

qui nunc te fruitur credulus aurea,
qui semper uacuam, semper amabilem
sperat, nescius aurae
fallacis! miseri quibus*

⁵⁷ Quint. 10.1.96: *nam et insurgit aliquando et plenus est iucunditatis et gratiae et uariis figuris et uerbis felicissime audax.*

⁵⁸ Petr. Sat. 118.5 *curiosa felicitas.*

⁵⁹ Nisbet 1999.

*intemptata nites! me tabula sacer
uotiuu paries indicat uuida
suspendisse potenti
uestimenta maris deo.*

What slender boy, Pyrrha, drenched in liquid scents, urges you on in some pleasant grotto? For whom do you tie up your auburn hair, simple in your elegance? Alas, how often he will weep at the changes of faith and the gods! How he will wonder in surprise at the waters made rough by dark winds, who enjoys you now and believes that you are golden, who expects that you'll always be available and lovely, ignorant of the treacherous breeze. Wretched are those whom you dazzle while still untried! As for me, the temple wall with its votive tablet indicates that I have hung up my dripping clothes for the god who has power over the sea.

Each of its four stanzas is marked by a significant instance of double hyperbaton (separation of noun and epithet) with interlacing word order, beginning with the opening line of the ode: 1: *quis multa gracilis te puer in rosa*; 6–7: *aspera / nigris aequora uentis*; 9: *qui nunc te fruitur credulus aurea*; 13–14: *tabula sacer / uotiuu paries indicat*.⁶⁰ The effects in each instance are varied. For example, in the opening line the postponement of the noun and the enclosing word order is suggestive of the adolescent boy enveloped in a bed of roses, while in line 9 the juxtaposition of the two adjectives, *credulus* and *aurea*, points to the boy's eventual disillusionment.

The more elevated style of the *Odes*, in comparison with the earlier *Epodes* and *Sermones*, is evident also in word choice, although the stylistic register is certainly not consistently of the highest level. This is reflected in ancient views of Horace, such as the clearly parodic citation of *Carm.* 3.1.1 in Petronius's remarks on poetic diction (*Sat.* 118.4): *refugiendum est ab omni uerborum, ut ita dicam, uilitate et sumendae uoces a plebe semotae, ut fiat 'odi profanum uulgus et arceo'* ('One must shun all that is coarse, so to speak, in the sphere of diction and adopt words remote from the common people, as it's put in Horace's "I hate the common mob and keep them at a distance.") In fact, however, Horace's vocabulary in the *Odes* is marked more by the artistic deployment of words drawn from the neutral register of everyday Latin,⁶¹ rather than the consistent use of elevated diction. In his seminal treatment of the language of Latin poetry, Axelson used the term 'prosaic' with less discrimination to describe the predominant lexical level of Horace's *Odes*, while isolating a large number of words that did not other-

⁶⁰ See the discussion by Nisbet 1999: 136–138.

⁶¹ For the term 'neutral' in this context, cf. Powell 1999: 324–322.

wise appear in the more elevated genres of poetry.⁶² A selection of the words in the *Odes* identified by Axelson as 'prosaic' includes: *atqui, attinet, cena, condicio, flagitium, idoneus, luctuosus, merces, meretrix, negotium, nequam, ordinare, pecunia, plerumque, praesidium, scortum, stultitia, uxorius*.⁶³

By the strategic deployment of such everyday words, both in terms of their syntactical agreement within the sentence and in their actual juxtaposition, Horace renovates the associations of the neutral register. This, too, is part of the process alluded to in the *callida iunctura* (*Ars* 47–48), which is described more fully in the second half of the *Ars Poetica* (240–243):⁶⁴

*ex noto fictum carmen sequar, ut sibi quiuis
speret idem, sudet multum frustra que labore
ausus idem: tantum series iuncturae pollet,
tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris.*

I will aim at a poem created out of the familiar, such that anyone might hope to emulate it, but sweat much and labor in vain if he ventured to emulate it; such is the power of texture and combination, such the dignity that can accrue to words taken from the common stock.

The point may be illustrated by a passage singled out for criticism by Axelson as written in the style of 'ordinary prose'⁶⁵ because of the character of its diction, a reading that runs counter to most intuitive senses of the passage (*Carm.* 4.9.45–52):⁶⁶

*non possidentem multa uocaueris
recte beatum; rectius occupat
nomen beati, qui deorum
muneribus sapienter uti
duramque callet pauperiem pati
peiusque leto flagitium timet,
non ille pro caris amicis
aut patria timidus perire.*

You would not call the man who possess many things properly happy; the title of the happy man is more rightly taken by the one who knows how to use the

⁶² The fundamental value of Axelson's study has not been diminished by the substantial critiques of his terminology and methodology; cf. Ernout 1947; Watson 1985.

⁶³ Axelson 1945: 98–113; cf. Muecke 1997: 776.

⁶⁴ Cf. Wilkinson 1959: 187. Horace is here talking about diction in satyric drama, but what he says follows upon his earlier remarks on diction in general in 47–48; cf. Brink 1971: 288–289.

⁶⁵ Axelson 1989: 111.

⁶⁶ The following discussion is largely indebted to Lyne 1989: 4–7.

gifts of the gods wisely and to endure harsh poverty, and does not fear disgrace worse than death: not for him to be afraid to perish for dear friends or for his homeland.

The juxtaposition of *recte* and *beatum* activates the two senses of the ordinary word *beatum*, material wealth and genuine happiness, which is then replayed in the recurrence of *beati* in the following line. The essentially unpoetic character of *flagitium* has been noted by commentators,⁶⁷ but by combining it with *letum*, a word for 'death' common in poetic diction,⁶⁸ Horace creates an evocative combination, suggesting that "fearful, fabled death, is said by Horace *not* to be as fearful in the estimation of the wise man as regular, familiar old disgrace."⁶⁹ The verb that Horace chooses for knowing, *callet*, has been assigned to the poetic register, but is probably more properly classed as colloquial.⁷⁰ Horace activates the root meaning of the verb from *callum* 'callus,' by combining it with *dura* and *pati*, words that primarily suggest physicality. The artfulness of Horace's style is the product rather of the stylistic tools that he employs in the construction of the *Odes* than of any inherent poetic quality of the language.

4. RECONFIGURING THE LANGUAGE OF DISCOURSE IN THE *EPISTLES*

According to Porphyrio, Horace's ancient commentator, the *Epistles* constitute a reprise of the *Sermones* in subject, meter, and diction, differing from the earlier work only in title.⁷¹ But the decision to couch his themes in the form of a verse epistle necessarily led Horace to modulate the hexametrical style of the *Sermones* to convey a different tone appropriate to the new subject. In antiquity, a letter was considered as constituting one side of a conversation,⁷² and Horace's addressees in the first book represent the lit-

⁶⁷ E.g., Axelson 1945: 111. It belongs to the neutral register of everyday language, but, not having about it any particularly suggestive shades of meaning, it is not used by poets, such as Lucretius, Propertius, Virgil, Ovid, or Lucan. In Horace, it occurs only twice elsewhere, at *Serm.* 2.4.82 and *Carm.* 3.5.26.

⁶⁸ Cf. *TLL* s.v. 1189.26–31.

⁶⁹ Lyne 1989: 6.

⁷⁰ Axelson (1945: 111) describes it as poetic, simply because it seldom occurs in prose, but while the distribution of its surviving occurrences makes it difficult to determine its stylistic register, its relative frequency in early Latin and comedy make it likely that it had an old fashioned and colloquial air in Horace's time.

⁷¹ Porphyrio on *Epist.* 1.1.1: *Flacci epistularum libri titulo tantum dissimiles a sermonum sunt. nam et metrum et materia uerborum et communis adsumptio eadem est.*

⁷² Cf. Demetrius, *Eloc.* 223: Ἀρτέμων μὲν οὖν ὁ τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἀναγράψας ἐπιστολάς

erate elite of society—not only aristocrats of ancient standing (including, in the second book, the emperor), but prominent equestrians.⁷³ Thus, while the freer treatment of the hexameter in the *Sermones* was appropriate to the fiction of a casual chat with Everyman, the more sophisticated epistolary dialogues with the educated class in the *Epistles* determined a different approach here.

The opening poem of the first book, as expected, serves as a programmatic introduction to the collection and establishes stylistic expectations (*Epist.* 1.1.1–12):⁷⁴

*Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena,
spectatum satis et donatum iam rude quaeris,
Maecenas, iterum antiquo me includere ludo?
non eadem est aetas, non mens. Veianius armis
Herculis ad postem fixis latet abditus agro,
ne populum extrema totiens exoret harena.
est mihi purgatam crebro qui personet aurem:
'solue senescentem mature sanus equum, ne
peccet ad extremum ridendus et ilia ducat.'
nunc itaque et uersus et cetera ludicra pono:
quid uerum atque decens, curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum:
condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.*

You, Maecenas, of whom my first Muse told, of whom my last will tell, do you seek to trap me in the old game again, although I'm well enough regarded and have been granted my wooden sword? My age is not what it once was, nor my mind. Veianus hangs his arms on Hercules's door and hides in the country lest he have to beg the crowd for his life so many times on the arena's edge. There is always a voice to ring in my clean ear, saying 'Be smart and turn loose the aging horse while there's time, lest he stumble, broken-winded, at the end, an object of ridicule.' And so, now I set aside verse and other light-hearted things: what's right and proper is what I care about and the question that I ask and I'm wholly absorbed in this. I store up and compose subjects that I can then bring out.

Addressed to Maecenas, his patron and dedicatee of the *Odes*, the opening lines suggest that what is in play here is a return to lyric poetry in the modern vein. Horace signals this by the wordplay on *ludo* in the third line, with the denotation of a gladiatorial contest suggested by the image of the wooden

φησιν, ὅτι δεῖ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ διάλογόν τε γράφειν καὶ ἐπιστολάς· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν οἶον τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τοῦ διαλόγου.

⁷³ Cf. Mayer 1994: 8–10.

⁷⁴ On the programmatic aspects of this poem, cf. Günther 2010: 1–46.

sword, but accompanied by the familiar connotation of lyric verse as play.⁷⁵ It is also suggested in the invocation of the *Camena*, an early equivalent for the Muse in Latin poetry resuscitated by Virgil in his *Eclogues*.⁷⁶ While Horace maintains the fiction from the *Sermones* that this genre of discourse is not true poetry, which he has set aside (*uersus ... pono*, 12), this genre is nonetheless distinguished by refined taste (*purgatam ... aurem*, 7)⁷⁷ and careful composition (*condo ... compono*).⁷⁸

In many respects Horace reprises in the *Epistles* his treatment of the hexameter in the *Sermones*.⁷⁹ As he did in his earlier hexameters, Horace obscures the expected ending of the line with a sense pause falling in the last two feet, often beginning a new clause with a monosyllable at line's end.⁸⁰ In his treatment of caesurae within the line, Horace also continues many of the practices of the *Sermones*, again deviating from the preferences on display in the hexametrical verse of his contemporary, Virgil. For instance, he is particularly fond of locating a caesura after a trochee in the third foot without a supporting strong caesura in the fourth, an effect that he employs with even greater liberty in the *Epistles* than in the *Sermones*.⁸¹ The effect is to "create a distance between the very irregular patterns found in his conversational poems on the one hand and the strictly regulated scansion of the contemporary heroic epos on the other."⁸² The greater control exercised over such licenses is also on display in both the distribution of elisions, which figure less prominently in the *Epistles*, and in their kind, the more harsh of which, such as elisions of long syllables and diphthongs, are avoided.⁸³

⁷⁵ Cf. *Carm.* 1.32.1 *lusimus* and Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: ad loc.

⁷⁶ Cf. *Ecl.* 3.59 and Clausen 1994: ad loc. The subsequent identification of these water nymphs with pastoral is established with Horace's compliment to Virgil in *Serm.* 1.10.44–45: *molle atque facetum/Vergilio adnuerunt gaudentes rure Camenae* ('the Camenae, who delight in the country, have given Virgil the nod for delicacy and wit').

⁷⁷ The metaphor of clean ears for a refined critical sensibility is drawn from Hellenistic poetry, e.g., Posidippus, *SH* 708.2: καθαροῖς οὖσιν; Antip. Sid. *AP* 7.409.3: τορὸν οὖα; Prop. 2.13.12: *auribus ... puris*; cf. Lloyd-Jones 1963: 81–82 = 1990: 169.

⁷⁸ The verbs in line 12 are metaphors for poetic composition, whose primary meanings are also activated here; cf. Mayer 1994: ad loc.

⁷⁹ On meter and style in the *Epistles*, see the excellent treatment in Mayer 1994: 11–39, to which the following discussion is much indebted; cf. also Cupaiuolo 1997.

⁸⁰ On tendencies in the treatment of the hexameter from Catullus onward, see Norden 1995: 400–402. In the first book of *Epistles*, Mayer (1994: 14 n. 41) points to examples in 1.8, 1.23, 1.24, 1.36, 1.80, 2.33, and 3.25; cf. Nilsson 1952: 151–157.

⁸¹ Waltz 1881: 210–211.

⁸² Mayer 1994: 14.

⁸³ For a general discussion, see Waltz 1881: 168–184; cf. Siedow 1911: 32–35; Soubiran 1966:

Horace's sense of stylistic decorum leads him to suppress some of the tendencies that reflect spoken conversation in the *Sermones* in favor of a more regulated rhythm of the written language in the *Epistles*.

In its other salient features, too, the *Epistles* reflect a tempering of the mannerisms of the *Sermones*. Elements of colloquial diction are far less common in the *Epistles*, although they are hardly absent.⁸⁴ Some forms found in the *Sermones*, but not repeated in the *Epistles*, would include *ac* or *atque* after a comparative; *num* or *numquid* to introduce a direct question; and adjectives and adverbs introduced by the intensifying prefix *per-*.⁸⁵ And Horace is more sparing in his use of archaisms in the *Epistles* as well.⁸⁶ In the later hexameters Horace employs the standard resources of Latin poetry style to distinguish his language from the purely everyday tone of even elevated discourse through familiar means, such as neologisms and Grecisms.⁸⁷ And in the deployment of word order in the *Epistles*, Horace is more restrained than in the free-wheeling *Sermones*.

The introduction to the epistle to Iccius, who manages the Sicilian estates of Marcus Agrippa, illustrates Horace's effective modulation of tone (*Epist.* 1.12.1–12):⁸⁸

*Fructibus Agrippae Siculis quos colligis, Icci,
si recte frueris, non est ut copia maior
ab Ioue donari possit tibi. tolle querelas;
pauper enim non est cui rerum suppetit usus.
si uentri bene, si lateri est pedibusque tuis, nil
diuitiae poterunt regales addere maius.
si forte in medio positorum abstemius herbis
uiuis et urtica, sic uiues protinus, ut te
confestim liquidus Fortunae riuus inauret,
uel quia naturam mutare pecunia nescit
uel quia cuncta putas una uirtute minora.*

80–90, 246–250. There are lists of elisions and hiatuses to be found in the indices of Bo 1960 and Klingner 1959.

⁸⁴ Everyday language was certainly recognized as a feature of the epistolary style. Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 9.21.1 on differences in style between letters and more formal prose: *uerum tamen quid tibi ego uideor in epistulis? nonne plebeio sermone agere tecum? nec enim semper eodem modo. quid enim simile habet epistula aut iudicio aut contioni? quin ipsa iudicia non solemus omnia tractare uno modo. priuatas causas et eas tenuis agimus subtilius, capitis aut famae scilicet ornati. epistulas uero quotidianis uerbis texere solemus.*

⁸⁵ Cf. Axelson 1945: 37–38; Brink 1971. For more general discussion, cf. Muecke 1997: 784; Ricottilli 1997.

⁸⁶ Mayer 1994: 17.

⁸⁷ On poetic diction in the *Epistles*, cf. Muecke 1997: 774; Mayer 1994: 17–21.

⁸⁸ For a reading of the whole epistle, see Harrison 2007b: 269–272.

Iccius, if you have proper enjoyment of the Sicilian fruits that you collect for Agrippa, no greater abundance can be given you by Jupiter. Stop your complaints; for no one is poor who has the use of plenty. If all is well with your stomach, your flank, and your feet, a king's wealth will be able to add nothing more. If you happen to live on herbs and nettles while abstaining from ready-set dainties, that way you will live effortlessly, even though Fortune's clear stream suddenly gild you, either because money cannot change your nature, or because you think all else inferior to virtue alone.

The displacement (hyperbaton) of *si* in line 2 is a feature of poetic word order that here serves also to emphasize the adverb *recte* 'aright.' Phrases such as *non est ut* (2)⁸⁹ and *bene est* (5)⁹⁰ are drawn from the stock of everyday Latin, but are not common in poetry, probably because of their inherently discursive tone. *Abstemius* would surely have been labeled 'prosaic' in Axelsson's day, but it simply lacks poetic color and belongs rather to the neutral register of the language.⁹¹ To render it poetic, Horace has it govern a genitive, an example of Grecizing syntax.⁹² The sense of *protinus*, 'without effort,' is somewhat unusual and perhaps reflects an idiomatic phrase.⁹³ The lines contain no significant metrical divergences, but there is some distancing from the rhythms of hexametrical narrative effected by sense pauses in the last foot in line 5, with the apodosis beginning in *nil*, and 8, with the concessive clause beginning in *ut te*.

The cumulative effect of Horace's modulation of the conversational tone adopted in the *Epistles* is to reproduce the discourse of educated persons on serious topics, without jettisoning the refinements of poetic style that characterize the age. As Horace moved from one genre to another, he adapted the aesthetic principles of lexical precision and virtuosity in rhythm to the requirements of each mode. Innovation in technique is the hallmark of Horace's poetic career, and the minute attention that he devoted to every detail of expression is best resurrected by a commensurate effort from his readers.

⁸⁹ Cf. *OLD* s.v. *sum* 7a.

⁹⁰ *OLD* s.v. *bene* 8b; cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004: 211.

⁹¹ In poetry it is attested at Lucil. 239M and Ovid, *Met.* 15.323.

⁹² See Mayer 1994: ad loc.

⁹³ Cf. Sen. *Dial.* 10.9.2: *omnia quae uentura sunt in incerto iacent: protinus vive*; *TLL* s.v. *protinus* 2285.48–66.

THE TRANSMISSION OF THE TEXT OF HORACE

Edward Courtney

Abstract: On the basis of some universal corruptions it must be concluded that the extant manuscripts ultimately derive from one source in the ancient world, which may have been furnished with diacritical signs. The tradition of these extant manuscripts had probably split into two families, one less cohesive than the other, in antiquity, but there has been much 'contamination' between the two. The lost Blandinian manuscript in the hexametrical poems has drawn on a different source, and some readings in this line of descent have filtered into a few of the extant manuscripts.

Keywords: Contamination, scholia, Mavortius, Valerius Probus, diacritical signs

1

Noteworthy discussions of this topic are:

Vollmer 1905

Lenchantin De Gubernatis 1937

Pasquali 1952: 374–385

Brink 1971: 1–43

Tarrant in Reynolds 1983: 182–185

Enciclopedia Oraziana I 319–354 (various authors). Henceforward referred to by *EO* and page number only.

The fullest available information about manuscript readings can be gained from:

Keller 1899–1925

Lenchantin De Gubernatis 1945/1958

Bo 1959.

As methodology requires that discussions of this subject be mostly based on manuscript errors (see section 5, below), it becomes important to decide which manuscript readings are in fact erroneous. Since the opinions of scholars differ widely on this, and my own are as subjective as anyone else's, it is necessary to take into account the judgment of a number of scholars. The most eminent editors of Horace, those who consider problems

most conscientiously and whose judgments carry most weight, seem to me to be:


(all the works) R. Bentley (1711), A. Meineke (²1854), F. Vollmer (²1912), D.R. Shackleton Bailey (⁴2001)
 (*Odes*, *CS*, *Epodes*) L. Mueller (1900; much superior to his editions of the *Satires* and *Epistles*, 1891–1893)
 (*Odes* I–II) R.G.M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard (1970–1978); (*Odes* III) Nisbet and N. Rudd (2004)
 (*Epodes*) D. Mankin (1995), L. Watson (2003)
 (*Satires*) A. Palmer (⁴1891); occasional reference is also made to Courtney 1996a.
 (*Epistles* II and *Ars Poetica*) C.O. Brink (1971–1982).

I have not labeled as corrupt anything that is not so considered, or at least severely doubted, by three or more of the above.

2

Whereas we have manuscripts of Virgil from the ancient world, for Horace the earliest extant manuscripts belong to the ninth century, and modern editors base their texts on a selection (usually of about 12–16) dating from the ninth to the eleventh centuries. There exist hundreds of others; a list of 860 is compiled by C. Villa (1992/1993/1994) and in *EO* (319), and Munk Olsen (1982–1989), with occasional supplements in *Revue d'histoire des textes*, who lists and describes those that fall within his period. Many of these have never been investigated fully or at all, and some perhaps never even catalogued. The labor invested in such investigation would be unlikely to gain proportionate rewards, but we cannot know this for sure; Vollmer came across the useful manuscript K by accident, and one manuscript of the fifteenth century, to be adduced in section 3, has its importance. Because of extensive horizontal transmission of variants ('contamination'), many of them recorded in extant manuscripts and to be presumed in lost ones, it is not possible to arrange the manuscripts in a comprehensive stemma. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to draw up a skeleton stemma that can show the affinities of some of the principal manuscripts and some of the cross-currents; the accompanying diagram, which I shall try to validate in my discussion, illustrates my attempt to do this. In this, dotted lines indicate uncertainty about the exact point at which contamination debouches and/or originates.

hexameter
poems



We have to begin with a strain of tradition that derives in part from a source standing apart from the main mass of manuscripts. In the years 1565–1578, a Belgian scholar, who latinized his vernacular name to Jacobus Cruquius, published in instalments an edition of Horace for which he had consulted four manuscripts in the library of the monastery of Blankenberge (Mont Blandin) near Ghent. One of these was the *codex antiquissimus Blandini(an)us*, lost with the others in the fire that in 1566 devastated the monastery after Cruquius had restored the manuscripts that he had borrowed. We do not know the age of this manuscript, which Cruquius may have overestimated since the science of palaeography barely existed at the time, but he does make it plain that it was in a difficult (which has sometimes without warrant been taken to mean Irish) minuscule script. The character of Cruquius's reports, not always precise or clear, can be conveniently studied for the *Odes*, *Epodes*, and *CS* in Keller (1.344–370), and for *Epistles* II and *AP* in Brink (2.47–50, 3.2–6). It is one of the glories of Bentley's edition that he was the first to see the value of V (as the *antiquissimus Blandinianus* is known) and to apply it with discrimination.

In the *Satires* this manuscript offered a long list of readings superior to those of the bulk of manuscripts, together with some interpolations. The most striking of its good readings is 1.6.21: **fugio Campum lusumque trigonem* (here and henceforward I asterisk what I regard as clearly correct readings) against *f. rabiosi tempora signi*; Cruquius reports that V's reading had dots beneath it and the vulgate reading was noted. At 2.3.255 its reading, **cubital* (*cubitale* the bulk of the manuscripts and a correction in V, unmetrically), is what is quoted by Fronto (vdHout, ed. Teubn. 1988, p. 20.15); on the other hand, at 2.4.44, Donatus (on Ter. *Eun.* 426) agrees with the bulk of the manuscripts in *fecundi* against V's **fecundae*. I list other readings of V in the *Satires* in Courtney 1996a: 271–273, where I inadvertently referred to B as the oldest manuscript (see section 4).

A fifteenth-century manuscript in Gotha (Forschungsbibliothek B 61), known as g and brought into prominence by C. Kirchner in 1847, has incorporated some readings from this strain; for its precise place in the stemma, see section 8. It probably presents V's reading in some places where Cruquius has not noted it, particularly at 1.3.56, *furimus*, a reading that will be discussed in section 8; it is also one of the very few manuscripts to offer **puer* (as against *puerum*) at 2.2.112. Other notable readings are 1.10.68, *dilatatus* (*dilapsus* most manuscripts, but Cruquius reports without details that

three Blandinian manuscripts had *delapsus*), 2.2.132, *postremo* (*postremum* cett.), 2.3.129, *tuo* (R, on which see section 4, also apparently had this probably correct reading before correction; *tuos* cett.). At 1.6.126 it agrees with V except that it corrupts *lusumque* to *lusitque*.

The status of V in the *AP* (which is missing in g) and the *Epistles* will be discussed in section 8. In the *Odes*, *CS*, and *Epodes* it seems to have provided an unremarkable text. At *Odes* 2.19.23 most editors ignore Cruquius's report that V as corrected offered the correct form **Rhoecum*; on the other hand, Shackleton Bailey has no warrant for suggesting, even dubiously, that it read *at huc* at *Epode* 9.17. One may also observe *Odes* 4.6.21, *flexus* (not inevitably right; *uictus* cett., but not the scholiast at *Stat. Th.* 5.277, where Sweeney's apparatus discloses that the manuscripts there omit the word); 4.7.15, *pater*, with a few other manuscripts, very likely right against *pius*, but one must balance this against the interpolated *uitae* two lines later with the same manuscripts and some others; 4.8.9, *nec*, with one or two of the same manuscripts, seems preferable to *non*. At *Odes* 2.16.19 g's *mutamus patria* may deserve more attention than it has received against *mutamus; patriae* of the other manuscripts.

4

To turn now to the mass of extant manuscripts, two among the earliest deserve particular mention:

R Vat. Reg. Lat. 1703 from Alsace, probably the oldest manuscript; it shows corrections by Walafrid Strabo, who died in AD 849 (Pellegrin 1978: 2.1.370–373, after Bischoff). Some of the lyric poems are accompanied by neums, and the manuscript is particularly notable for correct orthography. There are reproductions in *EO* 330; Chatelain 1884: pl. 1.87; and Buonocore 1992: tab.1.

B Bernensis 363, a collection of excerpts from various authors, including Horace (beginning with 19 Sapphic *Odes* and containing nothing from the *Epistles*; in the *Satires* it peters out near the end of I 3). This was written in the ninth century in a continental Irish scriptorium not yet securely identified. There is a facsimile by Hagen 1897, and Chatelain 1884: pl. 1. 76–77; *EO* 334 ff., and Questa and Raffaelli 1982: tav. 30–40, after p. 368, give plates. Closely allied to this is C, one component of an eleventh-century composite manuscript, Monacensis lat. 14685, the other component of which is known as E (they partly overlap). The contents of this manuscript are most clearly distinguished by Brink 2.4–6; it is especially important where B is missing. B

and C overlap in CS, *AP* (up to 440, after which they break off), and a number of *Odes* and *Epodes*.

Here are a few readings from these and V to illustrate their character and relationships: R: proper names: it is the only manuscript which consistently spells **Vergilius*; *Odes* 3.20.15, **Nireus* (so at *Epode* 15.22 with one other manuscript; Porphyrio, on whom see section 6, knows who is meant but seems to have spelled him *Nereus* with B and the other manuscripts); *Epode* 16.4 **Porsinae* (*Porsen(na)e* BC cett.). With the agreement of Porphyrio: *Odes* 2.7.5, **Pompei* (with the heading in B; *Pomp(il)i* cett.); 3.15.16 **uetulam* (-a cett.); *Epode* 16.37, **ex(s)pes* (*expers* BC al.), cf. *AP* 20. Other: *Epist.* 1.7.96, **semel* according to Keller and Klingner (*simul* VC al.).

B: *Odes* 3.14.14, **exiget* (*exigit* Prisc. GLK 3.189, *eximet* cett. including R, though Klingner thinks it may there be a correction); *Serm.* 1.3.128, **qui* (*quo* R cett.); *Epode* 17.11, **luxere* with C (*unxere* RV al.).

C: *Epist.* 1.1.57, **est lingua* (*et l.* R cett.); 1.6.50, **laeuum* (*saeuum* R cett.); 2.1.48, **ad* (*in* R cett.).

Cases where the right reading is not clear: *Odes* 3.14.6, *diuis*, R Porphyrio al., *sacris* B al., CS 65 *arces* BC al., *aras* RV Porphyrio.

Even this selection will show that fixed affinities cannot be established, and there must have been much crossing of readings even in the earliest manuscripts, a point to be developed just below. The manuscripts, where they differ, sometimes offer three variants; examples are *Odes* 1.28.31, *forset* V, *forsit* R, *forsan* B (each reading with support in other manuscripts); 2.13.23, *descriptas* R al., *discriptas* B al., *discretas* al., and Porphyrio; *Epode* 16.33, **rauos* BV al., *flauos* R al., *saeuos* al.; and especially *Odes* 3.24.4, *publicum* RV al., *ponticum* B al., *apulicum* al., where none of the three can be right. But generally they split between two readings on no very consistent lines. Editors must abandon attempts to force the apparatus into tidiness, as indeed they generally do nowadays. Brink simply quotes the manuscripts individually, though by typographical spacing he indicates some subgroups. Shackleton Bailey mostly adopts the same approach, but uses the collective siglum Ψ for one moderately cohesive group with six main representatives (see p. iv of his edition). This siglum he took over from F. Klingner, who in his unsatisfactory edition (1939, etc.), following Vollmer, wrongly included R in this group; Shackleton Bailey rightly does not include it. I think that one could go a little farther in this direction and recognize standing over against Ψ another stream of tradition to which BC belong. This branch is not so cohesive as Ψ, and other than C+E only one of its main representatives is complete, but where it does cohere it would do no harm to denote its consensus by adopting Klingner's siglum Ξ. That it is a real group at its roots

can be established from the following selection of readings, with that of R included for comparison; it should be noticed, here and elsewhere, that I pass over some details that seem to have no significance.

R Ψ wrong against E: *Epode* 17.62, *si*, with Porphyrio, **sed*; *Serm.* 2.3.21, *faber*, **uafer* E g Porphyrio; 2.3.39, *urget*, **angit* E V R var.; 2.3.96, *contraxerit* (again, Shackleton Bailey has no warrant for hinting that V might have read this), **construxerit* E g; *Epist.* 1.7.93, *dicere*, **ponere* E V; 2.1.186 *plaudet*, **gaudet* E V; 2.2.8., *imitabimur*, **imitaberis* E V; 2.2.11, *excludere* with V, **extrudere*; *AP* 76 *iunctis* from 75, **inclusa est*; 212 omitted.

R E wrong against Ψ: *Odes* 1.7.27, *Teucro*, with 'Victorinus' GLK 6.115, where see Keil's apparatus, **Teucro*; 1.8.2, see section 7; 3.18.7, *craterae*, **creterrae* Ψ Porphyrio (cf. *Serm.* 1.4.80); *Serm.* 1.1.38, *patiens*, **sapiens* Ψ V Porphyrio; 1.7.7, *tumidus* with V (contrary to Horace's metrical practice), **tumidusque*; 2.3.174, *insania* (unmetrical; the variant is not noted by Shackleton Bailey) with g, **uesania*; 2.3.235, *uellis*, **uerris* with V; 2.7.19, *acrior* with V, **ac prior*.

E wrong against R Ψ: *Odes* 1.15.20, *crines* with V, *cultus* R Ψ probably correctly; 3.2.22, *ire*, **iter* (Shackleton Bailey does not record R's reading); 4.6.10, *impressa*, **impulsa*; 4.9.52, *peribit*, **perire* with V; *Epist.* 1.16.5, *si*, with g, **ni*; 2.2.206, *fuge rite* with V, **fugere* with Porphyrio.

Ψ wrong against R E. Only a few instances of this need to be given. *Odes* 4.2.6, *cum ... saliere* (*saluere*), with V, **quem ... aluere*; *Epist.* 2.2.83, *Curii*, with Porphyrio, **curis*; *AP* 18, *fluuius*, with Porphyrio on *Odes* 4.4.38, **pluiius*. This branch prefixes eight spurious lines to *Serm.* 1.10.

I hope that this establishes that occasional use of the symbol E can be helpful, but to try to use it all the time, as Klingner did (and Vollmer did with his I and II), involves much forcing of the evidence. The above list raises the question of the exact makeup of the contaminated manuscript R. It is noticeable that in some cases where it disagrees with Ψ, it represents an earlier stage of corruption than Ψ itself:

- Serm.* 1.6.83, **seruauit* E, -*abit* R, -*abat* Ψ
 2.2.128, **nituistis* E with g, *innituistis* R, *instituitis* Ψ
Epist. 1.19.13, **textore* E, *extore* R, *ex ore* Ψ
 2.2.71, **purae* E with V, *pluræ* R, *plures* Ψ
 2.2.203, **loco re* E, *locore* R, *colore* Ψ.

There are other similar places where the manuscript known as π agrees with R against the rest of Ψ, its brother δ being absent:

- Epist.* 1.16.61, **iusto sanctoque* VR π E, *iustum sanctumque* Ψ cett.
 2.1.17, **dictitet* E, *dicet et* R π, *dicat et* Ψ cett.
 2.1.226, **eo rem uenturam* E, *forem uenturam* R π (unmetrically), *item fore uenturum* Ψ cett. (mending the meter); the corruption of E to F goes back to capital script.

This suggests that both R's Ψ -readings and $\pi\delta$, as indicated on my stemma, come from an earlier stage of this stream of tradition than its other representatives. As this point a reminder may be useful that such signs as Ψ and Ξ may indicate either consensus of readings within groups of manuscripts or reconstructed readings of common ancestors of these groups; theoretically, these are not the same thing, but as regards Horace this does not seem to be of any practical import, and I do not think that any confusion will be caused if I do not precisely define my use in each case.

5

Agreements in significant error show that all extant manuscripts, with the partial exception of g, go back to a common source, which on my stemma I have arbitrarily labeled Δ . At this point, it may be as well to remind ourselves of the definition of significant error, namely, 'error unlikely to have been committed independently by more than one source, and therefore by definition going back to one source.'

Here is a select list of such errors, compiled on the principle laid out in section 1; where a solution to a problem is widely accepted or in my view acceptable, I have noted this, and have also commended a few recent solutions. I have not included most errors involving just one letter, nor errors that, it might be claimed, could have arisen independently more than once. It is to be noted that this list is intended strictly to prove a point as objectively as possible, and is not meant in any way to be comprehensive.

- Odes* 1.2.39, *Mauri* (*Marsi*, T. Faber)
 1.12.31, *quia* (so V also; unmetrical, but clearly the tradition despite variants interpolated to cure the meter)
 1.15.36, *Iliacas* (the support of this in Nisbet and Hubbard is revoked in Nisbet 1995: 195). Best seems *barbaricas*, due to John Jones (1736); so Housman in Wilkinson 1974: 37, who adduces *barbarae turmae* of the Trojan army at 2.4.9 (cf. also *Epist.* 1.2.7).
 1.25.20, *Hebro* (*Euro*, ed. Ald.)
 1.32.15, *cumque*
 2.2.14, *pellit* (*pellas*, Peerlkamp)
 3.1.39–40. A conjunction is missing, either *triremi* (*et*), with a few manuscripts, or *post(que)*, with Bentley
 3.4.10, *limina Pulliae* or (unmetrical) *limen Apuliae*
 3.4.46, *urbes* (*umbras* Bentley)
 3.6.22, *matura*
 3.11.18, *eius atque*
 3.14.11, *iam uirum expertae male (n)ominatis*
 3.20.8, *illi* (*illa*, Peerlkamp)

- 3.24.60, *consortem socium* (Bentley connects the two with ⟨*et*⟩)
 3.26.7, *et arcus*
 4.8.17, spurious, but at least one other line must also be spurious, in my opinion 16, with Madvig's emendation *celeris fugae* adopted in 15.
 4.10.2, *pluma*
 4.10.5, *Ligurinum* (*Ligurine*, Torrentius)
Epodes 1.26, *meis* (*mea*, a few manuscripts)
 4.8, *ter* (*trium*, Barth)
 8.17, *minus* (*magis*, N. Heinsius)
 13.13, *parui*
 16.61–62 are out of place
 17.22, *reliquit* (*relinquor*, Peerlkamp)
CS 16, *genitalis* (*Genetyllis*, Bentley)
Satires 1.1.101, *N(a)euus* (*Maenius*, Glareanus)
 1.3.25, *peruideas*
 1.4.87, *auet* (*amet*, a few manuscripts)
 1.8.15, *quo* (*qua*, Bentley; *qui* Apitz)
 2.3.234, *in* (*tu*, Johnson)
 2.4.19, *mixto* (*musto*, Crato)
 2.5.36, *quassa* (*cassa*, a few manuscripts)
 2.6.29, *quid tibi uis, insane, et quas res agis* (unmetrical; *quam rem*, Bentley)
Epistles 1.1.56, spurious (see section 8)
 1.3.33, *heu ... heu* (so V; *seu ... seu*, a few manuscripts)
 1.13.14, *Pirria* or *Pyrria*
 1.14.9, *amat* (*auet*, Bentley)
 2.1.101, spurious, or possibly to be placed after 107 (Lachmann)
 2.2.70, *humane* (*haut sane*, Froehlich)
 2.2.87, *frater erat Romae consulto*
 2.2.89, *hic ... illi* (*huic ... ille*, Britannicus)
 2.2.171, *refugit* (*refringit*, Horkel)
AP 32, *imus* (*unus*, Bentley; cf. the variants at *Serm.* 1.4.87)
 45–46 are in reverse order
 101, *adsunt* (*adflent*, an anonymous grammarian and Bentley)
 120, *honoratum* (*inornatum*, proposed by Nisbet, *Gnom.* 58 (1986), 614, seems best)
 172, *spe longus* (if *splenosus*, proposed by Powell 1984: 240, is not right, it deserves to be) ... *auidusque* (*pauidusque*, Bentley)

Some such universal corruptions can be traced back to the ancient world:

- Odes* 1.23.1, *uitat*, Diomedes, Porphyrio (unmetrical; *uitas*, a few manuscripts)
 2.17.14, *gigas* Priscian (so too V), 3.4.69, Priscian (*Gyges*, Muretus, Bentley)
AP 60, *pronos*, Diomedes and GLK 5.326 (*priuos*, Bentley, a clear case of corruption due to capital script, PRIVOS › PRNOS)
 65, *diu palus*, (unmetrical) Priscian, Servius
CS 26, *dictum (est) stabilisque rerum* / *terminus seruet*, Porphyrio, Servius (*dictum stabilis per aeuum* / *terminus seruat*, Bentley).

The next step, then, is to review other testimonies from the ancient world. First, a few words about the scholia. One set of these is by Pomponius Porphyrio, dating from the third or perhaps fourth century. It was originally intended to accompany a punctuated text, but is now preserved as a separate commentary; its earliest manuscript (pretty clearly the source of the others), belonging to the ninth century, is of much the same age as the oldest manuscripts of Horace. The second set, preserved in the margins of Horatian manuscripts, assumes the name of Helenius Acro, who wrote his commentary in the second century, but his work is overlaid by masses of later accretions; because of this I have adduced it only once.

Second, at the end of the *Epodes* three significant manuscripts and a few others present a subscription:

Vettius Agorius Basilius Mauortius uir clarissimus et inlustris, excomite domestico, exconsule extraordinario legi et ut potui emendaui, conferente mihi magistro Felice oratore urbis Romae.

This Mauortius was consul in 527, and this subscription used to play, but does so no longer, an exaggerated role in theories of the transmission. However, one can perhaps extract a little from it. The main manuscripts that preserve it are known as A, which belongs to the Ξ tradition, and $\lambda\lambda$, which basically belong to Ψ but in the *Odes*, and *Epodes*, as Shackleton Bailey (p. iv, following Klingner, p. xxv) has remarked, often desert that strain. These same manuscripts also unite in reading *ducere* at *Odes* 3.3.34, which looks like a banalization of the **discere* presented by the other manuscripts; *lux* at 4.14.5 as against **sol* (but note that B is here absent); **aerea* at *Epode* 16.65 as against *aere*; and a few other places of little import (but see section 7 on *Odes* 4.14.28). Though I recognize this evidence to be tenuous, I have thought it worthwhile at least to arouse controversy by an entry on my stemma; the corollary would be that Ξ already existed by the early sixth century (in fact it probably existed earlier; see below). One may note that this subscription appears in g, but this probably has no significance; in two of the above readings, F. Ritter, in his edition (1856–1857), reports *discere* and *aere* from it (he is silent about the third).

The third testimony is that of the *Anecdoton Parisinum* (GLK 7.534) that the first-century scholar Valerius Probus *illas* (sc. notas; diacritical signs) in ... *Horatio* ... *adposuit*. Again, much has been built on this, but on shaky foundations; Suet. *De Gramm.* 24.2 seems to imply that this was a private activity, not the work of an editor ‘publishing’ corrected texts. However, it is likely that the textual situation in two passages of the *Epistles* (discussed

by Courtney 1987: 17–18) can be traced to misunderstanding of such critical signs. One of these is 1.18.89 sqq., where the authoritative manuscripts offer this:

89 oderunt (90)
92 oderunt porrecta negantem pocula ...

The correct text, with 91 supplied by inferior authority, is:

89
90
91 potores (bibuli media de nocte Falerni
oderunt) porrecta negantem pocula ...

with the bracketed words deleted by Pottier and Meineke. Probably after the interpolation had been made, knowledge survived in the scholarly tradition that its genuineness was open to question and doubts were signified by the affixing of some critical sign, which was subsequently misunderstood as a direction to delete 91. The other passage will be discussed in section 8.

Next, we have several passages in which ancient testimonia offer evidence that, at least potentially, predates universal corruption in the manuscripts:

Odes 2.18.30, *sede* was read by Servius in place of *fine*, very likely correctly.
Epode 15.15, **offensi* (Acro) in place of *offensae*, as Porphyrio has it (still defended by Rudd in Miller et al. 2002: 49).
Serm. 1.8.29, *manibus*, Porphyrio's lemma, I believe correctly, in place of *manis* or *manes* (as Porphyrio himself has it). The lemmata of Porphyrio lack ancient authority (see Keller 1879–1880: 796–797); presented with a gift like this, however dubious its origin, we should just take it and not look too closely.

One may here mention the claim that imitations of *Odes* 2.10.11 by Fronto and Isidore (quoted in Nisbet and Hubbard) imply a pre-archetypal *saeuus* for *saepius*, but, while this is plausible for Isidore, it is far from certain either that Fronto had Horace in mind or that *saepius* is wrong. Other divergences by ancient sources from the united testimony of the manuscripts are pretty certainly due to negligence.

7

The existence of two streams of tradition stemming from a common source has now, I trust, been established; what do ancient testimonies have to offer in relation to the split? Here are passages where such testimonies support both readings:

- Odes* 1.32.1, *poscimus*, Ξ Diomedes GLK 1.523, Serv. *ibid.* 4.469; *poscimur*, RΨ Serv. Buc. 1.10, 'Victorinus' GLK 6.175, and doubtless Porphyrio.
 3.5.10, **et nominis*, R (not recorded by Shackleton Bailey) V Ψ Chari-
 sius GLK 1.62, Serv. Aen. 7.118, most manuscripts; *nominis*, Ξ Cleonius
 GLK 5.439, Serv. *cod. Floriacensis*, (Cassiodorus).
 4.4.36, *indecorant*, RΨ Porphyrio, *dedecorant*, Ξ *schol. Juv.* 14.1.
 4.14.28, *meditatur*, R, one Ξ manuscript, Serv. Georg. 3.153 and Aen. 4.171,
 Porphyrio; *minitatur*, Ψ, Porphyrio's manuscript(s), intended by Nonius
 203 M, and perhaps Mavortius.
- Epode* 12.2, *quid*, Ξ 'Victorinus' 170.16, 181.22; *cur*, RΨ 'Victorinus' 170.27, Fortuna-
 tianus 303.30 (and *curue* for the following *quidue*).
- Epist.* 1.8.12, **uentosus*, RE Serv. Aen. 4.224; *uenturus*, ΨV Porphyrio on *Serm.*
 2.7.28.

Here we may also consider

- Odes* 1.8.2, **te deos oro* or *hoc deos oro* Ψ, *hoc deos uere* RE

This line is of great interest to ancient writers on meter because it has an unusual form, so they illustrate its nature by various adjustments to remold it into cognate forms. For some of these adjustments they need the third word to begin with a consonant and therefore introduce *uere*, which also entails alteration of *te* because it no longer fits the syntax. The correct form is naturally found in the initial quotation in 'Caesius Bassus,' GLK 6.270.5, but misunderstanding could easily have suggested that the reading of RE was correct; all this is explained by Nisbet and Hubbard, following Garrod. The inference must be that *hoc deos uere* did not come into RE stemmatically, but was introduced from outside the tradition.

One may also note that Porphyrio sometimes records variants, particularly at *Serm.* 2.1.79, **diffingere* (so R), and *diffidere* (Ψ; V had *diffindere*); *Epist.* 2.2.80, **contracta* (so Cg; more on this in section 8) and *contacta* (RΨ and one other manuscript, which with C here represents Ξ).

One must conclude from this that not only did the postulated common source (my Δ) belong to the ancient world, but that it had also spawned two hyparchetypes, perhaps drawing some of their readings from variants in that source, by maybe as early as the fourth century. Up until the mid-sixth century citation and imitation of Horace were common, but from then until the mid-ninth century they become rare, though not nonexistent, when not taken at second-hand (Vollmer 1905: 287–288). A book list in Italian handwriting of about AD 790 includes the *AP*, and it was rather fancifully linked by Bischoff with Charlemagne's 'court library' at Aachen, but that view seems to be generally rejected nowadays. Alcuin took the name 'Flaccus' in the court literary club, but his writings seem to show no first-hand knowledge

of Horace's text. When Horace re-emerges in manuscripts, starting with R in the first half of the ninth century, the tradition is already thoroughly confused by horizontal transmission of variants; as I have tried to show, though we can trace a fair number of these to hyparchetypes, in the majority of cases we have to content ourselves with quoting the manuscripts individually.

8

Finally, it is necessary to look a little more closely at the tradition represented by V in the *Epistles* and the *AP* in relation to BC. In the *AP* we have both of these. In the *Epistles*, unfortunately, B is absent and it cannot be determined (see Brink 2.6 and 3.1) whether we are dealing with C (the siglum used by Brink and Shackleton Bailey, whom I follow) or E (so Keller, i. xxiv, who seems quite confident); so some of the following arguments may have to be regarded as provisional. This manuscript needs to be examined by an expert with no interest in Horace.

In the *AP* we have BCV agreeing at 237, **et* (an R Ψ); 294, **praesectum* (*perfectum* R Ψ); 328; **triens eu* (*trienem* R, *triens est* Ψ); and a few other less striking instances; with B singly note 426, *quoi* V, *qui* B, *cui* cett.; with C singly 249, **fricti* VR al., *stricti* C, *fracti* B al. In the *Epistles*, V alone presents 1.16.43 **res sponsore* (*responsore* cett.), and at 1.10.13 I have argued (Courtney 1996b: 429; so also L. Mueller and Sauppe 1863: 253–256, with parallels not all to the point) for V's *ponenda* as against *ponendae* cett. But it is more important that CVg show striking agreements, of which here are some:

- In error: CVg 1.15.16, *dulcis* (**iugis* cett.); 2.1.167, *in scriptis* (**inscite* cett.)
Cg 1.14.11, *res* (**sors* cett.); 1.18.111, *qui* (**quae* cett.)
- Right or possibly right: CVg 1.2.31, *somnum* (*curam* cett.; actually in Courtney 2006: 177f. I advocate this usually rejected reading); 2.1.28, *Graiorum* (*Graecorum* cett.)
Cg 1.7.51, *resecantem* (*purgantem* cett.); 1.16.3, *an* (*et* cett.); for 2.2.80, see section 7 (g here is superior to V in presenting **contracta* against V's corruption *cantata*). Here we must also consider 1.1.55–58, which in the bulk of manuscripts appear thus:

*haec recinunt iuuenes dictata senesque
laeuo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto.
sed quadringentos sex septem milia desunt
est animus tibi, sunt mores, est lingua fidesque.*

Line 56 is a spurious repetition of *Serm.* 1.6.74, and 57–58 are in the wrong order, whereas Cg present them in the right order. Occam's Razor invites us to find one explanation that will simultaneously account for the two errors,

so let us suppose that a diacritical sign (for such, see section 6) intended to mark 56 as spurious was misunderstood as a direction to reverse 57 and 58.

It is very unlikely that C is preserving these readings against all its congeners through stemmatic descent. It is much more probable that readings from the V tradition filtered through to the parent of BC, and in it were recorded as variants, from which B and C took a slightly different selection; this would seem to be confirmed by 1.17.12, *inunctum* V, *adinunctum* C, **ad unctum* C corr. cett. Now if we think back to the *Satires*, this hypothesis would explain 1.3.56, *furimus* g (rightly or wrongly), *fugimus* B, *cupimus* E cett. (C being absent), and perhaps 1.2.110, *tollere* VB against *pellere* (see Courtney 1996a: 273); remember that B stops near the end of I 3, so we cannot look for more agreements. The readings of V in the *Satires* are so striking that its important role (with g) in the *Epistles* seems to have attracted little attention.

Finally, these observations may help toward placing g in the stemma. One's primary instinct might make it derive its V-readings from V itself, but there is some evidence that this is not so. *Epist.* 2.2.80, adduced just above, would point in a different direction if, as I have argued, the reading of Cg does indeed come from the V-tradition; there is also 1.10.25, **fastidia* Cg, *uestigia* V, which is a corruption of *fastigia*, as the other manuscripts have it.

The reader will have noticed that I have throughout avoided the use of the term 'archetype.' This is because we cannot identify an archetype of the Horatian text in the proper sense of the word, 'the last common ancestor of the manuscripts of an author.' Leaving aside V's nondescript text of the *Odes* and *Epodes*, which may well be related somehow to my Δ, we cannot tell whether it derived its characteristic readings in the hexametrical poems from a remote ancestor of Δ or whether they come from an entirely different source; so I have left two unconnected lines of descent on my stemma. It is not surprising that at its date g is much contaminated, but the same must have been true about V, as may be illustrated by its ambivalence between Ξ and Ψ as instanced by cases quoted above, particularly in section 4; this could only be indicated in vague fashion on my stemma. Much in the textual tradition of Horace will always remain obscure to us, but I hope that a clearer understanding of some lines of descent may emerge from my discussion, which, I must gratefully acknowledge, has greatly benefited from observations kindly communicated by professors R.G.M. Nisbet and M.D. Reeve.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	<i>Antike und Abendland</i>
AJAH	<i>American Journal of Ancient History</i>
AJPh	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
ALP	<i>Archaic Latin Prose</i> , ed. E. Courtney (Atlanta 1999)
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
BICS	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London</i>
BMCR	<i>Bryn Mawr Classical Review</i>
CJ	<i>The Classical Journal</i>
CPh	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
DÉLG	<i>Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque: Histoire des Mots par P. Chantraine</i> (Nouvelle éd., Paris 2009)
DÉLL	<i>Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine. Histoire des Mots par A. Ernout – A. Meillet – J. André</i> (⁴ Paris 1994)
DNP	<i>Der Neue Pauly</i>
EO	<i>Enciclopedia Oraziana</i>
EV	<i>Enciclopedia Virgiliana</i>
FGE	Page, D., <i>Further Greek Epigrams: epigrams before A.D. 50 from the Greek anthology and other sources, not included in 'Hellenistic Epigrams' or 'The Garland of Philip'</i> (Cambridge 1981)
FLP	Courtney (1993, 2nd ed. 2003)
GA	<i>Gesamtausgabe</i>
GP	Gow, A.S.F. – Page, D.L., <i>The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip and Some Contemporary Epigrams</i> , 2 vols. (Cambridge 1968)
HE	Gow, A.S.F. – Page, D.L., <i>The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams</i> , 2 vols. (Cambridge 1965)
HS	Hofmann, J.B. – Szantyr, A., <i>Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik</i> (² München 1972)
HSCP	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
IATP	<i>Studies on the Interaction of Art, Thought and Power</i>
JHS	<i>The Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JRA	<i>Journal of Roman Archaeology</i>
JRS	<i>The Journal of Roman Studies</i>
KS	Kühner, R. – Stegmann, K., <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache: Satzlehre</i> , 2 vols. (Darmstadt 1955)
LAC	<i>Lexikon für Antike und Christentum</i>
LCM	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>

LP	<i>Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta</i> , ed. Edgar Lobel and Denys Page (Oxford 1955)
LSJ	<i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , comp. by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott. With a revised supplement (1996). New ed. revised and augmented throughout by Henry Stuart Jones (Oxford 1996)
MD	<i>Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici</i>
MH	<i>Museum Helveticum</i>
ML	W.H. Roscher, <i>Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie</i>
MPhL	<i>Museum Philologicum Londiniense</i>
MRR	T.R.S. Broughton, <i>The Magistrates of the Roman Republic</i> (New York 1968)
OCD	<i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , ed. 3, 1996
OLD	<i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i>
PCPS	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
Philol.	<i>Philologus</i>
PLLS	<i>Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminary</i>
PMG	<i>Poetae Melici Graeci: Alcmanis, Stesichori, Ibyci, Anacreontis, Simonidis, Corinnae, poetarum minorum reliquiae; carmina popularia et convivalia quaeque feruntur</i> , ed. D.L. Page (Oxford 1962)
RAC	<i>Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum</i>
RE	<i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
RP	Syme, R. (1979–2007), <i>Roman Papers</i> 1–7 (Oxford)
RPh	<i>Revue de Philologie</i>
SIFC	<i>Studi italiani di filologia classica</i>
SVF	<i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> ed. I. ab Arnim (Leipzig 1902–1924)
TAPhA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
ThesCRA	<i>Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum</i>
ThL	<i>Thesaurus linguae Latinae</i>
UaLG	<i>Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte</i>
WS	<i>Wiener Studien</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

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